


INQUISITION AND POWER

CATHARISM AND THE CONFESSING SUBJECT
IN MEDIEVAL LANGUEDOC

JOHN H. ARNOLD




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John H. Arnold

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For Chris and for Katherine,
amici et socii heretici

Contents

Note on Texts and Translations

Introduction

PART I

1. The Lump and the Leaven: The Move to Inquisition
2. To Correct the Guilty Life: Representation and Knowledge
3. The Construction of the Confessing Subject

PART II

4. Questions of Belief: Catharism and Its Contexts
5. Sex, Lies, and Telling Stories: A Critical and Effective History

Conclusion

Abbreviations

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Acknowledgments

Note on Texts and Translations

In this book, I make use of both edited and manuscript sources. Where versions of texts are available in modern French or English I have indicated my use of them, but have otherwise provided my own translations. I have made occasional use of one collection in modern English—Wakefield and Evans's *Heresies of the High Middle Ages*—that might normally be considered a pedagogic rather than a research tool. However, this excellent edition provides the most thorough and scholarly references available for the texts it translates. When referring to people in the text, I have wherever possible rendered their names into modern French, allowing ease of cross-referencing with French scholarship in the area; on the few occasions where I have been unable to locate the French equivalent (usually a place name), I have left the Latin version italicized in the text. The occasional well-known figure, such as St Bernard of Clairvaux, has been given in English. Certain key terms in the text—such as *heretici*, *credentes*, and *fautores*—are given an English gloss on their first appearance, but thereafter are left in Latin.

Introduction

When I was admitted for the first time to the large room which housed in perfect order nearly two thousand inquisitorial trials, I felt the sudden thrill of discovering an unexplored goldmine.

—Carlo Ginzburg, “The Inquisitor as Anthropologist”

Studying consumers through the eyes of market researchers is a little like studying heretics through the eyes of inquisitors: it can be a useful and indeed indispensable practice, given the paucity of direct testimony about popular consciousness

—but we cannot pretend . . . that the statements constitute the clear and unmediated voice of the people.

We cannot pretend that the inquisitors have vanished from the scene without a trace.

—T. J. Jackson Lears, “Making Fun of Popular Culture”

We begin with the essence of history: with stories and with death. In the summer of 1273, Bernard de Revel was brought from prison in Toulouse into the presence of the inquisitors Ranulphe de Plassac and Pons de Parnac, to “correct himself” and to add to some previous confession now lost to the historical record. Under questioning, Bernard said a number of things about his contact with Catharism. He confessed that twenty-five years earlier he had met the heretics Raymond David and Bernard Rastel and had ritually “adored” them as they had taught him, by bending his knees before them and saying “bless.” He admitted that Raymond David and another heretic had stayed for a few days at his house, where his late wife, Pagèsa, his servant Grass, and his children Bernarde and Pons were present. However, he added, at that time his daughter was only a girl of about eleven years, and his son a boy of eight, and although the children knew that the heretics were in the house, they were ignorant of “the sort of men” they were. Bernard also spoke of other things he had heard, of how, early in 1244, a “friend of the heretics” named Bertrand Alamans had clandestinely visited a captured Cathar deacon in order that the imprisoned heretic could write the name of his chosen successor on a wax tablet; and of how, very recently, a woman he knew had gone with her son to the heretics in Lombardy. Bernard then told the inquisitors that he knew nothing more about heresy, and admitted that he “had believed the aforesaid heretics to be good men and true and to have a good faith and that one could be saved by them and that if he had died back then he would wish to have had them [save him], and that he was in that belief for fifteen years.” The following year, during Lent, the inquisitors’ notary Athon de Sainte-Victore visited Bernard, who was still imprisoned, now in leg irons. Finding him wounded, the notary recorded the following in the inquisitorial register:

I, Athon the aforesaid notary, had gone to the prison to see him and to hear if he wished to confess more,

and he admitted to me that he had struck himself and wounded himself in his head, desiring death and wishing to kill himself.

Beyond inscribing the names of the notarial witnesses, the record says nothing more.¹

Dealing with stories and silence —words recovered and words lost to death —is the task of every historian. If we are interested in the subaltern, those silenced beneath the grand narratives of state history and the condescension of posterity, the possibility of resurrecting such voices gains a particular urgency. Simply to bring Bernard de Revel into view may strike us, therefore, as a small but important victory. But there is also, surely, an uneasiness here. We have access to Bernard's words only through the mechanisms of power that brought him both to speech and to silence. That Bernard was made to *confess* provides us with our materials; but Bernard's suicidal actions also forcibly remind us that in the very production of these words, something more was at stake. We cannot know why, exactly, Bernard desired death and its silence. We do not even know whether he achieved it, as he intended, although the absence of further testimony may indicate that his wish was granted. But we can see, as he attempts in his deposition to protect his son and his daughter from heretical accusation by stressing their youth and innocence, that inquisitorial confession produced words that he would rather have remained unsaid. It may be that Bernard's wish to die stemmed from fear of future punishment or torture, the desire to replace death by burning with death by his own hand. But it may also be that what Bernard desired was a different kind of escape: the cessation of confession, the end of speech unwillingly given.

What is it, then, that historians should do with the words of the dead? We pick over their traces, sifting out fragments that can be made to speak to our particular interests, leaving the rest to decay into silence. We like, sometimes, to imagine ourselves in conversation with the dead, or even that we have "liberated" them, summoning shades to speak truths from another time. Occasionally we claim that they speak for themselves, imagining our role as Charon in reverse: as a guide who ushers forward dead witnesses and then departs swiftly and silently, leaving no trace. But we always feel, I suspect, a little guilt: that what we have drawn from silence was only to serve our own purposes, and that some debt has been left unpaid to those we forced once more into speech. As Guido Ruggerio and Edward Muir put it, we are perhaps no better than grave robbers.²

These concerns haunt this book. If the elusive debt to the voices of the past can be paid, it is perhaps through trying to examine and understand how these voices came to speak, the conditions that brought about the possibility of this history. In the particular case of the voices that interest me—those of the medieval people interrogated by inquisitors—this means not only examining their words, but also analysing the context of power that first demanded their speech. This was not, I would confess, my initial intention: when I first met

the particular “goldmine” of inquisitorial registers from Languedoc, I was enthused primarily by the allure of the subaltern speech they proffered; specifically, by the possibility that one might use them to re-examine the dying days of Catharism in the early fourteenth century, perhaps revising something of the picture provided by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s seminal book *Montaillou*.³ Catharism was a dualist heresy, positing the existence of a good God and a bad God, the latter being blamed for the creation of corporeal existence and its evils. Its elect—those the inquisitors labeled “heretics”—were known as the “perfect” (*perfecti*) or “Good Men.” They had appeared in southern France at some point in the later twelfth century, enjoying initial success, weathering persecution by crusade and inquisition, until dying out in the 1320s. Cathars were also present in Italy, Germany, and northern France during this period, but our focus in this book will be on Languedoc. There were no clear boundaries to this area in the Middle Ages; indeed, its name was only invented by northern French scribes after the land had been subdued by the Albigensian Crusade (1209-29). We might say, however, that it stretched from the eastern environs of the Toulousain to the Pyrenean villages in the west, and from the Mediterranean shore up to the southern strata of the Massif Centrale. The area was unusual: nominally under the control of the kings of France, it had long enjoyed practical independence from any sovereign. The land was governed in overlapping jurisdictions claimed by different local lords, based in various strongholds (*castra*) throughout the region, although the counts of Toulouse usually exercised the strongest authority. In its language and culture it looked much more to the south and west, to Aragon, Spain and the Mediterranean, than to northern Europe.⁴

We mostly know about Catharism from hostile sources, and preeminently from inquisitorial registers. While grappling with these documents, my initial desire to attempt to rewrite the history of later Catharism waned. I became more interested in the documents themselves, their possibilities and their problems: records that tantalizingly proffered the speech of ordinary lay men and women but which also constantly reminded one, through their formulaic language, of the additional presence of the inquisitor. Working with these records prompted certain questions that seemed to demand an answer before one could begin to “reconstruct” the experience of heresy. What, for example, went into the process of inquisition? How —and more importantly *why*—did it produce this kind of evidence? What effect did the inquisitorial context have upon the historian’s perception of the material? Answering these questions slowly changed the focus of research: heretics, in themselves, became less interesting; the inquisitorial texts that positioned lay people as confessing subjects had, and continue to have, much greater allure. The earlier records, from the mid-thirteenth century, are highly formulaic and extracting any kind of “subaltern voice” from them is particularly tricky. By the early fourteenth century, in contrast, one is perhaps too easily overwhelmed by the apparently garrulous detail that pours forth. Thus two overarching questions emerged:

why did the evidence itself changed so radically between about 1240 and 1320? And what is the historian to do with these records, knowing what went into their production?

As Ginzburg's reaction to his "goldmine" illustrates, inquisition records are exciting. This was not always the case: as Ginzburg also points out (in the context of witch trials) inquisitorial registers were once discarded as irrelevant and untrustworthy.⁵ Records such as these have spoken in many voices over the years. From the sixteenth-century onwards, medieval heretics have been claimed as historical precursors to Protestantism.⁶ Henry Charles Lea's great nineteenth-century work on the Inquisition regards the Cathars with some suspicion, but takes the deponents' part against the inquisitors' power with a humanist passion that transcends the bias of his particular religious affiliation. In contrast, the apparent vitality of the deponents' speech has been taken by others to illustrate the fairness and comparative gentleness of the inquisitorial tribunal.⁷ In the twentieth century, the deponents have spoken as elements in the class struggle, as enemies of the social fabric, and as the avatars of pagan culture.⁸ Historians of medieval heresy have used the evidence of the registers in a variety of ways. They have formed one element in syntheses of multiple sources, and they have been analysed statistically.⁹ They have provided the material for anthropological analysis, and individual depositions have been subjected to literary close reading.¹⁰ As fame of the richness of the records has spread (mainly through the commercial success of Le Roy Ladurie's *Montaillou*) elements from the registers have provided authenticating *exempla* within larger discussions of medieval life.¹¹ They have played a role in women's history, historical philosophy, and theoretical interpretations of literacy.¹² In recent times, the deponents have been adopted to shout quite loudly in the service of "Occitaniste" identity, as well as Anglophone popular culture.¹³ Their "voices" have literally been heard once again in the Pyrenees, as actors read aloud from the registers for the benefit of tourists and enthusiasts.¹⁴

The reason for this popularity—both within and without the historical profession—is obvious: depositions apparently present us with the voices of "real people" who do not often appear in the elitist records of history. As the cover to the English edition of *Montaillou* proclaims, the records allow us to "eavesdrop" across time. Alexander Murray has compared the process of inquisition to "the nearest medieval equivalent of a tape recorder." Elie Griffe has similarly suggested that "grâce à ces textes, nous pénétrons vraiment dans le monde cathare."¹⁵ The words of the deponents, spoken in their native Occitan in response to inquisitors' questions, were recorded, in Latin, by the inquisitorial scribes. This question-and-answer transcript was then rewritten as a past-tense, third-person narrative account of the interrogation, with the inquisitors' questions sometimes prominent in the text, but more normally submerged beneath its surface. For some historians, this medieval legal apparatus has allowed us access to the voices of the deponents, an access that

grants the authority to return these voices to their “pristine” condition. Hence, in *Montaillou*, Le Roy Ladurie shifts the speech of the deponents from the third to the first person; similarly Jean Duvernoy, translating the entire Fournier register into modern French, changes most of the evidence into the first person, and uses a typographical layout that separates the boring inquisitorial apparatus from the juicier depositional voices.¹⁶

However, there is also a long tradition of what has been called a “source-critical” approach to inquisitorial records.¹⁷ One might in fact trace this tradition back to the moment of the records’ creation, noting the objections of the Franciscan Bernard Délicieux, tried by the Inquisition in the early fourteenth century. He regarded the records and the system for their production as utterly untrustworthy, declaring that if St. Peter and St. Paul had been prosecuted by the inquisitors, even they would have been found guilty.¹⁸ The nineteenth-century historians had some suspicions about the evidence, when they used it, but were keen to reassure their readers that the sources were basically “sound.” Charles Schmidt noted that all the material (of which he was aware) on heresy was produced by its opponents, but saw the correspondence between learned treatises and the fragments of theology found in the depositions as an argument for authenticating both.¹⁹ A similar approach was adopted by Jean Guiraud, who argued that if one found sufficient correspondence between facts in different depositions, then one must have faith in them; and that although there were “absurd” moments, one should also note that the interrogators themselves had an interest in being “exact.”²⁰ Putting trust in inquisitors’ professionalism is also the position of one of the sharpest writers on Catharism, Arno Borst. He emphasizes the sobriety of inquisitorial practice in contrast with the earlier polemical accounts: “A la place des discussions passionnées, le froid interrogatoire; à la place des nuances, la loi. Vers 1250, sortent peu à peu des livres pratiques, de nouvelles sources qui viennent grossir les anciennes: les actes de l’Inquisition, témoins de l’anéantissement du catharisme. Une fois encore, nous allons entendre la voix des hérétiques.”²¹ Borst’s narrative of the history of representing heresy (from polemicists, to inquisitors, to modern historians) underlines a stock element in the historiographical canon: that inquisition, whatever its faults, was a more rational and therefore more “truthful” approach to heresy.

More extensive engagements with the problems of the sources have come from Grado Merlo and Robert Lerner. Merlo, writing primarily about the Waldensians, asks whether Grundmann’s and Borst’s conclusions (that despite their complications, the sources are essentially reliable, and are not “secret police reports” or “propaganda”) remain valid. Merlo suggests that one must see the depositions as both secret documents *and* public propaganda, in the sense that they are used by a police-type tribunal but also form part of public instruction. In conclusion, Merlo notes that although one cannot escape the “filter” of the Inquisition (and the sources are therefore not “objectively

trustworthy”), the sources are closer to life and truth than one might suspect.²² In contrast, Robert Lerner emphasizes the distorting nature of the context of inquisition: torture, the threat of the stake, the encouragement to confess at length in order to gain lighter punishment, and the psychological distortion of “confessing personalities.”²³ Inquisitors did not ask contextualised questions but followed handbooks, and deponents were not free to say whatever they wished but had to follow the patterns set by inquisition. In his work, Lerner rereads the sources to show how the inquisitorial *topos* of the heretic distorts them, arguing that the heretical sect of the “Free Spirit” is an inquisitorial fiction.

So the depositions are exciting, but also present us with a methodological challenge. This book engages with that challenge, and builds on the insights of those mentioned above. However, certain problems still remain within these “source-critical” approaches. Two elements are shared by the various methodological positions. One is a legacy from positivism: the desire to establish whether or not we can “trust” the sources. Although the recent answers by Merlo and Lerner are subtle (that we can trust parts of the sources) this Manichaean divide between the “true” and the “false” is sustained. But to regard the evidence as “true” or “false,” or even a mixture of the two, seems to me to ignore the historical context of language and truth. We do not necessarily have to agree with inquisitors’ conceptions of reality, but we must accept that not only was it *their* reality, but a reality that they imposed on others—namely on the deponents themselves.²⁴ “Trust” is not what is at stake: it too readily confuses the historian’s position with that of the inquisitor. The second, perhaps predominant, shared element in these methodologies is a suspicion of language, which sees the language of the inquisition as a “veil” over the “true” voices of the deponents. There are various suggestions as to how to penetrate this veil: one can search for “striking” moments that “break through” the inquisitorial language; one can use the depositions in concert with other documents; one can treat the veil as something understood at the time of the records’ creation as a rhetorical conceit, and then attempt to look “behind it.”²⁵ These are tempting arguments, as they legitimate our desires to hear the voices of the past; but they fail to engage fully with the context that produced the sources. One cannot, contra Alexander Murray, regard the inquisitor as a tape recorder unwittingly gathering up fragile moments of everyday speech. The depositions record the *creation* of that speech, the language impelled by the demand to confess. Although at points in the record “everyday” speech seems to occur, it is nonetheless a textual representation of such speech, and serves a specific purpose within the inquisitorial context. To seek to “penetrate” the language of the depositions in order to find the “true voices” is, ultimately, to fall for the phonocentric myth of the lost origin.²⁶ There is no language available to us prior to the inquisitorial event; the language prompted by that event is intimately connected with its discursive context, and is not a mirror of

speech occurring “elsewhere.”

While recognizing the strengths of the historiography discussed above, and those others who explicitly or implicitly follow similar methodologies, I do not find the critiques and procedures suggested completely satisfactory. As all of the above would surely agree, it is equally undesirable to adopt either extreme in regard to the sources: that, on the one hand, they deliver to us unmediated the deponents’ voices; or on the other, that they show us nothing but the demons of inquisitors. But when adopting a middle position (as, perforce, most historians do), I fear that it may not be sufficient simply to note one’s critique at the beginning of a work, among references to the other hazards that plague historians, such as survival and availability of evidence, and then to proceed in a modified positivist fashion. The challenge of the depositions is not a question of trust or a stripping-away of veils, but the need to find a way of addressing the dialectical relationship between inquisitor and deponent, between discourse and subjectivity.

Carlo Ginzburg has suggested one approach that allows space for an analysis of this dialectic. He argues (borrowing a term from Mikhail Bakhtin) that “we have texts that are intrinsically *dialogic*” (his emphasis), meaning that there are two “voices” (not necessarily reducible to the individual) that speak against one another, although from unequal positions. Ginzburg continues: “These trials not only look repetitive but *monologic* . . . in the sense that the defendants’ answers were quite often just an echo of the inquisitors’ questions. But in some exceptional cases we have a real dialogue: we can hear distinct voices, we can detect a clash between different, even conflicting voices.”²⁷ Ginzburg’s recourse to linguistic theory allows one to analyze the specific context of each record, but does not reduce analysis to a guessing game of lies and truth. However, certain problems remain. Ginzburg, most famously in *The Cheese and the Worms*, takes one “exceptional” voice to stand for a deep-rooted oral culture.²⁸ The relationship between the unusual “real dialogue” and a wide, yet otherwise silent, oral culture seems contradictory. It also fails to provide a way of addressing those cases where the voices are “unexceptional”: what is our response, as historians, to this apparently impoverished speech? Finally, Ginzburg is problematic on theoretical grounds: his understanding of dialogism as a concrete struggle between folk and official culture rests on a reductive reading of Bakhtin, and his interest in dialogism is unbalanced. Ginzburg invokes the theoretical concept of a struggle within language only in order to assert the authenticity of one voice, rather than to investigate the relationship between the two voices.²⁹

I would therefore like to rewrite the methodological question. Rather than posing a question of “trust” (as even Ginzburg does in the end), I suggest a question of “power.”³⁰ How do we analyze the effects of power within the inquisition register? Two recent critiques have already suggested moves in this direction. Dominick LaCapra’s commentary on Ginzburg’s *The Cheese*

and the Worms criticizes that book for, among other things, failing to recognize that inquisitorial records do not simply reflect or represent power relations but form part of those relations: “an inquisition register is part of a discursive context that embodies hegemonic relations, and a close reading of the nature of the questions and answers may provide concrete understanding of the interplay between domination and skewed ‘reciprocity’ [of speech between inquisitor and deponent].”³¹ Renato Rosaldo’s critique of *Montaillou* similarly points out that, having noted the “unequal dialogue” of questioner and confessant, Le Roy Ladurie “simply closes this opening to the interplay of power and knowledge by stressing . . . the scrupulous will to truth that drove Fournier [the inquisitor].”³²

Part of Rosaldo’s and LaCapra’s argument is that the historian begins to occupy the position of inquisitor: it is the inquisitor’s authoritative discourse (with all its concomitant mechanisms of power) that underwrites the historian’s own authority.³³ In fact, even the most “source-critical” historians might be seen as becoming inquisitors in their own fashion. As I show in the first half of this book, a key element of inquisitorial discourse was the establishment of categories of transgression, into which deponents were placed according to an assessment of their actions and words. Thus inquisitorial discourse imposes transgressive identities upon constructed subjects. Although Robert Lerner, for example, has written a brilliant thesis that seeks to demonstrate how some of those categories were “incorrect” or “fictional,” his own historiographical discourse incorporates the same methods of categorisation. In trying to explain why some people apparently confessed to actions he judged “fictional,” he sets up a number of categories: “suggestible women” confronted with inquisitors’ concepts of transgression; “young girls . . . in a highly wrought if not to say hysterical state”; those who profess “eccentric” beliefs who he judges to be “paranoid.”³⁴ These categories are the constructions of the historian, and can be contested. Apart from their political complications, this system leads Lerner into certain methodological contradictions. Having set out to show that the inquisitors encourage certain types of speech, but desiring as an historian to “winnow the wheat from the chaff,” Lerner then finds himself describing the deponent John Hartmann thus: “There are some personalities that so enjoy being in the spotlight that they will do or say anything to remain bathed within it. John might have been of this type or he might have been slightly deranged. His avowals to the contrary prove nothing since few madmen believe they are mad.”³⁵ In concert with the medieval inquisitor (although working within a twentieth-century psychoanalytic framework), Lerner interprets the speech of the deponent, placing the “coherent” aspects into one category and the rest into the disregarded category of “insanity.”³⁶ Elsewhere Lerner notes that “unfortunately, Hartmann was not allowed to speak entirely for himself.” Has Lerner done anything to change this, or does he finally (albeit for the best of motives) reestablish the power relationship between deponent and inquisitor?

These criticisms are not directed *ad hominem*, but to the historiographical discourse that grapples with depositions. The point of my comments is not to deride present historiography but to note that the treatment of depositions continues to present a particular historiographical problem; this book hopes to contribute to that debate. I would like to suggest that one's engagement with the sources is not simply a problem of methodology, but a problem of *ethics*, taken in Foucault's sense of the need to establish flexible and situational ways of constructing one's self, one's relationship to others, and one's political practices.³⁸ I do not suggest that one abandons the desire to interpret the sources of history; nor that one admits defeat in the face of inquisitorial discourse and disavows the ownership of the "voices" within the depositions. There is a very strong desire to "set free" the deponents' speech: Leonard Boyle, decrying Le Roy Ladurie's appropriation of the deponents' words, declares that he wishes to return control to the witnesses, as the "true authors" of the book.³⁹ One recognizes the ethical desire, but the deponents were never the "authors," in the sense that Boyle intends. What then to do with that desire?⁴⁰

What began as enthusiasm for the sources, and progressed as a methodological problem, has now become an ethical question; or, perhaps, two ethical questions. The first, bearing in mind the "inquisitorial" identity the historian sometimes adopts, is this: what is my ethical relation toward the deponent? The second, noting the many causes for which the deponents have apparently spoken, and the theorized concerns of recent times over appropriating or "colonizing" the voices of subaltern groups, is this: how can I engage with that desire to hear the voice of the deponent in a way that is politically productive?⁴¹ What follows is therefore not a history of Catharism or the Inquisition, but what might be termed a genealogy of subjectivity, and an exploration of the possibilities of agency, within inquisitorial discourse.

The language that I am using here—genealogy, discourse, subjectivity—is theoretical, and in particular, indebted to the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault's work is far from unknown to medievalists, though perhaps having greatest impact on those studying medicine, sexuality or the body, and working within literary studies.⁴² Historians have, with some honorable exceptions, tended more to shy away from this kind of analysis, as they have from all things "theoretical." It seems worthwhile, therefore, to set out here a few ideas that have influenced me as an historian. Although the engagement between historical material and theoretical concerns that have inspired this book will undoubtedly be better understood through the analyses in each chapter, it is nonetheless helpful to begin by trying to avoid some of the imprecision (and alienation) that the repetition of "jargon" can allow. At the outset, we might note that I do not take Foucault, or the other theorists engaged with below, to provide me with a set "model" to apply to the historical record. Rather, in framing the following three key concepts, one

might consider how they can raise certain questions and provoke the need for certain responses, in dialogue with the textual traces of the past.

(I) *Power*. Rather than concentrating on the “repressive” aspects of inquisitorial power, which are seen as “distorting” the evidence, we might consider a different concept of power, its scope and its effects. Foucault, in his various writings, tries to persuade us to turn away from a view of power as a linear force, where a subject acts upon an object in a limiting fashion. Instead, Foucault writes:

it seems to me now that the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely the productive aspect of power. In defining the effects of power as repression, one adopts a purely juridical conception of such power, one identifies power with a law which says no, power is taken above all as carrying the force of a prohibition . . . If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasures, forms knowledge, produces discourses.⁴³

How does one consider the Inquisition, surely a primary model of repressive power, as a “productive discourse”? How can one mention “pleasure” in the context of interrogation? This book concentrates upon the productive elements of power: the formation of a knowledge of heresy, transgression, and identities; the repetition of a particular of authoritative language that constitutes the inquisitor as an inquisitor; and the construction of the confessing subject who is taught to find the pleasure of release and contrition in his or her speech.

(2) *Discourse*. There are many different theories of discourse, and many more approaches to its study.⁴⁴ Again, beginning with Foucault, we might think of a discourse as a particular set of language and practices, that presents itself as a unity, constructs and distributes different identities and subject positions, and that claims to produce “the truth” within its procedures. With inquisitorial discourse, the foremost construction, as we will see, is the autonomous confessing subject, the deponent whose speech is demanded not simply to be policed by a repressive “Inquisition,” but also as a spur to self discipline and self recognition. Rather than imagining a “speaking individual” prior to the records, I analyze how the deponent is interpellated or “hailed” into inquisitorial discourse as a confessing subject; that is, how he or she is drawn into a particular kind of linguistic context (inquisition) and is thus made to collude in taking on a particular kind of identity (confessional).⁴⁵ My sense of subjectivity is therefore also a discursive one: rather than assuming an a priori “individual” who has an interior sense of selfhood, possesses agency, and remains in some essence unchanged through the different cultural situations within which it finds itself, we might consider subjectivity as contingent and discontinuous, as something produced in different ways and with different effects by altering circumstances, as he or she is asked or made or brought to speak within particular linguistic contexts. And, as already adumbrated above, we might also consider how being brought to speech—and hence, brought to a particular kind of subjectivity—may involve operations of

power.

(3) *Heteroglossia*. Following Ginzburg's lead, I have also found it useful to borrow a Bakhtinian term to describe the constitution of the depositions. However, unlike Ginzburg, I do not wish to read individual moments of expression as representative of a deep-rooted culture. Where Ginzburg imagines a dialogue —the inquisitorial voice versus the oral, popular voice — I see instead heteroglossia. Bakhtin's term can be taken to describe the *multiple* discourses that are at work within a culture, but which are not synonymous with the personal voices of individuals. Rather, the implicit dialogue or oppositions between the language of individual speakers are "only surface upheavals of the untamed elements in social heteroglossia, surface manifestations of those elements that play *on* such individual oppositions, make them contradictory, saturate their consciousness and discourses with a more fundamental speech diversity."⁴⁶ Although the inquisitor and deponent are in dialogue, the cultural codes which contain their speech are not reducible to that moment of individual interchange: as I show in Chapter 5, the records also contain competing discourses on sexuality, gender, vernacular culture, and social structure. Furthermore, it is the dialogic event of inquisition that prompts this heteroglossia; that is to say, once constituted as speaking subjects, the deponents are not simply *confessing* subjects (or rather, not simply subjects confessing to heresy) but are also sexual subjects, gendered subjects, social subjects, and so on. The concept of heteroglossia therefore suggests a reading strategy: to see where the competition between languages creates or reveals tensions and fractures in the texts' monologic claim to "truth." In the context of inquisition, this means not only that inquisitorial discourse can be analyzed and deconstructed, but also that the other discourses within the text can be similarly addressed. It can be argued therefore that inquisitorial discourse is inescapably heteroglossic as it seeks to have the subject speak within its monologic voice, and yet to prompt that speech must bestow upon the subject a degree of agency, which thus opens the inquisitorial text to admit a certain excess of speech. The textual practices of inquisition are designed to contain this heteroglossia, through the reinscription of language and authority: the first text, the deposition, is created through the multiple voices of inquisitor and deponent; the later texts (the sentences and other formulae) try to rewrite that interview as a monological narrative. However, as I argue in Chapter 3, the process of reinscription undermines the very authority that seeks to find its base in a text; and consequently, each inscription is open to a deconstructive reading. Maybe thus—through examining how the excess of speech transcends the discursive context that originally demanded its enunciation—the historian is able to repay his or her debt to the dead.

This book, then, is an attempt to engage with the voices of the deponents who were bound into the discourses of heresy and its repression. The first part of the book establishes the creation of the discourse of inquisition, and maps

the production of what I have called the confessing subject. Chapter 1 analyzes the historical move to inquisition as a means of combating heresy, drawing attention to the way in which the ecclesiastical hierarchy moved from viewing the laity in contact with heresy as an illiterate and undifferentiated mass, to approaching them as autonomous, confessing individuals. The move to inquisition, and the production of individualized transgressors required to make confession, is also therefore part of a larger historical change in how dominant medieval discourses addressed and constructed subaltern groups. Chapter 2 describes further the categorizing process of inquisition, concentrating particularly on the penances imposed for heretical transgression. The social theater of penance plays out representations for the crimes of heresy, forming a part of the “semiotic warfare” between the Church and the heretics, but also instituting certain individualizing effects for those sentenced. In Chapter 3, we turn to the inquisitorial production of the “confessing subject”: through the creation, preservation, and collation of texts, inquisition constructs the deponent as individual, interiorized, and possessing a degree of agency within particular bounds.

These first three chapters therefore chart the way that inquisition came into being, the main strands of its discourse, and the ways in which these factors shape the material it produced. The second part of the book focuses on that material—the depositions—in greater detail, reading them in light of the preceding analysis. Chapter 4 examines depositions mainly from the thirteenth century, working thematically on areas such as the names given to the Cathar *perfecti*, the language used by deponents to describe them and their relationship to them, and the activities carried out by both *perfecti* and laity in the course of their faith. The analysis here complements existing pictures of Catharism; preeminently, however, the chapter is concerned with “belief,” and suggests certain ways in which we might historicize that problematic term. Finally, Chapter 5 takes six case studies from the early fourteenth-century register of the inquisitor Jacques Fournier. These are the records that first inspired me, and in a sense, the rest of the book is subservient to this final engagement, providing the analytical tools necessary for one to approach once again these fascinating confessions. Throughout this book I am much more interested in lay people than in those who might be termed “heretics,” and thus I have chosen depositions that do not directly concern Catharism. Chapter 5 analyzes in detail the performance of subjectivity by each confessing subject, framed in part as a contest between Latin and vernacular modes of speech. I seek to lay bare the constructions of discourse, but also to demonstrate the agency of those constructed subjects, and the tactics they utilize in the face of the Inquisition. This final chapter, then, is in line with what I understand by Foucault’s idea of a “critical and effective history.”⁴⁷ It reads the evidence in order to analyze the way in which power places people into particular kinds of identities, while exploring also the possibilities of tactical opposition or evasion on the part of the deponents, thus attempting to

find a path beyond Foucault, beyond the more pessimistic conclusions one might draw from his picture of discourse and totalized power. Examining these performances of subjectivity also provides a space for reflection on the ethics of the complex relationship between the historian and the textual traces of historical actors. Steven Justice argues:

The historical study of dissent and its antagonists . . . almost irresistibly demand[s] of the historian now what they demanded of everyone else then: take sides. But where, and with whom, does the historian stand?

If as historians we cultivate sympathies, we should in all conscience admit that it is for ourselves that we cultivate them; and we should perhaps reflect that the figure we most resemble ... is the one who holds the pen and whose investment in the proceedings (beyond of course his professional investment) is in keeping himself awake and aware. . . . We may claim other motives than [the scribe's] but I am not sure that as historians we can claim any other lineage; like him, we engage with these Lollards, if we engage with them at all, from the safety of privilege and inconsequence.⁴⁸

Perhaps it is with the scribe that we now stand: disinterested, dogged, parchment strewn. Although I do not share the pessimism that pervades his article, for me, Justice underlines again that in the end, what the records present us with is an ethical problem; or, rather, an ethical opportunity. Let me state my position crudely: I would rather stand with the scribe than with the inquisitor, not because the inquisitor was necessarily a “bad man,” but because of his position as a discursive subject he did violence to language and to people.⁴⁹ But perhaps the best approach is to acknowledge that one *desires* to stand with the deponent—and yet cannot. The historian—whether subaltern champion or graverobber—can renarrate the stories of the dead, and in so doing perhaps introduce new stories, new possibilities, to the living. In the end, however, the historian faces another truth, perhaps more disquieting but also therefore potentially productive: that ultimately, after whatever cunning strategies have been deployed to reanimate the voices of the past, the dead must yet retain their silences.

PART I



I

The Lump and the Leaven

The Move to Inquisition

Let us begin with two exchanges of viewpoint on the complex question of “belief.” Both involve bishops and heretics, and both come from what is usually termed “the Middle Ages,” but they belong to different worlds. How one perspective changed to another is one concern of this book; these brief accounts therefore establish the trajectory of our inquiry.

The chronicler of the bishops of Liège tells us that around 1048 the bishop of Châlons-sur-Marne wrote to Bishop Wazo of Liège, asking advice on how to deal with heretics in his diocese. The bishop told Wazo that “there were some countryfolk who eagerly followed the evil teachings of Manichaeans and frequented their secret conventicles, in which they engaged in I know not what filthy acts, shameful to mention, in a certain religious rite.” These “Manichaeans” avoided meat, abhorred marriage, and forbade killing any living thing. The bishop was not concerned with the salvation of the “Manichaeans” themselves; he was more troubled by the effect they were having on the general populace. Thus, he asked Wazo, should he use lethal force against them, “lest, were they not exterminated, the whole lump be corrupted by a little leaven”? Wazo counseled toleration, in part because he felt that heresy was perhaps a cross that good Christians had to bear, and in part because he was worried about reports that certain people were executing as heretics anyone who had a pallid complexion (presumably because pallor indicated fasting, which might mistakenly indicate heretical asceticism).¹

In contrast, the register of depositions made before the inquisitor Jacques Fournier, bishop of Pamiers, records a rather different exchange. Fournier—who, in 1334, would become Pope Benedict XII—was conducting an inquisition into heresy within the Pyrenees. On 25 June 1324, the bishop questioned one Pierre Maury, a poor and illiterate shepherd from the village of Montaillou. Maury talked about many things: the various heretics and their supporters that he knew; the sermons preached by the Cathars; and his life as a shepherd. After prompting Maury’s lengthy exposition of life and heresy in the Sabarthès, the inquisitor became more formal. He questioned the shepherd closely on what the inquisitor had identified as sixty-two heretical “articles” drawn from Maury’s words, no doubt hoping for further information about the

Cathars, but also concerned to learn what the shepherd believed. The twenty-fifth “article” concerned annual confession: had Maury heard it said, or did he believe, that the pope, the bishops, and the priests of the Catholic church had the power to absolve men’s sins, or was it the Cathars who had that power? Maury’s answer is interesting in so many ways: he admitted that the heretics ridiculed the Church’s power of absolution, suggesting that the priests amused each other by sharing the secrets confessed to them. The heretics themselves had the power to absolve sin, which they had inherited from the apostles; but there was no need to actually confess these sins, since the absolution they bestowed came through their purification ritual, the *consolamentum* (or “heretication,” as the bishop then glossed it). For himself, however, Pierre Maury believed that the pope, the bishops, and the priests could absolve sin—but that the heretics could do it better. Therefore, when he went to church (which the heretics encouraged, to help keep their believers concealed) he did indeed make confession, although not of his heretical activities, and without taking communion, as he had heard the priests say that anyone who made communion in a state of sin would do better to take a hot iron into his mouth. And so the interrogation continued on to the next article.²

What are we to make of these two encounters? As other scholars have noted, the bishop of Châlons’s account of “Manichaeans” was modeled on St. Augustine’s description of heresy.³ The true Manichaeans—a dualist sect founded in Persia by a man called Mani in the third century C.E.—died out in the West in the sixth century. They had however left an “after image” for the Middle Ages. Their spirit lived on in the minds of orthodox churchmen, searching for ways to understand the reappearance of heresy in Christendom.⁴ The unorthodox beliefs ascribed to the heretics at Châlons might or might not have been influenced by this past model, but this is not my concern here. The account of these heretics, like most of the heretical occurrences in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, is known only from scant evidence. We cannot build a rounded picture of these “Manichaeans” from other sources; and even if we could, our image would depend entirely upon the language and logic of the medieval commentators. Of greater interest therefore is the way in which the image of Manichaeism structures the depiction of heresy: in particular, the distinction drawn between the few, dangerous heretics (perhaps led by an individual heresiarch), and the passive, if easily corrupted, laity. This distinction is neatly formulated as the relationship between “the lump and the leaven.” As we will see, this view (if not this specific phrase) was shared by other members of the Church in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and was the key structuring perspective of their fight against heresy.

The encounter between the man who would become pope and the Pyrenean shepherd points—through its very existence—to a massive change. This interrogation, which in its entirety runs to about forty-three thousand Latin words, would never have occurred in the eleventh century. Indeed, it would probably not have occurred even in the first half of the thirteenth century.

Why? Simply because no bishop, inquisitor, or other literate churchman would ever have thought it desirable, necessary or even *possible* to ask an illiterate shepherd about his beliefs. It would be literally unthinkable: something outside the bounds of conceivable behavior. But by the early fourteenth century the process that made this conversation not only possible but *necessary*—the process of inquisition—had become the primary method for combating heresy within Christendom. At the very least, we therefore need to ask ourselves how it is that this change came about.

We also need to pay close attention, at every stage of this trajectory, to the various discourses that forged the available evidence. There is no surviving representation of the speech of the heretics in Châlons-sur-Marne, and the possibility of envisaging these heretics other than through the eyes of their persecutors is limited. In the case of Pierre Maury, and the many others recorded within the registers of inquisition, the situation is different. Maury presents for himself a position of belief that is neither wholly Cathar nor properly Catholic: he believes in the power of both, although (unsurprisingly, given the number of heretics he knew) he tends to think that the Cathars have the greater force. But even in this simple matter of weighing the two sides against each other, Maury explodes the intrinsic binary opposition of heresy and orthodoxy. As he talked, he described a position for himself that was circumscribed by neither side, although negotiating both. By the end of his confession, through the production of his words impelled by the inquisitorial context, Maury was fixed, perhaps for the first time, as *both* Catholic and heretic: Catholic, in that he repented of his errors and “rejoined” the Church; heretic, in that it was heresy of which the bishop absolved him, and—if, as was intended, the punishment can be taken to name the crime—it was his past heresy that had him condemned to strict imprisonment on bread and water in the jail of the inquisitors.

In the last chapter of this book we will revisit other deponents like Pierre Maury and investigate further the possibilities of reading their speech. Before that point we need to understand how it is that such speech came into being, how it was that the words of peasants gained import and meaning to bishops and popes. But I have brought Maury in here, at the beginning, to remind us of where we are going—and therefore of the historical specificity of each stage of our journey. In this chapter I discuss the way in which the Church’s approach toward heresy and attitude toward the laity changed from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, from excising the “leaven” to the individualizing discourse of the Inquisition. It might be helpful, at the beginning, to distinguish broadly four different periods to this change. The first is the time before the Albigenian Crusade (begun in 1209), when the problem of heresy was largely conceived as the problem of the heresiarch. The Church saw the laity as simple, illiterate folk, as the “lump” who might foolishly follow learned heretics, but did not in themselves present an active threat. From the time of the Crusade up to and including the earliest tranche of

legislation for inquisition in the 1230s, a second view emerged: that since the laity provided support and shelter for heretics, they themselves were potentially dangerous, and should therefore be addressed directly. However, those targeted by this new view were mainly the nobility and not the general populace, since it was the nobility who provided the greatest material protection to the Cathars. A third phase of inquisitorial legislation followed in the 1240s and 1250s, when the first inquisition manual was written. In this period the construction of the lay person as “simple” and “easily led” still pertained, but was joined by a new concern to investigate the laity in contact with heretics, and to gain confessions from witnesses that were not simply confessions of information but also confessions of faith. This phase saw the emergence and construction of what I have chosen to call the “confessing-subject.” In the fourth period, the 1250s to the 1330s, the confessing-subject became the primary paradigm of the lay person in contact with heresy, and their speech—prompted by inquisition—produced a new arena to be policed by the Church. This chapter mainly deals with the first two periods, and elements of the third. Chapters 2 and 3 concentrate on the third and final periods. However, the arrangement of chapters is thematic, not narrative; and although this crude chronology acts as a kind of framework, it does not dictate the shape of our inquiry.

As we will see, this periodization does not describe hermetic boundaries or simple processes. Elements from each viewpoint haunt later developments: even in the fourteenth century, the image of the illiterate “lump” still lurked within the inquisitors’ construction of the confessing subject. The reasons for the changes described so briefly above had nothing to do with “progress” or the “improvement” of the Church’s combat against heresy; nor were they changes that anyone deliberately willed or intended (although, as we will see, they were intrinsically bound up with power). Nonetheless, they occurred, forming part of one of the greatest shifts in the way in which the medieval subaltern was viewed by the elite. The eye of power had refocused its gaze.

The Background to Heresy

Heresy reappeared in the Christian West around 1000.⁵ We are not concerned here with the wider analysis of medieval heresy, but it may be helpful to draw out a few points about its appearance, and the Church’s reaction to it, over a broad period. There are various interpretations of the origins, beliefs, and sociology of heresy,⁶ but most historians agree that the few earliest appearances, in the years 1000 to 1050, are discrete and unconnected, usually centering around one individual or small group of individuals, such as the heretics at Châlons-sur-Marne described above.⁷ For unknown reasons, there is no instance of heresy recorded in the second half of the eleventh century. During the years 1100–1150 there were individual heresiarchs, such as the wandering preachers Henry of Lausanne or Peter of Bruys, but, in contrast to

the eleventh century, these heretical outbreaks are usually linked by modern commentators to the reforming energies of the Church and can be seen as part of a growth in European spirituality during this period.⁸ Brian Stock has suggested that the growth in literacy may be a factor in the appearance of the heresies of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, arguing that the sources depict a learned individual or group interpreting scriptural texts for a wider community. Robert Moore has largely concurred, although he emphasizes that it is often the leader rather than the text that is prominent in the sources. Moore has usefully distilled the essence of the interpretation by describing heresy before the mid-twelfth century as “the cult of the heresiarch.”⁹

At a certain, disputed, point these individual reformers were superseded, firstly by the Church’s own apostolic revival, and secondly by dualist heresy infiltrating from the East, which can be confidently identified as Catharism by the 1170s.¹⁰ The Cathars were a clearly organized group, present in Italy, northern France, and Languedoc. They possessed bishops and dioceses, rituals and sacraments, and were wholly opposed to the orthodox Church. The core of their belief was the presence of two opposing gods. The good God created the spirit; the bad God created all corporeal matter. From this binary flowed their basic tenets and practices: no eating meat or any other product of coition, as everything physical was the product of the bad God; no respect for orthodox ceremonies such as marriage and baptism, since these colluded with the flawed nature of corporeal matter; salvation could come only through their hands (via the ritual of the *consolamentum*) and was a purification of the soul, which would join with the good God upon death. Those purified elite in the sect were known as the “perfect” (*perfecti*) or “good men” (*bons hommes*). Alongside the Cathars, another sect arose: the Waldensians. They were originally part of the Church and seem to have sprung from the same reforming desires and apostolic enthusiasms that gave birth to the Franciscans and Dominicans.¹¹ The Waldensians hated the Cathars; the Cathars hated the Church. The Church hated and feared them both.

Parallel, therefore, to this narrative of heretical growth is the story of the Church’s reactions to heresy. Most historians have seen a move from ad hoc tolerance to the institutionalization of repression. Certainly reactions in the eleventh century seem to have been undirected, varying from the toleration counseled by bishop Wazo to the summary execution of suspected heretics. The twelfth century saw the creation of more organized preaching campaigns (led preeminently by St. Bernard of Clairvaux) against heresy. In the thirteenth century we see the directed violence of crusade, and the organization of inquisition. Moore has argued forcefully that the literate elite of European society formulated mechanisms of repression between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, with heretics becoming only one of a range of targets, and that this process culminated in the Inquisition. Brenda Bolton has similarly noted that “the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 represented a watershed in the official attitude towards heresy. It marked the end of a period

of considerable flexibility and real experiment with dissident movements.” In contrast, Bernard Hamilton suggests that the edicts of the Fourth Lateran Council and the Inquisition show the Church adopting a milder and more liberal attitude to heresy than the violence dealt out by secular rulers. Moore has argued against the validity of this view, but regardless of the debate, both the critics and the defenders of the Inquisition recognize that it was one component in the increasing institutionalization of the Church.¹²

A few factors in this extensive scholarship form an important context for what I am going to suggest about the historical development of the Church’s attitude toward heresy, and in particular the development of inquisition. The first factor is the tendency of the two historical narratives outlined above—the resurgence of heresy in the Latin West, and the Church’s attitudes toward that resurgence—to treat the developments they describe as essentially “natural” and unavoidable. Accordingly, they propose an implicit, natural progression from the disparate individuals of the eleventh century to the structured and widespread sects of the thirteenth;¹³ and a concomitant understanding, expressed in a variety of places, that the Church’s reaction was at the very least understandable, and perhaps inevitable, in the face of this greatly increasing threat.¹⁴ Naturalizing these changes through a teleological narrative occludes a proper understanding of the discourses that produced them and problematically positions inquisition as an “improvement” over previous tactics.

The second factor arises from Moore’s concept of “the cult of the heresiarch.” His point—that heresy before the late twelfth century was concentrated around one charismatic individual, or a small group of individuals—is presented in his earlier work as a substantive, historical fact.¹⁵ As I have suggested above in the case of the heretics at Châlons, one can also analyze this phenomenon in terms of representation (as Moore has latterly done himself): how heresy was presented and understood in orthodox sources.¹⁶ It is common to note that heresy is created by orthodoxy; what must not be missed is the *degree* to which orthodoxy plays a part in shaping its creation, from the ways it depicts heresy to the methods used to combat it. Heresy, regardless of the particular beliefs and practices that fall under that sign, is always already a construction by a dominant discourse. Unless, as an historian, one gives space to an analysis of both sides of this construction, one can only speak within and about the dominant discourse. It is therefore essential to analyze the language and narrative structures that frame depictions of heresy, and to search for tensions within these discourses that may reveal the assumptions that thus shape the accounts.

A variety of rhetorical and cultural tropes were available to any medieval writer depicting heresy: the interconnection of all heresies and their Satanic origins; the stupidity, vanity, and madness of heretics; the devilish cunning of heresiarchs; the “infectious” nature of the “poison” of heresy.¹⁷ One element of these cultural conventions was to depict the heresiarch as learned, albeit

evil or insane, and the people who supported him as stupid, illiterate, and easily led.¹⁸ The accounts of heresy before 1200 mention support for heretics amongst the general populace but concentrate their narratives around the charismatic center—the heresiarch. We see this clearly in the early story drawn from the chronicle of Ralph Glaber, which tells of the peasant Leutard in the district of Châlons around 1000. Leutard, crazed by a swarm of bees, began to speak heresies to his contemporaries, and “since rustics are prone to fall into error, he persuaded them these things were done by a miraculous revelation from God In a short time, his fame, as if it were that of a sane and religious person, drew to him no small part of the common people [*vulgus*].” The local bishop, Gebuin, questioned Leutard, and concluded that he was a heretic. Gebuin then “recalled the partly deluded people from insanity and reinstated them more firmly in the Catholic faith.” Deprived of his audience, Leutard flung himself into a well to his death.¹⁹ Leutard presents danger precisely because the “rustics” were interested in him; but it is his death rather than their conversion that closes the narrative. Heresy, even in this very early story, is a problem of the flock; but the focus of attention is the individual heretic.

This pattern is repeated through most of the accounts of heresy before the later twelfth century. A nobleman called Aréfast, having discovered heretics at Orléans in 1022, informed the duke of Normandy, asking him to warn the king of “the pest then lurking in his kingdom, before it could spread.” The narrative ends with the immolation of the small group of heretics, save two who repented. In around 1028, when Archbishop Aribert of Milan found heretics at Monforte, his fear was that they might have “contaminated” the “country folk” with their beliefs. Again, the narrative concludes with the heretics facing the fire. In the early twelfth century the heretics Ramihdrus and Tanchelm are both labeled heresiarchs, and the wandering preachers Peter of Bruys and Henry of Lausanne are depicted similarly.²⁰ The complex fear of heresy is succinctly illustrated in a passage from St. Bernard’s letter to the count of Toulouse against Henry of Lausanne: “O Unhappiest of People! In them, at the voice of one heretic, have grown silent all the voices of prophets and apostles that had rung out in one spirit of truth to call together the church in the faith of Christ out of all nations.”²¹ Several elements can be recognized: fear of the inconstancy of the flock; fear of the charismatic power of the heresiarch; fear that orthodox preaching will not be sufficient. In his sixty-fifth sermon on the Song of Songs, St. Bernard depicts heretics as the “little foxes” who destroy the vine of the Lord. As he describes their depredations, it is clear that the “fox” is an outsider who threatens the defenseless (and passive) community. Toward the end of the sermon, he rhetorically belittles the heretical foxes as “base and rustic folk” who are unlettered; but this is still in distinction to “country women and ignorant people” (that is, the general laity) who are swayed by their opinions.²²

Although these early accounts implicitly recognize heresy as a problem of

the general populace, they focus the solution on combating the individual heresiarch. Whether the metaphor is one of removing the “leaven,” eradicating the “disease,” or unmasking the “fox,” the structure of the Church’s response is clear: remove the individual threat to protect the passive populace. Or rather, there is an attempt to formulate a response focused on the individual heresiarch or small group of heretics; but at certain points the narrative accounts of heresy admit to an uncomfortable awareness that the general populace may continue to misbehave and misbelieve even after the death of the “leader.”²³ One possible exception to this pattern is the case of those heretics, “followers of Gundulf,” who were converted by Gerard, bishop of Arras-Cambrai, in 1025. In that account Gerard closely questioned the followers of the heresiarch, rather than the heresiarch himself, and persuaded them to “condemn and anathematise this heresy, together with its authors unless they return to their senses.”²⁴ Although the narrative still names a heresiarch, it shows an unusual degree of interest in the followers and believers of the heretic, who are not named as “heretics” themselves (as they often are in other accounts, such as the case dealt with by Wazo, mentioned above). This approach can be seen as an early anticipation of one element in the development of inquisition: the interrogation and conversion of the laity, rather than simply the pursuit of the heresiarch. Unusually, Gerard was treating the “lump” rather than the corrupting “leaven.” Gerard’s case thus also shows that the change in approach that was to come in later years was not the inevitable consequence of an increased volume of heresy during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, nor of a change to greater “rationality” in European society. Such an approach was possible in 1025; that it was not widely used until the thirteenth century must be seen as a matter of cultural change and cultural power, not an inevitable process, naturalized by its claim to an historical progression.

What lies behind this particular approach to heresy, which sees an ever present danger in the *rustici* who are “prone to fall into error,” but largely attacks the “leaven” and not the “lump”? It is, as many scholars have pointed out in various historical situations, the prejudice that the *litterati* harbored against the *illitterati*. Literacy, in the medieval period and perhaps any era, is a loaded term. Since Grundmann’s seminal work on the medieval meanings of *litteratus* and *illitteratus*, there has been a great deal of investigation into the cultural effects of literacy.²⁵ The *litteratus* is specifically literate in Latin, rather than just the vernacular, and is credited with a privileged cultural position. As Martin Irvine puts it: “The idea of separateness of the *litteratus sapiens* endured in medieval culture. The *litteratus* has learned an *ars*, something based on *ratio*, which made possible a certain kind of discourse (*sermo*), the practice of which divided the *litterati* from the uncultivated (*rustici*, *simplices*, *idiotae*) as far as they were separated from the beasts.”²⁶ Various writers have argued that the *litterati* formed, in some senses, a particular social class or group in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.²⁷ They

defined themselves against those without literacy: the *illitterati*, they believed, were not capable of believing or adhering to faith in the same way as the *litterati*. Hence the need for tools refined especially for their religious education; and hence the particular fear of their tendency to wander from the path like a shepherdless flock. In the eighth century, Alcuin had condemned the notion of *vox Dei, vox populi*, on the ground that “the opinions of the populace are always closer to insanity”; such views had remained common within the religious hierarchies of the high Middle Ages.²⁸ Alain de Lille, for example, warned against preaching scripture to the *illitterati* because they would not understand it, and “if it is dangerous for wisemen and saints, it is extremely dangerous for the ignorant.”²⁹ Humbert de Romans argued that lay people should not “scrutinize the secrets of the faith but adhere to them implicitly”; he also drew a distinction between the errors (and relative dangers) of *heretici* and *simplices*.³⁰ In the later thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas wrote in his *Summa, theologiae* that uneducated lay people, whose faith was not entirely secure, should not be disturbed by further theological argument, unless they were already troubled by heretical preaching and needed correction.³¹ The *illitterati* were held to be essentially different, particularly in relationship to the performance of belief: they were thought to need suitably crude tools for contemplation (such as pictorial images and simple narratives); and their lack of a learned language placed them in a different relationship to God.³²

The brief extracts cited above have already illustrated the appellation of the laity as *rustici*; they have also shown the way in which heresiarchs were paradoxically seen as *litterati*.³³ Indeed, the bishop of Châlons warned bishop Wazo that the “Manichaeans” were able to make any peasant into a *litteratus*: “If it happened that any ignorant, tongue-tied persons were enrolled among the partisans of this error, it was stoutly asserted that at once they became more eloquent than even the most learned Catholics.”³⁴ There is a very clear division between the laity and the heretics, precisely on the lines dividing the *illitterati* or *rustici* from the *litterati*. The *illitterati* were seen to present a danger, but it was a danger of foolishness and passivity: the willingness to have their heads turned by charismatic heresiarchs such as Henry of Lausanne. For the most part, heresy was therefore combated by attacking the heresiarch, on the assumption that the flock would return to the fold. When the *illitterati* were addressed directly on the matter of heresy, it was usually by preaching to them as a homogeneous group, in a manner appropriate to their mentally enfeebled state.

However, by the thirteenth century, various elements of ecclesiastical practice were addressed to the specific circumstances of the laity, treating them in a more direct manner. The reforms of the Third and Fourth Lateran Councils, and the local conciliar legislation that followed them, set out in growing detail the beliefs and practices necessary for every person to conduct him or herself as a good Christian. The role of parish priests was changing to

fulfill what Jean Avril has described as “une nouvelle mission pastorale et sociale à la fois.”³⁵ In several ways, the relationship between the Church and the laity was becoming closer and was more active on both sides. The Church was extending and consolidating its influence over areas such as marriage and the sick bed. It also asked that lay people should know the basics of their faith and conduct themselves accordingly.³⁶ Most importantly, canon twenty-one of the Fourth Lateran Council had required all Christians to attend confession at least once a year, and preferably triannually. As Alexander Murray has recently pointed out, the institution of private, annual confession was the first time the administration of one of the Church’s sacraments demanded an individual engagement between priest and lay person.³⁷ Inquisitorial confession does exactly the same: it treats the laity as individuals rather than as a “lump.” The implications of this change are explored in the rest of this book.

The use of inquisition as a suitable weapon for combating heresy can be placed within the context of the growing bureaucratization of European society over these centuries, and the parochial reforms directed by the papacy and crystallized in the legislation of the Fourth Lateran Council.³⁸ However, the development of inquisition cannot be circumscribed by these events: as I have noted above, there was at least one earlier occasion in the Church’s history when it had dealt with the followers of a heresiarch as individuals, and brought them to confession. Conversely, as I shall show below, the representation of the laity as *rustici* or *illitterati* survived within the new bureaucracies and pastoral practices. Inquisition, and confession in general, was undoubtedly prompted by a changing attitude toward the laity and the *cura animarum*, and undoubtedly the practice of confession continued to produce its own change in attitudes; but these things were not born full-grown in 1215. The move from the “lump” to the individual is an important part of the story of inquisition (and society in general), but it should be seen in what follows as a continuing tension and struggle between two cultural constructions.

The Precursors and Beginnings of Inquisition

Whether one talks of “the Inquisition,” “an inquisition,” “inquisition,” or “*per inquisitionem*” is a complicated issue. In Chapter 3 I set out particular reasons for referring to “the Inquisition” as quasi-institutional, and “inquisition” as a discursive mechanism; for the sake of simplicity I have projected that nomenclature back into this chapter. The legal process of inquisition (*inquisitio*) was first adopted by the Church as a method for investigating clerical behavior in the late twelfth century. Whereas the older process of accusation (*accusatio*) had been, in the words of Adhémar Esmein, “confrontative, oral and public,” *inquisitio* was an ex officio action that limited and specialized the power to try the guilty, and was primarily written and

secret. The process of *accusatio* had worked through an accuser making a public complaint against a suspect, and agreeing to take upon him or herself the penalty for the case should their accusation fail. The case was tried publicly, before a judge, but the burden of proof was upon the accuser. By the twelfth century, *accusatio* procedures were conducted where there was no individual accuser, but a notion of “common accusation” arising from the public ill-fame (*infamia*) of the accused. *Inquisitio* was, by contrast, an essentially ex officio procedure, where the burden of investigation and proof resided with the judge or inquisitor.³⁹

In French secular law, the two systems remained in parallel and in opposition until the early part of the fourteenth century, but the Church adopted *inquisitio* exclusively, legislating for its use at the end of the twelfth century. It was not originally formulated for use against heresy, but as an effective method of putting the Church’s own house in order. The *inquisitio generalis* was used against communities, for example monasteries, where a few chosen individuals were expected to denounce any miscreants, who were then required to exculpate themselves.⁴⁰ The “inquisition into heretical depravity” (*inquisitio heretice pravitatis*) appeared in Languedoc in 1233, although it had already been briefly in effect in Italy, Germany, and northern France before that date.⁴¹ Although operating from the same legal system and precedents as previous processes *per inquisitionem*, the *inquisitio heretice pravitatis* was distinguished by two further features: the judges were delegated by the pope; and practices of secular law, such as the accused’s access to evidence and counsel, were refused.⁴² The legislative history of the Inquisition and inquisitorial procedure has been written in great detail elsewhere, and I shall not repeat it here.⁴³ My aim here is to attempt to place inquisition within a wider cultural context, better to understand its history and the kind of evidence it produces. To this end, I shall draw out a few elements of procedure that preceded the thirteenth century, and discuss the mechanisms of inquisition in some detail, to show that the ideology of an earlier period still pertained after the Fourth Lateran Council and that the individualizing discourse of inquisition was part of a struggle, rather than a natural and organic progression.

The “mature” Inquisition of the later thirteenth century had four distinguishing features in its approach to combating heresy: it was conducted ex officio; it sought heresy out, rather than merely reacting to events; it recorded and collated information; and people from all social levels were interrogated (although, as we will see below, in practice this varied). Each of these features can be traced in some form to actions or statutes of the twelfth century, as is demonstrated in Henri Maisonneuve’s valuable work on the history of inquisition. He identifies Gratian’s *Decretum* as providing “une théorie générale qui . . . inspirera la discipline de l’Inquisition,” composed of three major themes: the concept of the “salut public” which justified the use of force against those who threatened social structures; the subjection of

temporal power to the Church; and the idea of the crusade, where the heretic and the infidel were conflated in their threatening roles.⁴⁴ Further elements of procedure and punishment can be located in twelfth-century statutes and bulls; perhaps the most important are the bulls *Ad abolendam* of 1184 and *Vergentis in senium* of 1199, which, respectively, introduced the assumption that concerted action against condemned sects should be taken by both the clergy and the laity, and that heresy was a form of “lèse-majesté” and therefore deserved the death penalty.⁴⁵ The bull *Ad extirpanda* of 1252 formalized execution by burning and the use of torture, although clear evidence for the latter is very infrequently found within the Languedocian records. Let us look further at the background and context of these elements.

While there was some legislation prior to the thirteenth century that addressed the laity in general and linked them in some fashion to the fight against heresy, more often actions against heresy were addressed specifically to the nobility and the temporal powers. This is perhaps expected, but needs emphasizing precisely because it changed —though not immediately—under the practice of inquisition. St. Bernard attacked not only the heresiarch Henry of Lausanne but also his sympathizers; nevertheless it is to the count of Toulouse that Bernard, not unreasonably, addressed his letter denouncing Henry, and the purpose of that letter was to ask the count to withdraw his protection from the heretic, not to inquire whether he himself believed in Henry’s faith.⁴⁶ In 1178 the papal legate Henry de Marcy instructed the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Toulouse “and some other faithful men who have not been touched by any rumour of heresy” to put in writing the names of all those who had been, or might become, “members or accomplices of heresy.”⁴⁷ This creation of a written record can be seen as another component in the continuing construction of the Inquisition; but it is also clear that those who were to be recorded would be of the same social level as the recorders—the bishops and consuls are to record those whom they know well enough to divine whether they are likely to become supporters of heresy; and they are enjoined to leave no one out “for love or money,” suggesting that the legate’s main fear was of elite groups closing ranks or being swayed by avarice. The instruction was not aimed at the breadth of people who appear in the records of the Inquisition during the next two centuries, which include laity of all social levels, from lords of *castra* and learned men to Pyrenean shepherds and peasants. As the Church first moved from simply tackling the heresiarch to dealing with the heretical sect and its supporters, its primary concern was with those supporters who afforded protection and economic support: the nobility. Hence, when the preaching missions to Languedoc of the late twelfth century were deemed to have failed, Pope Innocent III called for the most political of sacred weapons: a crusade.

From 1209 to 1229 Languedoc struggled haphazardly against the crusaders.⁴⁸ The southern French were hampered by their internal rivalries and lack of cohesion; the northern French by the problem of keeping sufficient

forces in the area, and of retaining control of areas already won. What began as an undoubtedly religious venture, led by the papal legate Arnaud Aimery, degenerated into a confused mixture of religious persecution and territorial ambition. The conflict was finally settled when Louis VIII, king of France, at last joined in the struggle to subdue the south. Although he did not live to see its end (dying of illness in November 1226) his involvement had brought decisive forces to bear, eventually forcing Raymond VII of Toulouse to sue for peace. By the end of the conflict, the aims of the Crusade had become more political. The eventual Occitan defeat placed Languedoc under the authority of northern France, initially in the guise of Blanche of Castile. The Peace of Paris (1229) allowed Raymond VII to retain his lands, but only until his death; the treaty ensured that Toulouse would eventually fall into Capetian hands, either by marriage (Raymond's daughter was to marry a Capetian), or by default (in the event of Raymond's death). However, it was not until 1249 that Alphonse of Poitiers, brother of King Louis IX, took proper control of Languedoc.⁴⁹ Unsurprisingly, the end of the Crusade therefore left a lot of unfinished business. There were to be two more revolts by Occitan nobility against the French, one led by Raymond Trencavel in 1240, the other by Raymond VII of Toulouse in 1242.⁵⁰ Even when the Crusade was in full force, the Crusaders had been unable to maintain religious control of vanquished towns and the countryside; after the cessation of military action, this problem was still present.⁵¹ The initial inquiries and activities against heretics in the 1230s were thus inevitably shaped and given focus by this political situation.

Keeping the Peace (1227-1234)

With the ending of the Crusade, the problem of heresy remained. A thumbnail sketch of the development of repression would probably indicate that "the Inquisition" was thus created, by Pope Gregory IX, between 1231 and 1233. The reality is more complex: the accretion of various pieces of legislation, from both before and after the Albigensian Crusade, produced the procedures and methods for a new way to combat heresy. In 1231 Gregory IX ordered a Dominican prior in Regensburg to investigate heresy, and in 1233 he asked Dominicans in Languedoc to act as inquisitors.⁵² The Dominicans had since their conception played a major role in combating heresy, and therefore it was unsurprising that it was to these men that the Church first turned. However, the task of inquisition was not limited to this religious order: bishops, Franciscans, and others were to play their roles as well. In understanding the actions of the Church against heresy in the first half of the thirteenth century, it is essential to note that "the Inquisition" was not at this point one monolithic institution, procedure, or project. What we have initially is a conglomeration of conciliar statutes, moving forward to roughly the same area, but not directed by one, clear, overarching voice or vision.

Both Henri Maisonneuve and Yves Dossat identify a particular tone to legislation for inquisition, and its practice, before the 1240s: they see it as imprecise, uncoordinated, and inspired by a spirit of “vengeance” in the aftermath of the Crusade.⁵³ In contrast, after the 1240s both suggest that there is “une législation cohérente et complète” inspired by a spirit of medicinal correction and the *cura animarum*; the inquisitors moved from being zealous punishers to “confesseurs et . . . directeurs d’âmes.”⁵⁴ The following analysis posits two rough phases of inquisitorial legislation, the first (from around 1227 to 1235)⁵⁵ informed primarily by the Crusade and its aftermath, the second (from around 1236 to 1254)⁵⁶ dictated by a different set of circumstances and attitudes. However, it is also important to recognize that the Inquisition did not naturally or inevitably “evolve” in the first half of the thirteenth century. Elements of the *cura animarum*, such as reinforcing the dictates of the Fourth Lateran Council, are clearly present in the earlier legislation for inquisition,⁵⁷ and indeed the Albigensian Crusade had initially been conceived as a project of spiritual care. What happened during the thirteenth century was a struggle between different, and sometimes opposing, elements in the fight against heresy. These elements can be summarized under three headings: the preservation of the peace; the representation of heresy; and the control of the confessing subject. The latter two elements are the concern of later chapters; the first is dealt with here.

The conclusion of the Crusade did not resolve all the problems for the Church in Languedoc. Politically the country was still unstable, and the Cathars were still active in the land. In the words of the Dominican chronicler Guillaume Pelhisson, writing in the mid-thirteenth century, “just at that time that the Church thought to have peace in the land [1229], the heretics and their believers girded themselves more and more for numerous struggles and tricks against her and against Catholics, such that the heretics did far more harm in Toulouse and its lands than they had done during the time of the war.”⁵⁸ Pelhisson goes on to state that in the early years of the peace, it was extremely difficult to proceed because “the chief men of the region, and the powerful knights and burghers and others defended the said heretics and concealed them, and beat and wounded and killed their persecutors, because the Council of the Prince was notably corrupted in the faith.”⁵⁹ Much of the earlier legislation for dealing with heresy therefore continued to concentrate its energies against the noble *fautores* of the Cathars, in an attempt to finish off what the Crusade should have achieved.⁶⁰ The lords of Languedoc were required to swear an oath to defend the Church and to combat heresy.⁶¹ Heretics, their supporters, and those suspected of supporting them were all barred from holding public office.⁶² The council of Narbonne in 1227, two years before the Peace of Paris, excommunicated Raymond VII of Toulouse and other Occitan nobles, and commanded that “those who are in power should abjure heretics and their fautors.”⁶³ In 1229 Louis IX ordered that barons and their officials should search out heretics and present them to the

Church.⁶⁴ The only specific punishment set out by the council of Toulouse for supporters of heretics (as opposed to *heretici* themselves) was that those who persisted in sheltering heretics on their land should lose it.⁶⁵ This was not really a punishment for past transgression but rather an attempt to prevent further, material support for the Cathars; and since it follows on from the canon ordering lords to fight heresy, it should probably be read as being directed toward the nobility rather than their vassals. This legislation was a continuation of the Crusade itself and was also informed by the ecclesiastical approach of the previous century, recalling the efforts of St. Bernard and Henry de Marcy to induce the Occitan nobility to expel heresy from their lands.⁶⁶ The legislation may be seen as part of a “vindictive” program, or it can be viewed as a response to the uneasy situation after the end of the Crusade and an attempt to restore peace.

However, there is another context for “peace” in Languedoc, which also helped shape the early legislation: the organized peace. According to Thomas Bisson, the weakness of traditional feudal structures in southern France had led to legislation designed to institute peace in the land, and to organize oaths, money, and men to enforce it. This was not a formal “Peace association,” but what Bisson calls an “ultra-liturgical” cultural movement. The Crusade allowed the Church the chance to direct “the Peace,” linking it particularly to the extirpation of heresy; and, Bisson suggests, “The organised peace was the dominant if not quite the only coercive structure in much of Languedoc during the troubled generation of the Albigensian Crusades.”⁶⁷ In fact this structure continued to inform legislation after the conclusion of the Crusade, in the Church’s fight against heresy.⁶⁸ The council of Montpellier in 1215 had required all men of legal age in Languedoc and Provence to swear an oath of peace; similarly four canons of the council of Toulouse in 1229 concern an oath of peace.⁶⁹ The statutes of Raymond VII in the same year refer repeatedly to “the conservation of the peace,” and sentence to permanent exile all those “lawbreakers, rebels, pillagers, brigands and supporters” who disrupt it.⁷⁰ The wider oaths, which demanded everyone to combat heresy, can also be seen in light of the earlier legislation Bisson identifies for the organization of the peace, which were not negative oaths to refrain from violence but positive oaths to uphold the peace by seeking out and detaining those who broke it.⁷¹

The canons and edicts dealing specifically with the Inquisition were also, to a degree, informed by this process. The council of Narbonne in 1227 had ordered synodal witnesses to act *ex officio* to investigate “heresy and other manifest crimes,” which is partly in the tradition of the *inquisitio generalis* and partly the concern with public peace—and both of these are constitutive elements of the Inquisition. Louis IX’s ordinance of 1229 commanded all royal officials and subjects to cooperate in the prosecution of heresy, and as Maisonneuve argues, called for a “procédure inquisitoire” for the searching out of heretics. However, it is also clear that these measures were not exactly

the same as the inquisitorial procedure that followed later in the century: they were orders primarily for physically seeking out and denouncing heretics. The statute from Toulouse, which set out the procedure in greater detail, called for the parish priest and laymen to inquire for “heretics, believers, fautors, receivers and defenders [of heretics]” (*heretici, credentes, fautores, receptatores, and defensores*) in every house and hidden underground room. The statutes of Raymond VII, in 1233, ordered that lords should “persecute, seek out [*inquirere*], capture and punish” heretics, which would seem to describe a fairly mechanical and physical progression. The council of Tarragona in 1234 ordered that “in places suspected of heresy” a cleric and two or three laymen should search for (*perquirere*) *heretici, crecientes, and receptatores*, and look in “all secret places.”⁷² The early conciliar legislation was creating a process of inquiry; but, in its early stages at least, this “inquisition” was not so much an investigation as a physical search.

The chronicle of Guillaume Pelhisson describes the conduct of inquisition, chiefly in Toulouse, during the 1230s, and thus provides a useful picture of the actions being carried out against heresy in this earlier period. Pelhisson does tell us that the inquisitors sought confessions on heresy; indeed he notes that on Good Friday, 1235, so many people came to confess that the Dominicans had to enlist the aid of the Franciscans and some parish priests. The practice of eliciting confessions from a broad range of people points toward the workings of inquisition in the later 1230s and early 1240s. However, Pelhisson also describes the physical search for and seizure of heretics and their supporters; and the confessions he describes in detail are not the personal, moral narratives found in the later records. Many of those examined by the inquisitors had been cited, and sometimes “seized” or arrested, beforehand, which indicates a reliance on prior knowledge of their activities in their prosecution. Witnesses were heard against them and in their defense, placing the procedure closer to the system of *accusatio* and the use of compurgators.⁷³ On one occasion a woman did *reveal* herself to be a heretic (having just received the Cathar *consolamentum* on her deathbed) by her “confession” to the bishop of Toulouse; but the bishop had to trick her into speaking to him, and knew beforehand of her hereticated state.⁷⁴ The confessions of the woman’s son-in-law and his associate are noted by Pelhisson as being valuable because of the information they contained about others; they are not the kind of interior narratives, revealing the inner moral state of the individual, that one finds in later records. Confessions, in Pelhisson’s account, are primarily useful as sources of information. The people carrying out these anti-heretical actions can be called “inquisitors”—and the council of Tarragona (1234) does use the term⁷⁵—but we should be aware that the “inquisition” they were undertaking was only in part a matter of questioning or eliciting confessions, and the confessions were simply used to aid further searches. They were primarily hunters for heretics, which might indeed involve asking questions and gaining information; but their job was to

find the hidden heretics or their supporters, and then to hand them over to the bishops, the lords, or the *bayles* for sentencing and penance.⁷⁶ The “search” for heresy was understood to take place within the cellars, houses, woods, and *castra* of Languedoc itself.

Categories in the Earlier and Later Statutes

There was however another line of attack, one which was eventually to become the predominant strategy in the fight against heresy. The efforts of the Church in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (and, in part, in the first “period” of inquisition) had seen the problem of heresy as that of the leaven corrupting the lump, or (to point to a similarly structured metaphor) the wolf threatening the flock. Eradicating the external threat ought to have solved the problem; where it did not, the answer was to attack the more powerful elements in society who protected the heretical wolves or frustrated the Church’s efforts against them. For the most part, as we have seen, the flock itself was of little direct concern. However, with the legislation following the Albigensian Crusade, a new element emerged: the creation of texts recording information about the laity. The council of Toulouse had demanded that every man over the age of fourteen and every woman over the age of twelve should swear an oath to abjure all heresy, to serve the Catholic faith, to persecute heretics, and “to manifest a good faith.” This oath was to be renewed every other year, and failure to do so made one suspect of heresy; the same suspicion arose if one was delinquent in appearing triannually at confession. Most importantly of all, the names of those who took the oath were to be recorded.⁷⁷ Now, this was not a complete innovation: as mentioned above, in the twelfth century Henry de Marcy had instructed that the names of all those known or suspected to be heretics should be recorded. But two new elements had emerged: one was that, at least in theory, *everybody* was to be included, not simply those known to the writers of the documents; the second was that later councils seized upon and expanded this piece of legislation. At Albi in 1230 the orders were reiterated, with the added remit that the record should list all those who had accepted penance and communion from the parish priest, all those who had not, and all who were already excommunicated; in other words, a text was created dividing up the entire parish on grounds of religious observance and obedience. In 1232, the council of Béziers made a specific reference to the Tou-lousan edict, and indicated that the records were for the priest to use in monitoring the morals of the parish. Although no documents have survived from this edict, later councils indicate that the idea of keeping and using the records did not die out.⁷⁸ This was the beginning of a major theme to which we will return: inquisition as a textual mechanism. It formed a watershed in the Church’s attitude toward the relationship between the laity and heresy. But the effects of this change were not immediately apparent, and almost certainly not directly intended. The texts which can be inferred from these early statutes

still had more to do with the preservation of the peace than the construction of an interiorized, confessing subject. They were a way of recording oaths and of giving bishops the chance to monitor what was going on in the local area. The lay people they record did not have an active role in their creation, and the legislation does not foresee any problems in ascertaining (by confession or otherwise) the moral state of each parish member. Unlike later inquisitorial texts, there is no sense of the laity being engaged with these records: they were texts still informed by the idea of the “lump.”

If the idea of the “lump,” drawn from the earlier discourses around heresy, remained present in the early creation of texts, there were however other elements emerging within a new discourse, elements that would eventually break up the homogenized construction of the laity. Perhaps the most important was the emergence of a system of classification and categorization. This is present in the earlier period (C.1227–C.1235) but more fully worked out in the later legislation (c.1238–C.1254), where its function and effects slowly changed. As we will see, the classification of heretics and their adherents in the earlier statutes functions to depict an array of common enemies against the Church.⁷⁹ The main concern of the legislation of the 1230s (still informed by the discourse of the “Peace”) is to call for the laity—and particularly the nobility—to act against these adversaries. In the later legislation, the heretics and their supporters themselves became the objects of the inquisitorial discourse, defined, identified, and distributed within a variety of transgressive categories. Furthermore, unlike the earlier legislation, the councils of the 1240s do not simply present the categories as self-evident, but set out a mechanism for their identification and ascription.

The earlier statutes admittedly use a variety of words to describe heretics and their supporters. Given the importance of the specificity of language here, I have chosen in what follows to use the Latin words themselves, with occasional glosses, rather than adding a further level of confusion through continual translation. Preeminent, then, is the noun *hereticus*, which is used in a way that is not so much technical as polemical. It draws on the *topos* of the enemy of the Church, which had been established in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, or rather uses that established enemy as a call to duty for other parts of the social body: for example, as Raymond VII put it, “in pursuing, finding, capturing and punishing *heretici*, all barons, knights, *bayles*, and other men of ours should diligently offer careful and steadfast watchfulness, just as was promised by us at the peace made at Paris.”⁸⁰ When the transgressors themselves were the center of attention, a longer list of categories was supplied. The council of Narbonne in 1227 talked of *heretici et eorum fautores*, banned from public office *heretici*, or those *suspecti de heresi*, and mentioned in its excommunication of the Occitan nobility “heretici, credentes, fautores, defensores et receptatores eorum.”⁸¹ Raymond VII’s statutes similarly mention those *de heresi suspecti*, *heretici vestiti* (“vested” heretics, or the robed *perfecti*, the Cathar elite), and *credentes hereticorum*.⁸² The

council of Toulouse also uses a wide nomenclature: “heretici, credentes, fautores et receptatores seu defensores eorum.”⁸³ The councils of Béziers, Tarragona, and Arles all address *heretici, credentes, fautores et receptatores*, but tend to treat them as one block rather than differentiating them.⁸⁴

What is the function of this nomenclature in the earlier statutes? In some cases it is to make a legal point. The council of Toulouse draws a distinction between *heretici vestiti* who had spontaneously reverted to the Catholic faith (who are to be placed in a town free from heresy and made to wear distinguishing crosses—on which more will be said below) and *heretici* who had returned to the “Catholic unity” from fear of death or other, non-“spontaneous” cause (who were to be imprisoned so as not to corrupt others).⁸⁵ In some cases, it is plain that the nomenclature is simply descriptive, referring to those who received, supported, or defended the heretics. One should initially read these names within the context of the Peace, as they were (as I have indicated above) primarily employed to describe the Occitan nobility who were in a position to provide meaningful support and protection for the Cathar *perfecti*. It is plain too that they are used in a general, rather than a precise sense, as no gloss is given on the actions they entail. They also mainly appear in legislation aimed at preventing the people so designated from continuing their actions (and, again, are thus part of maintaining the Peace) rather than attempting to judge them or to reclaim their souls.

The legislation for punishments and penances in the earlier councils does not provide a particularly systematized treatment of levels of involvement or guilt, but tends to concentrate on the eradication of *heretici*, the maintenance of public order, and the prevention of further support for the Cathars. For example, the council of Toulouse in 1229, in addition to the control of *heretici* mentioned above, also orders that anyone who allowed a *hereticus* to stay on his land, whether for money or any other reason, should lose that land; and that any *heretici, credentes, fautores, receptatores*, or *defensores* should be captured and then handed over to the bishop or lord or *bayles* for punishment by the due penalty (*animadversione debita*).⁸⁶ A few years later, the formula *animadversione debita* was used to indicate the death sentence for relapsed or impenitent heretics, after “relaxation to the secular arm of the Church”; in this case, this is clearly not what is intended. It shows that the legislative discourse was not at this stage concerned to formulate standardized levels of punishment, but was happy to leave things to the local circumstances and assessment. Five years later, at the council of Arles, the death penalty for obstinate heretics had been introduced, and also the practice of exhuming and burning anyone posthumously “disowned” as a *hereticus* or *credens* (“believer”).⁸⁷ In this council, no other “levels” of guilt are mentioned.

The more complicated case is that of the “believers of the heretics” (*eredentes hereticorum*). The distinction between *heretici* — or rather, “good men” (*boni homines*) — and *credentes* appears to be found amongst the

Cathars themselves.⁸⁸ The Provençal Ritual, a Cathar text recorded in the 1240s that sets out the performance of the rite of the *consolamentum*, depicts a “believer” (*crezent*) directed by and responding to a Cathar “good man” (*bos home*).⁸⁹ Here the *crezent* is specifically the neophyte, hoping to progress into the elite of the sect. The *Chanson de la croisade*, an Occitan account of the Albigensian Crusade, also talks of “the believers of the heretics” (*li crezen del eretges*).⁹⁰ The text goes on to gloss these *crezen* as “those who take [the heretics’] part” in disputes, indicating that in this case the term refers more to a “faction” of heretical supporters, rather than any specific subset of the sect. Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, a Cistercian monk who was active in the Albigensian Crusade, wrote a description of the Cathars around 1213, in which he too notes a Cathar distinction between *perfecti* and *credentes*: the *perfecti* were the elite, who wore a black mande and practiced asceticism, whereas the *credentes* were those who “while living in the world, did not strive to attain the life of the perfected, but hoped nonetheless to achieve salvation in their faith.” Pierre glosses the distinction by saying that “they differed, indeed, in their manner of life, but in faith (or rather in infidelity) they were at one.”⁹¹ This lack of specificity in definition (“believers in heretics” sliding into “heretics”) is interesting: in the discourse surrounding heresy, the *receptatores*, *defensores*, and *fautores* are all, presumably though not explicitly, identifiable by their actions, whereas the *credentes* pose the difficult question of “belief.”

The legislation of the earlier period largely bypasses the problem of assessing “belief” by defining *credentes hereticorum* as legally similar to *heretici*, and condemning them to be punished in the same way, as equally guilty.⁹² The canons sketch out degrees of active involvement with heresy, and possibly the degrees of “belief” or adherence they might be understood to imply, but the primary concern and basis for punishment is the question of disobedience to the Church.⁹³ When “belief” is addressed it is dealt with in relation to the public good, through the notion of *infamia*.— the public opinion and knowledge of a person’s state and behavior—that had long been the basis of judicial action within canon law.⁹⁴ For example, the council of Toulouse banned from medical practice anyone who was “infamous for heresy, or noted for suspicion [of it] [*infamatus de heresi, vel suspicione notatus*],” and similarly barred from public office and from the counsel or retinue of the nobility *heretici vel credentes eorum* and anyone else defamed of heresy or who was “believed to be suspect [of it].”⁹⁵ Pinning down the category of “believer” and the question of “belief” appears to have been beyond either the remit or abilities of the earlier legislation.

One possible exception is a text from 1235 that presents the decisions of a Dominican and “learned” men from Avignon on “who should be called *credentes*” in response to the questions of two other Dominicans and the provost of Arles. The text is primarily concerned with Waldensians and their supporters in the city of Arles, but one can safely assume that it also held

implications for the prosecution of Catharism, as was the case with later legislation. Having carefully studied “the diversity of guilt” among those being prosecuted, the men stated that “those people were *credentes* of the Waldensians and of their errors, and should be judged as such, who confessed that they had the faith of the Waldensians or [confessed] that they believed that the Waldensians were good and holy men.”⁹⁶ The same judgment was made upon those who had confessed their sins to Waldensians, had eaten bread and fish blessed by them, had often visited them, heard their preaching, given them goods, or seen them without the intention of capturing them. However, this description was not quite as clear as it might seem, since later in the same document the learned men undermine their own categorization by saying that everyone found guilty must be condemned by a definitive sentence and punished, “and it must be pronounced that he was a *credens*, or *guilty in some other way according to the degree of his crime* [my emphasis],”⁹⁷ The Avignon text supports the principle that belief should be ascribed on the basis of actions, but displays an uneasiness about how exactly this should be done: the “degree” of crime affects the identification of “belief,” but how exactly this is to work the learned men do not say. If the Languedocian statutes do not attempt to define any of the categories, this is perhaps because they are mainly concerned with the eradication of heresy and the restoration of peace; and perhaps also because they are partly informed by the ideological view of the laity as *illitterati* and *idiotae*, who might foolishly follow charismatic heretics but for whom the question of “belief” was perhaps something of a moot point. However, the Avignon text illustrates that there was a degree of tension over the question of belief and the relationship between exterior actions and interior states.

In the later councils some of these things change. As Languedoc moved out of the period immediately following the Crusade, the concern with “peace” decayed and a new logic appeared in the fight against heresy. Whereas the earlier councils had largely presented categories of heretical adherents as self-evident (although displaying some concerns over the role of the *credens*), the legislation from the 1240s and 1250s expands the definitions of categories, places the role of “belief” much more centrally, and changes the focus of legislation from the noble supporters to transgressors of all levels. Maisonneuve wrote that the twenty years after 1240 were “une période d’intense activité législative,” and stressed that, in contrast to the earlier statutes, the councils of Tarragona (1242), Narbonne (1243), Béziers (1246), Valence (1248), and Albi (1254) formed “une législation cohérente et complète.”⁹⁸ This element of coherence is important, as it not only marks the coordination of ecclesiastical efforts against heresy, but also marks the beginning of a universalising discourse around heresy.

The council of Tarragona in 1242 primarily addressed the problem of Waldensian heretics (whom it names *Inzabbatati*, “the Shod,” referring to their practice of wearing sandals in apostolic imitation).⁹⁹ As with the “Learned

Men of Avignon” text, however, the principles it set forth had a wider application; and its authority was no doubt derived not only from the detail it presented but also from the presence at the council of Raymond de Peñafort, perhaps the most important voice on canon law in the period.¹⁰⁰ The council begins by asking “who should be called heretics, who believers, who fautors, who receivers, who defenders, and who relapsed?” and then carefully sets out an answer that establishes and defines eleven categories of transgression in heresy:

- *Heretici* are those who obstinately persist in their errors and are not obedient to the secular powers or the Church, who refuse to take an oath, who will not kill “and so on.”¹⁰¹
- *Credentes* of the said heresies are similarly to be called *heretici*.
- One is *suspectus* who has listened to the preaching of the *heretici*, or has genuflected when praying with them, or has kissed them, or believed them to be “good men” or similar things which can induce suspicion.
- One *vehementer suspectus* (vehemently suspect) has often done one or some of these things.
- One *vehementissime suspectus* (most vehemently suspect) has done all of these things.
- *Celatores* (hidiers) are those who have seen *heretici* in a square or *domus* or other place but failed to reveal them to the Church or judges when they have had the opportunity.
- *Occultatores* (concealers) are those who have made a pact not to reveal *heretici*, or have otherwise endeavoured to ensure that they are not revealed.
- *Receptatores* (receivers) are those who have knowingly received *heretici* twice or more in their houses or other places of theirs.
- *Defensores* (defenders) have knowingly defended *heretici* by word or deed, or generally hindered the Church in its persecution of heresy in their lands or elsewhere.
- *Fautores* (fautors) are all of the above to a lesser or greater degree, and also those who have otherwise given *heretici* “counsel, aid or favours”; “and all *fautores* we believe can be called ‘suspects’ thereby that they must clear themselves through witnesses [*se purgare*] and abjure all heresy and all provision of support [*fautoriam*].”
- *Relapsi* (relapsers) are those who, after renouncing or abjuring heresy, revert to their former beliefs. And in the same manner we say that relapsed *fautores* are those who, after abjuring heresy or *fautoriam*, do good to the heretics or conceal them.¹⁰²

The obvious difference here from the earlier legislation is the concern with definition and detail. These words, most of which appear in the councils of the preceding decades, are defined for the first time, assigned specific punishments (discussed in Chapter 2), and related to each other. More

importantly, by virtue of these definitions and interrelations, the words are no longer simply descriptive but construct a system of distributed categories, indicating not so much transgressive actions as transgressive identities. This is clearest in the once again problematic case of the *credentes*: the council of Tarragona, having listed the eleven categories, goes on to ask the question, “whether one who has kissed ... a heretic whom he believes or knows to be (a heretic); or prayed with him, and hidden him, or heard preaching or reading from him, and believed him to be a good man; is he judged a *credens* of their errors?” The reply is instructive:

And we say no; but he is to be condemned as a *fautor* or *occultator* and *benefactor*, and *vehementer suspectus* that he believes in their errors; unless to the point that he is *litteratus vel discretus*, that he could not claim ignorance. We are led to relinquish arbitration of this to the judges.¹⁰³

Literacy—and the wisdom (*discretio*) implied by the medieval valency of “literacy”—is bluntly stated as the prime qualification for belief, rather than actions alone. For the first time in the inquisitorial legislation, the “lump” and the “leaven” begin to interweave, since although Tarragona specifies a difference (between literate and illiterate, believers and *fautors*) it also considers this a matter for inquiry rather than a predicate for action. Although the ignorant are still more part of the “lump,” they do not start from that position, but are assigned to it; similarly, the inquisitorial procedure does not begin from an *a priori* view on who is *litteratus vel discretus*, but suggests that this should be discovered or decided in each case. Also interesting is that the statute presents the possibility of punishing someone as “vehemently suspect of having believed in their errors [*vehementer suspectus quod credit eius erroribus*].”¹⁰⁴ In other contexts *suspectus* might be understood as indicating the need for further investigation to establish belief; in this case, “suspicion” is the basis of punishment and essentially constitutes the identity of the subject.¹⁰⁵ Most important of all, however, is the suggestion that heretical contact or activity needs to be investigated in relation to the individual, rather than being confined to the public sphere. This is a key change within inquisitorial discourse: the beginning of a process of individuation.

Following from Raymond de Peñafort’s legislation, the council of Narbonne in 1243 presents a mixture of canons setting out individual penances for heretics and their supporters, inquisitorial powers to determine the allocation and conduct of penances,¹⁰⁶ extraordinary legal process proper to the Inquisition such as the secrecy of witnesses and the admission of criminals’ evidence,¹⁰⁷ the secular co-operation with and support for inquisitorial activity,¹⁰⁸ and certain further refinements of the definitions of categories and procedure. For instance, the inquisitor must diligently examine the “circumstances” of *fautores*, paying attention to exactly what actions they performed and what those actions therefore imply; no one should be condemned without “clear and frank proof, or the production of their own confession; indeed, it is a better deed to free the guilty than to condemn the innocent”; those who are convicted as *heretici* or *credentes* but “obstinately

deny” their guilt are “without doubt judged *heretici*,”¹⁰⁹ There is also a long list describing how people can be judged *credentes* if they make “reverence” to heretics, or attend a “service” or preaching of the heretics, or believe that they can be saved in their sect, or if they freely and often receive the heretics, and most importantly if they *knew* the latter were heretics.¹¹⁰ Maisonneuve suggests that the council of Narbonne and the other southern French councils differed from the council of Tarragona in their allocation of categories: whereas Tarragona had followed “un point du vue théologique et moral,” the Languedocian councils “les classent plutôt suivant leur comportement envers l’Inquisition.”¹¹¹ This is certainly true, but there is also another development: the description of categories had become enmeshed with the system of inquisitorial procedure, with the assumption that exterior actions could be interpreted as signs of interior morality. The council of Narbonne stresses that the weight of assessment is upon the inquisitor and sets out the beginnings of good inquisitorial practice; it also remarks upon the desirability of confession, and that a witness’s refusal to confess, although guilty, obviously reveals impenitence.¹¹²

The council of Beziers in 1246, and the accompanying Directory of Béziers, set out inquisitorial procedure in even greater detail and organisation.¹¹³ The Directory (which practically forms a kind of inquisitorial handbook, created by the council in addition to its canonical legislation) explained that on being assigned to conduct inquisition in a particular area, the inquisitors were publicly to announce their authority, call on everyone who knew of crimes of heresy to come forward, and allocate a “Period of Grace” in which people could confess without fear of punishment. Everyone who appeared before them had to swear to say “the full and plain truth on the fact of heretical lapses, both on themselves and on others, living and dead,” an oath which appears more or less in this form in all future inquisitorial depositions. They were to be diligently interrogated, and the interrogation to be recorded, and at the end were to swear an oath of abjuration and be reconciled to the Church. The “guilty” who did not appear were to be cited by letter, and if they “failed in their defense” they were to be sentenced without mercy, unless they wished to confess their guilt.¹¹⁴ The same extraordinary legal powers applied as set out in the council of Narbonne, and similar discussion of penances and punishments pertained.¹¹⁵ Above all, the inquisitors always retained the power to alter the penance, whether to strengthen or lessen it; for in awarding penance they had to assess the “type of person and quantity of guilt” (*qualitas personarum, quantitas culparum*) and other circumstances.¹¹⁶ The inquisitorial procedure imagined by the accumulated legislation of the 1240s had changed greatly. Inquisitors were no longer simply hunting down heretics, but were to consider each particular person, in his or her personal circumstances, and identify him or her within the system of categories outlined above.

The precise definition of each of the categories given by the councils was,

however, still unstable, particularly in the case of *credentes*. This was not so much a “weakness” in the system, as both an indication of the ideology that informed it and a necessary element for its successful operation. It indicates the ideology, discussed above, that saw the *illitterati* and the *litterati* as separated by a chasm of ability, experience, learning, and relationship to God; a chasm that posited a perhaps essential difference between the clerical, literate elite, and the lay, illiterate flock, at least in the field of spirituality. These common attitudes suggested that *illitterati* were more likely to be swayed by heretics, but also less likely to be (or capable of being) true “believers” in the heretics. At the same time, the inquisitorial treatment of these people as individuals, rather than as an undifferentiated group, demanded that they be assessed rather more carefully. Behind that assessment was the specter of the “hidden” heretic, presenting a facade of false piety or stupidity in order to hide his or her evil interior; and this made each deponent appear potentially far more dangerous than he or she had been as simply one element among many in the foolish flock. This danger could be controlled and punished if fixed into a more stable, and less threatening, position: if it could be established for example that the deponent was not a *hereticus* or *credens*, but was a *receptator*.

As the synodal legislation accumulated during the thirteenth century, the complex dialectic between the prejudices of the *litterati*, their fears and concerns over heresy and the laity, and the changing political situation within Languedoc, had changed inquisition into a new kind of discursive force. These changes were not exactly planned or willed by the bishops and legislators of the Church, but emerged as part of an ongoing process of reaction to the fact of heresy, perhaps also informed by nascent changes in the thirteenth-century Church’s approach toward, and expectations of, lay people in general. Nonetheless, the changes made had longer and deeper implications than could have been imagined by any of the particular councils. Preeminent among these changes was what had happened to the categories and nomenclature used within inquisitorial discourse. These categories were now identities, circumscribing the meanings of each individual’s actions. This notion of identity can be illustrated by considering the term “burglar,” as opposed to “one who has committed a burglary”; although the second is a definition of the first, they are not congruent. A “burglar” is identified by more than his or her one action, and the term implies more than a past history: the category “produces” an identity that seeks to explain, define, and characterize all that surrounds an individual and his or her thoughts and actions.¹¹⁷ That *defensor*, *receptator*, and so on are identities in this sense seems clear from the fact that the councils legislate against the children of *defensores* and *fautores* holding public office.¹¹⁸ The later councils of Languedoc had begun to establish a system for the treatment of heresy that was no longer primarily aimed at the social body, and informed by a method of prohibition and pursuit, but focused instead upon the individual and worked by the assessment

and location of each individual within a wider schema.

Again, however, one should not see sharp and absolute divisions between the two legislative periods I have posited heuristically. Just as elements of this process had appeared previously, earlier procedures likewise lived on. The council of Albi in 1254 gives a perfect example of two discourses working alongside each other. On the one hand, it repeats legislation calling for the “searching out” of heretics in hidden places (*latibula*) and calls upon the support of secular lords against heresy;¹¹⁹ on the other hand, it also provides legislation in line with the *cura animarum* and its accompanying mentality, ordering for example that all children over the age of seven should accompany their parents to church on Sundays and feastdays, to learn the Catholic faith (in practice, the Credo, Paternoster and Ave Maria) because “it is well known that through ignorance of the articles of faith many have strayed [*errare*].”¹²⁰ Nonetheless, the councils in the middle of the thirteenth century had formulated a mechanism for the *production* of the categories of transgression, and the people who were to be identified within them. The Church’s attitude toward heresy and the laity had traced a trajectory from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, shifting its focus from the individual heresiarch or group of heretics as threatening outsiders, to a far greater concern with every Christian soul. With the birth and development of inquisition, this trajectory had not however come to an end. The implications of this paradigmatic shift were still to be played out and further developed within the parishes of Languedoc.

To Correct the Guilty Life

Representation and Knowledge

The Context of a Discourse

The Albigensian Crusade had Ended in 1229, and with the cessation of armed conflict, a new kind of battle against heresy within Languedoc could begin. In the following two decades, inquisitors would question, record, and assign penance to thousands of people. Between 1245 and 1249, just two of the several inquisitors—Bernard de Caux and Jean de St. Pierre—interrogated over six thousand individuals. Their investigation was concentrated on the Lauragais, the region between Toulouse and Carcassonne. Whole villages and parishes were brought to Toulouse for questioning, and the inquisitors aimed to examine every single male over the age of fourteen, and every female over twelve.¹ Around 1248, this pair of Dominicans put down in writing some thoughts about the task of inquisition and certain tools they thought useful for its practice. The text they created —the *Ordo processus Narbonensis* — was the first inquisition manual.²

As James Given has noted, the production of manuals for inquisitors can be placed within the context of a general enthusiasm for “how-to” manuals during the thirteenth century, most notably the manuals for preachers and the manuals for confessors.³ However, the *Processus* is somewhat shamed by the comparison: it is a very short text (about seventeen hundred words in Latin), and consists of a letter of commission, a brief description of procedure, a question list for interrogations, a few *formulae* for citations, abjurations, and the imposition of penances and punishments, and an example of a penitential letter. Although it marks the increasing professionalisation of inquisition, the *Processus* has nothing of the breadth of, say, Robert of Flamborough’s early penitential manual, the *Liber poenitentialis*, composed in the first decade of the thirteenth century.⁴ As one might expect from a procedure that had appeared from a conglomeration of existing juridical and religious ideas, there is almost a sense, with the *Processus*, that the inquisitors were beginning to *discover* the need for an abstract statement of their task.

To be sure, the questions asked by these first inquisitors were simple, tailored no doubt for the limited faculties of the *illitterati* they were to

interrogate; but perhaps within those crude questions they found other speech, other ideas, and hence further challenges. The *Processus* ends with a curious admission: “We do various others things, indeed, in procedure and in other matters, which cannot easily be reduced to writing, holding in all things to the letter of the law or to specific apostolic ordinances.”⁵ Might we be permitted to sense a hint of nervousness in this confession of textual limitation, in the hurried reassurance that whatever these “things” are, they nonetheless follow the “letter of the law”? There are, perhaps, revealed here the limits of a simple textual mechanism confronted by speech and practice that exceed its rudimentary discourse. This is a lot to read into one oblique comment; but if we can project backwards from what inquisition would *become*, we can best understand its trajectory as pushed forward by the momentum gained in both demanding, and then negotiating, an excess of speech. With this one phrase, the *Processus* points to the motive force behind later changes to inquisition, and its construction of the position of the deponent. The inquisitors were caught in an unrecognized quandary: on the one hand, they carried with them the previous discourses surrounding heresy and the laity—in particular, the apprehension of the laity as *illitterati*, lacking interior reflective selves. This drove the discourse of inquisition to construct deponents as *objects* of knowledge, identifiable and classifiable within the burgeoning system of classification. On the other hand, however, the demands intrinsic to inquisition for the production of speech—and for speech positioned as authoritative through issuing from an autonomous, interiorized confessant — pushed inquisitorial discourse into the construction of speaking *subjects*. This tension between the construction of objects of knowledge and subjects within knowledge might be described as the internal (and unintended) momentum to inquisitorial discourse.

For if the authors of the *Processus* were unable to specify the more abstract qualities of their task, later writers attempted to fill in the gaps. Over the next century various manuals and accompanying works were produced.⁶ For my purposes, three are of particular interest: the *Doctrina de modo procedendi contra hereticos* (probably composed between 1278 and 1298), the *De inquisitione hereticorum* formerly attributed to David of Augsburg (probably late thirteenth century), and Bernard Gui’s *Practica, inquisitionis heretice pravitatis* (written c. 1323).⁷ Together with the *Processus* these four works were all for use in Languedoc, all appear before 1330, and rely heavily upon one another for information.

The development of these manuals points, firstly, to the fact that the inquisitorial task was also becoming increasingly “professionalized”; not necessarily in the sense that inquisitors had assumed a permanent vocation, but in the abstraction and systemization of procedures and principles surrounding their project. With the development of manuals, the process of inquisition had clearly begun to transcend the particular time, place, and circumstances of each individual inquisitor’s jurisdiction. What we see in the

second half of the thirteenth century is the creation of a new discourse for understanding heresy and lay people in contact with heresy. The manuals and the later statutes construct and set out procedures, vocabulary, practices, places, and subjectivities which form a coherent area of operation. As we will see, these elements combined to form a new field of “knowledge” around the prosecution of heresy, a “knowledge” that was intimately bound up with operations of power and representation. In describing inquisition as a discourse—that is, as a language and set of practices that lay claim to an authoritative coherence—it is important however to note that I am not arguing that inquisition was static or hermetically divided from earlier language surrounding heresy. Rhetorical models and modes of interpretation from earlier times still held a place within the prosecution of heresy in the later thirteenth century. Nor did inquisitorial discourse have clear boundaries dividing it from the other medieval discourses of sacramental confession, legal jurisdiction, or modes of piety. These discourses overlapped and interwove, sometimes in concert and sometimes in tension. Nonetheless, as I shall show in this chapter and the next, inquisition had by 1250 begun to represent itself as a field of inquiry and knowledge that was separate, coherent, and authoritative. The next chapter will explore further the inquisition’s construction of deponents as *subjects*; in this chapter, I will concentrate more upon the positioning of lay people as *objects* of knowledge, and examine what the manuals tell us about categories and their allocation, the creation and representation of knowledge about heresy. The move between subject and object, described by this chapter and the next, may be seen in part as a chronological move. However, the change was not linear or absolute: it is rather a matter of shifting emphasis. The negotiations involved in representing heretical transgression were complicated by the nascent subjectivity accorded to the deponents; and the construction of the confessing subject was, as we will later see, positioned within a discourse that still sought to produce objects of knowledge.

Manuals and Procedures

We shall begin with the matter of categorization. In the case of the *Processus*, the text adds almost nothing to what had gone before within the conciliar legislation. The oath of abjuration provided by the manual requires the penitent to refrain from defending “heretics of any sect whatever”; if the penitent relapses, any who defend him are excommunicated as “fautors, receivers and defenders of heretics.”⁸ These terms, lacking further definition, point back towards the earlier period of synodal legislation. However, the *Processus* does introduce a more detailed procedure for the questioning of witnesses.⁹ These questions concentrated mainly on the actions undertaken by the deponent: whether he or she saw a heretic, and if so, when and with whom; if he or she listened to preaching; if he or she ate with them; if he or

she “adored” them; if he or she “associated” with them, and so on. These can be seen as a method for locating the deponent in a particular category of adherent, so that he or she can be condemned as a “*fautor* or *occultator* and *benefactor*” or whichever category is pertinent. Perhaps most importantly of all, the manual indicates that inquisition is to be carried out across a wide geographical area, and that everybody— “men from the age of fourteen, women from the age of twelve, or younger if perchance they shall have been guilty of an offence”—must appear before them to abjure heresy. The *Processus* also emphasizes the need for the deponents to come “spontaneously and penitently” to tell the “pure and full truth on themselves and others.”¹⁰ This is the first indication of the move the Inquisition would make toward interiorized confession rather than simply searching for bodies and information. Inquisition, as imagined by the *Processus*, is no longer a procedure for searching out heretics hiding in barns or secret places, but a mechanism for interrogating the entire flock (within the area assigned to each particular inquisitor), not only to make the laity take an oath against heresy (something which had theoretically been in place since the council of Toulouse in 1229), but also to examine them for what they *might* have committed “against the faith.” Confession, in the *Processus*, is beginning to be constructed as the revelation of an interior truth, narrated by a supposedly willing subject, rather than just a simple catalogue of information about events and actions. In addition, the manual stresses that the deeds undertaken by inquisitors are, in themselves, a form of penance or sacrament: “we have decided to send you, for remission of your sins, to make inquisition of *heretici, credentibus, fautoribus, receptatoribus et defensoribus eorum*”; “And if justice is well done in respect of the condemned and those who relapse ... the Lord will gloriously and wonderfully be made manifest in the fruit of the inquisition.”¹¹ This procedure has clearly moved a long way from the politically reactive force against noble *fautores* and others in the wake of the Crusade, and is instead both part of the *cura animarum* and a sacrament in itself.

The *Doctrina de modo procedendi contra hereticos* similarly adds little more to the formal definition of categories, although its basis is drawn from the later, more detailed period of synodal legislation; in fact, it repeats almost verbatim the definitions found in the council of Tarragona in 1242.¹² As with the *Processus*, the *Doctrina* does expand upon the punishments necessary for each level of category, and also provides a question list for inquisitors that is largely drawn from that given in the earlier manual. It also insists that the inquisitor must inquire on the “conditions, that is, their name, country [*patria*], parents, estate, bodily disposition and similar” of every person mentioned by the deponent, and similarly on the details surrounding each act committed in heresy: the place, time, people present, and other circumstances.¹³ These questions reiterate the concerns of earlier statutes, but present an expansion of detail. Again, the manual points to a greater process

of individuation. However, this is a construction of an individuality of a limited kind: it is primarily concerned with the production of individuated objects of inquisitorial discourse that can be distributed within the system of categories of transgression.

More important, the *Doctrina* starts to display what might be called a “professional knowledge” about heretics and their supporters. In a discussion on procedure, the manual notes: “*Relapsi* however who are relinquished [from the care of the Church] should not be reconciled even if they ask for it; nor *heretici perfecti*, because they will not ask nor wish [for it]”¹⁴ Prediction of behavior of this type is perhaps unsurprising to find in what is, after all, a kind of professional manual; but it marks a different sort of knowledge being produced around heresy, one which is not overwhelmingly concerned with pointing out the evil genealogies and anagogical meanings of heresy and heretics, but with methodically constructing a picture of heretical behavior. The *De inquisitione hereticorum* manages to combine the two themes in a somewhat divided partnership. The text is closer in style to a polemic, with a strong recourse to the *topos* of heretics displaying false piety (on which I will say more below), and generally follows the model of the “little foxes” who destroy the vineyard of the Lord.¹⁵ In its longer redaction, the manual is also pessimistic about the opportunities for catching heretics, since it is rare to find people sufficiently zealous and persistent to conduct an inquisition, few people know enough to catch them or to avoid being fooled into releasing them; and that it is difficult to find proofs necessary for conviction.¹⁶ That said (and although perhaps pessimistic, it clearly shows the idea of a need for a professional knowledge and method to combat heresy), the manual goes on to set out useful ideas on how to proceed: inquisitors are to watch out for deponents who only mention people who are already dead or convicted, or who have long left the area. They are to preach clearly the true articles of the faith, and to contrast this account of the Credo with what the heretics believe (thus making it more obvious to the populace how to identify heretical opinions). The *De inquisitione hereticorum* suggests that anyone who visits heretics when they are captured, and brings them victuals or whispers with them, is suspected of being *discipuli vel fautores eorum*. The same is true of anyone who laments their capture or death, or who excuses them and says they were unjustly condemned, or who “had a harsh face” to those who persecuted heretics, or who took the bones of burnt heretics as if they were holy relics.¹⁷ The manual sets out a working method, albeit a paranoid one, for conducting inquisition effectively —if, by effectively, one means that it is guaranteed to produce as much information and as much detail in confessions as is possible.¹⁸

It is with Bernard Gui’s lengthy *Practica inquisitionis* that the “professionalization” of inquisition reaches maturity. It is worth considering for a moment that simple fact of length. The brevity of the *Processus* we have already noted. The *Doctrina* is rather lengthier —about 7000 Latin words —

and the shorter redaction of *De inquisitione hereticorum* is about the same. Gui's *Practica*, however, is over 120, 000 words long. This expansion between 1250 and 1330 is probably the clearest indication of how the Inquisition had evolved and mutated; and is even more fascinating when one considers that the number of Cathars in Languedoc was declining during the same period. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, there were perhaps more than one thousand Cathar *perfecti* in Languedoc (and possibly many more), in addition to the far larger number of people who supported them.¹⁹ By the time that Bernard Gui wrote his manual there were only slightly more than a dozen *perfecti* left in the area.²⁰ The creation of a professional body of experts, a corpus of information, and a mechanism for the production of further knowledge, was not driven by a reaction to a real external threat. To understand the textual energy of the Inquisition, we must look elsewhere; perhaps to a kind of internal momentum from its own operations.

Power/Knowledge and Heresy

Gui's *Practica* provides a massive collection of formulae for citing deponents and imposing penance on all categories of heretics, believers, adherents, and suspects.²¹ Gui also provides further shadings of definition: *heretici imperfecti* are those who have the faith of the heretics, but do not follow their life as far as rites and observances, and therefore are strictly speaking called *credentes hereticorum erroribus*, and are thus judged as *heretici*. Those *heretici* who convert to the Catholic faith must be divided into three groups — those who convert before being captured, those who do so after capture but before examination, and those who only convert after examination and being released to the secular arm for execution. Gui also makes a distinction between relapsed *heretici* who abjure and then fall into their old ways, and those who perjure themselves or refuse to carry out their penances; the former are sentenced to death, whereas the latter can be awarded a further penance at the discretion of the inquisitor.²² He describes in intricate and systematic detail how the sentencing of *fautores* can be refined according to a threefold division into greater and lesser acts, certainty or doubt of evidence, and whether they transgressed before or after abjuration. Eight different “grades” of actions are then listed, based on a hierarchy of implied belief in or adherence to heresy, and Gui makes further detailed distinctions within each category on the basis of circumstance.²³ This language of categories, and the logic behind them, are also applied in the *Practica* to a wider area of transgression than simply Cathar or Waldensian heresy: for example, the description in the *Practica* of a Jew who shelters “re-Judaized” people mirrors the activities of a heretical *receptator*; and formulae of sentences are provided for *detentores* (withholders), *occultatores*, and *celatores* of Jewish books, thus reascribing the categories developed in relationship to Catharism and Waldensianism to other kinds of “heresy.”²⁴ The *Practica*, then, presents a

fully developed system for the assessment, application, recording, and ascription of the various levels of transgression. This system allows what might previously have been an appropriation of the Cathars' own description of their elite and adherents to become an abstracted principle of behavior and morality, and a legal position, such that the labels can be applied to all kinds of transgressors against the faith.²⁵ What had previously been a procedure for dealing with a specific kind of problem had become a mechanism that potentially could address, define, and process every member of Christendom within its own epistemology and hermeneutic framework.

The *Practica* also presents an extensive knowledge concerning heretics and transgressors. Of course, in a general sense, churchmen had "known" things about heretics and heresy long before the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Various polemicists had discussed, described, and analyzed the genealogies of heretical sects.²⁶ These accounts tended to reproduce similar, defamatory stories about the activities of heretics but also show a degree of specificity in their information. Accounts from the eleventh and twelfth centuries were occasionally based upon interrogation of heretics, and provide some descriptive information along with their condemnation.²⁷ One could say that in these earlier accounts, things were known in general about heresy (that it was devil-sent, that heretics had strange orgies, that heretics pretended to be pious, and so forth) and also in particular (that the Manichaeans believed in two gods, that the heretics discovered at Montforte in 1028 prized virginity and welcomed martyrdom, and so on). These earlier accounts were not lacking in "knowledge," but the type of knowledge they produced was informed by a different kind of cultural context from that of the inquisition manuals.

The Inquisition instituted a *mechanism* for producing knowledge, a *system* for interrogating and interpreting all kinds of subjects, and a "*will to know*" that transcended the particular historical and geographical moment.²⁸ Elements of this discourse, its reliance on textual production, its transcendence of the particular, and its implications for the confessing subject, are discussed in the next chapter. Here, I will briefly sketch out a few elements of the "external" characteristics. In suggesting that the Inquisition, in the later parts of the thirteenth century and the early fourteenth century, produced a "knowledge" about heresy, one might distinguish three "levels" of operation. At its broadest, the Inquisition continued to produce a knowledge similar to that of the polemicists, the knowledge that heresy was one element in the dark forces aligned against the Church, and that any individual heretic was but one factor in a larger process. Consequently, as the thirteenth century progressed, inquisitors found themselves pursuing not only Cathars hidden in cellars, but also proselytizing Jews and those they reputedly converted, usurers, sorcerers and soothsayers, schismatic Greeks, Beguines, "rebaptizers," and Jewish books.²⁹ Inquisitorial discourse at times conflates all of these specific transgressions into a familiar picture of evil, linking the

various groups into one, many-headed threat. For example, the phrase “to return like a dog to its vomit,” which has a long history of usage for describing heretical relapsation, is reconfigured to describe “returning to the vomit of Judaism.”³⁰ In the same way, the phrase “by whatever names they are reckoned” (*quibuscumque nominibus censeantur*), often applied to heretical sects, is also found attached to Jewish books.³¹

But this is not to suggest that inquisitorial discourse fails to distinguish between different kinds of evil: on the contrary, at the second level of knowledge, Gui’s *Practica*, overflows with information on how to distinguish those features specific to each type of heretical sect and transgressive practice, not only describing the heretics’ particular beliefs, but also informing the inquisitor of the manner in which they are likely to react, their demeanor, their temperament, and the kinds of tricks they might attempt to play upon the inquisitor.³² For example, Gui describes the beliefs and practices of the “Manichaeans of modern times” (i.e., the Cathars), glossing his description with condemnatory phrases and interpretations. He suggests specific questions that might be put: if the deponent had “adored” them, or had been present at a heretication, or had heard them saying things about baptism, marriage, or confession. He notes that “these are the general interrogations for the said sect, from which special questions often may be developed through the good industry and alertness of the inquisitor”: a perfect example of the “will to know.”³³

Finally, at the third and most specific—or rather, most individualized—level of knowledge, the inquisitorial discourse claims to “know” things about specific transgressions. It can recognize for example that *fautores* are not those who excuse heretics “with a slippery tongue or in jest,” but those who defend heretics in hidden meetings; and that *fautores* often “incite simple men to love and respect the heretics when they have diminished and weakened the Church.”³⁴ These definitions of specific categories are the features particular to each transgressive identity; and the inquisitor’s recognition, or construction, of these features is what allows him to place each deponent into the appropriate category and identify him or her by the appropriate name. The process of individuation earlier marked by the inquiry into “circumstances” demanded by the *Doctrina* is here brought to maturity.

What is the purpose of this “will to know”? Relatively soon after the beginnings of inquisition in southern France, it was not simply to combat or destroy heresy, if by “heresy” we understand the supposed threat that the Cathars posed to the established Church. This threat had arguably disappeared in 1229, when Raymond VII formally swore to persecute heresy in the land, and certainly was gone by 1244, after the fall of the major Cathar castle at Montségur. But the Inquisition was changing from being the sociopolitical police force of Languedoc into something more complex, individualizing and wide-ranging. To some degree at its inception, and without doubt by the later part of the thirteenth century, the Inquisition had turned the pursuit of heresy

into a process of gathering, interrogating, noting, collating and naming. The motive force at the heart of this process was the desire to *represent* heresy; to control and order and communicate the meaning of transgression.

“To Correct the Guilty Life; or at Least, to Make Visible Who Walks in Darkness, Who in Light, Who is Truly Penitent, Who Feigns Conversion”³⁵

I have made brief reference above to the penances imposed by the Inquisition; now it is time to focus upon this area in detail. As many writers have stressed, inquisitors were both devising penances designed to bring the straying sheep back into the fold, and (particularly in the years immediately after the Albigensian Crusade) were imposing punishments to deter other *fautores* from aiding the Cathars.³⁶ Grado Merlo has argued that inquisition instituted repression of a “ritual character,” which used words, gestures, and images that reaffirmed “l’hégémonie de l’Eglise et celle de son message religieux aux yeux des hérétiques et à l’égard du public, dont on renforce le conformisme en assimilant hérétique et ‘déviant’, hérétique et criminel.”³⁷ This idea of a symbolic “hegemony” is useful and, as we will see below, has been developed by other writers. However, it is important to remain cautious of an overly structural approach toward the operations of inquisition, or to condense the complexities of its procedures into one monolithic project. Gui’s manual sets out the purpose of inquisition: “to correct the guilty life; *or at least* to make visible who walks in darkness, who in light.” That uncertain conjunction points back to the passage in the *Processus* on the difficulty of specifying in writing the essential task of inquisition: whether inquisitorial discourse was dealing with the deponents as objects for representation or subjects of interrogation and penitential care. Once again, we shall concentrate in the remainder of this chapter upon the former.

What were the inquisitorial penances? In the earlier synodal legislation (1227-34), there was a division between penances applied to *heretici* and *credentes* (who were to be punished as *heretici*) on the one hand, and their *fautores*, *receptatores*, and *defensores* on the other. As noted above, *heretici* were moved to “Catholic” towns and made to wear two crosses displayed on their clothes, or (if they were impenitent) were imprisoned for life.³⁸ Houses where *heretici* had lived or stayed were to be knocked down.³⁹ Those who had been posthumously declared heretical were exhumed and burnt.⁴⁰ Those who had supported heretics lost their goods or their lands (unless they were judged to be *credentes*, and therefore legally punished as *heretici*).⁴¹ They were also publicly excommunicated every Sunday, which not only effectively punished them by *infamia*, but also rendered them liable to becoming *heretici* if they were not reconciled to the Church within a fixed period.⁴²

As I have argued, these punishments were primarily directed toward forcibly converting *heretici* and strongly discouraging *fautores* from giving them further support. Guillaume Pelhisson, for example, was quite clear that

the burning of *heretici* (which he notes caused a good deal of public unrest) was to put the fear of God into *heretici* and *credentes* who had not spontaneously converted.⁴³ He also describes how exhumations were performed “in the presence of the people,” with a herald proclaiming the names of those disinterred, saying “Qui aytal fara, aytal perira [Who behaves thus shall perish thus].” They were reburied in the meadow of the count of Toulouse, which was unconsecrated ground.⁴⁴ Such public pronouncements undoubtedly acted as discouragements. They might also be seen as an element that appears more strongly in the later councils: the representation of transgression and its consequences, by the Inquisition to the laity. In this earlier legislation, the representational strategies adopted are bold and simple, drawing a sharp and explicit line between the medieval community of the faithful and those excluded from that community. The complicated problem of “belief” is assuaged by collapsing the categories of *heretici* and *credentes*, and both are excluded (literally, by imprisonment, in the case of impenitent heretics). Knocking down houses and burning the bones of the dead (thus denying them resurrection at the Final Judgment) can also be read as spectacles of expulsion, encouraging, through their formalized violence, the recreation of *communitas*— that is, firmly reinstating “the flock” away from the “otherness” of heresy.⁴⁵ The crosses borne by converted heretics were, in this earlier legislation, homologous to the symbols of exclusion assigned to such “marginalized” groups as the Jews, designed primarily as aids for shunning the outsider. However, as inquisitorial discourse grew in complexity during the thirteenth century, these representational strategies were to change.

The later councils are not sharply divided from the earlier group in their imposition of penance.⁴⁶ Stubborn and impenitent *heretici* were “released to the secular arm” for “punishment by the due penalty” (*animadversione debita*; undoubtedly, by this stage, a sentence to death by burning);⁴⁷ repentant *heretici* and persistent *fautores* were imprisoned;⁴⁸ dead *heretici* could be exhumed and burnt;⁴⁹ and houses could be destroyed and goods seized.⁵⁰ However, the later councils expanded in both range and detail the most public penance: carrying the crosses of infamy. This was no longer applied simply to penitent *heretici*, but to all categories of *fautores*, and the penance was “tailored” to each level and degree of transgression. The specific elements of the penance vary slightly from council to council. The council of Narbonne in 1243 orders that each penitent “carry” (*portare*) crosses on his or her clothing and process barefoot to the parish church every Sunday between Epistles and Gospels. There, the penitent presents him or herself to the priest with a stick in hand, and is beaten by him. On the first Sunday of every month the penitent must also visit every *domus* where he or she saw *heretici*.⁵¹ The Directory of Béziers (which closely follows the earlier councils in most matters) makes no mention of visiting houses, but does supply a very specific description of the crosses:

In detestation of their ancient errors, they must carry on their clothing two crosses of saffron yellow, two

and a half palms long and two palms across, and having a width of three digits, one in front on their breast and the other behind, between their shoulder blades . . . And if they are *vestiti heretici*, or *damnati*, they must carry a third cross ... on their head or veil. And if they have strongly perjured themselves, or led others to perjure themselves, they should wear on the upper part of the two crosses (which they have to carry on their breast and between their shoulder blades) a crossbar, of one palm or thereabouts.⁵²

The ruling of the council of Tarragona in 1242 is very similar, except that it specifies that men must wear breeches and a shirt while women retain ordinary attire. This council also clearly sets out further periods when the penitents were to be ritually excluded from church, and the number of years this exclusion was to apply for each level of transgression. The days on which they were to process to the cathedral church were: All Saints (1 November, celebration of Christian fellowship); the first Sunday after Advent (parallels Lent as preparation for Christ's coming); Christmas Day; Circumcision (1 January); Epiphany (6 January); Candlemass (2 February, purification of Mary, and Christ presented in the temple); the Feast of St. Eulalie (12 February);⁵³ Annunciation (25 March); and all the Sundays in Lent. In addition, on Candlemass and Palm Sunday they were to process to the parish church and receive discipline from the bishop or priest. On Ash Wednesday they were to present themselves (again barefoot and dressed in breeches and shirt) to the cathedral church, in order to be expelled for all of Lent, then reconciled back on Maundy Thursday. The ritual processions were to last for "as long as they live" in the case of *credentes* (though they would only be excluded during Lent for ten years); for ten years exactly for relapsed *fautores*; and for seven, five, and three years respectively (with an additional reduction in the number of penance days) in the cases of *vehementissime suspecti*, *vehementer suspecti*, and *suspecti*.⁵⁴

As with the definition of categories, the main difference between the earlier and the later canons is an increase in detail. The canons of the councils of Tarragona, Narbonne, and Béziers focus on the minutiae of penance, indicating once again the different context within which they were written, freed from the political demands of the period immediately following the Crusade and able to formulate a procedure and knowledge for the prosecution of heresy. The penances are part of the process of individuation and identification: they mark out each of the categories as separate identities, individual elements within the larger threat. As the categories had allowed the construction of individuated objects of inquisitorial knowledge, so the penances took these individual objects and tried to fix them into place by marking them clearly for their sins.

But from where was the Church gaining its inspiration? Were heretics and their supporters markedly different from other medieval sinners? Is it possible to decipher other cultural meanings attached to the specific penances? Above all, to return to the quotation that introduces this section, were the penitential and representational projects of the Inquisition in concert or in tension? To answer these questions, I will look to three interlinked contexts: the wider

realm and history of public penances; the long history of the struggle between the Church and heretics over external appearances; and the medieval preoccupation with the relationship between external signs and interior identities.

Public Penance

Public penance was a legacy from late antiquity.⁵⁵ It was originally a ritualized and extreme exclusion not only from the Church but the entire social structure, and although it formally fell into disuse after the fifth century, these elements were subsumed into the withdrawal from the secular world implied by entry into a monastery.⁵⁶ In the ninth century it was intensively propagated, and ran in parallel with “private” penance. The rule for assessing which was to be applied was, on the surface, fairly simple: “if they have sinned publicly, they are to receive public penance; if they have sinned privately, they are to receive private penance.”⁵⁷ “Public” sins were those that caused “public” offense, originally meaning offense to specific, powerful social groups, but later implying offense to the Church, or rather, to God; and thus demanding public penance, lest God wreak his displeasure upon the people as a whole. In practice, “public” sins included parricide, adultery, and incest.⁵⁸ Such penance in the early medieval period was a solemn ritual: the sinner was driven from the church, dressed in a sackcloth (*cilicium*), and obliged to make amends in “semicaptivity” (usually a monastery), until he or she could be publicly reconciled with the Church.⁵⁹ As private confession and private penance began to supersede the early medieval forms, three kinds of penance were distinguished: private penance, which could be required by any priest and usually involved giving alms, fasting, or pilgrimage; public penance, which differed little from private penance, but was performed before the congregation or involved a penance that was necessarily known by the people; and solemn penance, which could only be imposed by bishops, and even then only once in the lifetime of the penitent (although the single penance could last for several years), where the penitent was ejected from the church on Ash Wednesday and reconciled on Holy Thursday wearing penitential garments.⁶⁰ This last category, which was a remnant of the earlier practice of “public” penance, was only applied for “reserved” sins, such as incest, sodomy, or murder; and it is obviously one element in the foundations of the penances for heresy.

Penances for heresy might therefore be seen as a subset of “solemn” penances: the Church was keen to present heresy as a capital offence and hence a public crime;⁶¹ the penitent was dressed humbly and ritually excluded from church over a period of years; and as with certain capital sins, the penance was awarded at the inquisitor’s discretion but within the guidelines laid out above.⁶² Other “public” crimes were punished or publicised in similar ways: usurers, perjurers, and “sorcerers” (*sortilegi*),

diviners, and those who had committed incest were to be excommunicated publicly every Sunday and feast day, in a similar manner to heretics and their supporters;⁶³ prostitutes were frequently punished in the thirteenth century by being stripped, led to church, and publicly beaten.⁶⁴ However, there were three important differences between “solemn” penance and inquisitorial penance.⁶⁵ Firstly, as I have already mentioned, solemn penance could only be awarded once, and effectively debarred the penitent from civil society. Inquisitorial penances, on the other hand, provided for “relapsing” *fautores*, who would therefore receive a second penance. The Inquisition was not primarily concerned (at least after its early period) with absolute exclusion from society; it was more interested in managing and mapping areas of transgression. Secondly, although “solemn” penances (and “public” penances) based themselves on common symbols (the hairshirt, exclusion from church, and so on), the specific ritual varied from place to place and sometimes from penitent to penitent. For example, in 1202 Innocent III provided a penance for a man who had cut out a Bishop’s tongue. The penitent was to be led around in breeches and shirt for fifteen days in the region of his crime, “with his tongue drawn out and fastened with a cord,” and to be scourged at every church door; and then to spend three years on Crusade.⁶⁶ Mansfield says there are nearly as many versions of public penance as there are pontificals, noting that “no other episcopal rite shows anything like this variety.”⁶⁷

It would seem that public penance was designed to be tailored to the local situation. In marked contrast, the Inquisition statutes and manuals set out a strict hierarchy of transgression, using different signs to indicate the degree and nature of sin. Every category had its specific penance, and although there was some variation between councils, the central concepts of hierarchy remained uniform throughout Languedoc. Thirdly, at least in theory, the penances awarded in “solemn” penance were under no circumstances to reveal the exact nature of the penitent’s sin; the reason for this being, originally, that the penitent was likely to be a public figure and should not be so humiliated as to be unable to hold power afterward.⁶⁸ In contrast, inquisitorial penances were specifically intended to communicate the exact sin. The Directory of Béziers expands upon the reasons for performing the procession to church:

At mass, every Sunday or feast day, between Epistles and Gospels, with top garment and veil or hood removed (unless on the veil or hood they carry crosses), they must publicly present themselves with sticks in hand to the priest at Mass ... and there, when they have been disciplined, the priest will expound that by their penance the stain of heretical guilt may be driven out. They are then to make procession . . . with top garment removed and with head bare of veil or hood ... and to carry on high in their right hand (between the cleric and the people) a long stick, and at the last station present themselves to the man leading the procession *who will expound to the people that they do this penance because of that which they have committed in the crime of heretical depravity* [my emphasis].⁶⁹

Here was a particular effect of that dual instruction, “to correct the guilty life, or at least to show who walks in dark and who in light”: the ascription of a degree of subjectivity (the penitent speaking of his or her own sins) but

confined within a system of objectification (the penitent presented as an object for the edification of the lay audience).

Mansfield suggests that whereas public penance in the tenth and eleventh centuries had been a collective rite of expiation for the whole community, in the thirteenth century penance became more individualized and a form of humiliation for the specific sinner. After the Fourth Lateran Council, each Christian made his or her own annual confession and so would no longer read the public penitent as a representative of the community, but as a sign of a particular kind of transgression (and therefore a warning of how he or she might also transgress).⁷⁰ Inquisitorial penance might be seen as part of that change: the individual doing penance for heresy was being personally humiliated, but was also representing a specific degree of transgression to the rest of the Christian faithful, who were themselves all potential sinners.

One might point to a fourth difference between “solemn” or “public” penance and inquisitorial penances: normally, the public aspect of penances was performed at one specific place and time (although they might be repeated over a number of years, if, for example, someone was ritually excluded from church for seven Lents). In contrast, marked as they were by the yellow crosses, the inquisitorial penitents carried out their penances every day of the year, until they were allowed to “put them down.” The yellow cross was more than a slight impediment: the council of Béziers in 1246 legislated that no one should “mock” those wearing the crosses or prevent them from gaining work.⁷¹ Despite this injunction, various deponents appear in the inquisitorial registers who had “put down” the crosses without permission, precisely because they found it difficult to get work, or were otherwise persecuted.⁷² Inquisition had turned the delimited ritual of penance into a powerful system for representation and control. What we should examine next, therefore, is the semiotic context for the penances.

False Piety

As we have seen, ecclesiastical polemicists had a range of *topoi* and rhetorical vocabularies upon which they could draw: the depiction of heresy as a disease; the devilishly inspired plot against the Church; the hubristic madness of individual heresiarchs; the foolishness of the common folk; the licentious and depraved behaviour of heretical sects. Perhaps preeminent among these pictures (because it provided an explanation for the possible disjuncture between the other *topoi* and observed reality) was the depiction of the heretic as falsely pious, one who presents a facade of deep humility and piety, deeper in fact than most of his peers, in order to mask his depravity and evil deeds.

This dual signification of heretics had been present for a number of centuries. Adémar of Chabannes, a chronicler working from hearsay accounts of heresy, reported the appearance of “Manichaeans” in Aquitaine around 1018. These, he said, “abstained from food and seemed like monks; they

pretended chastity but among themselves they practiced every kind of debauchery.” Similarly, Adémar described ten canons, discovered to be heretics at Orléans in 1022, as appearing to be “more religious than others.” These heretics practised “abominable” crimes in secret, “while publicly they pretended to be true Christians.”⁷³ The heresiarch Henry of Lausanne, in the early twelfth century, was said to hide “the madness of a ravening wolf under sheep’s clothing” (Matt. 7:15), and furthermore, “everywhere he went he gained an increasing reputation for astonishing holiness and wisdom; not by merit but by deceit; not by truth but by appearance.” In fact, his appearance was so holy that he was initially invited into Le Mans by the bishop, “little suspecting the deceits of a Trojan horse.”⁷⁴ The model of a good exterior concealing a nasty interior was not, of course, confined to heretics: women could also be presented as attractive surfaces that hid interior horrors.⁷⁵ But in the case of heresy, it was a particularly pertinent image, since heretics presented the problem of competition, in practice and appearance, for the orthodox Church.

It also presented a hermeneutic problem: how did one uncover the paradoxical relationship between exterior appearance and interior depravity? St. Bernard’s sixty-fifth sermon on the Song of Songs, addressing the problem of heresy, struggles with this question of interpretation. He argues, following the Gospel of Matthew, that the truth is revealed by the fruits of the heretics’ work; seeing that they “demolish the vine of the Lord,” one can deduce the evil nature of apparently pious heretics.⁷⁶ But although theologically satisfying, this line of attack did not provide a procedure that could be carried out with any speed or certainty; nor could it effectively police how the laity responded to the apparent piety of heretics. It did not, for example, answer a question raised by Eberwin of Steinfeld, in a letter to Bernard; Eberwin had noted that when some heretics at Cologne were burnt, they bore the flames with patience and joy. “I should like you,” wrote Eberwin, “to explain whence comes to those limbs of the devil constancy such as is scarcely to be found even in men most devoted to the faith of Christ.”⁷⁷ Bernard, like most churchmen, had no answer. One solution to this conundrum was presented in the early thirteenth century by Caesarius of Heisterbach, who tells, in a preaching *exemplum*, of heretics who were able to withstand the flames of the fire. These heretics were protected by indentures given to them by the devil, sewn into their flesh under their armpits—a stunningly literal vision of the disjunction between exterior appearance and inner reality, but one unlikely to aid those engaged in a practical pursuit of heretics.⁷⁸

The piety of heretics posed particularly unsettling problems. In the eleventh century, as we saw, Bishop Wazo of Liège had counseled toleration of heretics, in part because certain French people were identifying heretics “by pallor alone, as if it were certain fact that those who have a pale complexion are heretics.”⁷⁹ Most troubling of all, at certain points the heretics themselves were capable of deploying the same language against the orthodox Church. A

debate between bishops and heretics (possibly Cathars) at Lombers in 1165 records the responses of the heretics to the Catholics' questions. The heretics told the bishop present that "he was a heretic, not they; that he was their enemy; that he was a ravening wolf, a hypocrite, an enemy to God." They refused to answer questions on their faith, because they were guarding themselves, having heeded the Gospel of Matthew (7:15): "Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves."⁸⁰ In drawing attention to the apparent disjuncture between exterior and interior, medieval commentators were also opening up problematic and dangerous areas of doubt. As we shall see in the next chapter, the procedure of inquisition, particularly in its reliance upon confession, was one way of trying to solve the problem of interpretation. But it was not a complete or final solution.

The Church, particularly in the thirteenth century, was therefore engaged in a fairly explicit struggle with heretics (particularly Cathars and Waldensians) over the ownership of signs of piety. It is clear that medieval commentators understood that the behavior and dress of the Dominicans were directly formulated on the model set by Cathar *perfecti*: pairs of wandering preachers, dressed in an ascetic manner, in imitation of the Apostles. "Use a nail to drive out a nail" was Diego of Osma's description of this competition.⁸¹ This struggle was conducted for the sake of the audience, the laity. The flock could not be trusted to read signs correctly, and was too easily deceived by exterior appearances; at the same time, bold and simple exterior signs were a useful way of instructing the simple mind. This dichotomy led the Church into what might be called, to borrow a term from Gábor Klaniczay, "semiotic warfare" with the heretics.⁸² This warfare extends into the language of inquisition and is slightly in tension with the other developing strand, the codification and knowledge of heresy. For example, Bernard Gui finds it necessary repeatedly to gloss the label *hereticus consolatus* (a "consolated" heretic, that is, one who has received the *consolamentum*) as *immo verius desolatus* ("or more truly desolate").⁸³ This might be read as a specific point about heretics' duplicitous use of language, except that Gui goes on to indicate a different etymology, underlining the disjunction between inquisitorial "knowledge" and the semiotic struggle: "many years ago he was made a *hereticus consolatus*, or more truly *desolatus*, and was received into the sect and heresy of those who call themselves alone, and no others, 'good men' and 'good Christians,' that the Holy Roman Church calls or names *heretici perfecti* or *consolati*, but more truly *desolati*."⁸⁴ There is a struggle over language here (primarily over the term "good men") but also a struggle between the Church's desire to label transgression in a technical fashion, and the desire to gloss it in a condemnatory manner; again, the tension between the construction of subjects of knowledge, and the production of objects for representation. Before turning to the question of subjectivity in detail, we can conclude this chapter by completing our analysis of the semiotics of transgression: its audience, its

Stigma Symbols

Robert Jütte has described the vast range of symbols—badges, jewelery, hats, clothing—that were used in the late Middle Ages to signify particular, excluded groups in medieval society.⁸⁵ The yellow crosses for those doing penance for crimes of heresy were only one symbol in a whole range of possibilities. Most famously, the Jews had been compelled by the Fourth Lateran Council to wear signs or clothing to distinguish them from Christians, which the thirteenth-century councils of Languedoc specified as the *rotae*.⁸⁶ Similar signs marking out minorities were applied to prostitutes, lepers, beggars.⁸⁷ Other signs were also used by the Inquisition to mark out particular transgressors: those who bore false witness had to wear, “two tongues of red cloth, one and a half palms long and three digits wide, on their chest; and two hanging between their shoulder blades; and to stand with their hands tied on the steps before the Host in a certain church . . . from the beginning of morning till the hour of nones, with a bared head and beltless shirt.”⁸⁸ Priests who baptized idols were to wear “two figures of idols with a ewer, of saffron-yellow”; anyone who tried to use the Host to practice magic was signed with “a circular Host of saffron yellow.”⁸⁹

There are a number of differences, however, between Jütte’s “stigma symbols” and the inquisitorial signs for penitent heretics. First of all, the groups Jütte describes were all condemned to wear their marks for life, since the reasons for their exclusion were (with the possible exception of prostitutes) permanent. In contrast, those marked by the Inquisition were, at least in theory, moving from one state to another: they were doing penance, in order that they might return to the bosom of the Church.⁹⁰ This fact is stressed in the inquisitorial literature, which enacts legislation protecting those wearing crosses, and on one occasion compares them to the Prodigal Son.⁹¹ At the same time, unlike other penances, the crosses and the symbolic exclusion from church held the inquisitorial penitents at a very public and protracted distance from the community of the Christian faithful, sometimes for periods of over ten years. A second difference follows from this: most of the groups marked out by signs were thus distinguished so that Christians could avoid them. Legislation concerning Jews and lepers makes this clear, and also includes statutes limiting the movements of these groups on certain, symbolic days.⁹² This was not the case with heretical penitents. Although in practice they might suffer exclusion as a result of their crosses, the statutes are clear that those signed with the cross are not to be mocked (*inridere*) or to suffer socially on account of their penance.⁹³ Since penance for heresy was in part designed to “show who walks in dark and who in light,” one cannot therefore, at this later stage, simply place the penitents within the imaginary subset of medieval society, “the marginalised.”⁹⁴ Their position is more

complicated; the signs do not signify complete “otherness,” but rather *strata* of transgression.

This signification of a hierarchy of transgression also marks out the penitents as performing a rather different function from that of the earlier, twelfth-century condemnation of heretics as simply “bad” or “insane.” The degree of transgression committed by each individual was attributed to them by the public sermons that first publicized their crimes, and continually marked by their future penitential behaviour. The sermon was intended publicly to list each “order” of crime from the least serious to the most grave, with the penitent standing up as his or her transgressions were enunciated and penance assigned (again, marking him or her as an individual).⁹⁵ Bernard Gui orders it thus:

Recite or read out the guilt of those sentenced or penanced in this order: firstly those who are under discretionary penance to make pilgrimage and carry crosses, and to observe the general rules of life; then those who are simply imprisoned; then those who are penanced and imprisoned for false witness; then priests and clerics, if they are degraded and imprisoned; then deceased who, were they living, would be declared imprisoned; then deceased impenitent of the crime of heresy whose bodies are exhumed; then fugitives who are condemned just as *heretici*; then relapsers into heresy . . . who are relinquished to the secular arm, firstly laity then clerics, if such there are; then *heretici perfecti* who refuse to convert . . . lastly, in truth, those who first made confession . . . and then revoked that confession, or who are convicted of the crime of heresy by witnesses and refuse to confess the truth, and cannot defend or excuse [*purgare*] themselves ... who, as impenitents of the crime of heresy are relinquished to secular care.⁹⁶

The summary of each person’s crimes, and his or her appropriate penance, was read out firstly in Latin (emphasizing that the *litterati* inquisitors controlled the process) and then in the vernacular, “so that it can be perfectly perceived and understood by the same people.”⁹⁷ Those who had previously confessed to their parish priest were to be sentenced and reconciled in secret, and their names held back, unless their crime was known publicly through *fama* or witnesses, in which case they had to be included. (The council of Tarragona notes that the priest should not have absolved the penitent, since heresy was a “reserved” sin to be dealt with by the bishop or Inquisition, but that the absolution was nonetheless valid).⁹⁸ Apart from emphasizing the central position the Inquisition sought to retain over the management of heresy, one should also note once again the concern with public appearances and communication. Although people might be absolved by the priest, with an unspecified penance, the statutes and manuals seek to formulate and propagate a strict, ordered, publicly visible system for their sentencing and absolution.

Given that the crosses and other penances were to be read by the *populus*, can one say more about the specific choice of signs and the times when the rituals of exclusion were to be performed? To answer this, we need to look again to the broader context of “semiotic warfare” conducted by the Church, among others, in the Middle Ages. Gábor Klaniczay has analyzed the tension between the desire for clothes and outward appearances to reflect, on the one hand, social hierarchies of class and power, and on the other, to carry “moral-symbolic” meanings. As we have noted, he indicates how the “wandering

preachers” of the twelfth century, and then the Cathars and Waldensians, used clothing and appearance to signify their ascetic and apostolic lifestyle, which allowed them to launch criticisms against the Church’s hierarchical splendor. The mendicants reappropriated these symbols and “turned the tables” on the heretics, using the same symbolic power to attack their enemies.⁹⁹ This battle over the ownership of apostolic piety did not however end in the early thirteenth century. The Cathars, from the late twelfth to the early fourteenth century, made a point of emphasizing their claim to an apostolic heritage through their manner of dress and conduct, their way of life, and their preaching.¹⁰⁰ The signs of apostolic spirituality were therefore part of a continuing struggle in this period, a struggle firstly over who owned them, the Church or its critics. But external signs were also part of a more complex conflict, the problem of determining the relationship between outer appearance and inner reality.¹⁰¹ I have already mentioned the *topos* of “false piety,” which sought to discredit the straightforward link between (heretical) asceticism and interior morality; other studies have also pointed to a gradual breakdown or greater complexity in the relationship between exterior and interior.¹⁰² Klaniczay quotes the example of the fabliau of the “Ill-Fitting Coat” that reveals the true nature of the person who wears it: a perfect match between exterior and interior. For him, this utopia illustrates “the medieval dissatisfaction regarding the ambiguous and uncertain symbolism of clothes.”¹⁰³ Clothes, or signs, could be used to conceal identities (for example, when healthy people adopted the dress of lepers), a ruse that might have varying degrees of success. The penitential garb and actions formulated by the Inquisition can therefore be seen as one part of the Church’s attempt to dictate and control the meaning of clothing, worked out elsewhere in the signs for Jews and lepers, and the burgeoning sumptuary legislation, also adopted by the secular authorities. However, like any sign, clothing and exterior appearances have a tendency to “slip” from their original position and meanings. To give just one example, in one location earrings could move from being a sign of Jewishness to being a Christian accessory forbidden to Jews; and conversely, could elsewhere shift from being an acceptable decoration for the Virgin Mary to being a symbol of Jewish pollution.¹⁰⁴ What was at stake, therefore, in medieval “semiotic warfare” was not only the “ownership” of specific symbols, but the ability to dictate and determine how symbols were *read*.

With this in mind, let us look back at the specifics of inquisitorial penance. Public burnings, exhumations, and the destruction of houses occupied the darker end of the spectrum of punishments, and in that respect their role was supremely important. However, the overwhelming weight of signifying “heresy” and “repentance” fell to the penitent *fautores*, *receptatores*, and *defensores*, whose penances were extremely public; were specifically “glossed” in the vernacular for public consumption; and took place over the greatest length of time and in the widest variety of places (since they were

acting as signs not only during the ritual at church, but also in every public place where they sported the crosses). And, moreover, this group greatly outnumbered any other class of transgressor in heresy.¹⁰⁵ The days upon which they were to process to church, in order to be excluded, were all public feast days when the attendance of all the Christian faithful was required, and all major dates in the life of Christ. The one exception is the feast of St. Eulalie, 12 February. St. Eulalie of Barcelona was a martyr of the early Church who was killed by a Roman judge after Eulalie berated him for forcing people to worship false gods and refused to touch the incense and chrism she was proffered.¹⁰⁶ She therefore offers a perfect example of how to conduct oneself in the presence of heresy, a lesson to be learnt by the *fautores* and *receptatores* of Cathars, and more importantly, by those others—the laity in general—bearing witness to their penance.

Why were the penitents to wear crosses? The signs for other kinds of transgression are all straightforwardly mimetic: red tongues for false witness, pictures of idols for idolaters, pictures of the Host for those who had misused it.¹⁰⁷ What was the cross imitating? As H. C. Lea notes from a slightly different perspective, “[it] seems a contradiction that the emblem of the Redemption, so proudly worn by the Crusader and the military orders, should be to the convert an infliction almost unbearable.”¹⁰⁸ One should not discount the power of symbolic inversion (which is what Lea goes on to hint at), which can link the highest and lowest elements in a semiotic system;¹⁰⁹ and one must remember that the crosses were yellow, a color associated with many excluded groups.¹¹⁰ But still a problem remains, particularly when one notes that the penitents were frequently referred to as *crucesignati*—a term normally reserved for Crusaders.¹¹¹ Crusaders were, of course, also penitents of a kind, and were also acting as models of Christian behavior,¹¹² but it seems curious that they should share a sign and a name with those who had represented the Church’s enemies at home.

The answer to this conundrum lies in the struggle noted by Klaniczay over the power to assign meanings to exterior symbols. The penances assigned by inquisitors were designed to show the laity “who walks in dark and who in light.” This struggle had been going on for a very long time, beginning perhaps with the battles over interpreting the lifestyle and behavior of wandering preachers in the twelfth century. Henry de Marcy, writing at the end of that century, had summed up the problem of authority in relation to the Cathars: “Heretics speak, and all admire them. A Catholic speaks, and they say: Who is this?” The solution, he suggests, is to dictate meaning: to tackle the heretics, “and throw into light the work of darkness.”¹¹³ In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the penances were a way of illuminating the darkness. James Given interestingly suggests that the inquisitorial system of punishment can be read as the establishment of a hegemonic system within Christendom, that sought to establish a “collective consciousness” that taught, and gained assent for, the binary division of “orthodoxy” and

“heterodoxy.”¹¹⁴ I think, however, that this identification of a binary is analytically insufficient. What we see with the changes wrought by inquisition is precisely a move away from the easy and absolute distinction between orthodoxy and heresy found in earlier discourses (although the division between the two still of course persisted). Due to the changes discussed above that categorized and individualized transgression, the penitents did not simply represent “the Dark” as one, homogeneous block: through the hierarchy of signs and rituals, they set out before the eyes of the people a charcoal spray of transgression. The message of the penitential rituals was not a straightforward division between “heresy” and “orthodoxy,” but a more complex and stratified area of possibility and danger. This communicative element can in part be seen as a complement to preaching, as could all inquisitorial tasks.¹¹⁵

But the people themselves were no longer seen simply a homogeneous lump. The Church had made changes in what it required of each Christian in the thirteenth century, from the need for annual confession to the learning of prayers. It had also formulated a more amorphous notion of “Christian behavior.” The council of Toulouse, in the wake of the Albigensian Crusade, had for example ordered that when people took the universal oath of abjuration, they should “manifest a good faith”; in a similar vein, a letter to accompany a penitent tells the Christian faithful that they must treat him well, as long as he comports himself “in all respects as a Catholic.”¹¹⁶ Gui’s *Practica* presents specific penances for heresy (such as going on pilgrimage) but accompanies these with assertions of good orthodox practice: confessing three times per year, hearing mass on Sundays and feastdays, abstaining from labor on Sundays and feastdays, shunning the observance of divination and magic, and avoiding usury and rape.¹¹⁷ Being a Christian in the thirteenth century had become more demanding, and the possibilities of erring much greater. The possibility of multiple varieties of transgression, and the Church’s management of it, were represented by the friends, neighbors, and enemies seen everyday, bearing their yellow crosses. The penitents therefore not only illustrated “the Dark,” but also the ease with which one could fall into it.

This is one element in the semiotic battle: the instruction of the laity, changing with the developments in the Church’s expectations of its flock in the thirteenth century. But there is another side to this, relating to the specific choice of symbols. Rather than seeing the cross as an unusual choice of sign for penitent heretics, we might recall the same long struggle that the Church had had with heretics over the “ownership” of signs of piety. In this context, the crosses and Christocentric days of penance make much more sense.¹¹⁸ They not only mark out the penitents as transgressors and assert the Church’s power to award penance and assess categories of transgression: they also assert the Church’s ability to determine how these signs were *read*. The cross, the lowly clothing, the bare feet, the beating, could all be seen as signs of

piety.¹¹⁹ In this case, the Church was asserting its power to make these signs indicate *penitence* rather than elevated piety. The public penances for heresy emphasized contrition over restitution and dramatized in a highly public and extended manner the Church's control over absolution and entry into the community of the Christian faithful. To be "signed with the cross," whether as one departing for Outremer or as one processing each year to church for ritual humiliation, underlined the Church's power and authority over the control of exterior signs of piety and how they should be read and understood. The penances attempt both to "set straight the guilty life" *and* to "show who walks in dark and who in light."

The next chapter analyzes the move from the positioning of lay people as objects for inquisitorial scrutiny to the construction of lay people as speaking subjects. When examining the transition from objects to subjects, it is relevant to reflect once again on the systems of penance. Carrying crosses of infamy was a public performance, one that involved moments of carefully choreographed ritual (in the procession and beating at church) but also the more loosely negotiated performance of bearing these marks within everyday life. As a performance—a moment of theatricality—it involves positioning both the spectators and those they observe. In other contexts, medievalists have linked this kind of theatricality and spectatorship to the construction of new subject-positions and understandings of the self.¹²⁰ What we see with the theater of inquisitorial penance, however, is perhaps a period of change. It seems clear that the penances and punishments—from the carrying of crosses to the burning of houses and, occasionally, the burning of people—initially functioned as a fairly simple set of dividing significations: marking out the good from the bad. It may be that, in parallel to Mansfield's assessment of penance in general, the penances were also designed to produce a sense of shame within the penitent; but "shame" does not, within a medieval context, necessarily indicate an individualized subjectivity. Shame can operate, rather, through marking the exclusion of the penitent from the collective whole—an assertion of the group rather than the individual. As first conceived, then, inquisitorial penance sat quite happily within the assumption of the laity as a general flock or "lump," for both penitent and spectators.

But I would suggest that this changed during the thirteenth century. As noted above, the increased specificity of inquisitorial categorization led the finely graded rituals of penance to represent not a homogeneous block of "otherness," but a stratified field of transgression. And, accompanied by the changing expectations of the "good Christian life" and the wide embrace of the inquisitorial missions in the 1240s, this field of transgression became more and more aligned with the potential to sin among *all* lay people, not just the unfortunate few. This, surely, changed the position of the spectator: no longer the general mass observing that which had been cast outside it, but the individual lay person beholding the dangerous and various possibilities of transgression open to him or her. Subjectivity, of a kind, is thus produced; and

no less for those performing the penance. The experience of being observed as “the outsider” is the experience of being an object under the sight of others. But the experience of being beheld as the signifier of *particular* transgressions, of *particular* degrees, necessarily involves an element of individuation. The specificity of later inquisitorial penance is bound up with the specificity of one’s actions and words. This does not, yet, necessitate the apprehension of an interiorized and reflective “self”—but it does mark one as “individual,” in the degree and details of one’s transgression. Thus the penitential system of the mature inquisition ineluctably pushes an undifferentiated spectatorship, and an unproblematic object for beholding, into a more complex arena of individuation.

This returns us to the relationship between inquisitorial procedure in the second half of the thirteenth century and the general development of the *cura animarum*. The Church was developing a new role for the laity, engaging in what André Vauchez has called “the campaign of interior reconquest.”¹²¹ Through the aggregation of statutes, confessors’ manuals, and preaching material the Church reconfigured the place of the laity, of every social level, within Christendom. To live as a good Christian still involved practical matters of social action—attending mass, paying tithes—but was now also working toward an interiorized reflection on and monitoring of belief, inculcated primarily through sacramental confession and through the active reception of vernacular sermons. As Roberto Rusconi describes it, in an analysis of preaching and confession: “Cette évolution correspond d’une part au désir, chez les autorités ecclésiastiques, de contrôler plus rigoureusement la société, et d’autre part, à la nécessité dans laquelle se trouve l’Eglise d’offrir des modèles de comportement qui permettent de sauvegarder l’hégémonie culturelle des clercs sur le corps social.”¹²² The development and diffusion of these hegemonic models was a long and drawn-out process, not something instantly created by the demand for annual confession, nor something willed into being by any one person or group. Inquisition was part of this: although inquisition was a legal process, the task of the inquisitors was increasingly understood as a penitential act of care, pushing it further toward a construction of the people it questioned as interiorized subjects capable of self-reflection. And although inquisition only directly affected that relatively small number of Christians interrogated by the tribunals, the development of inquisitorial mechanisms played a part—perhaps a large part—in constructing models of an interiorized, confessing subjectivity, monitored (by both the Church and the subject him or herself) within models of comportment. It is to this area we shall now turn.

The Construction of the Confessing Subject

Introduction

In the year 1290, on 15 September, a woman called Richa Topina of Rivière-Cabaret was interrogated by the Dominican inquisitor Guillaume de Saint Seine. The questioning took place in the prison of Carcassonne, where she was already sequestered, and the register tells us that she was “spontaneously” adding to a previous confession, the records of which have now disappeared. We will discuss later the Inquisition’s curious investment in the idea of “spontaneity” under such circumstances, but at this point let us concentrate upon the production of texts through the translation of speech into writing. The register records that Richa confessed to having first met the Cathar heretics Bernard Pages, Nairros, and Bernard Costa at Rivière-Cabaret some twenty years before, in the house of Raymond de Boucher, and along with others had “adored” them, and for four or five years had believed them to be “good men” and that she would be saved in their faith and sect.

On 4 October, Richa was questioned once again, and further added to her deposition. After recounting a few variant items, she spoke as follows:

Item, she said that when Barthélemy Leret of Rivière-Cabaret was sick at Rivière-Cabaret in his house, of the illness from which he died, a certain day (which she does not remember) around the beginning of the night, when she the witness was visiting the aforesaid ill man, present there before her were Raymond Caunas and Raymond de Boucher who had led [there] Guillaume Pages and Bernard Costa, heretics, who, the aforesaid ill man wishing and petitioning them to hereticate [him] and receive [him] into their sect, held the hand of the ill man between the joined hands of one of the heretics, and said certain words that she the witness did not understand, as she said; and there were present at the said heretication she the witness, the aforesaid Raymond Caunas and Raymond de Boucher, Pierre de Leret and Elissende his wife, Raymond Leret (brother of the ill man), all of Rivière-Cabaret. And when the heretication was done she the witness and all the aforesaid others adored the aforesaid heretics, bending their knees according to the rite [*modum*] of the heretics, and saying “bless.” Asked about the time, she said that it could have been twelve years ago or thereabouts as it seems to her; it was however that illness from which he [Barthélemy Leret] died. The day, hour, place, and circumstances were as she had said above.¹

After this item, Richa continues in the same vein; in fact, in an identical vein. She goes on to recount the deathbed heretication of Raymond Leret (Barthélemy’s brother) in exactly the same narrative form: she visited Raymond when he was ill, of the illness of which he died, and found the heretics there who performed the purifying ritual of the *consolamentum* (that which the inquisitors termed “heretication”), and she and the others present

“adored” the heretics according to their rite. Richa then continues to repeat the same narrative in a further eighteen cases; in four of them, the narrative is abbreviated to the terms “as above,” but in the majority the full story is given, using (with a tiny degree of variation) the identical words given above with only the names changed.²

Why should this interest us? There is nothing remarkable about Richa’s confession. She tells us precisely nothing new about Cathar beliefs or practices. We hardly know anything about her, her life, or her social status. It would be fair to say that, of the many surviving records of inquisitorial deponents, hers is among the most dull and repetitious. This, however, is its point. As I waded wearily through Richa’s deposition—and other similar depositions—hoping that some pearl of interest might be uncovered amid the tedium, a thought occurred. Richa was not only telling me nothing new (beyond providing the names of a few more Cathar sympathizers); she was also telling the inquisitor nothing new. The inquisitor knew all about the ritual of *consolamentum* and the *melioramentum* (that which he termed “adoring”); hence he was quite happy to have the latter abbreviated to “bending knees and saying ‘bless.’”³ What Richa was essentially giving him was a series of people who had died “hereticated,” and a series of heretical supporters. Her information could have been rendered quite quickly and simply as a list of names. One *might* suppose that in her original speech, to aid the process of memory, Richa needed to recount every separate story; but this does not explain why the inquisitorial scribe, when translating these words into writing, would choose to mirror her repetitive narrative.

As we have previously noted, the deposition records are not the transcripts of the interview taken down verbatim: they are later redactions created by the scribe, turning the question-and-answer session into a past-tense narrative. There was, therefore, every opportunity to condense the record (as, on four occasions, the scribe chose so to do, by abbreviating the story to “as above”). But this opportunity was not taken. Here, then, is our pearl: the tedious repetition itself. There is something of interest here in what might be seen as an attempt to represent speech in writing, suppressing the technical possibilities of the written record to condense, paraphrase, and cross-reference, possibly in order to assert the oral, personal nature of the confession. Perhaps, therefore, we see an attempt in the records to mimic the loquacity of speech, to occlude thus their own writtenness, and to emphasize the “spontaneous” speech of the confessing subject over against the powers and mechanisms of recording that speech. If so, the scribe performs his task badly; or, rather, lacks yet the tools of verisimilitude and variation that come to signify, for us, the attempt that writing makes to imitate speech, since he offers almost no variation in words, grammar, or vocabulary to differentiate or personalize each narrative. We are, at any rate, once again reminded that what we have before us is *writing*. We are also aware, in some way, that we have an intriguing excess of writing; that the records are not innocent tools,

transparent acts of communication, but are texts.

This chapter concerns the circumstances under which such texts were produced, and an analysis of the textuality of the records, in order to provide certain reading strategies for analyzing the depositions. In the last chapter we saw how different elements during the thirteenth century led to a greater individuation of lay people within ecclesiastical discourse: the changing understanding of what “heresy” was and meant; the tension between outer appearance and inner “reality”; the desire to categorize transgression and control the semiotics of penance. But individuation does not immediately produce “individuals”; or rather, a recognition of the various discursive processes that construct individualized subjects reminds us that our assumption of what “an individual” might be needs examining both historically and theoretically. How what I have chosen to call “the confessing subject” was produced is bound up with an analysis of textuality. As we shall see, the changing treatment of the deponent over the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries was not a natural evolution, but an ideological shift in emphasis; and even in the early fourteenth century, when the records become richest, the confessing subject is still caught up and bounded by ideological factors. The reasons for this are twofold. First, the idea of autonomous confession lies at the heart of the Inquisition’s claim to be an authoritative producer of “truth.” The subject confesses not for him or herself, but for the Inquisition; this fact is covered over, however, by an assertion of the autonomy of confession. Second, the subject is not a presence “revealed” through writing, but a presence constructed within writing. The Inquisition placed great emphasis on the use of documents, but as already noted it is essential to view these registers and letters as *texts*, rather than as simple conduits for information. The confessing subject is above all a textual subject, constructed within a particular discourse; and subjectivity, I am suggesting, should be seen as an operation of (textual) power, not a transhistorical presence revealed through language. The confessing subject was not her or his “own” self: he or she was also subject of, and subject to, the Inquisition.

Richard Kieckhefer has recently argued that there was no such thing as “the Medieval Inquisition”: there was no centralized, permanent institution or staff, but only the particular tasks and contexts of those individuals acting as inquisitors at certain periods in certain places.⁴ In seeking to correct a degree of laziness among medievalists who casually refer to “the Inquisition” doing certain things (such as redirecting itself against witchcraft in the fourteenth century) his argument is strong and timely. However, in emphasizing the contingent and personal nature of inquisition, there is a danger that we might bypass important questions about power, language, and the use of records. As Alan Friedlander has noted, certainly by the early fourteenth century contemporaries clearly saw the “office of inquisition” (*officium inquisitionis*) as existing independently from individual inquisitors.⁵ Where Kieckhefer points to the meaning of *officium* as being closer to “function” than our

modern connotations of “office,” we can nonetheless note that the medieval sources do make a distinction between the *officium*—the task to be fulfilled and the manner in which it should be carried out—and those charged with its completion. The *Practica*, for example, provides a sentence for those who “opposed the office of inquisition or the inquisitors of heretical depravity”; although the two terms are obviously related, they are not synonymous.⁶ We can also note that although Thomas Aquinas differentiates *officium* from *status* (state of life), since the former is related to “function” (*actus*) whereas the latter “requires stability in that which regards the condition of the person himself,” the examples he uses to illustrate *officium* are a physician and a judge, and he notes that *officia* are not differentiated by the infinite variety of human acts, but are grouped around the different *species* of acts performed within them.⁷ Inquisitors might thus be seen as similar to physicians, in that they can be recognized as inquisitors by the similar types of actions they individually perform. This does not mean that the *officium inquisitionis* was a formal institution, but it does suggest that recognizing only individual inquisitorial acts is an underestimation. The inquisitors themselves did not see things this way: as we will see below, they were becoming a kind of professional group.

Most important, they shared an authoritative procedure and language: as we will discuss below, the mechanisms for the production of “truth” within inquisition, such as confession and textuality, form a discourse that transcends the more limited circumstances of the individual inquisitor.⁸ Those entrusted with the *officium inquisitionis heretice pravitatis* were supposed to possess particular qualities suitable for the task. A section that only appears in the long version of the *De inquisitione hereticorum* bewails the fact that it is difficult to catch heretics because of a lack of sufficiently zealous and persistent men to carry out inquisition, and that such men must also be clever enough to know how to trap them and not to be fooled into letting them go.⁹ Bernard Gui similarly implies that inquisitors must be not only *magni litterati* in order to detect heretics (and Cathars in particular) but *experti magni litterati*.¹⁰ He expands upon the qualities an inquisitor should possess, including diligence, zeal, discipline, constancy of purpose, and the ability to deal effectively with areas of doubt, “that he should not easily believe all that seems to be true, because not all of such always is true; nor stubbornly disbelieve the opposite, because often what does not look like the truth is found to be true.”¹¹ The assessment of the amount (*quantitas*) of guilt and type (*qualitas*) of person, necessary for the correct imposition of the requisite penance, is possible “following the wisdom [*discretio*] given to you by the Lord.”¹² The ideal inquisitor was therefore the epitome of the literate, knowing subject; one possessing not only the technology of literacy, but also the wisdom of *discretio*, the authority of *litteratura*.

It is in this sense, therefore, that we can use the collective label “the Inquisition”; and it is in its discursive and textual workings that we can

discuss operations of power beyond the particular circumstances of each individual inquisitor. The Inquisition used the depositions and other records it created as sources of factual material, but they also had another function. As sites of discourse, they construct identities, place each deponent within one of the categories discussed in the last chapter, and permit the possibility of future transgression. This was probably the most powerful operation of inquisition: the control of the future as well as the past. The question of subjectivity is also, therefore, a question of power.

Since the second section of this book is concerned with reading this evidence in detail, in this chapter I limit my use of examples to those particular cases which illustrate most plainly the power at work. This is to say that (1) the case I make in this chapter about subjectivity is designed as a preliminary statement which is explored further in the rest of the book (particularly in the final chapter); and (2) much of the evidence I quote here is not composed from a synthesis of the material, or of representative moments, but from parts of inquisitorial discourse that, precisely through their unusual constructions, illustrate the wider workings of the inquisitorial system. The tedium of Richa Topina's deposition is more representative of the vast body of inquisition records; through discussing some more obviously shining pearls in the registers, I would suggest, we come to better understand the operations of language and power hidden behind that cloak of boredom.

Inquisition and Textuality

The fact that inquisitors created, kept, and used documents is so obvious for the historian, since they are the main source of evidence, that it is sometimes forgotten that this is a particular feature of inquisition, and that the systematic keeping of records was in some senses "unusual," or at least part of a wider change toward a more bureaucratic and written culture. Inquisition documents were not made for "us": the logic that informed their production is part of the historical situation under analysis. They need to be approached as *texts*, which means firstly that the effects of their Latinity and their "writtenness" must be examined; and secondly that they must be understood not as passive reflectors of events occurring "elsewhere," but as sites of discourse that are inextricably part of the performance of power and authority. As texts, they must be analyzed not only in terms of what they *say*, but also of what they *do*: their functions, their effects, their textuality.

Although some historians have read the inquisitorial texts as if they are transparent and provide windows into the lives of the deponents, questions of power in relation to the use of records have not been entirely ignored. James Given, for example, notes that "One of the most striking aspects of [the inquisitors'] work is the effective use they made of documents."¹³ The aspect of power considered by Given is the use of documents to cross-reference information and thus catch out mendacious deponents. This power could be

politically motivated, as when the inquisitor Geoffroi d'Ablis removed a royal official at Albi from office by proving from inquisitorial records that his grandparents had been in contact with heretics.¹⁴ But whether “political” or “effective” in other ways, this approach tends to see the use of documents as both natural and obvious. Henry Charles Lea spoke of how inquisitors “recognized” the “value” of their records; Arno Borst calls the records “(les) livres pratiques”; Yves Dossat notes that “l'intérêt pratique d'une bonne conservation des documents apparut rapidement aux inquisiteurs.”¹⁵ It is necessary to unpack some of the assumptions that lie behind these thoughts, since they form part of the broad narrative that sees inquisition (whatever its faults) as a move toward a more measured and rational method of control.¹⁶ Although the harsh and excessive activities of two of the earliest inquisitors—Robert le Bougre, active in northern France, and Conrad of Marburg, at work in Germany—have frequently been presented as somewhere between extremely overzealous and completely insane, historians tend to qualify their actions as anomalous.¹⁷ Indeed, this pair's tendency to prosecute and execute indiscriminately is sometimes taken to provide a perfect contrast with the calm and measured approach of most other inquisitors: they become the exception that proves the rule. The development of inquisition is thus depicted as part of the new “rationality” that bade farewell to trial by ordeal and other “superstitions,” and welcomed a notion of “intentionality” to criminal procedure. The use of documents was central to this rationality (or to historians' recognition of it): “the inquisitors used their records in . . . an active, analytic fashion.”¹⁸

The invocation of rationality is always a dangerous thing. There is a tendency to see the “rational” use of documents as a sign of modernity and therefore something that can be left relatively unquestioned. James Given makes explicit some of the assumptions: “Some inquisitors subjected the records . . . to a form of scientific scrutiny. *Like modern historians* they were interested in discovering what heretics believed and what practices they followed” [my emphasis].¹⁹ But the narrative of any historical move from “irrational” to “rational” has come under attack from various quarters; not in an attempt to deny that things changed, or that processes of thought were at work, but to note that what changed was the idea of what constituted “rationality” itself, and that “rationality” is always a contested term.²⁰ Let me clarify my argument: I am not suggesting that the inquisition texts were actually “irrational,” but rather that (1) the concept of the “rational” is historically contingent (and that Given's scientific analogy is not the only way to describe inquisitorial practice); and that (2) the assumption that the methods of inquisition are the same as those of historians can mean that historians fail to scrutinize these methods. As Talal Asad puts it in his analysis of the wider move from ordeal to *inquisitio*, medievalists should be “recognising a historical problem where they see only a triumph.”²¹ If the earlier methods used against heresy were, in their historical situation, as

“rational” as the later ones, then we need to find another way of analyzing the thinking that lay behind the move to documentation and textuality, and the effects of that move.

Information as Power

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the production of records about the laity in contact with heresy had been important from the beginning of the thirteenth century. As the inquisitorial process expanded, the concern with the management of these records grew.²² The registers are more than the by-product of inquisition; from the very first inquisition manual, one can see a complex investment in a nexus of textual authority, autonomous confession, authenticity, and the production of “truth.” The mid-thirteenth-century *Ordo processus Narbonensis* follows its list of questions for deponents thus: “Finally, after that which he has confessed . . . has been written down, in the presence of one or both of us [inquisitors], with at least two other persons qualified for careful discharge of this task associated with us, he verifies everything which he caused to be recorded. In this way we authenticate the records of inquisition as to confessions and depositions.”²³ By the early fourteenth century this element had grown. Gui’s *Practica* is full of details concerning the recording of depositions and other *acta*: it notes, for example, that a deponent who was found to have perjured himself did indeed “authenticate” his own confession; that inquisitors can consult and copy from books or quires which contain information on inquisition; and that they can require cities in Lombardy to record in their chapter books apostolic and imperial laws against heresy. And, of course, there is the simple fact that the *Practica*, like the *Processus* and the *Doctrina*, is largely comprised of formulae designed for the express purpose of recording inquisitorial information.²⁴ The overall *negocium fidei* relies upon the creation, protection, and intercommunication of texts, whether as a means to “uncovering” heretical sects, or as a form of speeding along the announcement of various penances.

The Practica also makes it plain that inquisitorial registers and other documents were of great importance. Gui, for example, advises inquisitors to keep a copy of a papal letter setting out the laws and statutes pertaining to inquisition in a separate book for easy consultation. A form letter he provides indicates that the *domus* of the Inquisition in Toulouse should not be let to others in the inquisitor’s absence, since the books and acts of Inquisition were kept there. Another form letter dictates the terms for allowing information contained in the inquisitors’ books to be copied out for royal officials: this, it warns, should happen “rarely, and not without great and rational cause.”²⁵ The records, above all else, belong to the Inquisition.

The system that created and circulated texts made efforts to establish clearly their Latinate authority over against the *illitterati*. For example, those

sent on pilgrimage were required to take with them the letter of penance, a letter which described their crimes and fixed their identity within a particular transgressive category for the duration of the penance (and indeed beyond, since the records were kept even after absolution and satisfaction). These letters were to be returned to the inquisitors, or those who succeed to their office, with accompanying letters from officials at the shrine visited.²⁶ The letter was written in Latin, and the penitent was told to present it on the first Sunday of each month to his or her own priest “or other literate and Church person, and he is to have the letter read and expounded to him in the vernacular, so that through this what he should do and from what things he should abstain is defined.”²⁷ The method of reading things to the laity first in Latin and then in the vernacular is also used for the initial presentation of penances at the General Sermon.²⁸

That the laity located the power of inquisition at least partly in its documentation is well attested by the various plots and attempts to destroy those documents: in Narbonne in 1235; at Avignonet, during the massacre of the inquisitors in 1242; in Narbonne again in 1248; and the best known, unsuccessful, attempt at Carcassonne in 1285, when a plot to break into the inquisitorial archives and steal *particular* registers went wrong through a combination of confusion and duplicity among the conspirators.²⁹ The Franciscan Bernard Délicieux’s criticism of inquisition documents is also well known, though he was, of course, criticizing the manner of their creation and veracity rather than their existence. In fact, a closer look at the massacre of Avignonet also reveals that the records were not destroyed on the spot but appropriated: the witness Bérenger de Lavelanet tells how Pierre Roger de Mirepoix and twenty-one other knights returned to Montségur saying that they had killed brother Guillaume Arnaud and brother Stephan, “and showed the caskets and books and charters and vestments and things which they had from the slaughter of the said brothers.”³⁰ Although one purpose of bringing back such bounty was to prove the deed done (as, in similar spirit, Pierre Roger supposedly demanded of Guillaume Ademar, “Traitor! Why have you not brought me the severed head of brother Guillaume Arnaud?” and declared that he had wanted to drink wine from it³¹), certain of the records survived to be sold to Cathar *perfecti*.³² It was, perhaps, not the existence of the records themselves that frightened the *illitterati*, but control of the information they contained and how they were employed.³³ It most surely demonstrates that to the contemporary opponents of the Inquisition the texts constituted in large part what they were fighting.³⁴

And the Inquisition’s documents were undoubtedly powerful. As Michael Clanchy points out, to write upon a durable medium, such as parchment or paper, was to make a record for possible future consultation.³⁵ Inquisitors certainly made use of their records in just such a way: for example, Bernard Benedict of Villardonel was arrested for questioning in 1288 because he had appeared in “the books of inquisition” for an earlier offense; he denied any

further transgression.³⁶ Some spectacular cases illustrate the communication of information across a generous period of time: a woman who was sentenced in 1316 was found to have relapsed from an earlier abjuration given in 1268;³⁷ an inhabitant of Albi was caught out by reference to records dating back twenty years.³⁸ These are, however, relatively rare occurrences; more common is cross-referencing between contemporaneous cases, and frequent cross-referencing over a period of years when one individual was repeatedly subject to inquisition. Inquisitors often proceeded by concentrating on one geographical area, as for instance in 1308 when Geoffroi d'Ablis arrested the entire population of Montailhou, or even in the broad-ranging inquiries of Bernard de Caux and Jean de St. Pierre in the 1240s, where the depositions are arranged by town.³⁹ One should note in these cases that although written documents were useful, they were not perhaps essential or inevitable: memory presumably also aided the inquisitors in checking the veracity of interrogations.⁴⁰ The fourteenth-century depositions of Beatrice de Lagleize and Barthélemy Amilhac, discussed in detail in Chapter 5, provide much evidence each against the other, and would therefore allow for crossreferencing; they were, however, depositions given at much the same time to the same inquisitorial staff. Much inquisitorial cross-referencing was not essentially dependent upon written records. One does occasionally find depositions that, because of the specificity of the questions, suggest that the inquisitor might have been testing the deponent against other evidence.⁴¹ These are also rare however; the vast majority of depositions, until the early fourteenth century, follow closely the standard questions suggested by inquisition manuals.

There are also individuals who reappear within inquisition records over a lengthier period of time, where the effects of record-keeping seem more certain. Fabrissa Vital of Toulouse and her daughter Philippa appear first in records from 1274. Accused by her neighbor, Fabrissa made several depositions before the inquisitors Ranulphe de Plassac and Pons de Parnac, as did Philippa. The evidence given against Fabrissa clearly shaped the questions she was asked: her first deposition is almost entirely composed of lengthy questions suggesting that she said certain things, followed by her brief denial. In later interrogations she began to crack. The inquisitors were certainly aided in her interrogation by the records made shortly beforehand from the evidence of the accusatory witness, since the exact phrasing is usually repeated; but they were also, no doubt, aided by memory, since all the depositions (as far as one can tell) took place over the same few months.⁴² We do not know Fabrissa's fate; however, there is a sentence against Philippa dating from 1307. This records the fact, and brief details, of Philippa's original interview with Ranulphe de Plassac and Pons de Parnac in 1274. It goes on to mention a sentence that "relaxed" her from the crosses imposed by the inquisitors Ugo Amiel and Jean Galand, a further confession before Pierre de Mulcéon, and the details of a confession she made in 1306 before Bernard Gui. Her final

confession, again before Gui, was on 18 February 1307. The contact she had had with heresy was unexceptional —present at preaching, seeing, and speaking with heretics (including Pierre and Jacques Autier)—though she finally confessed to believing that the heretics were good men and that she could be saved in their faith. She was sentenced by Gui to be released to the secular arm, to be burned, having “returned like a dog to vomit” after her earlier abjurations.⁴³ Her fate was sealed by the records of earlier transgressions; records certainly could “catch people out,” and could be cross-referenced in a manner similar to the historian’s task.

But this is not the whole story. Sometimes the effect of recording things was not so much to discover transgression as to produce it. One can argue that Philippa’s transgression was produced by the records: her fatal sentence arose not so much from the stubbornness of her support for the heretics (which was not unusually strong) as from her repeated contact with inquisitors. Philippa “relapses” into heresy; but this relapsation is a product of the textual memory of inquisition. The records were not innocent. Yves Dossat quotes one example of inquisitors using past records to show how “la consultation d’une ancienne confession a permis de découvrir la fraude.” However, “la fraude” was not a “relapsation” into heresy, but in fact consisted of having failed to confess *again* to events previously revealed to other inquisitors: “he admitted, having had read to him the confession which he had made to the other inquisitors, that he had often seen heretics and adored them and eaten with them.”⁴⁴ This is a reference to texts the inquisitors already have, and the desire is not to add to the total store of information but to make the deponent repeat his confession to a past event. Indeed, the transgression is manufactured entirely by this demand for repetition, since the passage also makes it clear that the deponent had in fact already confessed (although previously to those “other inquisitors”) to seeing, adoring, and eating with heretics. Historians have seen these questions about past inquisitors as attempts to reconstruct registers that had been lost, particularly those lost after the massacre of the inquisitors at Avignonet.⁴⁵ This may have been one motive, and inquisitors were aware that the lack of registers could cause problems: Bernard de Caux appealed to the archbishop of Narbonne on the question of what to do about people who knew that the records concerning them had been lost, and who were therefore scorning their citations.⁴⁶ It is true that deponents were frequently asked whether they had previously confessed to another inquisitor, and that there are various short depositions simply stating that the witness had previously confessed to Guillaume Arnaud and afterwards had had no contact with heresy.⁴⁷ However, the question was not limited to the lost investigations of Guillaume Arnaud: for example, in the investigations of Ranulphe de Plassac in the mid-1270s, deponents were frequently asked whether they had previously confessed to anyone. Guillaume Arnaud is mentioned,⁴⁸ but so are the inquisitors Brother Reginald, Guillaume Bernard, Bernard de Caux, Stephan de Gàtines, Brother Ferrier,

Reginald de Chartres, and Pons de Parnac (Ranulphe's co-inquisitor), along with Brother Alguisio (a papal legate) and Brother Pierre Augier (a Franciscan).⁴⁹ Presumably some of the records of these contacts survived, even if we cannot be certain that Ranulphe de Plassac had access to them.⁵⁰ The question on prior confession is therefore not the straightforward recovery of information sometimes imagined.

The records of inquisition are a necessary—we might even say, *the* necessary—constitutive part of the Inquisition's existence. They provide a collective textual memory for the *officium* of inquisition. They permit the operations of various kinds of power: catching out suspects, permitting future investigations, constructing future transgression, and producing particular subjectivities. And they assert the primacy of literacy and “wisdom” (*discretionem*) that underwrite the inquisitors' claim to authoritative knowledge and control. Gui notes that the inquisitor should take care over the appearance of the records:

Note . . . that although any and all of the questions can be asked according to the different persons and facts to draw and worm out the truth more completely, it is not expedient that all interrogations be formally recorded but only those which more clearly touch the core or essence of the matter. . . . If in one deposition a great many questions are found, another deposition containing less may seem too small; moreover, with so many questions written in the process, concord in the depositions of witnesses can hardly be found, a contingency to be borne in mind and avoided.⁵¹

Gui's notion of how the truth may be reached overlaps, perhaps, with modern historical procedure, but his concern with appearance and the problem of lack of “concord” is part of a very different methodology. Inquisitorial records frequently contain elements that seem “unproductive” to historians; there are depositions, for example, that simply record the fact that the witness denied a long list of heretical beliefs,⁵² or confessed that the deponent had previously confessed to another inquisitor, had received and completed penance, and knew nothing more.⁵³ As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, in the deposition of Richa Topina, there are lengthy, repetitious passages, when the deponent tells of many similar events, often using identical narratives and language, simply inserting the names of the people. This is not “rational” record keeping as historians understand it; neither does it precisely follow Gui's advice about length. But this kind of textual “excess” is necessary to place each person within the inquisitorial narrative, to write them into the text. It is important to examine the textual operations of the records, what the authority of their “writtenness” permitted and allowed, rather than simply viewing them as obvious tools. Asserting “rationality” in the use of documents constructs them as innocent and inevitable. We must therefore investigate how “rationality” masks the exercise of *power*.

Textuality as Power

Although reconstruction of information might have been one reason for questioning deponents on past confessions, it does not seem to have been the

sole function of this inquiry. The question of prior confession raises several issues. One is that, strictly speaking, if the deponent had already confessed and performed penance for heresy, the inquisitors could not prescribe another punishment. On other occasions the deponent confessed to having concealed things from the previous inquisitor, and therefore his or her earlier absolution was invalid.⁵⁴ But there are two more important effects of asking whether the deponent had previously confessed. The first is that (as in the case of Philippa) it opens up the possibility of future transgression. To illustrate this point, it is worth quoting one deposition in full:

In the year above [c. 1278], 3rd kalends of June [30 May], Arnaud de Corneilhan of Toett in the diocese of Toulouse, coming cited, sworn as a witness and asked etc. [sic] said that he the witness had formerly confessed on heresy to brother Guillaume B[ernard] d'Aquart from whom he had received penance; and afterwards he did not transgress [*delinquere*] in this said crime, nor knew more about the fact of heresy.⁵⁵

The main point of recording this bit of noninformation is to get Arnaud to swear again to having abjured heresy; and thus, should Arnaud falter at any later date and appear once more before the inquisitors, he would be guilty of having “knowingly concealed the truth” under oath. Since this is exactly what several people admit elsewhere, as I have mentioned above, one might imagine (although it is not spelled out) that the inquisitors were using existing records to catch people out in just such a fashion. This was a powerful weapon. For example, the deposition of Guiraud de Aveyron, given around 1284, apparently indicates a rare escape from the inquisitorial use of documentary evidence:

the witness denied ever seeing or having faith in heretics; when asked if he had ever confessed to other inquisitors or received penance, he said not. He was then shown a letter of G[uillaume] Arnaud, inquisitor, showing that G[uillaume] Arnaud ratified a penance against Guiraud de Aveyron, squire, that he should give 100 pounds Quercy to the poor, and visit Rome for a forty-day period [i.e., on pilgrimage]. To which he replied that he had never seen Brother Guillaume Arnaud inquisitor, nor Brother Pierre Seila, nor is he of that estate,⁵⁶ and said that he reputed the said letter to be false or that through error his name was placed on it.⁵⁷

This is an unusual deposition, and Guiraud’s tactics appear to show unusual success (although we do not know what other records have now been lost).⁵⁸ Guiraud effectively points out one of the weaknesses of written authority—the possibility of error or forgery, of a text speaking “falsely” —which is also a weakness reproduced precisely by the inquisitors’ demands that deponents confess again to events contained in other records, since this dilutes the authority of any one single document.⁵⁹ However, Guiraud’s confession—or latest confession, should he in fact have been lying —once again opens up the possibility of future transgression, in precisely the same manner as the inquisitors were attempting to implicate him with the letter of Guillaume Arnaud.⁶⁰ Although the same doubt might arise about accuracy, it is unlikely that Guiraud could use the same tactic twice, even if he were telling the complete truth the first time. One effect of asking about past confession was, therefore, to allow the possibility of future guilt.

But there is a second point, which is slightly more subtle and amorphous,

but in its own way perhaps more important. The inquisitors' use of documents, questions about other inquisitors, and desire for reiterated confessions all serve to assert the primacy of inquisition as an authoritative, written process. The questions about other inquisitors and past confessions do not reproduce in any detail the matter of the earlier confessions, and therefore do not "reconstruct" lost interrogations; instead, they provide a reiterated record of the *history* of the deponents' contact with heresy and with the Inquisition. They also assert the Inquisition's right to jurisdiction over heresy, and right to demand reiterated confessions and penance. It is this right to (sole) management that is being asserted when inquisitors record deponents who have made past confessions to people who are not inquisitors themselves, as in the case of Isambard de St. Antoine, who stated that he had previously confessed to the Franciscan Pierre Augier and had penance from him.⁶¹ Although legally and penitentially the matter had been dealt with by confession to the Franciscan, the Inquisition could assert its primacy of control by recording that confession for its own use.

The assertion of the Inquisition's control can be illustrated by three cases, two concerning a lack of documents, all indicating what might otherwise be read as a certain "superfluity" in the texts. The first is the case of Raymond Jean of Abia, who in 1238 confessed that he was previously reconciled by the Bishop of Albi and had letters of reconciliation from him, and afterward from brother Arnaud, inquisitor. Appended to his testimony (for which he would receive no penance, having already been reconciled) is what is presumably, from its brevity, a fragment of his confession to Arnaud, dated 1235. The information this fragment contains is already attested above in his 1238 deposition.⁶² In terms of rendering information on heresy and heretics to the inquisitors the fragment is therefore redundant. In terms of marking the existence of "the Inquisition" as a textual process, the deponent's contact with the Inquisition, tying the deponent's future behavior to this record, and above all ensuring that the power of validation, identification, and categorization is located in a *text*, it is essential.

This is similarly illustrated by the cases of Pierre Guillaume and Bona de Puy of Prades. Pierre confessed in 1274 to past contact with heretics, for which he claimed to have been absolved by Brother Guillaume B[ernard], prior of the house of Preachers at Toulouse, at the mandate of Brother Guillaume de Montreuil, inquisitor; and furthermore that he had been given a letter of license to meet with certain people including Etienne Donat, heretic, in order to regain a legacy.⁶³ However, Pierre could not show his new interrogators the letter of license—because, he said, he had returned it—and consequently could not prove the license, absolution, and reconciliation. The inquisitorial record does not make explicit comment, but at his next interview, nearly a year later, he was in prison. What he confessed at this second interview was, however, nothing to do with the letter or the question of license: he talked instead of heretical contact earlier in his life. He attested

that he had abjured this earlier contact before at a general abjuration, though he was not sure if he was then under oath; and he ends by admitting that “he recognizes that he did wrong because recently he knowingly concealed this [i.e., the earlier contact] before us against his oath.”⁶⁴ The importance of a textual record of contact with heresy is both undermined and affirmed: the record can be lost, but the inquisitors must be able to demand again the history of the deponent, bind it with an oath, and place it in writing; to reconstitute it, with an added attribution of guilt.

Bona’s case similarly concerns a missing document. She confessed in 1274 to Pons de Parnac and Ranulphe de Plassac, admitting to contact she had had with heretics.⁶⁵ In a later interview she also admitted to having received Bernard Godalh, a heretic, and to having eaten bread with him. This incident occurred, she said, before she had confessed to one Brother Reginald and his companion, inquisitors; and, moreover, she had perjured herself before them by failing to tell them this. However, she *had* confessed her contact with Bernard Godalh to Lord R., then bishop of Toulouse,⁶⁶ but it was not written down (*sed non fuit scriptum*). Now, whether or not her episcopal confession was recorded—or, indeed, whether or not it really took place—makes no legal difference, since Bona had already admitted perjuring herself before the inquisitor Reginald, and (through the other contact she confessed) of relapsing after abjuration. Why then is the *lack* of a text noted here, particularly when such a text would be anyway unexpected, since Lord R. was not an inquisitor, either papal or episcopal, and sacramental confessions were not otherwise recorded? It is noted in order to assert the necessity that Bona’s heretical history be recorded: the need to put into writing what she did, to provide her with a confessing identity under the auspices of the Inquisition, and to assert the Inquisition as the authority controlling these texts and identities.

The Inquisition also sought to control the language used to describe and delineate heretical transgression. Gui several times recommends that inquisition should proceed “plainly and simply, without the rumblings and formulae of advocates and lawyers,”⁶⁷ and that inquisitors (with the counsel or acknowledgment of the diocesan bishop) can define and order anything that appears “doubtful or obscure” in past statutes against heretics. They can curb the preaching of pardoners, where it impedes the Inquisition. If, when captured, a stubborn heretic attempts to end his or her life in the *endura* (the supposed practice of starving oneself to death, having received the *consolamentum*), the inquisitor should proceed to sentence as quickly as possible, before the *perfectus* escapes into silent death.⁶⁸ Since the heretic’s sentence will be to be cast out from the Church and executed, rather than returning to its bosom, there is no penitential implication in the inquisitor’s haste, simply the need to pronounce definitive sentence. Similarly, the *Practica* contains a sample sentence for someone who “incautiously and thoughtlessly” *asserted* that he was a heretic over the objections of the inquisitor. The deponent, having been forced to “recognize his guilt” was

sentenced to public discipline and an oath of good conduct. The passage ends in noting that after examining the witness, “we found little heresy, nor from this do we think him a heretic; unless other [things] legitimately appear to us against him.”⁶⁹ The desire for control of definition asserts the correct description of identity, while retaining the possibility of future reinscription, should other evidence appear.

To recapitulate: the inquisitors used texts that were not simply repositories of information (as historians’ consider their own filecards), but that enunciated and effected operations of power within language. The inquisitors, during the course of the thirteenth century, formulated a discourse about heresy and transgression and laid claim to a privileged authority for this language. The texts they produced did not simply record information, but reiterated a history of the deponent’s contact with heresy, and with inquisitors. It is in this sense that one might speak of the Inquisition with a capitalized letter: not as the fictional “institution” Kieckhefer rightly decries, but as a mechanism for producing “truth,” using a particular kind of authority and language, that lays claim to continuity in its textual repetition. The inquisitorial process, and the texts it produces, extend beyond the individual inquisitor, who is himself constituted by them. Thus far, we have examined the construction of the inquisitor and the manner in which members of the laity were placed into categories or turned into objects of the inquisitorial discourse. But there is another, more insidious operation of power at work in inquisition: the power of subjection.⁷⁰

Confession and Power

Inquisition depositions are also confessions, and confession lies at the heart of the Inquisition’s production of truth. The council of Narbonne in 1243 set down the precept that no one was to be condemned without “clear and frank proof, or their own confession,” and the earliest inquisition manual fervently reinforced this principle.⁷¹ The Directory of Béziers, three years later, reversed the two terms, and set the pattern for later manuals, so that confession was the most desirable object.⁷² It is their confessional aspect that has rendered the records so enticing to historians, since the promise of confession is to see “inside” a historical actor and perhaps to “catch the plain man on a weekday” as Alexander Murray puts it in a different context.⁷³ For precisely this reason one needs to analyze what was understood by “confession” in this specific context, and to explore what kind of subject was understood to be producing the confession. Inquisitorial confession does not give us “weekday” access to ordinary people, if weekday access implies an unmediated and direct contact with an unhistoricized “interior person”: as we shall see, notions of “inferiority” and “confession” are historically constructed, rather than natural.

Omnis utriusque sexus, canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council, made

annual confession by all Christians a requirement of faith. There has been debate as to whether or not Lateran IV instituted annual, private confession, and how quickly annual private confession permeated regular, lived piety.⁷⁴ Certainly the laity confessed individually to priests at least slightly before 1215, as Robert of Flamborough's early confessor's handbook, the *Liber poenitentialis*, predates Lateran IV by five years. On the other hand, statutes from southern France reiterated the need for annual confession well after 1215, and latterly included details on how individual confession was to be conducted (for example, that the priest should not look the confessant in the face, particularly if she was a woman).⁷⁵ As Murray has recently pointed out, individual confession, alone of all the pastoral duties of a priest, configured a new relationship between priest and laity. To act as confessor was to work, in part, without a script and therefore, in Murray's language, to act as a counselor.⁷⁶ But if individual confession placed the priest in a new position, the same was true of the confessant. The layperson had to act as an individual, producing a narrative of his or her own *self*, in conjunction with his or her confessor. However, the concerns of confession and the stories told about "selves" were not necessarily synonymous with our own concerns and selves. As Mary Mansfield argues, in the thirteenth century individual confession was still very much to do with the "public demonstration of unity in participation."⁷⁷ The sins to be confessed were frequently "social" sins, and the function of confession was still in large part communal. Although individual confession had its roots in a tradition of interior reflection, (and, of course, theologically confession was a necessary preparation for receiving the Eucharist), when the *litterati* applied the practice to the *illitterati*, the former had doubts about the latter's abilities to perform correctly.⁷⁸ As Mansfield puts it, "Thirteenth-century theologians shied away from dreams of interiority [for all Christians] and settled for [policing] the world of private morality."⁷⁹ The concept of self-reflection as a route to knowledge and to God was the province of the *litterati* and not the masses; the implications "confession" held for selfhood were dependent upon other cultural discourses, such as the literate divide.

This new form of individual confession was not a "natural" act but something that had to be learned. There soon developed a vast contemporary literature telling the priest how to conduct confession and how to instruct the laity to confess. The earliest example of a confession manual, Robert of Flamborough's *Liber poenitentialis*, contains idealized exchanges between priest and sinner. Although this was not meant to be a representation of "real" confession, and therefore must be interpreted with caution, one can note that Flamborough has the priest do most of the talking.⁸⁰ The problems he foresees and seeks to illustrate are of confessants asking what certain theological notions mean (for example, the priest asks if the penitent has sinned in *superbia*, and the penitent responding *Quid est superbia?*), rather than confessants garrulously rambling on and the priest having to interpret.⁸¹

The need to teach confession is noted by other medieval writers. St. Peter of Luxembourg encouraged his servants to confess frequently, and instructed one who did not know what to say, “if you never confess you will never know how to confess; but if you become accustomed to it you will soon know what to say.”⁸² Caesarius of Heisterbach recorded the tale of a man unused to the new form of individual confession. When his new, young priest asked him to confess, at first he asked that the priest give him the words to repeat. Eventually he confessed to adultery, theft, rapine, perjury, and homicide. The shocked priest asked him if he had really done all of these things; “Oh no sir, none of it,” was the reply. He had simply been repeating the list of general sins he had learned for general confession; and it proved impossible for him to learn the new method of individual confession. He died without communion.⁸³ Confession was not an easy task; it was a ritual to be learned.

Related to this is the question of power and confession. The agenda of the debate, which has been undertaken within the disciplines of theology and history, has been set largely by Thomas Tentler’s description of “social control.” Tentler’s analysis of how certain kinds of behavior were “forbidden,” and how sinners came to be “accountable to God but also to men,” is useful but has certain limitations.⁸⁴ It has centered the subsequent debate on two notions: the intention of the confessor, and whether or not confession produced the effects that have been argued for it. Boyle, for example, defends Raymond de Peñafort on the grounds that he did not “conceive” of his *Summa* as “an instrument of social control.”⁸⁵ A more interesting view of the relation between power and confession is mentioned briefly by Tentler, but left undeveloped: he notes that one thing the *summae* taught was that once morality had been defined (by the *summae*) “all men were responsible for knowing and practicing it; [and] that those who did not were guilty and should feel guilt and remorse.”⁸⁶ We might describe the process that Tentler hints at as the “hailing” of the subject into confessional discourse, where power primarily operates not from an exterior source “against” the individual’s will and desires, but inculcates the notions of individuality, desire, and will, and shapes them in particular ways. The confessing subject (as I choose to name the deponents dealt with later in this book) is subject to power inasmuch as he or she is a subject *of* confession; confession does not primarily seek to forbid but, as Tentler indicates, to produce certain internal effects. It is precisely through those internal effects that power operates. The confessing subject is one who is taught to constrain his or her own self, to produce a self through the prismatic of “sin” and to recognize its “failures.” The confessing subject does this in conjunction with the confessor, but it is not sufficient to say that the confessor has power “over” the confessant; rather, the act of confession distributes power between the two people, constituting both as subjects within discourse. As Foucault puts it:

The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence . . . of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires confession . . .

[Confession is] finally, a ritual in which the expression alone . . . produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him [sic]; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises salvation. . . . By virtue of the power structure immanent in it, the confessional discourse cannot come from above . . . through the sovereign will of a master, but rather from below, as an obligatory act of speech which, under some imperious compulsion, breaks the bonds of discretion or forgetfulness.⁸⁷

The confessor carries “authority” in that he prompts and interprets the speech of the other, encouraging that “imperious compulsion”; but the process of confession demands that the confessing subject recognize a truth that he or she speaks about him or herself, and constitutes him or herself as a confessing subject, placing him or herself within the web of possible emotions and effects mentioned by Tentler. The power of confession is therefore hegemonic, in that it does not have to effect total control in order to exercise power (that is, it does not have to stop people sinning) but operates by dictating the terms by which people understand their own selves and their positions as subjects, inculcating interiorized reactions to sin and interiorized disciplines. In order to discuss confession and power in these terms, we need to examine the kinds of confession produced by particular discourses, and the type of confessing subject constructed by those confessional practices.

Inquisitorial Confession

Inquisitorial interrogations were supposed to bring the deponent to contrition and absolution, and also to produce a truth spoken about the deponent him or herself and about others, “both living and dead.” These two kinds of truth-telling—before God and before man—were of course intimately connected. But the Inquisition in fact developed a working theory of different types of confession, which held different implications for both types of truth production, and introduced other factors into the system. These factors can be classified under three broad headings: the timing of confession; the veracity of information; and the ontological nature of the confessant. I shall deal with the first two of these here, and the third a little farther on.

The matter of timing was initially related to the question of prior confession to a priest. The council of Tarragona in 1242 expended some energy on the question of jurisdiction over penitents who had already confessed to heresy outside the inquisitorial context (whether before inquisition had begun, or at a time when no inquisition was planned) and the validity of their subsequent absolution. The council decided that although the confession and absolution were illicit (since the priest should have referred the crime to his bishop) they were nonetheless valid, and the penitent was therefore immune from inquisitorial and secular jurisdiction, as long as he or she was not found to be “in false penitence, or to relapse after penance, or to be publicly defamed” (*in falsa poenitentia, vel relapsus post poenitentiam vel publice diffamatus*).⁸⁸ As Maisonneuve points out, although these concerns beg questions of intention and the breaking of the sacramental seal, the final method of arbitration is

through the assessment of the penitent's exterior actions and "disposition."⁸⁹ This also has an implication for the manner of assessing the "truth" of a confession, which I shall discuss below. During the thirteenth century, the issue of timing became more a question of at what point during contact with the Inquisition the deponent had produced his or her confession. One could confess completely "spontaneously," seeking out inquisitors before they had even called a general sermon; or after the general sermon during the Period of Grace; or after the Period of Grace, once cited by the inquisitors; or after being cited, initially refusing either to appear or to take an oath, but then relenting; or after being a little more obstinate and only confessing after a period of imprisonment (which could in itself vary from one day to many years); or confessing after torture; or confessing "before the fire" (that is, after the sentence, just before its execution); or making a statement that was not under oath and did not abjure heresy but defended it. These "stages" were not explicitly codified within the statutes or manuals, but began to appear through practice.⁹⁰ Each deposition notes whether the deponent was "cited," or came "spontaneously," or was captured or led from prison, and when the person had refused to take an oath. These notes are not explicitly glossed, but by implication added to the assessment of a person's guilt and "disposition."

The "truth" of a confession was perhaps affected by such circumstantial evidence of disposition; but inquisitorial confessions were also statements of fact, designed to provide the inquisitors with more information against others. There were, in a sense, two kinds of truth at stake: the truth (and completeness) of information given, and the truth of the deponent's intention and disposition. These truths interconnect, but also cause tensions. Gui's sentences authenticate the factual veracity on which their decisions were founded by underlining that what follows was found through inquisition and through the legitimately received confession of the deponent, or sometimes (when for example deciding the guilt of someone now dead) through the statements received by the inquisitors.⁹¹ But there were two other possibilities: that the deponent lied initially but later admitted his or her guilt; or that the deponent did not "confess" (in the penitential sense) but "defended" his or her beliefs. The deponent Philippa (mentioned above) was sentenced for having "knowingly concealed [this] against your own oath" and having pretended to have been converted "falsely and feignedly."⁹² Another woman called Stephane de Proaude, who initially refused to convert from heresy, had her sentence introduced thus: "Because it is evidently and legitimately found through your *impious assertions* to us" (my emphasis).⁹³ The tensions are clearly presented in the injunction from Bernard Gui to do the utmost to convert Cathar *perfecti*, since firstly they will reveal their accomplices, secondly those deceived by these "masters" (*magistri*) will also convert, following their example, and thirdly others will come forward in order to preempt being cited. At the same time, these conversions are to be treated with great care, particularly if the conversion came after sentencing,

just before the threat of the fire (in which case, the inquisitor should be so suspicious as to imprison them for the rest of their lives).⁹⁴ Confession guarantees the truth of information and saves the deponent's soul—but the inquisitor may ultimately trust neither. Those who swear to return to the Church can have this wish glossed in their sentences “whether feignedly or whether from a true heart,” and the *formulae* in Gui's *Practica* note that the deponent “as he asserts, wishing to return to the unity of the Church” has made his confession.⁹⁵ The “truth” of a confession, within inquisition, was always open to doubt.⁹⁶ As Talal Asad remarks, of inquisitorial procedure in general, “The words [spoken in confession] were not identical with the truth, in the way that the bodily marks of someone who had submitted to the ordeal were identical with it.”⁹⁷ And two further elements must be noted. One is that the inquisitorial sentences work to record what is in effect another oath by the deponent, that he or she has the intention of returning to the Church, which guarantees the possibility of discovering his or her guilt (should he or she be lying) at a later stage. The phrase “as he asserts” does not so much indicate a specific suspicion on the part of the inquisitor as a structural suspicion that is shored up by the existence of records.⁹⁸ The other is that even a false confession, or an “impious assertion” or “profane profession,” paradoxically reveals the “truth”; and reveals it in fact more clearly than a confession that has not been proven true or false. It is precisely Philippa's earlier mendacity that makes “manifest” her “incorrigibility” and legitimates the harsh sentence against her.⁹⁹

Although the confession, in its timing and veracity, therefore presented some problems for inquisition, a confession was still the main prize for the inquisitors and functioned to authorize the production of truth within their procedures. Consequently, after the Period of Grace, the inquisitor might employ a range of coercionary tactics in order to elicit confession. The *Doctrina* states plainly “if he conceals [anything] or refuses [to confess], he is placed in prison and detained until he confesses.”¹⁰⁰ *De inquisitione hereticorum* includes a section on ways of eliciting information, which suggests that the inquisitor can scare deponents into confessing through threats of death; can imprison them, telling them (mendaciously) that there are witnesses against them, so that failure to confess will deny them mercy; can deny them food; and can promise that sincere confession will save them from burning. The idea of the section is summed up in one, grim sentence: “Fear of death and hope of life soften the heart that would otherwise hardly be softened.”¹⁰¹ And of course, the threat of violence permeates the whole system, since the point of the Period of Grace is to confess before heavy penalties might be applied, or before your neighbors betray you anyway.¹⁰²

But although the system was essentially coercive, the central element to the authority of the truth produced by confession was the notion of “spontaneity.”¹⁰³ As Cazenave notes, “[l']idée de spontanéité est liée à celle d'intention.”¹⁰⁴ However, as I have suggested above, the inquisitorial

procedure undermined the possibility of perceiving intention with any confidence; and, in fact, turned the idea of spontaneity into something of a legal fiction. The Period of Grace and the spontaneity it implied was itself, as just noted, a form of coercion. The records also reveal much less subtle examples, particularly in the registers from the end of the thirteenth century. For example, Raymond Garrigue of Puylaurens was imprisoned after his first interview, in which he had denied all knowledge of heresy. Three more interrogations took place, with the witness in prison between each. Finally, having been imprisoned for a year and a day (as the record carefully notes) he “spontaneously” confessed.¹⁰⁵ This pattern is found repeated elsewhere in the records.¹⁰⁶

So what is the effect of the tension between confession as a source of information and confession as a revelation of disposition? And how do we talk about “power” in relation to inquisitorial confession? There is the power of violence and constraint (which depends upon the varying level of secular support for inquisition);¹⁰⁷ but more importantly (because it is largely unaffected by the contingent application of force) there is the power of subjection. The tensions in the notion of “confession” might be termed “strategic paranoia” in that they do not bring the system to collapse, but rather function to assert the necessity of inquisitorial intervention. There is a need for *inquisitors* to deal with people confessing about heresy, precisely because of the problem of defining the “truth” produced by confession. Strategic paranoia is strongly exhibited in a passage from Gui’s *Practica* (largely copied from *De inquisitione*), on the duplicity of the Waldensians under questioning. Noting the sophistry and cunning of the heretics, the author suggests asking that they take an oath. However, if they agree, they are to be told the following:

If you are taking an oath now in order to be released, understand that one oath does not satisfy me, or two, or ten, or a hundred, but as many and taken as often as I require. For I know that in your sect you have dispensations and arrangements for a certain number of oaths when necessity requires, by which you may win liberty for yourself or others. But I intend to demand oaths without number.¹⁰⁸

The text suggests that opposing an unlimited number of oaths to the “certain number” the Waldensians have arranged will reveal some kind of truth. But if any oath can be taken without validity, what value does any oath have? Why, indeed, ask these mendacious heretics any questions at all (since the passage goes on to gloss how each answer should be disbelieved)? The notion of “confession” underwrites the production of truth within inquisition, but the stability of its claim to veracity is undermined at the very moment of its assertion. Why this tension? The tension produces a particular need (and also a slightly different effect which I shall discuss below): in the circular logic of paranoia, the instability of truth in confession asserts the need for a cunning fellow like the trained inquisitor to spot duplicity. This paranoia informs the whole inquisitorial system, and in fact demands the system in the first place. And it also asserts the need for inquisitorial intervention to be *textual*: that is,

the necessity of recording each statement, in order that it can be turned back upon the witness, while simultaneously undermining the authority of any single recorded statement (because a later statement may prove it false)—which in turn demands the need for further statements.

This is one side of the question of power: the construction of inquisitorial identity, where the speech of the deponent in his or her confession, although not necessarily “true” (or, rather, only true insofar as it has not yet been proven false), is a “legitimate” voicing of opinions, actions, and errors. This speech is legitimated by the presence of the inquisitor, and the confession and abjuration take place “in his hands”;¹⁰⁹ which might in turn be opposed to the unpoliced speech that takes place when a deponent talks of beliefs to someone who is not an inquisitor, when he or she is said to have “vomited forth” their errors.¹¹⁰ Both confession and error are the “bringing forth” of what is inside.¹¹¹ The difference between the two is not “truth” but the authoritative presence of the inquisitor, who prompts, receives, and interprets the speech. But there is a second side too: the construction of the subject performing the confession.

Construction of the Confessing Subject

The ideological divide between the “lump” and the “leaven” continued in the treatment of deponents and the kinds of questions they were asked. The split between the deponent as a member of the flock and the deponent as an autonomous subject can be seen in part as an historical change moving from the former in the 1240s to the latter by the end of the thirteenth century. But it must also be seen as a struggle between the two concepts throughout that period; and, as I will argue below, it was the tension between the ideas of the *illitteratus* and the confessing subject that caused change. Most importantly, it was the perceived danger presented by the confessing subject that spurred on the use of inquisition, allowing the extension of inquisitorial power and authority into realms previously unconsidered.

As historians have long noticed, most inquisition questions deal with actions and not beliefs.¹¹² This has been seen either as an inevitable difficulty in detecting the crime of heresy, or as an indication that inquisitors were well informed about heretical beliefs and so did not wish or need to investigate further.¹¹³ In fact, inquisitors’ questions change over the course of the thirteenth century. To describe the evidence in broad terms, the earliest depositions are indeed concerned primarily with acts, whereas by the 1270s one finds quite long descriptions of belief and some discussion as to why people believed the things they did, while the Fournier registers, from the early fourteenth century, famously supply much greater detail from their deponents, including a lot of material on belief. Accompanying this expansion in the material is a parallel contraction: whereas the earliest records, the registers of Bernard de Caux and Jean de St. Pierre, dealt with thousands of

deponents, the Fournier register contains just ninety-five depositions.¹¹⁴ Why is there this change, and how did the Inquisition approach the question of the relations between action, intention, and belief?

As I suggested in Chapter 1, the cultural construction of literacy (underwriting the binary of “lump” and “leaven”) divided notions of piety and belief. To state the point bluntly, the *illiterati* were seen as incapable of, or unsuited for, belief in the manner available to the *litterati*. The early concentration on actions was therefore not simply a product of circumstance: it followed from the notion that those the (literate) inquisitors questioned were (illiterate) *simplices*, for whom doctrinal and theological questions would be quite unsuitable. One could not be a *credens* unless “*litteratus vel discretus*.” The inquisitors did ask whether a deponent had attended Cathar preaching, but did not, until the later thirteenth century, go on to ask questions designed to see what he or she had thought of the sermons. All but one of the questions from the *Processus* (copied by the *Doctrina*) deal with actions or statements of fact (the one exception is whether the deponent “believed in the heretics or in their errors”). Gui’s *Practica* considerably expands this area of inquiry, asking more detailed questions about the sense in which deponents believed “in” the heretics, how long they had “persisted” in this belief, whether they still believed it, and when and why they abandoned it.

So this was one element in the construction of the deponent. The second element was in stark contrast: the construction of the subject confessing as interiorized and autonomous. The idea of the autonomous subject is central to the manuals’ construction of confession, and works to authorize the “truth” of that confession, with all its attendant operations of power. For example, the deposition is read back to the deponent in the vernacular so that he (or she) can “amend himself” and “correct his confession.”¹¹⁵ The final interchange between inquisitors and deponent, before sentencing and penance, asks that the deponent “recognizes all that he caused to be written” and thus authenticates it.¹¹⁶ As I indicated above, the notion of “spontaneity” —which implies autonomy—is what acts to guarantee the truth-value of confession (while the other factors discussed above simultaneously undermine that authenticity). The words of the deponent are emphasized as being his or her “personal confession” (*propria confessio*).¹¹⁷ The confessant must guarantee under oath that his or her confession is given not through hate or fear or greed; what the deponent says is therefore constructed as an autonomous statement, devoid of intrigue, violence, trickery, pressure. This notion of autonomy, which effaces the role played by the Inquisition in demanding that the subject confess, lingers on in prescriptions relating to his or her later actions. Not only has the deponent “caused [the confession] to be written,” he or she is also asked to “freely submit to the penalty for heretics” should the deponent act contrary to the conditions of his or her abjuration at any future point. A refusal to submit tells the inquisitor that he or she is “thus revealing [his or her] fictitious penitence.”¹¹⁸ Those cited to appear for sentencing are

there to “recognize their guilt.” Those who after abjuring heresy then commit usury are said to have “forgotten salvation and have contempt for their own oath,” that is, they actively condemn themselves. If sentenced to a penance that includes procession to the Church, the penitent must “*present himself* in such a manner that exhibits to the people [*populus*] that it is because of what he committed against the faith that he is carrying out this penance.”¹¹⁹ The contradictions between autonomy and the inquisitorial system that coerces that autonomy are clearly illustrated in the *Practica*’s injunction to “let the witness be *urgently exhorted* to tell the truth, *of his own accord*” (my emphasis).¹²⁰

Autonomy is also present in the depositions, in a way that both continues the construction of the autonomous confession and relates to the heretical actions recounted in them. Several deponents, having been imprisoned, return and “correct themselves.”¹²¹ When a rumor arose in Carcassonne that “certain witnesses were constrained to make false depositions,” the inquisitors had all of one Bernard Agasse’s testimony recited in the presence of “religious men” [*religiosi viri*] and the witness himself. They then asked Bernard if he had been constrained from love, fear, or torture, to which he replied that he had been free of coercion and had confessed “for the salvation of his soul and the defense of the Christian faith.”¹²² This again illustrates the centrality of the autonomous confessing subject to the Inquisition’s production of truth, and the complicated interconnections between the confession that seeks absolution (“for the salvation of his soul”) and the confession that renders information (“the defense of the Christian faith”). Those who receive the *consolamentum* are said to have “hereticated themselves,”¹²³ and a *converted perfectas* renders the grammatically uncomfortable information that he and a companion returned to Montségur “and there ‘apparellated’ themselves by/from the Bishop of the heretics” (*et ibi apparellaveruntse de episcopo hereticorum*).¹²⁴ Numerous descriptions of deathbed heretications take care to state that the recipients were “wishing and seeking” (*volentes et petentes*) the *consolamentum* from the *perfecti*.¹²⁵

The tension between the dual constructions of the deponent as part of the “lump” and as an autonomous subject, is soothed by the process of confession itself. In confession, the deponent appears as both subject and object. He or she is an object of scrutiny for the inquisitor and also for the autonomous subject (him or herself) producing the confession. However, this deferral of tension cannot produce closure, since the deponent never becomes entirely objectified or subjected. He or she is never completely an object, since despite the Inquisition’s textual mechanisms for categorizing transgression, the deponent is always already liable to further transgression, or, one might say, further illegitimate speech. The closure implied by confession is undermined by the processes of reiteration discussed earlier, where one can be required to confess again and again, to deliver “oaths without number.” But this production of speech within confession is always already performed within

the discursive boundaries I have described in this and the last chapter, which work to limit and contain the subject, and to represent its “autonomy” only in so much as “autonomy” is a cause of fear and concern and blame (thereby producing the need for further confessions and categorizations).

So inquisitorial power operates in a classically Foucauldian manner: it is not primarily “repressive” but “productive.” Inquisition constructs and distributes the identities of “inquisitor” and “deponent,” and each is dependent on the other for its own existence. The tension between the “lump” and the autonomous subject, between confession-as-truth and confession-as-doubt, produces firstly a speaking subject (on whom I will say more in a moment) and secondly “the Inquisition” as a response to the danger represented by that speaking subject. Although Kieckhefer is right to note that one cannot say that “the Inquisition” turned its attention from heretics to witches (where one is imagining a centrally directed and self-aware institution), one can say that the reason inquisition continues in southern France long after it had achieved its original objectives is due to the production of the confessing subject, and its attendant dangers. Alexander Murray, keen to play down the effects of “the Inquisition,” notes that it was originally started to “catch rats” (Cathars) although it admittedly did go on to catch “mice” (other people who were not Cathars, or not so obviously a threat).¹²⁶ If the point of this rather flippant metaphor is to distinguish between those who posed a clear threat to the Church and those who did not, one would have to note that in fact the “mice” appear from the beginning of inquisition, since the vast majority of people interviewed were not *Cathar perfecti* themselves, and that the “rats” were burnt out of Montségur in 1244 (and indeed fled the sinking ship to Lombardy). In fact, even if one limits the qualification for “mousehood” to mean someone with *no* Cathar “affiliations,” by the fourteenth century inquisitors were expending a good deal of energy (in terms of textual production) on those who only nibbled cheese.¹²⁷ Why? Precisely because of the construction and production of the confessing subject. That subject, increasingly talking about beliefs, internal decisions, personal moral calculations (and this speech recorded in Latin, the language of authority and rationality), had become far more fearsome in appearance—as an individual—than a peasant admitting he had once seen heretics and mendicants hold a theological debate. Where once the Church had feared the “lump” for the sullen and unthinking momentum it could add to one or two disobedient heresiarchs, it had now met that mass in its individual components, had questioned and probed these individuals on their beliefs, and recorded their answers in Latin. The perceived site of danger had changed, from the sheeplike stupidity of the group to the unpredictable and virgin pastures of the interior individual.

To illustrate how things changed between the 1240s and the 1320s, I will look briefly at two depositions. The deponents I have chosen are Lombarde, daughter of Bérenger de Lavelanet, a knight connected to the Cathar stronghold of Montségur;¹²⁸ and Guillemette Arzelier of Montailou, daughter of Pierre Caravassas of Montailou, whose social standing is unknown but presumably placed her among the lower orders. Lombarde appeared before Brother Ferrier on 14 February 1244.¹²⁹ Her deposition was taken at one sitting and is under one thousand words in length.¹³⁰ It begins with the standard inquisitorial formula:

Lombarde, daughter of Bérenger de Lavellanet, requested to say the truth on herself and others both living and dead on the crime of heresy and Waldensianism, sworn as a witness, said . . .¹³¹

She goes on to provide ten separate “items” on the subject of heresy. These range in time from one and a half years to one fortnight before the confession.¹³² Most are not specific instances but notes of repeated contact with heretics: “Raymonde de Cue, heretic, aunt of the witness, held her *domus* publicly at Montségur with other heretics, and the witness often went there to see the said heretic and her companions, heretics, and there the witness often ate with the said heretics.”¹³³ The deposition is a list of actions, mostly undertaken by Lombarde herself, but occasionally relating to someone else. She confesses to seeing heretics, eating with heretics, “adoring” heretics, hearing heretics preach. Lombarde also mentions others who were present when Bertrand Marty, a Cathar bishop, preached at Montségur, women who accompanied her when she went to see heretics, and a man called Arnaud de Verna who was hereticated on his deathbed. The accounts are repetitive, following closely the pattern of “where, who, what and when,” with the inquisitor’s questions sometimes prominent in the text, and never far from the surface. Descriptions follow established patterns. For example, Lombarde’s description of the ritual that accompanied eating with the heretics could have come from any of the depositions of the period:

and there the witness often ate with the said heretics at the same table of blessed bread and other things placed on the table, and at each sort of food and at the first drink, when it had just been taken, she, the witness, would say *benedicite*, and the heretics responded to each *benedicite*, God bless you.¹³⁴

Even the apparent verisimilitude of “at the same table” has transgressional import; when mentioning another woman who visited the same heretics, Lombarde specifies that she ate with the heretics, “but not at the same table.” The table may well have been real, but the proximity it implied had moral and symbolic implications, indicating an involvement in a heretical “rite.”¹³⁵

All the actions Lombarde mentions are drawn from a conventional vocabulary of transgression: she “adores” the heretics “when arriving and leaving”; in later depositions this is more clearly glossed as “following the custom of the heretics.”¹³⁶ The deposition ends with a formulaic statement of belief, found in most of the records: “Asked, she said that she was a believer in the heretics for two years, such that if she died in the sect of the heretics she believed she would be saved.”¹³⁷ Lombarde’s identity is composed in the

text entirely through the actions described above and this blank declaration of belief. There is no question of motivation, no interest in the words that passed between deponent and heretic (other than those that constituted a “rite”), no narrative to explain or contextualize Lombarde’s contact with the Cathars. Stressing the formulaic nature of the records does not imply that these events did not take place (that, for example, Lombarde did not sit at a real table); it does however show that the notion of “category” was very strong at this period of inquisition, and that the subject-position constructed for deponents was extremely limited. Lombarde’s confession is first and foremost a confession of information, on herself and others, that allows the inquisitor to place her within the requisite category; it is a confession of contrition (or a confession of *herself*) only in so far as it *exists* — that is, Lombarde’s moral state is attested not by the content of the confession, but only by the obedience implied by the very fact of confession. In the 1240s, nothing more was necessary or desired.

Guillemette Arzelier of Montailou first appeared before Bishop Jacques Fournier, at Pamiers, on 7 January 1324. For a long time she refused to say anything; her deposition was spread over five interviews, the last on 12 November (presumably in the same year).¹³⁸ Guillemette’s deposition is roughly five times as long as Lombarde’s. She first appears “suspect and denounced of the crime of heresy,” cited to confess, but simply denied everything, “although diligently questioned.” Fournier thought that she was concealing something and therefore assigned another day for her to appear, giving her time to think about confession “and to recognize the truth on herself and others.” On 10 July she appeared again, was questioned on her actions and her faith, and again said nothing; this time she was imprisoned, now “vehemently suspect.” She was brought from prison for three further interviews, on 5 October, 10 November, and 12 November; over these three interviews she told of just one event (and two very minor occurrences).¹³⁹ At first she said that in the year that Jacques Poloniac, the jailer of Carcassonne, came and arrested the people of Montailou, she had gone to Raymond Maury to borrow a mattock. When at Maury’s house, she had met two men dressed in brown who shrank back as she passed so as not to touch her, which surprised her somewhat. When she returned the mattock, she asked Raymond who the men were; he replied that they were friends, who taught nothing bad but only good, and would not let any woman touch them.¹⁴⁰ This did not satisfy Fournier, who thought that she had not confessed “fully,” and she was returned to prison.

Over the next two interviews she expanded the story. The next time, she admitted that Raymond Maury had told her more about the men, and particularly that they held the path of the apostles Peter and Paul, and that she was going to ask Raymond more but had been interrupted by the arrival of another man. Fournier asked if she understood Raymond to mean “heretics” by what he said, to which she assented; Fournier then asked “how she

perceived, from Raymond's words, that the said men were heretics when nothing that the said Raymond had said would make one see the men as heretics" and Guillemette refused to respond.¹⁴¹ In her final interview, she told the story once more from the beginning, and this time expanded the conversations between herself and Raymond: he had told her that these men could save her, and she was interested in this; she then went with Raymond to see the men, talked to them, and "adored" them; and she ended up by giving them some money.¹⁴² Guillemette was sentenced to prison in 1329.¹⁴³

What sort of things appear in Guillemette's deposition that are not present in Lombarde's? There are simple things to note: the length of the deposition, the details it contains, and the extensive information on inquisitorial practice. In terms of subjectivity, however, there are three areas of change. First, Guillemette is a confessing subject. The period of time initially allowed for reflection, and her imprisonment are specifically noted as intended to encourage her to confess "fully" (the latter depending upon the fiction of "spontaneity" I have discussed above).¹⁴⁴ Although obedience is still an issue, the contritional aspect of confession is more intimately bound up with the actual content of Guillemette's speech, and she is made to retell the same story until the "full" truth appears. This truth is full not only in actions recounted (that she did go to see the heretics) but also in subjective detail (what she said and did, how she felt, why she acted as she did). Her deposition ends with a lengthy formula of abjuration, where she declares her penitence for all that she had done and believed.¹⁴⁵ Second, Guillemette is a subject who is ascribed a degree of agency. She explains her motivation for failing to confess fully at the first interview (she was afraid that she would lose her goods, and she had made a promise with other people from Montailhou that they would not reveal anything);¹⁴⁶ and she contextualizes her belief in the Cathars by recounting that she had said to them that if they could indeed save her soul, better than the priests, then she would adhere to them.¹⁴⁷ Fournier asks her the tricky question of why she thought Raymond was describing heretics, when all he had said (as far as she admitted at that point) was orthodox. These elements of *decision* on Guillemette's mark her difference from Lombarde: the deposition is concerned with context and intention, as well as actions. Guillemette is allowed to represent herself interrogating the heretics, quoting direct speech in the records: "do not the priests show the way to salvation?"; "is it not that the priests have learned what they say from the pope, whom God has constituted for himself in the land?"; "and how can a man [sic] believe you [Cathars], when those who believe you have lost their goods?"¹⁴⁸ This element of agency leads to the third point: Guillemette's deposition presents a narrative; or, in fact, several narratives. There is the narrative of Guillemette confessing, drawn out over the five depositions, depicting a move from stubbornness to compliance. There is also the narrative of the mattock, which is retold in each interrogation: how Guillemette had gone to borrow it and Raymond's son-in-law Guillaume had fetched it for her

(which was when she first met the two men in brown); and how the second meeting had occurred when she returned it a few days later. This provides a context for Guillemette's actions, quite different from the apparent verisimilitude of "eating at the same table as the heretics" in Lombarde's deposition. Finally, there is a narrative about Cathars and their attitudes toward women. Guillemette explains three times how they shrank back from her presence, and that this surprised her; she recounts Raymond's explanation; she notes that when she went with Raymond to visit the men, she initially made the mistake of trying to sit next to one of them, and was shooed away with cries of "*Eula, Eula!*"; and she explains how she was not allowed to give her money directly to the Cathars, but had to hand it over to Raymond (and, she said, she did not know whether or not he did give it to them).¹⁴⁹ Guillemette is produced as a subject through these narratives: she is the one seeing, describing, and acting, made present to us through the narrative performance of agency and interaction.

The subject-position rendered by inquisitorial records developed over the course of the thirteenth century, as these depositions show, but it would be incorrect to assume that there were not exceptions to this progression. The depositions of the 1240s are mostly short and simple, not because inquisitors lacked the skills to interrogate deponents more fully, or because deponents were for some reason unable to speak at length; they are concise and limited in their ascription of subjectivity because the Inquisition at that period was still largely informed by the idea of the "lump," and made a choice (informed by and reaffirming the cultural understandings of literacy) to question deponents in a certain manner. For example, in contrast to the normally terse records of mid-thirteenth-century inquisition, when literate Franciscans were called upon to be deponents (giving evidence against a citizen of Toulouse named Pierre Garsias in 1247), the questions expand to cover wider questions of belief and motivation.¹⁵⁰ Conversely, when a literate deponent called Pierre de Luzenac submitted his own, written testimony in the early fourteenth century, the document had to be read aloud to the inquisitors, with the inquisitorial scribes then framing the insertion of his words into the official record and producing a standard, third-person redaction of his subsequent oral confession.¹⁵¹ Although Pierre's written confession addresses us in the first person, represents himself, and might therefore appear as an example of a "fully-fledged" confessing subject, this occurs through the discursive constructions of inquisition. His confession, although given in written form (and possibly in Latin)¹⁵² is rewritten for the Inquisition's purposes, and responds to the questions they ask. Accounts of actions figure prominently, and the confession operates in the services of the Inquisition, giving details that will lead to the conviction of others. Pierre is given a subject-position that has agency but is not unfettered.

Guillemette and Lombarde are not "typical" deponents, since each deposition has its own context, but they are not wildly different from the other

depositions of their respective eras. They represent two poles of inquisition, between which lie various stages. Depositions from the 1270s usually contain more information than those of the 1240s, and show a greater interest on the part of the inquisitor in the beliefs of the deponent and the manner in which he or she came to those beliefs; depositions from the register of the inquisitor Geoffroi d'Ablis, which predate Fournier's investigations by fifteen years, tend to contain slightly less detail than the records of the 1320s. The broad change is from many short depositions to a few long ones, but even this must be slightly qualified: the deposition of the *perfecta* Arnaude, given in 1244, is about fourteen thousand words in length, and other long depositions survive from the earlier years of inquisition, while some late depositions are themselves quite brief.¹⁵³ However, as I have shown here, the confessing subject of the fourteenth century was allowed—or rather, *required*—to speak of many things other than the simple fact of contact with Cathars. At the same time, the agency accorded to the deponent was not unconstrained. The speech of the confessing subject was prompted by the inquisitorial context, recorded by the inquisitor's scribes, made comprehensible to inquisitorial logic, and was an essential part of the discourse of Inquisition.

Technologies of the Self

The preceding analysis of inquisitorial discourse has tried to historicize and contextualize the production of a particular kind of subjectivity and individuality. Should we perhaps place this development within the wider historical narrative of the “discovery of the individual”? My answer is both yes and no, and is worth explicating, firstly because this analysis of inquisitorial discourse can provide a useful case study for the critique of some arguments in this area, and secondly because we are, in the later stages of this book, going to meet some “individuals”—and we need to prepare the ground in advance for what that label might actually mean.

Jacob Burckhardt's statement that in the Middle Ages “Man was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family or corporation—only through some general category” has long provided a challenge to medievalists, keen to disprove this problematic thesis.¹⁵⁴ Over the course of the twentieth century, arguments have ranged from Charles Haskins's notion of the “twelfth-century renaissance” to Richard Southern's “medieval humanism” and Colin Morris's “discovery of the individual.”¹⁵⁵ As the debate has multiplied and expanded, one is faced with either positing a very long twelfth century, or reconfiguring the project to be, as David Aers put it, “a whisper in the ear of the early modernists.”¹⁵⁶ This “whisper” is designed to draw attention to the existence, in the medieval period, of literary and cultural phenomena more usually associated with the Italian Renaissance, and in particular the appearance of the self-reflexive subject within writing, which is stated in less theoretical language as the appearance of “individuality.” A

variety of works have approached this amorphous area from a variety of perspectives, and my brief critique here is undoubtedly unfair to them all. Nonetheless, we might say that accounts of medieval individuality—like many other accounts of individuality—tend to share three problematic characteristics. The first of these is the preponderance of teleological narratives, or stories of “becoming.” Commentators talk of “individualism” or “humanism” as becoming “fully- fledged,” of an “evolution of literary individuality” of a “process of becoming.”¹⁵⁷ The *telos* of these narratives is modernity, or more precisely, “us,” and so the discussion of subjectivity has—at least initially—tended to concentrate on those elements we find most recognizable and assess the historical actors in their abilities to perform those elements. Thus Robert Logan, for example, writes on how Abelard and St. Bernard had a “limited” ability to construe themselves “fully” as selves.¹⁵⁸

The second, shared characteristic might be described as the “trickle-down” theory of individualism. Most authors have concentrated primarily on a small group of intellectuals, starting with Abelard and ending, perhaps, with Chaucer, whom they take to represent the rest of their age. Elite literacy underpins many of the changes discussed, and so, for example, Morris writes “for the men of the age [reading and writing Latin] was an essential preliminary to the imaginative exploration of themselves and the universe. What cannot be verbalized can scarcely be thought.”¹⁵⁹ Here one form of cultural technology—that of the *litterati* - is equated with the more universalized notion of “verbalization.” At best, this concentration on the elite ignores the experiences of most of western Christendom; at worst, it fails to engage with the historical struggle over the meaning of literacy and becomes a form of social Darwinism. Duby, for example, notes that the Church in the thirteenth century began to “invite” laymen to adopt a more personalized and autonomous attitude towards their own spirituality, an attitude that had previously been the province of the clergy alone. He writes, “The internalization of Christian practices came about very slowly. It began among the ‘powerful,’ among those whose official duty was to set an example, which then propagated from the upper strata of society to the layers beneath.”¹⁶⁰ The “trickle-down” theory—which is also, of course, underpinned by the teleological narrative—fails to explain *how* exactly this change came about; and ignores any question of power in relation to that change.

The third shared assumption is another element of the narrative of “becoming,” and particularly the partial (but burgeoning) “ability” of medieval writers to “express themselves” in language. It is predicated upon a view of language as both a reflection of, and a veil over, reality. Braunstein writes, “Language served in many ways to disguise the expression of private feeling,” and Gurevitch shares similar worries that rhetoric acts as a “filter” between the historian and the historical voice.¹⁶¹ Although it is precisely the new, interiorized narratives that suggest the birth, or growth, or discovery of the individual to medievalists, the language of these narratives also leaves

them uneasy. One returns to metaphors of “becoming,” narrating the *partial* ability of, say, Abelard to express his self in a way that we can understand.

Two crucial points arise from this search for the individual: histories such as these depend upon a problematic view of language, and they forego any discussion of power. However, certain recent works on subjectivity and selfhood in the medieval period, informed by poststructuralist theories of language and power, have made more helpful conceptual moves. Some historians have rejected the idea of a transhistorical human “self-ness,” and historicize the concept of “self” as well as “the individual.”¹⁶² Crucial to these approaches is the argument of Michel Foucault that there is no subject or self prior to discourse, and that different discourses in fact construct discontinuous subjects, even when those subjects might be said to inhabit the “same” body. Foucault’s stated aim has been “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects,” mapping three heuristic categories: modes of inquiry that claim the status of sciences, such as linguistics, economics and biology; “dividing practices” which split human subjects into binary oppositions such as mad/sane, sick/healthy, criminal/law-abiding; and “the way a human being turns him or herself into a subject,” such as the discourses of sexuality.¹⁶³

Those who have taken up Foucault’s challenge have sought to show how different subjectivities are constructed within different discourses, and how the claims to autonomy and transhistoricity within these discourses can be deconstructed.¹⁶⁴ For example, Talal Asad has described his own project as “to examine disciplinary practices, including the multiple ways in which religious discourses regulate, inform and construct religious subjects.”¹⁶⁵ Others have reminded us that we are mistaken if we see language as a “veil” to subjectivity; as Mary Carruthers points out “we should think of the apprehending and commenting individual subject (‘self’) also in rhetorical terms.”¹⁶⁶ Language is not a veil over subjectivity: it is the arena in which subjectivity is provoked, contained, and performed.¹⁶⁷ And language does not produce a universalized and transhistorical subject; rather, different discourses produce different selves.¹⁶⁸ One of these discourses was confession, and it is through confession that various writers have seen “individuality” moving away from the elite sphere into the realm of the common laity.¹⁶⁹ But, as I have noted above, confession is not the “bringing to speech” of a prior subject: it is the construction and performance of a particular kind of subjectivity within contexts of language and power. As Leigh Gilmore puts it, identity is not prior to confession, “patiently awaiting the moment of revelation,” but rather identity is “the space from which confession issues,” and that space is always already structured through historical and contingent cultural discourses.¹⁷⁰

As I have argued in the Introduction, it is a mistake to ignore the context of inquisition within which our evidence is produced, not because one must strip away the “veil” of inquisitorial language, but because one must recognize that

we are caught in a false paradigm if we search for the subject prior to speech, for the deponent before he or she confesses. It is the event of confession that produced the deponent as a speaking-subject, and there was much at stake in that event. The power involved during confession was perfectly well recognized by the medieval laity. The early inquisitor in northern France, Robert le Bougre, was reputed to have “by magic art made a bit of writing which, when placed on anyone’s head, compelled him to say whatever the friar desired.”¹⁷¹ What is indicated here, I would suggest, is the process of interpellation: Robert’s power came not simply from making people speak, but from making them speak within a particular language and context of power. Slightly more subtly, some fifty years later the deponent Bernard Barra, just about to confess before the inquisitor, was warned by a man called Roger Pascal that “a man binds a bull by its horns and a peasant by the tongue.”¹⁷² Again, the proverbial warning concerns the power inquisitors possessed to draw others into their language. The cultural politics of literacy and confession were very plain to some members of the medieval laity. The demand to speak as a confessing subject involved operations of power that went beyond the simple threat of punishment; recalling the prison suicide of Bernard de Revel with which we began this book, we might wonder whether the complex network of power involved in being brought to confessional speech was also understood by some contemporaries.

PART II

The first half of this book mapped the creation of a discourse—inquisition—to demonstrate the conditions that produced the representation of subaltern speech found within inquisitorial registers. This second section reads the evidence of those registers in light of that analysis, firstly (in Chapter 4) thematically, in an attempt to place both “Catharism” and “belief” under question; and secondly (in the final chapter) through close reading, concentrating on particular depositions from the early fourteenth century, to investigate the performance of subjectivities. But we finished the last section with a reminder of power; and lest we become too downhearted, it is power and its limits we must first address before yielding to the temptation to imagine a heroic “liberation” of subaltern speech from the confines of inquisitorial discourse.

Thus far, my analysis of the subject position constructed by inquisitorial discourse has largely followed my reading of Foucault; and hence, my description of this subjectivity at present falls prey to a common criticism alleged against Foucault’s theory of discourse: that it binds each and every one of us securely into a power that is found literally everywhere, thus leaving no space or position where one might locate resistance.¹ But the point we have reached, after these opening chapters, is not intended as a flourish of triumphant pessimism. There is little point in producing histories that seek only to remind us of our imprisonment by power, only rediscovering the ways and means of repression. If history is to be critical and effective, to have a role to play in more positive discussion, it must also investigate the limits of power: the ways in which subjects may, if not elude power, then at least find a space within it for other possibilities and other words.

There are three overlapping ideas that we can invoke to help us beyond this impasse. The first is drawn from what might be called “the sociology of the everyday.” A close analysis of the myriad interactions performed in “everyday” life and language allows us the possibility of discovering spaces within power, where the detail of one’s conduct is not yet mapped and directed. Those subject to power may have recourse to “tactics” that, while not escaping the discursive web, nonetheless provide a negotiated space within it and possibly build into practices and languages not wholly controlled

by the dominant discourse. Thus, in Chapter 4, a careful examination of the languages, practices, and beliefs presented by inquisitorial deponents may allow us to reconsider both an account of the Cathar heresy, and more importantly the various experiences of lay belief hidden beneath the label of “heretic.”

Secondly, recognizing the constructed nature of subjectivity does not necessarily mean denying the possibility of agency. Every performance of confession has a degree of agency “thrust upon it,” prompted by the very subjectivity it constructs. And every telling-of-the-self, although it must “succeed” in the sight of inquisitorial authority, is also the opportunity—indeed, demand—for another moment of “self-making.” Although inquisitorial discourse prompts and frames the telling of the self, the kind of subject it desires and demands (a subject with an interior, with will, a subject who is self-knowing) must “have its say” precisely so that it submits to the judgment of the inquisitor *and of itself*. The Inquisition does not “veil” the deponent’s speech: it prompts it, and in prompting it, brings into being an autonomous subject who is accorded (within certain bounds) an element of agency. Thus, in Chapter 5, we will examine the “self-making” of several different confessing- subjects, and explore the limits and possibilities of this constructed agency.²

Finally, to analyze and map the constitution of a discourse should not lead us to believe that every fragment of language spoken within, or disciplined by, that discourse is pre-given and univocal. As I have argued, the inquisitorial registers are heteroglossic, containing many interweaving voices, sometimes in concert and sometimes in opposition. In fact, I would suggest that rather than seeing discourse as controlling every detail of what is, or can be, said within its chosen field, we might instead note that discourse always demands an *excess* of speech. If I suggest anything new with this thought, it is an idea that has arisen through the conjunction of theoretical questions and empirical research; particularly through the vast excess of recorded speech, the like of which began the last chapter. Discourse, I suspect, always necessitates an excess of speech and language, must always insist that the subjects it constructs produce language beyond the carefully mapped boundaries that constitute a given terrain of “knowledge.” This is clearly the case with inquisitorial discourse: the records, in their slow burgeoning from the thirteenth to the fourteenth century, always produce language that exceeds the inquisitorial categories. This excess appears at first only in fragmented moments, but (as we will see particularly in Chapter 5) builds to an extraordinary outpouring of language. Of course, as this excess grows and expands, so too does inquisitorial discourse, finding new strategies to control, delimit, and discipline this language. But here, however, is the key: discourse *must* demand excess, in order that discourse can continue to exercise power. If every moment of language produced and policed within a discourse could be smoothly and unproblematically located within the designated field of

“knowledge,” that knowledge would reach a plateau, an inescapable stasis—at which point, the “knowing subject” (in this case, the inquisitor) would cease to be, erased by the completion of his task. For discourse to reiterate itself—to grow, to change, or simply to sustain itself—it must find new tasks, new challenges. Here, therefore, we find the basis of a reading strategy: to examine these moments of excess, and reflect them back onto the speech that appears to have been structured and contained. It may be that this act of reading can only ever be an *historical* victory—that is, a strategy of reading, and challenge to power, only made possible by the chronological distance between subject and analyzer—but this seems a small victory worth claiming, nonetheless. Let us, then, turn our gaze properly to the language of the depositions.

Questions of Belief

Catharism and Its Contexts

Pictures of Catharism

Between 1277 and 1279, Pierre Pictavin, an elder of the village of Sorèze, was interrogated eight times by inquisitors. He talked in detail about Catharism in his locality, reporting the activities of himself and his neighbors. Among his statements, we find the following vignette, recounting a conversation from about 1266:

Item, he said that he heard Raymond de *Camis* of Montxoy saying to him, “Sir, what worth is it to us whatever we do, whatever profit we make, if we cannot do what is fitting for us when it is needed, and have at our end what we need? Whatever good there was in this land has been thrown out and made foreign.”¹

This tiny fragment of reported speech—a Cathar supporter bewailing the problems of obtaining the *consolamentum* on one’s deathbed—once again holds out to us the peculiarly historiographical pleasure of eavesdropping on the dead. But as I have argued in the first half of this book, these necrophiliac delights must be examined and questioned rather than simply embraced. We must consider what we might *do* with these confessional textual events—where they will lead us, and why.

When Pierre Pictavin gave his depositions, he was an old man, possibly close to seventy years of age.² His memories of Catharism stretched back into the late 1220s, focused on his home village and its environs. The different events he recalled for the inquisitors, the various “items” (as each is prefixed by the scribes), include occasions of Cathar preaching, deathbed “heretications” (where dying adherents received the *consolamentum*), meetings with the heretics, and the names of every person involved in such events. He also notes bequests left by the laity to the *perfecti*, along with other material support supplied by the “believers” to the heretics, and further moments of interaction such as medical care provided by certain Cathar *perfecti*. There are thirty-six separate “items” in Pierre’s deposition. Each one provides a particular nugget of information about Catharism, its supporters, its history, its shape within Sorèze.

So an historian might, of course, decide to take these thirty-six items, put

them together with further items drawn from other Sorèze depositions, and begin to fashion a picture of Catharism. That is, we could begin a process of synthesis: building a larger picture from the snapshots provided by Pictavin and his fellow villagers. If we were to perform this process with Pierre's deposition, we would find quite a lot that would support current historiographical pictures of Catharism: for example, a narrative of change over time, from fairly frequent Cathar preaching and deathbed "heretications" in the 1230s and 1240s, to a period when the *perfecti* were less active or present in the late 1250s and 1260s, to the situation in the 1270s where the *perfecti* were based in Lombardy and only visiting Languedoc infrequently. Taking the names of all those mentioned by Pictavin, we might map the extent of Cathar support within Sorèze; and place this map against other localities, to gain a wider picture of Cathar "believers" in Languedoc. Looking at Pictavin's own involvement in the heresy, we might also find support for particular historiographical theories about Catharism and its context, such as the importance of familial connections: for example, of the seven deathbed "heretications" attended by Pierre, five involved members of his extended family and friends, and he was taken along to the other two by his master when he was an apprentice.³ Overall, then, we might say that Pictavin's information on Catharism thus supports an accepted picture of the heresy: a hierarchical and symbiotic structure, where the elite *perfecti* tend to the spiritual needs of the "believers" via a few, key rituals, and the "believers" support the *perfecti* in practical and material ways, this support indicating their belief in the "good men." Pictavin's chronological narrative also fits within historiographical consensus: a Church-like Catharism in the pre-Crusade period, with its own bishops and deacons, declining over the course of the thirteenth century, as the process of inquisition attacked the social and familial bonds on which the heresy depended, until it ended with a whimper in the local and disorganized Autier revival of the early fourteenth century.

These are valid pictures of Catharism, and it is not my intention here to try to demolish them; rather, I want to explore what might complement our existing image of the heresy if we adopt a change of focus and a degree of self-questioning. I would like to consider further what inquisitorial discourse takes for granted in its construction of heresy—its production of the items in each deposition—and to think further about "belief" and what it might mean, for the laity in particular. This means, in part, undoing our process of synthesis, to see what might be flattened out or occluded in the production of a larger picture of Catharism; asking, in fact, what we understand by "Catharism," and whether different perspectives may produce further pictures. In the extract quoted above, for example, rather than simply labeling Raymond de *Camis* a "Cathar believer," we might reconsider his reported statement: the way in which he expresses the social context of his faith, bringing social activity and "profit" into the same sentence as salvation. His final words intrigue me most of all: that the "good" that was once part of his

land has now been made “foreign.” What complex relationship between activity, locality, identity, and belief might this adumbrate?

To begin the process of looking differently, let us take two more vignettes from Pictavin’s deposition, both concerning death and provisions for it. The first involves a conversation that Pictavin overheard in about 1261 between a dying man called Guirald Terrier and a Cathar supporter called Pons Ramfred:

he the witness heard the said sick man questioning the said Pons Ramfred and asking him “Will I still have a friend who will give me advice about the good men?”; to which he [Pons] replied to him saying that, “a man could give you very little advice about this, no more than he could lift the bell tower of the monastery of Sorèze by the scruff of the neck. In truth, your father Guirald Terrier ought to be able to give you better advice than anyone else.” And the said sick man replied to him: “I am in a bad way with him, and he has not visited me throughout this illness.”⁴

Subsequently, Pictavin said, he heard that the man had died without receiving the *consolamentum*. One can note here the familial connection with heresy, something frequently seen as playing a key role in the production and survival of Catharism. But the relationship between “family” and “belief” is a complex thing: in the case of the Terriers, despite a shared allegiance to the Cathars, the bad blood between them kept the father from arranging for the salvation of his son’s soul. It is tempting to make an easy link between “family” and “belief”—a link also made, as it happens, by medieval inquisitors—but we need to be wary of such equations. This is the case even when the family bond is not disrupted: as already noted, Pictavin’s presence at deathbed “heretications” involved a familial or social contact on each occasion, but one must consider rather carefully how to interpret this. Was he present because he was a Cathar believer (and a Cathar believer because of his family), or was he present because those dying were part of his social network? Family connections are not a guarantor of either belief or behavior; the relationship between the two requires further analysis.

The second vignette concerns a visit Pictavin made as a young apprentice to the dying Guillaume Raymond Frances in about 1237:

he the witness, who together with Raymond Pierre his master had come there to give the charity of bread for him [Guillaume], heard the sick man himself telling the said Raymond Peter that, concerning the five hundred shillings which he had after making a division with his brothers, he had ordained [matters] in this fashion: that he was giving a hundred shillings for charity, little children and burial, and he had now given four hundred shillings to the good men, that is to say, the heretics.

The dying man went on to say that he had already received the *consolamentum* from Lord Arnald Hugo, who was the Cathar deacon of Vieilmorès.⁵ If Guillaume Raymond entrusted his soul to the *perfecti*, he might fairly enter our synthesis of “Catharism” as another “believer.” But leaving money to both the “good men” and to charity shakes easy assumptions about the connection between action and belief. It is tempting to elide the challenge that Guillaume Raymond Frances presents to our mechanical ascription of “belief,” by suggesting for example that through his bequest he was simply trying to cover all the bases with regard to the salvation of his soul.⁶ But can we see such a thing as “simple”? Leaving money for charity

sits uncomfortably with Cathar theology (as they did not believe in “good works” as a means to salvation, nor did they believe in Purgatory and the possibility of intercession after death), and yet Guillaume was clearly in favor of the “good men” and their promise of salvation. If we begin to pick away at these fragmentary moments, “belief” itself—what it means, what it implies, how it is negotiated —becomes a more complex issue.

There is a primary factor that renders this process of “looking differently” something of a challenge: the insidious ways in which inquisitorial discourse works to structure our picture of heresy. The initial problem is linguistic: the names and categories that inquisition has provided for us in advance, and how they work to structure our knowledge. Yves Dossat, in his exemplary reconstruction of Catharism from trial records, writes: “The Cathars could not have continued their evangelism without the active role supplied by the believers. What was indispensable was the help of the *ductores*, the *receptatores*, the *questores*, according to the divisions established, by a more-or-less theoretical distribution of the tasks of the supporters of heresy, in the manuscripts of the Inquisition.”⁷ Thus Dossat implicitly notes the interplay between inquisitor and historian, the tensions between inquisitorial nomenclature, possible Cathar nomenclature, and historiographical expression, and proceeds in his article by adopting the language of inquisitors, having registered his reservations. In this methodology—common to many historians—inquisitorial categories are theoretical, and perhaps in tension with “heretical” language, but reflect nonetheless something of the lived reality they represent. But where and how does one draw the line between these two languages? And if, even if only from convenience, the historian finds him or herself speaking with the inquisitor, are there not problems here that are both epistemological and ethical?

In addition to this, the discourse of inquisition presents us with more problems than simply the arrangement and naming of categories. There are deeper elements taken for granted within inquisitorial discourse, a set of assumptions that “goes without saying because it comes without saying,” as something so “natural” to an inquisitorial way of thinking that it rarely finds direct expression.⁸ Linked to the process of categorization, but expanding beyond its field of appellation, are three areas of inquisitorial assumption. The first is the concept of a heresy—Catharism—as a sect or church.⁹ The logic of the “sect” is the assumption of clear boundaries that divide the faithful from the heretical, a logic that cannot admit to a more complex or diffuse arrangement of the field of belief. One is either within or without the heresy; the world of faith is always already binary. The second is to see the laity as passive receptors of heretical faith, imported from “elsewhere.” Here the ghost of the twelfth-century heresiarch still haunts the more individualized discourse of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century inquisition. Deponents are assumed always to have been taught their beliefs by others, and to relate to those beliefs as adherents rather than participants. Although this model slowly

changes over the thirteenth century, as inquisitorial discourse constructs the deponent as an interiorized and autonomous confessing subject, the *litterati* continue to view the laity as essentially passive and incapable of independent thought.¹⁰ Thirdly and finally, inquisitors assume a straightforward and subservient relationship between action and belief: that the former is a sign of the latter. The precise degree and arrangement of this putative code may vary—as the council of Tarragona in 1242, among others, attempted to specify—but the essential semiotic hierarchy remains: action has meaning in as much as it points to belief; belief is visible in as much as it is indicated by action.

Perhaps following what is “taken for granted” in inquisitorial discourse, the “believers” of Dossat’s quotation have often been presented as passive and docile receivers of Catharism, as the mulch in which Catharism grew.¹¹ Some writers, indeed, equate “Catharism” with the lives and beliefs of the *perfecti* alone, giving the laity a supporting role only.¹² But to configure “Catharism” as essentially the *perfecti*, or to present the *perfecti* as the “cause” of Catharism, is an effect of adopting inquisitorial language and ideas: in particular, the idea that Catharism (or heresy) is defined primarily by the elite heretics, and secondarily by the laity’s interaction with those heretics, which will follow certain normative patterns.¹³ Thus Duvernoy can comment “Si on a ‘vu’ un parfait, le ‘*melioramentum*’, l’adoration’ étant obligatoire pour les croyants . . . il est probable que le deposant a ‘adoré’ a vu les autres le faire, a entendu la prédication.”¹⁴ In fact, it is unclear from the evidence what was “obligatoire pour les croyants”; and thus similarly uncertain as to whom we, rather than the inquisitors, should name and identify as “les croyants.” There were, as we shall see, various ways in which the laity could participate in Catharism; and, as Natalie Zemon Davis reminds us, we should be wary of positioning the laity in contact with religion (whether orthodox or heretical) as “passive receptacles.”¹⁵ Although, as we will see below, at times the *perfecti* represented themselves as a formal, institutional group, this does not automatically dictate all the ways in which the laity could respond and relate to the “good men”—any more than the claims to unity and institutionalization, presented by the thirteenth-century Roman Catholic Church, dictated all the ways in which the laity related to their parish clergy.

In attempting to provide another possible picture of “Catharism” (complementary to the existing analyzes, while placing their central premise under question) we thus need to explore the possibility of negotiating inquisitorial structures of thought, particularly where they overlap with our own. Note, however, that this is a *negotiation* rather than a negation: I would not suggest that one can elude inquisitorial discourse. The language of inquisition not only permeates the registers, it also creates them. The project is therefore not so much one of “reading against the grain” as reaching an accommodation with the language of power by bringing to light the particular interplay between the hegemonic and the subaltern. Inquisitorial discourse was not only spoken by inquisitors but also by deponents: the process of

confession and transcription worked precisely in order to bring the deponents into the language of inquisition, to have them recite (through their confessional phrases and abjurations) the discourse themselves. The two are therefore not separable but produced in concert. We therefore will not seek to read “beneath” the language of inquisition, but rather allow inquisitorial discourse its say in order to identify the excess of language it also demands.

In what follows, I do not concentrate on particular deponents so much as read *across* the records (particularly the thirteenth-century registers) in search of illumination for a number of questions. Preeminent among these concerns is to ask whether, following the analysis of the construction of inquisitorial depositions explored in the first half of this book, we might be able to reexamine the contours and boundaries of heresy and its construction, to see whether there might be “Catharisms” in the plural, rather than one homogeneous sea. Secondly, although in what follows we will examine Cathar rituals and the roles of the *perfecti*, I am ultimately much more interested in the laity themselves. This is partly because I feel that it is the laity who most frequently disappear behind the sign of heresy, subordinated to the implicitly hierarchical idea of the “sect”; and partly because I suspect that it is through placing the laity at centre stage that we will gain new perspectives on “belief” and its negotiations.

Overall, therefore, we find two things at stake: a practice of reading, and the politics or ethics of an historiographical project. The practice of reading—analyzing the specific ways in which inquisitorial discourse frames and presents our evidence, and the possibility of analyzing elements which may exceed (if not escape) that framework—is the easier place to begin. It can serve, however, to point us toward the second element. The historiographical project is to reexamine “belief” in relation to the laity and heresy. By “belief,” I would like to indicate, heuristically, “a way of *doing* belief,” and to analyze the ways in which actions, words, and contexts may relate to the difficult term “belief.”¹⁶ It seems worthwhile to begin here the journey of rethinking “belief,” not least because the great interest of the records of inquisition—the excitement they engender—is that they show us in unprecedented detail how lay people set about “believing” in things. That these things are termed “heresy” may be neither here nor there.

But this project also has a political or ethical element, because its implications extend beyond the bounds of the specific question of belief. The desire to focus on the laity, rather than what we might call the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Catharism, has a broader historiographical heritage: specifically, the move from conventional ecclesiastical history to what has been called “lived religion”; but more broadly, in the long-established projects of social history and the Annales school, to widen the bounds of our histories and those who we include within them. To put it with undoubted hubris, part of my desire here is indebted to E. P. Thompson’s famous introductory paragraph to the *Making of the English Working Class*: to “rescue” the laity from “the

enormous condescension of posterity.”¹⁷ However, as various commentators have suggested, this project and ideal may now strike us as more problematic than in former times.¹⁸ The essence of the problem is discussed by Jacques Rancière, in his recent work of historical philosophy: that the possibility of bringing the forgotten subaltern “back to life” has been attenuated by the crushing weight of the analytical structures we use on those very people we seek to “rescue.” That is, seeking to bring “ordinary” men and women back into view, we tend immediately to bury them once more beneath statistics, anthropological categories and collective *mentalités*. Having brought the dead to speak again, they are then only allowed to utter their words within the confines of our prescribed analytical categories. As Rancière puts it, commenting on Le Roy Ladurie’s anthropological project in *Montaillou*, “The inquisitor suppresses heresy by eradicating it. . . . The historian, on the contrary, suppresses it by giving it roots. He removes it, as it were retrospectively, from the inquisitorial condemnation by giving it the color of the earth and the stones, by rendering it indiscernible from its place.”¹⁹ The critique here is not, I think, against the use of anthropology per se, but the way in which the historian sets about “rescuing” the subaltern, and what he or she does with them once they are summoned again to speak.

Here, then, we come full circle: to a reading strategy that must recognize the “inquisitorial condemnation” while also attempting to hear the excess of words prompted by that context. I do not wish to “rescue” the dead in such a way that they are once again silenced. Therefore, while I make some efforts in this chapter to suggest possible areas of commonality between different moments of depositional speech, these connections are provisional and heterogeneous. By focusing on “belief,” I hope that we might discover some other ways of looking at the laity, and some other spaces within which subaltern speech may reverberate once more. But these analyzes can only be provisional, and perhaps must always remain thus if the dead are not to be silenced by our clumsy kindness.

Rituals and Performances

Asked if he had adored a heretic, or bowed his head or bent his knees or said “Bless” before them, or if he had been present at their *consolamenta* . . .²⁰

“Ritual” is another troublesome word, and although I would prefer to steer clear of the depths of recent anthropological discussion about its possible meaning and boundaries, it nonetheless seems helpful to begin by outlining what I am taking the term to mean here.²¹ Let us say that a ritual is a semi-formalized interaction, structured around a pregiven script, which produces both meaning and identity for those involved in its performance. However, these meanings and identities are plural and not fixed, because firstly (in our present context) there are at least three groups of participants in, or audiences of, the ritual—laity, *perfecti*, and inquisitors—and secondly because the

specific performance of any given ritual may produce fluctuations in meaning and identity for its participants. For example, as Bernard Hamilton has recently noted, the apparent Cathar ritual of blessing bread before a meal was not necessarily seen in the same way by *perfecti* and laity: whereas the latter attached a “sacramental significance” to the rite, the perfect did not.²² Rituals are slippery things and carry out more than one kind of cultural work.²³

Consolamentum

To investigate these fluctuations, let us begin with the ritual central to Catharism, the *consolamentum*. This rite of purification, that freed the soul from the restraints of tainted corporeality, was the essence of the *perfecti*’s claim to be able to provide a response to the evil nature of existence. Without this transforming ritual, Catharism would merely pose a problem—how to be spiritual in a corrupt world—with no answer. However, one can note that when we identify the *consolamentum* as central to Catharism, we are also accepting one *particular* definition of “Catharism” itself, as a hierarchical sect with an eschatological project. In pursuing this analysis of the various meanings and affects produced through ritual, I am seeking to suggest that there are other “Catharisms” one might identify.

Let us turn then to the three “audiences” I’ve indicated. For the *perfecti*, the *consolamentum* had to have central significance. It was the act that defined their very role and existence, making them into purified spirits. Other activities—particularly preaching—also had high importance, but the *consolamentum* was preeminent. We have quite detailed information on the words and actions performed during the ritual, from hostile polemics, inquisitorial registers, and from three surviving Cathar descriptions.²⁴ Of the latter, the most important version for our purposes is a manuscript of the ritual in Provençal, written at some point during the thirteenth century.²⁵ This describes a lengthy prefatory sermon that emphasizes how the ritual performs a spiritual baptism in the Holy Spirit. Extensive quotation from the gospels is deployed to claim a continuity for this practice from the apostolic Church. The participant is then exhorted, again following scriptural quotation, to shun the world and its works. Participant and Cathar elder then perform the ritualized greeting and blessing called the *melioramentum* (discussed below) before moving to the central rite:

Let the elder take the Book and place it on the believer’s head, and the other Good Men place each his right hand on him. Then let them say the Pardon and the *Let us adore* thrice, and then, *Holy Father, receive Thy servant in Thy righteousness and bestow Thy grace and Thy Holy Spirit upon him*. Then let them pray to God with the Prayer and let him who conducts the service say the Six in a low voice. When the Six is finished, let him say *Let us adore* thrice, the Prayer once in a full voice, and then the Gospel. When the Gospel has been read, let them say *Let us adore* thrice, the Grace and the Pardon. Then they should perform the Act of Peace with each other also. Let women believers, if there are any present, perform the Act of Peace with the Book and with each other. And then let them pray to God with a Double, with obeisances. And thus they will have administered [the *consolamentum*].²⁶

As Anne Brenon argues, the *consolamentum* was thus a form of second

baptism, supplementing and completing (rather than replacing) the baptism by water that most orthodox Christians would have received.²⁷ The ritual clearly emphasizes the apostolic claims of the Cathar church. One can also analyze the cultural symbolism of the ritual: the straightforward establishment of a hierarchy between the *perfecti*, who can pass on the Holy Spirit through a laying on of hands, and the “believers” who have yet to attain that state; the simultaneous production of a privileged discourse and a more public enunciation, as the Lord’s Prayer is repeated first in “a low voice” for the *perfecti* and then in “a full voice” for the general audience; and the claim to ownership of literacy and textual authority through the use of the Gospel of John (the “Book”). It is during the *consolamentum* that the Cathars most resemble the kind of heretical “textual community” analyzed by Brian Stock, in their claim to authority through their relationship to a text.²⁸

So, in both a literal and a symbolic sense, it is the *consolamentum* that produces the *perfecti as perfecti*: makes them who they are, and dramatizes their essential claim to authority. To move to our second “audience,” much the same reading can be posited for the inquisitors. The Inquisition had its own investment in the *consolamentum*, that overlapped with that of the *perfecti*, while of course reinterpreting its meaning. Of all the areas in which inquisitors questioned, what they termed “heretication” was perhaps most central. For example, Georgene Webber Davis notes in her edition of records from 1299-1300 that the inquisition scribes provided marginal glosses to the text, noting items of transgression. In the first deposition of this particular register most items are glossed, but in subsequent depositions only “*hereticacio*” is noted.²⁹ Inquisitors tended to read Cathar rituals as deliberate perversions or mockeries of orthodox sacraments, and thus the *consolamentum*—which in some ways played the parts of baptism, confirmation, penance, extreme unction, and ordination—might appear as the most offensive practice of all.³⁰ Narratives of the ritual recorded in the registers follow the same outline as the Provençal Ritual, but omit any of the particular claims to apostolic authority, and tend to focus on the acts of renunciation made by the recipient: for example, not to swear or lie or have sex or eat meat.³¹

The nuances of the ritual also provided space for the operation of inquisitorial power, as deponents were requested to relate its performance. Frequently the witnesses mentioned that the *perfecti* said or read certain words “that the witness did not understand.”³² This was usually suffixed by the short and troublesome phrase *ut dixit*—“as he (or she) said”—that usually indicates inquisitorial doubt over the truth of the deponent’s confession. There are, of course, at least two obvious explanations for why the deponent would or could not have understood what was said: that it may have been in Latin, or that it may have deliberately been said “in a low voice,” as the Provençal Ritual demands. More interesting however is the reaction of the inquisitors when a deponent did understand the words. Master (*magister*) Bernard Amati,

a notary, witnessed a *consolamentum* in the late thirteenth century. He noted that the *perfecti* said certain words “according to their rite [*modus*],” but was not then asked to reproduce those words; that is, the inquisitors were not concerned with the content of the ritual but its occurrence.³³ For the Inquisition, therefore, rituals such as the *consolamentum* were important not so much for themselves, as for the possible nexus of understanding, participation, knowledge, and guilt they engendered for the deponents. Ritual for the *perfecti* permitted the performance of one kind of hierarchy and power; but it also permitted a different operation of power for the Inquisition.

Inquisitors were also keen to note the autonomous desire of deponents to receive “heretication”: the record frequently glosses the participant as “wishing and requesting” (*volentem et petentem*) to receive the *consolamentum*. One should note that a subtly different, quasi-legal meaning of “heretic” was being instituted by this relabeling of the ritual and the inquisitors’ emphasis on autonomy. Strictly speaking, a “heretic” within canon law was someone stubbornly choosing and persisting in faith or actions contrary to the conduct of the Church. In practice, a “heretic” had become someone who chose to undergo this ritual. This complicates our pictures of Catharism, as it was not only those who wished to become *perfecti* who received the *consolamentum*: it was also a ritual performed at the deathbeds of believers and adherents. For inquisitors, this made the recipients “heretics.” For the Cathars themselves, the definitions were not synonymous, since those receiving a deathbed *consolamentum*, but subsequently recovering, were enjoined to receive a second *consolamentum* in order to become part of the living faith.³⁴

The deathbed *consolamentum*, which is recorded much more frequently in the registers than the use of the ritual to create new *perfecti*, leads us to our last “audience,” the laity. The Provençal Ritual provides a separate set of instructions for administering the *consolamentum* at the deathbed, pointing once again to this version as a separate ritual. In this context, the Ritual dispenses with emphasizing the baptismal nature of the ritual and instead prefaces the central rite with a lengthy inquiry into the commitment of the sick person to the tenets and disciplines of the Cathar faith, also checking to see whether they owe and can pay any debt to the Cathars.³⁵ The main rite once again involves laying on hands and the presence of the Gospel text, and includes mostly the same ritual prayers and invocations. The first possible reading of this ritual is therefore once again an emphasis on the power of the *perfecti*, their ability to fulfil their promise of purification that will allow the trapped soul to transcend upon death, rather than returning to the evil flesh via metempsychosis. It is perhaps therefore unsurprising to note that people might attend such a *consolamentum* at least in part as an opportunity to see the *perfecti* in action. For example, a knight called Guiraud Colom recalled that when going to visit his uncle, who was ill, he was accosted by two knights who asked him if he wanted to see “the good men, namely the heretics,” who

were in fact busy administering the *consolamentum* to his relative. On this occasion, Guiraud replied that he did not, and that he would attempt to have them arrested.³⁶ Nonetheless, the knights' invitation suggests that the *consolamentum* was in part a chance to see the *perfecti* playing their apostolic role. If one examines the names of those present at deathbed *consolamenta*, amid the perhaps expected relatives and household members, one can also see other visitors. For example, on one occasion, in about 1225, apparently nearly one hundred people attended the deathbed ritual.³⁷

As already noted, if the recipient survived their illness, they were supposed to receive another *consolamentum* to place them more firmly into the Cathar faith, making them a proper *perfectus*. There were occasions on which this occurred, and the reluctance of the *perfecti* to make the deathbed ritual synonymous with their own ordination ritual is understandable, since frequently the recipients quickly broke the vows they had made to avoid meat, oaths, sex, and so on. For example, the deponent Pierre de Beauville described receiving the *consolamentum* during an illness in 1278. He recovered, and “served the sect of the heretics and abstained from meat” for only five or six days, then decided to quit. Another deposition, mentioning a *consolamentum* in 1230, tells of a *perfectus* confiding in the deponent that he was worried that although the female recipient had treated the Cathars well, he was not at all sure that if she lived she would be able to observe the strictures of their sect.³⁸

This tends to point to an understanding of the ritual, by the laity, as essentially a last rite: although theologically purified (or partly purified) within this world, the lay recipients were mainly concerned with the destination of their souls. They were not hoping to join the perfected elect in this life, and may indeed have been rather alarmed by the idea (important though it was to the *perfecti* themselves, as the careful questioning around this possibility, set down in the Provençal Ritual, attests). Many people are noted as having made a “pact” with the *perfecti* to receive the *consolamentum* on their demise (the existence of these “pacts” providing inquisitors with a further opportunity to ascribe autonomy and devotion to their suspects). The need for a pact became stronger during the thirteenth century, as the *perfecti* declined in number and could travel less freely. On a number of occasions people bewailed the fact that a friend or relative had not been able to receive the *perfecti* on his or her deathbed because the Cathars had arrived too late or could not be found.³⁹ The pact was also important for ensuring that the *perfecti* would perform the ritual if the ill person had lost the power of speech and therefore could not give assent to their demands.⁴⁰ On occasion a lay person failed to make the pact, and was indeed denied the *consolamentum* because he or she could not give voice to the *perfecti*'s demands; in one instance the deponent describes how the ill person “made a sign with his arms” to send away the heretics, because he had lost his voice.⁴¹

One also finds, however, occasions when people refused the

consolamentum for other reasons. Sometimes this was clearly because they did not want to participate in the Cathar faith: one dying man fled to a monastery to escape his nephews, who were pressing him to let the *perfecti* perform the *consolamentum* on him.⁴² On other occasions, the refusal may appear to have more to do with the unwelcome implication that the intended recipients were on their last legs. For example, the deponent Raymond Adémar tells of how the *perfecti* visited him when he was ill, but he sent them away, saying that he would send a messenger to them if he got any worse.⁴³ Another deponent tells of how the heretics Raymond de Carlipac and his companion were led to her ailing husband, but the sick man “cried out that she should quickly expel them and they left.” The deponent claimed that she had ignored the proceedings until she heard her husband’s cries, leaving us uncertain whether this was a rejection of the *perfecti*, a desire to avoid his imminent end, or a tale told by the wife to protect the husband.⁴⁴

Although the majority of accounts of deathbed *consolamenta* follow a brief and uninformative pattern, the disparate details that do emerge suggest that the rite was primarily, for the laity, a death ritual. As such, like orthodox practices surrounding death, it was tied up with a social, as much as theological, context. Another occasion that prevented a *consolamentum* being performed was when the wife of the recipient refused to “absolve” him from his marital ties (a practice presumably necessary for the recipient to be able to swear to abstinence), the wife then bursting into tears, prompting the departure of the witness who reported the incident.⁴⁵ Other moments of emotion are mentioned: the deponent Raymond de Mireval said that he was too upset by the imminent death of his father to stay and watch the *consolamentum* being performed.⁴⁶ Another deponent recalls, after a successful *consolamentum*, seeing the sister of the recipient “hitting her cheeks with her palms, not daring to cry out in grief until the heretics had got a long way away.”⁴⁷ Beyond these private moments are other social meanings, indicating (as one might expect for a ritual of death) the production of community.⁴⁸ The deponent Pierre de St. Michel, for example, mentioned that he had been invited by a woman called Fizas to attend her *consolamentum*, although (he claimed) he refused the offer.⁴⁹ In the early fourteenth century, we find a large group of people—up to fifty, according to the witness—gathered at the deathbed of Lady Gaillarde de Gaillac. On this occasion, they were ushered from the room by Gaillarde’s son before the *consolamentum* took place in secret.⁵⁰

For the laity, the death rituals did not necessarily end with the *consolamentum* itself, since burial was also to follow. There is some evidence of specifically “Cathar” graveyards, presumably provided in case the local priest refused burial in consecrated ground.⁵¹ Here, again, the sense of community is felt: in about 1203, the knight Raymond de St. Paul was taken in candlelight procession to “the cemetery of the heretics” at St. Paul, “and all the people of the said *castrum*, knights and others, followed the said knight to

the cemetery.” Around 1225, the deponent Bernard Oth, lord of Niort, saw his wounded brother receive the deathbed *consolamentum*, and then, with “many others” witnessed his burial.⁵² Death was something that brought the community together, performed and reproduced the bonds between the living; and this could be true of Cathar, no less than Catholic, ritual.

Catholic and Cathar theologies differed in how they presented the meaning of death. The Cathar belief in either metempsychosis or transcendence suggested that death was far from the final judgment, regardless of one’s spiritual state, since those still in sin would get another chance to transcend in a following life. One can find examples, in the early fourteenth-century depositions, of *perfecti* teaching the doctrine of the transmigration of souls to potential converts: one woman remembered, on having metempsychosis explained to her, that the heretics had told her she might have been a queen in a previous life.⁵³ Despite this, however, the lay interpretation of the Cathar rituals around death tended to mirror, in their social and symbolic import, the Catholic notion of the “good death,” where the dying person had time to put their social and spiritual affairs in order.⁵⁴ People would say of someone who had received the *consolamentum* that “it had gone well with him, and that he had done his deed well.”⁵⁵ The ritual contained a web of intersecting meanings: spiritual, individual, emotional, and communal. If we are looking “with” the laity, we must recognize that although the meaning of the *consolamentum* overlaps with that of the *perfecti* (and indeed with that of the inquisitors), they are not synonymous.

Melioramentum

If with the *consolamentum* we see a fairly clearly delineated ritual, that was nonetheless open to reinterpretation by both inquisitors and laity, the *melioramentum* presents a more complex picture. The ritual is described and defined within the same Cathar texts that outline the *consolamentum*, but its appearance within the inquisition registers is more variable. The basic ritual involved a lay person bending down on one knee before a *perfectus*, saying “bless” three times, then asking the *perfectus* something along the lines of “Good Christian, pray to God for me, and lead me to a good end.” The *perfectus* would reply to each “Bless,” “Let God bless you.” It is possible that the performance of the ritual could indicate the formal passage for the lay person from supporter to believer.⁵⁶ In a different sense, this was the weight given to the ritual by the Inquisition; they termed it “adoration,” and seem to have taken it to indicate belief.⁵⁷ The repetitive inquisitorial language on the matter also suggests that the ritual was performed on greeting and on taking leave of the *perfecti*, with witnesses frequently saying that they “adored, when arriving and leaving according to the rite of the heretics.”⁵⁸ This, various deponents attest, they were taught to do by relatives, friends, or the heretics themselves.⁵⁹ Evidence from the late thirteenth century would indicate,

however, that a specific inquisitorial question was formulated to probe this area: “asked in what manner he departed from them [the heretics].”⁶⁰ Inquisitors therefore had their own expectations about the context of the ritual.

However, the incidences of the ritual within the records of inquisition present variations on the basic pattern. Annette Pales-Gobilliard has noted that in the early fourteenth century, the final petitions included phrases such as “Good Christians, pray to God for me,” “Lords, save us,” and “Good Christians, pray to God for us, that God will conduct us to a good end.”⁶¹ Other variations can be found, such as “Bless [me], good men, pray for this sinner,” or “Lords, beg [*rogo*] God for this sinner, that God may make me a good Christian and lead me to a good end.”⁶² In deciphering these variations, we are hampered by the inquisitors’ investment in the ritual as a sign of belief, and in particular their desire to know whether the words included an implicit pact to receive the *consolamentum* before death (leading one to “a good end”). The inquisitors certainly seemed to have an idea of how the ritual ought to go, questioning people for example about whether or not they said anything—that is, the petition—after the final “bless.”⁶³ This may, however, lead to some confusion over different rituals and their meanings, as when the deponent Aldric Saix, a young boy, was led to attest that

Jean Fabre taught him to adore the good men and to say “bless” and “spare us,” and other things which the heretics say when adoring, namely “Father and Son and Holy Spirit, spare us and release us from all our sins” and then they say the Paternoster, and in the middle of the prayer “our supersubstantial bread,” and at the end of the Paternoster they adore and after that they say “You are King and virtue [*virtus*] and Glory in the world, amen, we bless the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit by the grace of our lord Jesus Christ, thus with all of us, amen” and then they adore and they say “bless” and “spare us,” and then the heretics reply “May the Lord bless you.”⁶⁴

The confusion of details here leads one to suspect that a number of different rituals are being conflated and mixed up. In fact, this principle of conflation might be applied more widely. One rather suspects that what inquisitors termed “adoration” was made to cover a number of variant Cathar rituals that made use of similar words and actions: firstly, but most rarely, a ritual that admitted a lay person as a formal “believer” in the faith; secondly, a more common ritual that both asserted the desire on the part of the lay person eventually to receive the *consolamentum* (a “good end”) and recognized the power of *the perfecti* to supply that service (“pray God for me”); thirdly, a very common but foreshortened ritual of respect and greeting, where the final petition might not be made. To the inquisitors, such nuances were lost.

But beyond this possible multiplication, one can also see a more interesting negotiation of the ritual by various lay people. Sometimes this negotiation was to do with practical circumstances, as when fear of capture or fear of others present prevented deponents from carrying out the ritual.⁶⁵ A very personal negotiation (and one with which I have particular sympathy) was noted by the deponent Bergère de Loubens, who explained that she did “adore,” but without bending down, because she “could not bend her knees without great difficulty.”⁶⁶ On two occasions, the deponent Raymond Aiffre, a knight,

claimed that he had not performed the ritual while attending a deathbed *consolamentum* because of the sadness he felt for his dying relatives.⁶⁷ Youth seemed likewise to affect the rite, with Raymond Aiffre (among others) also claiming that at the first time he saw heretics, in the early years of the thirteenth century, everybody present “adored” except for him, because “he at that time was not putting himself into what they were saying because he was too little [*parvulus*].”⁶⁸ It is unlikely in cases such as these that the deponents were simply searching for ways of protecting themselves from the inquisitors’ questions, since all admit elsewhere in their depositions to having “adored” at other times, and to having had belief in the heretics.

Belief is the most interesting element here: whether a ritual (or variations on a ritual) should be read as a sign of belief, and what such a reading really means. For inquisitors, it was undoubtedly the case that participating in the ritual—performing “adoration”—indicated belief, or at least the suspicion of belief. But for inquisitors “belief” was essentially the same as “adherence” or “support.” If we are interested in the lived religion of the medieval laity, such a mechanical and prosaic equation of action-adherence-belief may not provide the most satisfying picture.

One can read with some interest, therefore, the following vignette supplied by the deponent Guillaume Matfred, who had met two heretics in a hut near Puylaurens:

and before leaving, the said heretics said to the witness that they would not deal with him, and the witness asked why not, and then the said heretics said that he was badly educated [*malessenhatz*] because he did not bend down [*inclino*] before them. And the said witness said that he did not perceive how any great benefit to him, either in body or in soul, would come to pass [from doing this], but because of love and honor for the heretics, he would willingly bend down before them.⁶⁹

The possibility that one could “love and honor” the *perfecti*, while being doubtful about their ability to help one’s body or soul, is intriguing in itself, and we will discuss this kind of statement later on. What seems clear from this example however is the possibility of participating in a ritual that, while in one context signifying “belief,” could also indicate something more akin to social respect. Here the delineations of what makes a ritual a *Cathar* ritual—and therefore its attendant motivations and meanings—become even more problematic. For there are occasions on which deponents attest to greeting *perfecti* in other ways: for example, Austorga de Rosengua confessed that she had “embraced” a female *perfectus*, but did not “adore” her; and Raymond de *Astanova* admitted that he had seen heretics living publicly at Puylaurens “and had greeted them in the road just as others of the population.”⁷⁰ It was difficult, however, for inquisitors to see heretics “just as others.”

With this in mind, it is intriguing to note a rather different ritualized greeting attested in the deposition of Arnaud Gélis, given in 1320 before the inquisitor and bishop Jacques Fournier. Arnaud, according to his confession, had no contact with Cathars but did spend much of his time talking with the ghosts of the recently dead, who seemed to use him as a messenger to the living.⁷¹ One of the ghosts Arnaud met was that of Bernard, the late bishop of

Pamiers, still dressed in his sacred vestments and mitre. Arnaud describes his reaction: “At this sight, he bent his knees before him and greeted him, asking that the grace of God might be with him and that God might give him Paradise. He [Bernard] replied that he had confidence that God would give Paradise to him and to all, and that his son Christ would give to everyone whatever they asked.”⁷² We should not, of course, be surprised to find that bending one’s knees was a ritual mark of respect that had a wider currency than within Catharism alone. But finding the action linked here, in a totally orthodox (albeit uncanny) context, to a petition for grace and benedictory response, we are reminded that the rituals surrounding Catharism were not invented from thin air, but drew on existing interactions that performed a variety of symbolic meanings.⁷³ Would we say that Arnaud “believed in” his dead bishop in the way that inquisitors saw people believing in heretics? Or do certain privileged positions—privileged spiritually *and* socially—tend to accrue homologous forms of ritualized, respectful behavior?

The *Perfecti* and Nonhieratic Activities

Asked whether he had any other familiarity or participation with heretics, in whatever manner . . .⁷⁴

The performance of rituals would appear to show us the *perfecti* in their most hierarchical relationship to the laity—at their most “sectlike”—but, as has been argued above, the analysis of ritual also alerts us to the various ways in which people and Catharism interacted. In addition to this, *the perfecti* did not spend all of their time in hieratic activity: although the registers focus most of their attention on the *consolamentum*, “adoration,” and preaching, this must primarily attest to the interests of the inquisitors, rather than being taken as an objective picture of Cathar activity. For, as Duvernoy has noted, *the perfecti* did not lead lives of austere or hierarchical isolation, but were involved in the world around them, undertaking physical work such as weaving, agriculture, building, teaching, and medicine.⁷⁵ Indeed, on occasions the records note actions performed by members of the *perfecti* which were not presented as priestlike, not directly linked to the performance of any religious rite, or obviously necessary for the survival of an heretical sect. In exploring these areas of evidence, we might find further gaps between what constituted a heretic as a heretic for the inquisitors, and what constituted a “good man” as a “good man” for the deponents.

Once again, the initial problem is with negotiating the strictures of inquisitorial discourse, and interpreting brief moments that may exceed the categorization of transgression. For example: Dyas de Deime saw *perfecti* in her youth at Montesquieu and confessed that they gave her “fruit, and other things to eat.” She did not adore them, nor was the meal taken “at the same table,” nor did it include bread blessed by the *perfecti*.⁷⁶ Although the act was still deemed a transgression, it also presents the possibility of *perfecti* giving foodstuffs outside of the context of a “rite.” They are, in the item, simply

people who give Dyas food; the transgression comes because they are heretics, not because it is heretics' food. This slight realignment of heretics' identities reappears in a brief mention of one "Guillelme den Marty, heretic, baker."⁷⁷ Here we have a rare but important instance of a "heretic" (member of that essentially "other" sect within the text) overlapping with a functionary: a baker, a most important role within any village. Guillelme is allowed, for a tantalizing moment, to break free from the strict codes of inquisitorial categorization.

We also find, on occasion, *perfecti* doing things for laypeople without any hint of religiosity. For example, two *perfecti* built a bread oven for Faure Paratori; two "weavers, heretics" made some cloth for the deponent Bergère.⁷⁸ *Perfecti* also lent money to various people: Hêlis de Mazerolles borrowed money from *the perfecti*, and was keen to state that she paid it back.⁷⁹ It is interesting to note another occasion where the loan of money is presented as a socially useful deed: *perfecti* lent Rubea Ceteratz some money so that she could buy back some cloth that she had been forced to sell. There is no suggestion that this was a usurious transaction, or that it was in any way resented; it is presented rather as a social service, easing the flow of a faltering cash economy.⁸⁰

The most entertaining glimpse of these nonhierarchical social services performed by *perfecti* comes as an aside in one item, estimating a period of time. The deponent Raymond Hugo reported that certain *perfecti* had spoken to him of their travels and the places they stayed. One of their stops was at the *domus* of Bernard Faure at Toulouse. They had stayed there so long, the *perfecti* said, "they had carded ten bags of wool for the wife of the said Bernard."⁸¹ Such domestic activity, so haphazardly reported, does not fit the normal picture of the *perfecti* as superior, priestly, an elite. Such glimpses are few and far between but they illuminate in two directions: they show us outlines of how *the perfecti* and their social context interacted; and they illustrate, through their very scarcity, the type of hieratic picture the inquisitors normally drew of the *perfecti* and their relationship to the flock.

The records also attest to some degree of medical contact between the laity and *the perfecti*. This was of particular concern to the Inquisition, because the sick person might have received the *consolamentum* if he or she were dying. It may have been of further concern, given the Church's attitude toward physicians in general. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 ordered that physicians and surgeons were to exhort patients to call in a priest to hear confession before medical care, "[a]s physical illness is sometimes the result of sin."⁸² A sick person tended by a heretical doctor was considered to be in dual danger, and consequently the council of Toulouse in 1229 had ordained that anyone suspected of heresy could not act as a *medicus*, and must be prevented from attending the sick.⁸³

Walter Wakefield has lucidly set out in a short article most of the depositional evidence concerning Cathar physicians.⁸⁴ He provides no

particular interpretation for their occasional medical practice, but rightly dismisses Jean Guiraud's opinion that Cathars practiced medicine as a means to gain converts and refused treatment to those who would not adhere to their sect.⁸⁵ In fact, although part of the provision made by Cathar *medici* was arranging for the *consolamentum* of the patient, should they reach the point of death, they also practiced medicine and medical care in less extreme cases. Guilabert de Roussillon, a knight, was in the care of Guillaume Bernard d'Airoux (the Cathar physician who appears most frequently in the records) for half a year, but the knight did not "adore" the heretic nor did "those things which pertain to heresy"; a woman called Austorga was cured by another Cathar *medicus* after three visits.⁸⁶

Almost no details are given about treatments used, but one case, where Guillaume Bernard d'Airoux treated someone, who later declared that the heretic "with God" had cured him of his infirmity, is revealing.⁸⁷ Here we might see—at least for this *medicus* and this patient—a seamless link between the hieratic and social functions of the Cathar; the roles of physician and of *perfectus* were not in conflict.⁸⁸ In contrast, on one occasion Guillaume Bernard fetched another heretic, Raymond de Carlipac, to a sick person, though the patient refused to be hereticated.⁸⁹ It is unclear why Guillaume Bernard (who was definitely a heretic at the time of the incident) could not hereticate the patient himself. The record does not state that he was actually medically caring for the ill man, but the possibility is obviously there. Perhaps, then, this Cathar doctor did not also perform the *consolamentum*—maybe perceiving some conflict between his different available roles?

There is one other social function performed by the Cathar *perfecti*, which Duvernoy calls "l'Parbitrage."⁹⁰ These were occasions when Occitan nobleman were reconciled following feuds and disputes "in the hands of" the Cathars, frequently at Montségur.⁹¹ Curiously, this activity has not been much remarked upon in the secondary literature of Catharism and Inquisition, possibly because it is not presented by the inquisitorial record (nor understood by the historian) as an innate function of the heretical sect or of particular interest to inquisitors.⁹² What precisely happened at these arbitrations? The records provide few details: we know neither the reasons for the conflicts nor, to any great degree, how they were resolved. The items all follow a similar narrative pattern:

Item, he [the witness] said that when there was discord [*discordia*] between the witness, and the brothers of the witness on the one part; and B[ernard] Daide and his sons on the other; the witness and Raymond Orre and Arnaud Orre (brothers of the witness) and Pierre Orre (father of the witness), and B[ernard] Daide and Arnaud Daide and P[ierre] Daide (sons of the this Bernard), came together and all went together into the *domus* of the said B[ernard] Daide; and when they were there they found there Pierre Pollan, and another four heretics; and there, in the hands and the power of the said heretics, the witness and all the aforesaid others made peace between themselves, and concord among them, and in sign of [that] peace gave each other a kiss.⁹³

A list of those present at the reconciliation then followed. On another occasion, around 1240, a large group of people came to Montségur and made

peace with Pierre Roger de Mirepoix and with Raymond de Péreille, in the *domus* of the heretics, “in the hands and in the power of Bertrand Marty, bishop of the heretics.”⁹⁴ As a sign of peace each gave the other a kiss. The context for such references within the inquisition depositions is usually amid other items concerning people who came to Montségur for various reasons, or among the record of other general contact with the heretics. It is this contact that primarily interests the inquisitors; the arbitration, the making of peace is simply one of a number of contexts, investigated in no greater detail than, for example, the fact of having seen heretics “living publicly.”

Nevertheless, the peace making is attested. The reconciliation is “in the hands of” the heretics, a phrase more normally used in the care of souls by orthodox *religiosi*.⁹⁵ Duvernoy reads “l’arbitrage” as a renunciation by the Cathars and their adherents of orthodox secular justice. He links it to other instances where crimes are dealt with away from the royal or ecclesiastical powers, and constructs a picture of a kind of utopian, social self-ordering away from the state. However, this interpretation ignores two factors: one is (as Duvernoy himself notes) that Catharism was by no means separated from, or antithetical to, the “normal” sociopolitical structures of the region. Although it is true that we very occasionally find Cathar *perfecti* involved in the concealment of certain crimes, their “rejection” of judicial power structures was from force of circumstance.⁹⁶ They too were criminals of a kind and could not come forward, or risk discovery if the crime touched upon their own actions. Looking closely at the brief accounts of the “arbitrations” we see also that they were not “judicial” as such; that is, no one was found guilty or punished. They appear to have been part of that larger system of which juridical process is only one part: a way of easing social tensions, of restoring stability and peace.

But there is another reason to reject Duvernoy’s reading: there is one example of peace making which is carried out by men who were not *perfecti*. Around 1242 Guillaume de Astrava and Pons Arnaud de Château-Verdun came to Montségur to make peace between Raymond de Péreille and Pierre Roger de Mirepoix, the lord of Montségur. The deponents reporting this item did not see either Guillaume or Pons adore the heretics while they were staying at the *castrum*.⁹⁷ Now, the context for this event is still Montségur, the heretical stronghold (and the item appears in Guillaume de Bouan’s testimony among a number of other references to people who came, for one reason or another, to Montségur). But in this case it is the arbitrators—Guillaume and Pons—who came *to* Montségur, where the feuding combatants were already. If Montségur is important as the geographical context, we should remember that it is primarily important as the reason why this information appears in the records at all. If, in 1242, the location had been, say, Toulouse (which was not at that time seen as a center of heretical activity in the same fashion) there would have been no imperative to record it. This item indicates that it is not only *perfecti* who perform the role of arbitrator. It

is something that they do; but it is also something that others do. It is not therefore an action that marks them as a “heretic”—not to the inquisitor, and nor should it to the historian. And there is a clue as to what this action of arbitration and peace making entailed: one example mentions that the heretics made peace between feuding parties “having heard and thought about the arguments of both sides in the lawsuit or dispute.”⁹⁸ It is rational thought and authority that the Cathars, or rather the *arbitrators*, supply. We are starting to glimpse, therefore, ways in which the roles of the *perfecti* might overlap with other social roles that need not necessarily be marked as “heretical”; and, hence, “Catharisms” that momentarily exceed the definitions and assumptions of inquisitorial discourse.⁹⁹ Let us now further pursue this line, by turning to names and language.

Naming Heretics

Asked what he understood by this, he said that he understood them to mean the heretics.¹⁰⁰

The Cathar *perfecti* were given a variety of names, by lay people, by *perfecti* and by inquisitors. They were usually called “heretics”; often called “good men” and “good women” and “good Christians”; sometimes called “perfected heretics” or “vested heretics”; very occasionally called “just [men]” (*justi*). What does this variety tell us? These terms were not all synonymous and interchangeable; neither were they exclusively linked to oppositional discourses. They were, instead, employed strategically and contingently, interweaving meanings and implications. Names are beguiling things: they quickly become labels, quietly constructing homogeneous identities and categories, and thus in the registers provide another trap where inquisitorial language may colonize historiographical discourse. We might therefore try to unpick some of the nuances of these appellations and how they function.¹⁰¹

Duvernoy has shown how the term *heretici* became a synonym for *perfecti* in certain inquisitorial documents, but this equation is not the whole story, nor does it show all the ways the term operates.¹⁰² Through its endless repetitions in the registers, *heretici* operates firstly as a legal category, positioning the other, lesser transgressive categories of *credentes*, *fautores*, and so forth, and distinguishing those who had received the *consolamentum* from those “condemned as heretics” (*condempnati heretici*) who were not *perfecti*, but had reached a legal state judged “heretical” through contumacy.¹⁰³ Secondly, *heretici* (as a synonym for *perfecti*) distinguishes Cathar heretics from Waldensians, the latter being named in the registers as “Valdenses.” Finally, *heretici* is placed over against other terms (represented as lay usage) such as “good men” and “good Christians.” Naming Cathars as *heretici* therefore plays a role at various different levels of discourse: constructing transgressive hierarchies and categories, positioning Cathars against other (lesser) heresies, and providing a more “truthful” name against which “lay” nomenclature can be measured and judged.

Looking at the use of the term *heretici* in the texts, we also find that it works both as a collective, but curiously “empty,” label: there is a surprising lack of interest in details concerning those who were *heretici*, or at least certain lacunae which the records leave unaddressed. Although the depositions of some converted *perfecti* are extremely long, and obviously rendered a good deal of information to the inquisitors in terms of supplying the names of adherents and supporters,¹⁰⁴ most of the companions [*socii*] of named heretics are not themselves named, and deponents who do not “remember” the names of heretics they saw apparently remain unchallenged.¹⁰⁵ Quite often one heretic’s name is used to stand in for the presence of many: for example, items concerning Montségur often mention Bertrand Marty (the Cathar bishop) “and others” without listing them.¹⁰⁶ Even with those deponents who were *heretici* themselves, there is a lack of interest in their beliefs and motivations. For example, in the deposition of the converted *perfectus* Arnaud de Bretos, one slowly becomes aware that Arnaud had had a variety of companions over a period of time; however, not all of them are named, and there is no question directed as to why he should have had a different *socius* at different times.¹⁰⁷ Most tellingly, the formulaic language of the depositions has converted *perfecti* speak of “the heretics” as if they were an “outside” group, when in fact the witness had been one of their number.¹⁰⁸

What is the function and purpose of all this? Essentially, it works to place *heretici* beyond negotiation, constructing them as the complete “Other” against which the deponents must be positioned; and emphasizing that the primary purpose of inquisition (after the post-Crusade period) is to police the *laity* rather than simply to seek out the “little foxes.” To put it crudely, there is very little that inquisitors needed to know from or about the *heretici* themselves. The information the converted *perfecti* supply mainly concerns other laypeople, and the information lay deponents supply about the *perfecti* mainly concerns other laypeople who came into contact with them. In short, the records treat the heretics as a pestilence which contaminates the lay man or woman, thus situating the moral struggle between orthodoxy and heresy within the individual layperson rather than against the beguiling heresiarch.¹⁰⁹

If we then reject *heretici* as the “inquisitors’ name,” we must still recognize that it is numerically the most prominent term in the depositions. And, in fact, we cannot simply attribute it to the Inquisition and thus discard it, because part of the process of inquisition was to make the deponents speak this name themselves. Constantly they are asked what they “understood” (*intelligere*) by other names such as “good men”: “by that I understood him to mean the heretics” they reply. Inquisition is a penitential, confessing process; and part of the penitential process is recognizing one’s sin. *Hereticus* is just as real or accurate a term in the depositions as other names for the Cathar elite, because it had real, penitential implications and meaning.

Although “heretic” is the most frequent term used in the depositions to indicate the *perfecti*, the one usually utilized by historians is “good men” or “good women.” This is particularly favored by modern historians working from within the context of contemporary pride in the history of southern France, and is often rendered in their work under the Occitan translation of *boshomes*, although the record very infrequently uses this term itself (or, indeed, other vernacular expressions). Rhetorically, the use of “good men” seeks to utilize what is seen as the true, vernacular, sympathetic term given by the inhabitants of Languedoc, rather than by the inquisitors or northern French. It also tends to become a title rather than a description: *bonshommes* or *boshomes* rather than *bons hommes* or “good men.” *Boni homines* are not “men who are good” but “Goodmen” or “Cathars.”

To a degree this is fair enough. In both polemical literature and the writings of the Cathars, we find the same usage: Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, writing against the Cathars around 1213, says of the sect that “certain of the heretics were called the Perfect or Good Men; the others were called the believers of the heretics.”¹¹⁰ This is supported by the Cathar Provençal Ritual, which uses “Good Men” (*bos homes*) for the *perfecti*.¹¹¹ What is apparently the first instance of the term appears in a record of a debate between Catholics and “certain persons, who chose to be called Good Men” in 1165.¹¹² There is much evidence for the use of “good men”—either given as *boni homines* or *probi homines*—in the depositions, and there is evidence too for it being a vernacular, rather than inquisitorial, term: for example, the deponent Bernard Hugo mentions that a man came to ask him if heretics were staying in his *domus*, “but he did not call them ‘heretics’ but ‘good men’ [*probi homines*]”;¹¹³ similarly the deponent Bernarde de Fonte tells of a man on his deathbed who called “for the *boni homines*, by which she understood him to mean the heretics.”¹¹⁴ This seems pretty incontrovertible.

“Good men” also operated in the service of inquisitorial discourse. The council of Narbonne in 1243, dealing primarily with Waldensians, but also with heresy generally, talks of those “who believe they can be saved in their sect, or that they are good [*boni*], or holy [*santi*] men, or friends of God, or [His] messengers.”¹¹⁵ Almost every deposition ends with the formulaic question, “Asked if he believed the heretics to be good men and true and to have a good faith, and that one could be saved by them.” This is not a question about “titles” per se, but about allegiances, assessment of piety, and belief. We also find places where the term gets rather confused through the glossing of the inquisitorial scribes: Raymond Rociner of Sorèze, a butcher, admonished a sick man “to provide for the salvation of his soul . . . that is to say, that he should have the good men, that is to say, the heretics.”¹¹⁶ “Good men” here is located halfway between inquisitorial and vernacular usage.

These examples also argue against a direct and neat synonymity between “heretics” “Cathar elite,” and “good men,” precisely because these examples (and others) narrate a process of translation, which allows for the possibility

of a different answer. The Inquisition's desire for specificity opens up the space to see alternative usages and meanings. It seeks to gloss the vernacular, as it does throughout the depositions, usually by using the formula "the good men, namely [*scilicet*] the heretics." The other possibilities are plain when the inquisitorial questions are recorded explicitly: Raymond de *Astanova* deposed that a man had approached him and told him that two *probi homines* wanted to see him. The item continues: "Asked what manner [*cuiusmodi*] of good men he believes and then believed that they were, the witness said that he understood that [they were] heretics, and in particular that they were G [uillaume] Prunel of St Paul and his companion."¹¹⁷ Although Raymond de *Astanova* realized that the "good men" were in fact "heretics," the example also illustrates that this gloss was performed in the inquisitorial context of confession; his own gloss at the time was to realise *which* "good men" were meant, namely Guillaume Prunel and his companion. An example from the early fourteenth century raises another possibility: Philippe de Larnat inquired of Athon du Château if he was a "good man" (*bonus homo*), and Athon replied affirmatively. The inquisitor questioning Athon asked him what he understood Philippe to mean by this inquiry (since Athon himself was not a *perfectus*). Athon explained that "he believed he wished to ask whether he was a believer in the heretics."¹¹⁸ These instances suggest that there could be other "good men" than those deemed "heretics."

This is more than idle semantics, for, as others have pointed out, there are indeed other "good men" and "good women" in the depositions, and in the historical and social context of medieval Languedoc.¹¹⁹ Within the depositions, a number of people held the family name *bonus homo*—for example, the knight Isarn Bonhomme, mentioned above. "Bonus" also appears as a first name, even within the ranks of the inquisitorial staff, such as the scribe Bon Mancip.¹²⁰ In these and other cases it is clear that "Goodman" or "Good-woman" are simply names, and probably indicate nothing more; it is interesting though that they occur in the later depositions (the 1270s), and it would be intriguing to know when the name first appeared in Languedoc.

In certain of the examples, "good man" might be a description; and elsewhere one finds "good" used simply as an adjective. However, this adjectival sense is perhaps more complicated than meaning "pleasant" or "well-behaved." One finds the adjective in the rather wonderful story of the deception played by the women of Sorèze against a messenger of the Inquisition: the messenger, having captured two heretics, was assaulted by the women of the village who freed the *perfecti*. When the messenger's master arrived to sort things out, the villagers told him that the messenger had been mistaken and had captured two "good, married women" of the *castrum* (*duae bonae mulieres de castro maritatis*) and not two heretics at all. So here we have two "bonnes femmes" who were not *bonnesfemmes*!¹²¹ On another occasion, those present at a deathbed heretication are described as "many good people of Saissac."¹²² "Good" in these examples perhaps indicates a

quality more akin to respectability or citizenship; this would certainly seem to be the way in which the term is used in a contemporary vernacular source, the *Chanson de la croisade*, where the terms “good” (*bos*) and “worthy” (*pros*) are applied to various people who displayed good conduct.¹²³

Do *boni homines* and *probi homines* indicate different vernacular words? Could they be translations of *bonshommes* (or *bos homes*) and *prud’hommes* (or *pros homes*) respectively? Quite possibly: as Duvernoy points out, a deponent in the Fournier register uses both terms, as well as “saints, Friends of God [and] Masters.”¹²⁴ Does this then indicate that the term(s), in the vernacular usage, were qualitative rather than titular? Again, possibly: we also find a clear, adjectival use of this concept of “goodness” when one Raymond Isarn berated a group of his peers for failing to “adore” the heretical deacon Bertrand Marty; Isarn called them “beasts” and said that Marty “was one of the best men in the world.” Similarly, “good” was clearly an adjective when someone commended the heretics by saying that they were “very good men.”¹²⁵

At the same time the repetition of the description undoubtedly forms a kind of title, as the examples of interpretation and glossing above show. One might think, however, of a mid-point between “adjective” and “title.” The records show the variety of names used for the *perfecti*, of which *boni homines* and *probi homines* are the most frequent. One cannot see them, therefore, as being titles of an official kind: they are not as specific as “inquisitor” or “bishop”; nor even as “baker” or “smith.” Yet they are obviously deployed to indicate something more than an assessment of an individual’s virtue: to say that Bertrand Marty “was a good man” is to say not only something of his moral worth, but also (if we follow the record’s rubrics) to indicate his social position. However, I wish to argue that this social position did not necessarily equal “the Cathars” alone; or rather, that “the Cathars” were one subset within a wider social position.

As noted above, the term “good man” had a currency outside the heretical. Duvernoy writes “c’est également un ‘bon homme’ ou, s’il appartient à la hierarchie ou à une famille importante, un ‘bon seigneur’ ou une ‘bonne damme’.” He notes also that *bons hommes* was used, as was *prud’hommes*, before the Albigensian Crusade “pour désigner de quelconques religieux.”¹²⁶ Borst also notes that “good man” was a general term of respect in medieval French society, and Mark Pegg has recently suggested that it was used in any situation “circumscribed by courtesy.”¹²⁷ Of course, there are varieties of the appellation “good man” or “worthy man” throughout medieval culture. Rodney Hilton notes that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the term *prud’hommes* (*probi homines*) is applied to “well-to-do ruling groups of merchants” throughout England and France.¹²⁸ *Preude fame* appears in the *Roman de la rose*; trade leaders in Languedoc in the thirteenth century were known as *probi homines*; and *prud’hommes* could be used to indicate a role of civic standing in Languedoc well into the fourteenth century.¹²⁹

Focusing on southern France, before and during the period of this study, I think however that we can go further than simply noting that “good man” was a term of respect. There are two areas where we find the term, suggestive in their complementarity. The first is in the development of villages and towns in Languedoc, on which Monique Bourin-Derruau has written extensively and persuasively. She traces the names and functions of those men raised to a level of authority, although below the nobility, who were what she calls “autochthonic”—that is, drawn from, standing for, and in some senses created by, the local community. She finds legal witnesses known as *boni viri* during the Carolingian period, who were supplanted by *boni homines* in the eleventh century. These *boni homines* were representatives of the local lord, but acted partly in the interests of their own community. This appellation disappeared in turn by 1100. Around 1140 a new name, and a slightly new group, appeared: *the probi homines*. These men acted as prejudicial arbitrators. They were usually landowners, though not noble, were part of the seigneurial administration, but were also instrumental in organizing pious works on the part of the local community. A charter from Laurens in the twelfth century emphasizes above all their freedom—from serfdom, from debt of money, and from debt of honor. As the settlements of Languedoc developed municipal institutions in the thirteenth century, the *prud’hommes* settled into the role of buffers between the merchant classes and the nobility, a position retained at least into the fifteenth century.¹³⁰

Bourin-Derrau’s *boni homines* and *probi homines* were “autochthonic”; concerned with the social mediation of justice; and freed from certain social bonds, which thus allowed them to fulfill their allotted roles. This position of power, authorised by the local community, was superseded by the establishment of municipal institutions, and the concomitant abstraction of these principles of mediation and negotiation from the persons of certain men into sets of statutes. Now, I am not suggesting that Cathar *boni homines* were synonymous with these village and town officials, or that Cathars were recruited from their ranks. But I think we should see this social role—emphasizing local authority, freedom, and the arbitration of justice—as one half of a social position that the Cathar *boni homines* or *probi homines* came to occupy.

The other half comes unsurprisingly from the spiritual. The name *boni homines* was also applied by deponents to the Waldensians,¹³¹ and an eleventh-century eremetical foundation in southern France (which reached its zenith in the 1140s) had monks known as *bons hommes*.¹³² Reaching into the thirteenth century, we find *preudons* in *La Queste del Saint Graal*, written around 1225. In the *Graal*, *preudons* is applied to religious men: firstly to monks; secondly to hermits.¹³³ For example, one hermitlike traveler (who turns out to be a priest) addressed as *preudons*, is described thus: “a man of great age, who was dressed in a religious robe and rode on an ass” (*un home de grant aage qui ert vestuz de robe de religion et chevauchoit un asne*).¹³⁴

This, I would suggest, is the other aspect of the position of the *perfecti*, the two sandals they wear, one might say—the spiritual and the social. The Cathar *boni homines* quite clearly do fill these two roles: they are representatives of the spiritual, but act within the social sphere, practicing medicine, giving alms, lending money, arbitrating in disputes. I would suggest that there was, within their social functions, a degree of interchangeability between one type of holy “good man” and another, whether orthodox or heterodox; although theologically at war, they could fulfill similar functions.¹³⁵

When pointing, however, to the more spiritual side of the *perfecti*, there is another available term: “Friends of God.”¹³⁶ This appellation is presented by the records as the language of the deponents rather than of the inquisitors. It is also, however, repositioned by inquisitorial questions, taken to indicate the (mistaken and sinful) respect given by the laity to the heretics. By the 1270s the following formulaic question had emerged: “Asked if he believed the said heretics to be good men, and true, and friends of God, and to have a good faith and that one could be saved through them, the witness said . . .”¹³⁷ The usage also appears in more specific, referential contexts, although the inquisitorial and penitential implications still remained: the deponent Bernard de Montesquieu told the inquisitors that Bernard de Puys had asked him whether “he wished to see the friends of God, that is to say the heretics.” One Pierre Maurel delivered a long lecture, in the hearing of the deponent Fabrissa, on the virtuous life and faith of the “Friends of God,” and of how it was a sin that the (orthodox) Church persecuted them.¹³⁸

Peter Brown has written on the emergence of people labeled “Friends of God” during the late second and early third centuries C.E. in the early Christian Church. In his analysis, at that time such people formed a focus for the mediation of the supernatural amid the temporal, and fostered an elevated sense of community among Christians, which privileged the faithful above their neighbors. By Constantine’s reign, the “Friend of God” was implicitly connected with a power that not only mediated between this world and the next, but also allowed the wise management of temporal affairs.¹³⁹ I note this earlier example not to suggest any undisturbed continuity of spiritual vocabulary or practices, but to see how Brown’s analysis of people holding a privileged spiritual position in an earlier period might throw light on those in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Cathar *perfecti* obviously held a privileged spiritual position too: according to their own theology they were but one final step from being angels, or pure spirits; they could purify others through administration of the *consolamentum*; they understood the processes of death and the afterlife (something Brown also identifies as a prominent feature of “Friends of God” in his own period). However, they were not mediators between mankind and the supernatural in the sense that earlier “Friends of God” were: they did not perform miracles, and were rarely presented as having supernaturally influenced physical events. Indeed, even supporters of the Cathars were likely to look elsewhere for this

kind of access to the supernatural: twice we find people consulting augurers when someone they knew had been captured by the Inquisition, and they were scared of being betrayed.¹⁴⁰ The Cathar theological rejection of the temporal somewhat disbarred them from being effective ambassadors of the supernatural as an active force in the world; they were more concerned with distilling the spiritual essence from its physical bonds.

Nonetheless, as we have seen, their privileged position did extend to some degree into temporal affairs. The Cathars never had a Constantine: the ultimate renunciation of the physical world would have been impossible to square with the contingencies of political power. But although they did not actually occupy the seats of power of Languedoc, for a long time they had taken a prominent place beside them. They had members in the noble families, they were implicated in the social world, and they were protected during and to some extent after the Albigensian Crusade. In the later thirteenth century, when Montségur had fallen and their political support had disintegrated under the ordered and centralized administration of the northern French, the Cathars were still at the side of the lower nobility, were still able to claim their protection to a degree, and at times could act as mediators between opposing factions.

What does all of this imply for the concept of “friendship with God” and the position of the Cathar elite? In the early Christian Church, friendship with God meant that a person was a focus *through* which God worked in this world. In Peter Brown’s analysis, the Friend of God allowed for the transition between pagan and Christian supernatures, and was a catalyst for discussion of the role of the divine within the everyday. “Friendship” here meant a special, though unequal, relationship with, and access to, the deity; to be a channel for the divine. Elements of this relationship were true also for the *perfecti*. The *perfecti* were those closer to God, because they were closer to their true spiritual essences. They were allowed to pray to God in a way unavailable to the nonelect. However, with the partial exception of the *consolamentum*, they did *not* serve as a focus for the irruption of the spiritual (as a motive force) into the physical; they were not miracle workers.¹⁴¹ And although people occasionally saw the contingencies of the everyday as benefiting from their presence, they were for the most part supernaturally uninvolved in the temporal. The relationship between laity and *perfecti* is therefore bound up with the relationship between *the perfecti* and God; or, perhaps more exactly, between *the perfecti* and the afterlife. The *perfecti* acted as spiritual foci, but not spiritual channels; they *represented* the spiritual in the physical, but, as befitted their theology, kept the two safely discrete. They were “friends” of God in the sense that they were “of” God: signifiers of the spiritual within the temporal.

Again, therefore, we might see the *perfecti* as operating as one type of “holy man” among many within Languedocian society. The early Dominicans, as we saw in Chapter 1, themselves saw the possibility of

supplanting the Cathars through imitation, replacing heretical holiness with their orthodox version.¹⁴² Humbert de Romans, presumably describing a zeal he felt the Dominicans should emulate or at least combat, interestingly emphasizes the social function (and its religious implications) of the Cathars: “Moreover the *perfecti* among the heretics take such care of their followers that they never stop travelling around, collecting alms for them, so that they will be able to support their poor and in this way lure others to subscribe to their belief.”¹⁴³ On a couple of occasions in the registers, *perfecti* are mistaken for pilgrims.¹⁴⁴ Elsewhere they describe themselves as *predicadores*, something that Humbert would no doubt have found reassuringly sinister.¹⁴⁵ Occasionally in the records we get quasi definitions, issued through the mouths of the deponents or other laity, and these perhaps sum up best the combination of roles I am trying to describe: “they were good men and holy [*sancti*]”; “Fabrissa commended Placentia, a certain woman from Lombardy, who was a good woman, and faithful, and a friend of the Good Lord”; “they are good and beautiful [*pulcri*] men just like other [men?]”; “they were good men and taught much good”; “they were those good men who are called heretics, and they hold to great chastity and do great penance”; “they were good men and they were of the rule of the apostles, and they were very holy and very abstinent.”¹⁴⁶ One could profitably contrast these definitions with the words ascribed to one Guillaume d’Albi: he fled to Lombardy, but found “bad men” (*mala gens*) there, and so returned.¹⁴⁷

I suggested above that one might see the *perfecti* performing two roles, religious and social. This may be, however, to produce a division that is influenced more by modern, secular conceptions of faith and society: we might be better off considering the social and the spiritual as not only entwined but indivisible; and noting that the term “good man” could resonate across what we now choose to see as different realms, spiritual and temporal. One longstanding view of Cathars has maintained that they were essentially separated from the society they lived in, and that the basic tenets of their faith were opposed to the dominant social structures of the period; in particular, that their abhorrence of marriage, procreation, and oaths, and their commitment to asceticism and the *endura*, attacked both the specific structures of feudal society, and perhaps the basic fabric of any society.¹⁴⁸ This image of Catharism as a force hostile to community is accompanied by a wider argument that sees heresy in general in opposition to social structures, and explains the persecution of heresy through that supposed threat. Chenu, for example, argues that heresy was the greatest danger to Christendom because it attacks the vital structures of *Christianitas*: the bond between the individual and God, and the bond of fraternity between believing individuals.¹⁴⁹

Was Catharism so inimical to social bonds? One can note the kind of language the inquisitorial scribes use to translate the deponents’ expressions of their relationship with the *perfecti*. People are frequently said to “value” or

“love” (*diligere*) the *perfecti*, to love (*amare*) them, and to be friends of the heretics (*amici hereticorum*). For example, Guillaume Faure of Puyhermer chided his wife for failing to value (*diligere*) the *perfecti*;150 Guillaume Matfred deposed that he bowed before certain *perfecti* out of “love and honor” (*amor et honor*);151 Raymond Ugo mentions various people who “the heretics reputed friends and believers [*amici et credentes*].”152 These descriptions also operated within inquisitorial discourse, and *amicus* (in conjunction with *credens*) might be seen as a kind of quasi category in itself.153

Julian Haseldine, working on twelfth-century letter-writing, places words like these within the vocabulary of “friendship” (*amicitia*). For medieval writers, friendship “was not an expression used to denote personal, subjective whims or individual affections, but to describe a sphere of social, political and public activity”; “*Amicitia* was part of a set of common ideals based on the vision of a Christian society.”154 I am not suggesting that the deponents had read and internalized Cicero’s *De amicitia* (although the scribes translating their words might possibly have been influenced by monastic rhetoric rooted in that work). However, the description of “a set of common ideals based on the vision of a [Cathar?] society” does have some application here. A converted *perfecta* noted that “all of the men and women of Villemur were *credentes et amici hereticorum*,” which suggests that one could identify belief in the context of social groups rather than individuals.155 Friendship, love, and common allegiance are strongly evoked in one item from the deposition of Raymond Jordan, a squire. The witness confessed that he had gone to collect a Lady Philippa who was to stay with his mother over the Christmas period; however, on reaching the Lady’s *domus*, Jordan was refused entry by Lord Pader, who would not allow the Lady to go with him. Pader said that the witness “valued the French and the religious clerics and preachers, and had departed from the love of his friends, and that he loved nothing from the heart.” Jordan told the inquisitors that from these words he realized that Pader wanted him to love (*amare*) the heretics and not the French.156 The “faith” that Pader suggests Jordan has lost is not simply spiritual, but also communal. Even in its spiritual element, it was bound up with ideas of benefit and reciprocity: one deponent describes being urged by another man “to do just as others, because the friendship and fellowship [*familiaritate*] of the said heretics could provide him with great good.”157 Another was told that “the said heretics were good men and the witness could be provided with great benefit from friendship and respect for them, and that if the witness embraced and believed in them, they would give him silver and gold money.”158 “Friendship” was not straightforward or freed from context, and it did not relate directly to “belief”; or, rather, the tonal variations in “friendship” indicate how varied, complex, and socially implicated “belief” might be.

In the early thirteenth century, the knight Pons Adhémar de Roudeille explained to an irate Foulques, bishop of Toulouse, why the nobility did not expel the heretics from their lands: “We cannot: we have grown up with them, we have relatives among them, and we see that they live well.”¹⁶⁰ As mentioned above, historiographical consensus has emphasized the importance of familial connections to Catharism. Lambert, for example, states that in the success of Catharism “Family influence is the most important single factor,” and Duvernoy similarly credits familial structures for keeping Catharism alive when there were no longer many *perfecti* around to proselytise.¹⁶¹ There are well known examples which back up this link between family and heresy: Arnaude de Lamothe became a Cathar *perfecta*, along with her sister, on her mother’s wishes;¹⁶² an Autier family appeared to have had heretical contacts from at least the 1240s, before the activities of Pierre Autier in the 1330s.¹⁶³ Michel Roquebert locates the early strength of Catharism entirely in its familial support, and suggests that it falters after about 1250 precisely because the inquisitorial punishments attacked those things most important to the large familial structures: goods, property, and inheritance.¹⁶⁴ Roquebert describes a nobleman born between 1170 and 1180 as one “naît croyant. . . . Ce n’est pas parce qu’ils assistent aux sermons . . . et qu’ils ont été convaincus par tel ou tel commentaire de l’Apocalypse ou de l’Evangile de Jean, qu’ils sont devenus croyants. C’est parce qu’ils sont croyants qu’ils écoutent les parfaits.”¹⁶⁵ Now, on a lesser scale, this might be seen still to hold true after the Albigensian Crusade. There are various instances of deponents who first saw heretics when they were below the age of discretion, brought along by their families: for example Alzeu de Massabrac who was taken by his mother when still a child to see his grandmother, a *heretica induta* at Montségur;¹⁶⁶ or Arnaud de Villeneuve, a knight, who deposed that when he was a small boy of eight years he often saw his father Raymond de Villeneuve, heretic, living “publicly” (as the registers put it) with other heretics at the *castrum* of Lasbordes;¹⁶⁷ or Bernard Oth, later Lord Niort, whose grandmother Blanche was a heretic and lived “publicly” at Laurac. Bernard was led there in his youth and “raised” (*nutritus*) by his grandmother for four or five years.¹⁶⁸ The inquisitorial evidence, it would seem, continues to point to the connection between “family” and “heresy.”

However, as we briefly noted at the beginning of this chapter, this connection—along with other elements of social context—may bear further examination. The possible circularity of connecting “family” and “faith” demands once again that we consider the nuances of “belief” and its ascription rather carefully. Might we wonder, for example, whether the position of “believers” who were involved via familial connections is any way reformulated or mitigated through the fact of their kinship? That is, might something like “family loyalty” be understood as a different kind of motivation or intention from other contacts with Catharism?

For most depositional material, we can have no certainty about inquisitorial interpretation of these factors because we lack the final sentences delivered on deponents. Even with the sentences, we could not be sure of the precise reasons for their imposition. We can however look at how certain matters are presented in the depositions, to see if they make any space within their formulaic structures for circumstance, whether mitigating or otherwise. What is firstly clear is that the formulae do not readily deviate when called upon to describe a heretic who also happens to be a family member. Here, for example, is the first “item” in the deposition of Pierre Guillaume d’Arvigna:

He said that he saw at Mirepoix Jordana de Marlhac, mother of the witness, and Flandina de Marlhac, aunt of the witness, [her] companion, heretics, staying publicly in the house of the same heretics, and many times the witness ate, drank and lay with the said heretics, more often than he can remember; but he did not adore them nor saw them adored.¹⁶⁹

If one removed “mother/aunt of the witness” the item would be no different from a thousand others. Although the familial connection is noted, the deposition talks about *hereticae* and not family, and Pierre is not asked about his motivations. The same is true in reverse, as it were, in the deposition of the Cathar *perfectus* Raymond Carabasse who includes in a long list of people who came to see him: his brother, his wife, his daughter, and his son. Their familial connection is noted but otherwise undiscussed.¹⁷⁰

Inquisitorial discourse, it would therefore appear, has the effect of flattening out the nuances of cultural context and faith. There was, in fact, a thirteenth-century suspicion that families could be a site of danger and a seed bed for heresy: people mentioned in the depositions could be described (by the deponents, but within the inquisitorial framework) as coming from “a family/kin [*genus*] much infected by heresy” or “corrupted by heresy.”¹⁷¹ Inquisition produces a particular kind of “knowledge” about family and heresy, one that paradoxically permits historians to create their own pictures of “Cathar families,” while emphasizing particular interpretative strategies (family as cause of heresy) over others (family as reformulation of faith). So once again we must be wary of where an apparently “objective”—but nonetheless *inquisitorial*—viewpoint may lead us.

However, I would suggest that the entirety of each deposition, in the various details it narrates, might be read in a way that undermines this monological discourse. The inquisitors do not only ask about activities, connections, and so on: they also inquire into questions of belief, and produce a narrative of morally charged actions; and here things become more complicated. Returning to Pierre Guillaume d’Arvigna, we see that despite his frequent contact with his relatives (the heretics) he claimed never to have “adored” them. Neither did he adore the other heretics that he met, except for one group at Mirepoix whom he adored “many times”; and one other time he adored the *perfectus* Vigoroux de la Baconne.¹⁷² In contrast to this, at the end of the deposition he affirms that “he believed the aforesaid heretics to be good men and to have a good faith and that one could be saved by them

although he knew that the Church persecuted them.” The context for Pierre Guillaume’s changeable actions might be temporal: when he did “adore” heretics it was less than fourteen years before his confession, whereas the other items he recounts were all further back. However, he admits to having believed for more than thirty years.

These negotiations possibly caused the inquisitors a little thought. They certainly should give us pause; to note, if nothing else, that Pierre Guillaume’s “belief” and what it entails is not simply a binary function, either “present” or “absent,” but something that requires examination. And there are other examples of similarly complicated negotiations. Alzeu de Massabrac, mentioned above, “adored” his grandmother, ate with her at the same table, and believed in the heretics, “from the year of discretion.” In contrast, Guillaume d’Elves saw his brother and two other heretics at their weaving workshop at Cordes (and mentions two others, not heretics, who were there to learn the weaving craft) but although he ate at the workshop, he stated that he did not share a table with the heretics and was not at that time a believer.¹⁷³ We can point to others too: Raymond de Montcabrier, a knight, who with his mother visited his grandmother Mathilda, who was a *heretica induta* at Montcabrier, but neither he nor his mother adored Mathilda, although he believed in the heretics.¹⁷⁴ Gaucelin de Miraval who “received” his mother Adélaïde, *heretica induta*, at his *domus* but did not adore “nor bent his knee before the said heretic” although he adored other heretics “many times” and was a believer.¹⁷⁵ Pons Carbonel who saw, ate with, and adored his heretical parents (both father and mother *were perfecti*).¹⁷⁶ Arnaud de Villeneuve (mentioned above), who saw his father and other heretics at the *castrum* of Lasbordes when he was a small boy of eight years, but never adored nor ate bread blessed by the heretics, and never believed in them.¹⁷⁷ Lord Bernard Oth of Niort (also mentioned above), who spent four or five years of his youth being brought up by Blanche his grandmother in a house of female Cathars at Laurac. He never adored her, although he adored other heretics.¹⁷⁸

What to do with these variant details? We can remind ourselves firstly that family bonds did not necessarily imply “belief” in heresy; and we can continue to consider what a problematic task we undertake when attempting to locate and identify “belief” in a past cultural context. But we can also note an essential contradiction that holds the closure of the texts in abeyance: that on the one hand the process of categorization *cannot* allow explicit deviations (the heretics, whatever else they are, must remain heretics; the question of belief must be addressed blundy); while, on the other, the process of confession *has to* record some or all of the “extraneous” details supplied by the deponent. And in recording these details, a fissure opens up in the smooth surface of power.

What is coming into view here is the way in which inquisitorial discourse constructs a particular relationship between “action” and “belief”: the former functioning solely as a sign of the latter. Or rather, recalling the earliest years

of inquisition and the concentration on controlling the actions of the (noble) laity in order to “keep the peace,” we are discovering the chronological move within discourse that produced this linear equation, as “belief” became a topic for inquisitorial consideration during the course of the thirteenth century. It is, however, possible to pull this equation apart, through an examination of the detail of the registers, in order to place the relationship between belief and action as something under question rather than as something taken for granted. Let us then turn to some other areas of lay activity, with the *meaning* of this activity posed once again as a question rather than an assumption.

One of the most common activities noted in the registers is “leading” heretics from place to place. Dossat terms those performing this action *ductores*, thus producing another categorized identity.¹⁷⁹ In fact, the verb usually used in the records is *associare*, to accompany or to keep company with. The occurrence of this activity is usually read as evidence of the changes wrought in Occitan society by persecution: heretics could no longer wander freely, but needed protection; they were not as numerous as before the Crusade, did not know the lands they had to cover so well, and therefore needed guides.¹⁸⁰ The records themselves do not overtly distinguish between these two functions of guide and protector (functions that could, of course, overlap), although the context of certain items may point more in one direction than another. We sometimes find knights accompanying heretics, particularly to and from Montségur, and this might reasonably be assumed to be at least partly for protection.¹⁸¹ We also find many people fetching heretics to deathbeds in order that they might perform the *consolamentum* for a dying adherent; and increasingly, through the course of the thirteenth century, we find them arriving too late.¹⁸²

As with any contact with heretics, leading or accompanying Cathars had import for the inquisitors. Following this lead, historians often see it as one of the defining features of the *credentes*. However, once again, this move toward categorization can be complicated by the context. In the sentences of the inquisitor Pierre Seila, from 1241, “leading heretics” is frequently admitted, as it is throughout the registers of inquisition.¹⁸³ However, we also find some of the same deponents leading Waldensian heretics: for example, Pierre de *Lace Oleiras*, who led heretics and also P[ierre] de Valle the Waldensian;¹⁸⁴ Gautier Archambaut, who led and adored heretics and led Waldensians to his own *domus* so that they could “dispute” with the heretics.¹⁸⁵ Later in the century, the Waldensians largely gone from Languedoc, we find other contexts. Several people lead heretics and receive payment for their services. Arnaud Roger, a knight, with some companions, led Bernard Bonafos, deacon, and seven other heretics from Montségur to the Col de Vas between the *castrum* of Cuella and the *castrum* of Laroque d’Olmes, for which Arnaud and friends received two pounds of pepper; Stephan Massa was contracted by his father to take seven heretics with two “beasts” from the gate of Villeneuve near Toulouse to the Manse del Aicres near Caraman, for the sum of five

shillings.¹⁸⁶ In 1209, Pierre de Cornelhan and his uncle led seven heretics from the *castrum* of Roquefort to the church at Lagrasse, a distance of some eighty kilometers. For this they were to receive ten shillings from the heretics, only this time the *perfecti* refused to pay.¹⁸⁷

These were contracted journeys. Although they were far from the only form of contact these people had with the Cathars, they were not necessarily expressions of devotion to the sect but financially rewarded services. The presence of financial reward complicates (for us, and perhaps for inquisitors) the question of devotion and belief.¹⁸⁸ There are also two instances recorded in the inquisition records of deponents leading people who were *not* Cathars. Both fall into the inquisitorial inquiry because the destination was Lombardy, and at that time (the 1270s) Lombardy had become a place of refuge for Cathars and their supporters fleeing from Languedoc. Bernard Furnier and a friend accompanied six men and one woman, whose names he did not know, from an area near Roquevidal; another man led the party on to Lombardy, while Bernard returned home. Bernard Escoulan made the journey to Lombardy to visit his father Pierre who was a fugitive there, and his father paid another man to guide his son.¹⁸⁹

It is possible that, particularly for long journeys, it was normal practice for *all* travelers to contract a guide. Of course this does not eradicate the contact with heresy; but it does nudge these deponents away from an easy identification as *ductores*, where that category functions (for historians) as a tacit admission of belief. The same unsettling of categories occurs with items describing the use of guides where no contract was made, simply because the arrangement was contingent, not planned. For example, Jean Gandil, a *bayle*, bought corn at a house and there met *some perfecti*. They then asked him to lead them to a certain sick man, which he did; he did not adore them at any stage. When asked at the end of his deposition the formulaic question, “Did you do any good [service] to the heretics?” he replied, no, putting his own interpretation on events. Pierre de la Caunes went to Montségur to retrieve some cows that had been taken up in another man’s herd. He failed to get his animals back, but he saw many heretics at the *castrum*, and ate with Pierre Roger de Mirepoix (the lord of Montségur) who asked him to accompany a *perfectus* called Raymond Imbert and his companion to Lordat (about five kilometers away). This he did, but did not adore. More simply than either of these, Pierre de Cabanial passed Raymond de Villeneuve in the road, leading two heretics. Raymond asked Pierre to accompany them, and Pierre agreed.¹⁹⁰

Actions produce meaning through contexts, sometimes multiple meanings occurring simultaneously, as the analysis of rituals earlier in this chapter has shown. Actions recounted within the discursive context of inquisitorial confession are ascribed a particular set of transgressive meanings, but they may still bear the ghostly trace of other contexts. One can note, for example, the particularly *political* context of actions undertaken by the nobility during

the Albigensian Crusade and the revolts against French domination in 1240 and 1242. The complicated interweaving of political and religious motives and effects of the Crusade have been dealt with in detail elsewhere.¹⁹¹ The contingent effects of these complicated loyalties were played out also at the local and personal levels. Ann Peal has shown how during the lifetime of one Occitan nobleman—Olivier de Termes—an opponent of the French and supporter of the Cathars could eventually pledge allegiance to the king of France and in 1248 set off for Outremer on crusade.¹⁹² As already noted, the early years of inquisition had a particular interest in targeting the noble *fautores* of Catharism. But in the period after the Crusade, the nobility's relationship with the heretics was complicated by political factors: resentment of the French intervention, class solidarity, a nascent sense of Occitan quasi nationalism. And so, in the depositions, we find Arnaud de Miglos, a knight, denying positive contact with the *perfecti* but admitting that he had sent military weapons to Pierre Roger de Mirepoix at Montségur when the *castrum* was under siege. In a second interview Arnaud admitted that he had believed in *the perfecti*; perhaps then his motives were influenced by faith. But regardless of this, his first interview presents his military actions alongside an otherwise complete denial of active support for heretics.¹⁹³ No conflict between the two is admitted: therefore, it is presumably an expression of regional solidarity rather than heretical support.

Even outside the context of the struggle against the French, the depositions tell of interaction with Cathars that was affected by socio-political factors. For example, on two occasions Lord Isarn of Laurac was approached by *the perfecti*, who requested firstly that he release a certain man he had captured, and secondly that he should forbid hunting in a particular wood.¹⁹⁴ He refused both petitions. However, he did admit in his deposition that he believed the heretics to be good men and to have a good faith, although he had not heard them saying errors against God or marriage or baptism. He had heard them say that it was as much a sin to lie with one woman as with another, but he did not believe this.¹⁹⁵ Lord Isarn's "belief," despite the formulaic approach of the questions, sketches out a context for itself: it does not extend to influencing seigneurial decisions; nor does it imply commitment to their doctrine. But it permits the free passage of heretics, and it describes them as "good men" with a "good faith," although it may not concur with the specifics of that faith.

Of course, it is not only the nobility who interacted with the *perfecti*. We find many deponents and people mentioned by them giving or sending food to the *perfecti*. The supply of food was a necessary means of support for the *perfecti*, but it is also open to a degree of contextualized interpretation. Food plays an important symbolic role for both inquisitors and certain deponents: those who became *heretici* and then left the sect are usually described as having left the sect "and eaten meat" (though not if they were women, who usually "took a man" instead);¹⁹⁶ certain people preserved pieces of bread

blessed by the heretics.¹⁹⁷ As Borst notes, the many instances of people giving food to Cathars illustrate the way the *perfecti* restricted their diet for spiritual reasons: people give nuts, grain, vegetables, fruit, fish.¹⁹⁸ But frequently only three, symbolically laden foodstuffs are mentioned: bread, wine, and fish.¹⁹⁹ It is difficult to interpret this trope with certainty, given the lack of any source providing an explicit commentary; but it is possible that inquisitors noted these products above others, believing them to indicate the Cathars' subversion of orthodox theology. We can note however that the records, despite tending to categorize the actions of the laity through repetitious vocabulary and formulae, nevertheless allow space for other examples. Other food, such as fruit, pepper, and salted eels, is mentioned on a number of occasions.²⁰⁰ And other "supportive" actions are recorded: a man helped *the perfecta* Dyas and her heretical companions by repairing their cabin and carrying wood for them; Austorga, wife of Pierre de Rosengua, made woolen clothes for two *perfectae* who were her neighbors (*vicinae*), and gave them corn and six pence; Stephan de Prades, a tailor, made clothes for the heretics, "and handed over the sewn [clothes] without [receiving] money"; Jean Blach did woodwork for the heretics, for which he was paid eight Melgeuilan pennies.²⁰¹ These interactions sway between an uncomplicated support and something nuanced by social context: those who received Austorga's clothes were neighbors as well as *heretici*; Jean Blach was paid for his work; Stephan de Prades was not.

The problems of assessing a particular case—for historians, and for inquisitors—are highlighted in the deposition of Pierre de Flairan from Mirepoix. Appearing twice before the inquisitor Ferrier in 1243 he confessed to having belief in the heretics for twenty years.²⁰² Certain of the actions deposed fit neatly into inquisitorial categories; others do not. The uncomplicated items first: he saw and adored heretics on several occasions;²⁰³ he ate with heretics "at the same table"; he was present at several deathbed *consolamenta*; he brought food to heretics; on several occasions he led heretics from place to place; once, he delivered money to some heretics, for which he was paid ten Toulousan shillings; and another time he was paid three Toulousan shillings for accompanying a heretic to Montségur.²⁰⁴ In fact, even with these less equivocal items, categorization is complicated since Pierre falls into several groups: *questor*, *nuncius*, *fautor*, *credens*. These categories, as we have seen, overlapped; it was the job of the inquisitor to find the final resting place for the deponent's identity (which, once again, we do not know, lacking the evidence of sentencing). But there is another complication, begun perhaps with the payment noted in the last two items. As I have suggested, payment was a matter that concerned the inquisitors, although they did not trouble to tell us how they reckoned its import. Regardless of the Inquisition's decision, it remains a matter of context in the records. Pierre provided other contexts too, of action and circumstance: he came into contact with heretics several times because he shaved them, and

also “bled” them.²⁰⁵ He supplied the heretics with scissors, a razor, sandals, and shoes, receiving seven and a half Toulousan shillings, from which he made or purchased a tunic for his wife. He helped to bury Pierre Barta, a heretic who had died in the house of one of Pierre’s friends; they put him in a grave next to the *castrum* of Mirepoix. He was given a leather pelisse by someone who had originally had it from the heretics. When his father was dying, the heretics came to perform the *consolamentum*, and his father held a great banquet for all of the heretics; and at this banquet Pierre ate with them. On another occasion, Pierre specifies that although he ate with the heretics, it was not at the same table; although he did eat bread blessed by them.²⁰⁶ Now, on a certain level, there is no “problem” about Pierre: he confessed to belief in heretics, and had obviously had contact with them for many years. However, the repetitions of contact were important to the Inquisition; the difference, we remember, between “suspect” (*suspectus*) and “most vehemently suspect” (*vehementissime suspectus*) could be calculated by the number of times the individual had performed tasks connected with heretics.²⁰⁷ In specifying these repetitions, a context emerges for Pierre’s actions; but this context does not shut down his identity within the text into one neat category. He performed a variety of functions for the heretics, but for some of these he was paid. He sold them items of his trade; he wore clothing once owned by them. He had contact with them on a professional level, as a barber-surgeon. Although the records function to categorize Pierre’s actions, and allow the imposition of penance, the heteroglossic nature of the deposition can be read as a refusal of that limited identity. Thus we catch a fleeting but essential glimpse of Pierre, his world and his belief, and of how we might read this differently: not as inquisitors, but as historians.

Conclusion: The Question of Belief

Asked if he believed the heretics to be good men, and to have a good faith, and that he could be saved through them . . .²⁰⁸

I have tried to draw out the social context and social elements of Cathar activity, of lay interaction with *perfecti*, and of the functions and roles the *boni homines* played in Occitan society. This could constitute an end in itself, broadening our picture of Catharism and its context. But the question of belief has hovered over these analyzes, and now we can conclude by making this area our focus; in particular, by emphasizing that “belief” demands a *question*—that belief is by nature problematic—rather than something easily accepted, divined, and ascribed.

Let us begin by accepting quite readily that there were many people in Languedoc who adhered to the Cathar faith, “believed” in the good men and felt that their souls could be best cared for by receiving the *consolamentum* upon death. In asking how these people came to these beliefs we can point, as other historians have done before, to the role of family tradition and

education, to the preaching of the *perfecti* and to the inability of the orthodox Church in the early years of the thirteenth century to provide a sufficiently attractive alternative. But there were other factors and routes to belief. First of all, if by “preaching” we understand a communication *from* a spiritual elite *to* the laity, we have to note that our picture of this interaction is more complex than at first appearance. As I have shown elsewhere, the majority of Cathar preaching in the first half of the thirteenth century was not carried out by all *perfecti*, but by the Cathar bishops and deacons alone.²⁰⁹ There were hierarchies *within* the Cathar faith that cut across whatever other relationships we might consider to have existed between all “good men” and laity. Furthermore, about half of the instances of sermons for which we have evidence were delivered to fairly small groups, of ten or fewer people; and about half of all sermons were given within the intimate setting of a lay *domus*.²¹⁰ What this suggests to me is that we should not frame our analysis of lay belief in terms of “the laity” having contact with (and belief in) “the Cathars” as two homogeneous entities, but consider the ways in which lay individuals have contact with particular “good men,” in particular kinds of ways.

This impression is strengthened if we consider how *many perfecti* each lay deponent knew and had contact with. One might consider here the evidence given by the seventy deponents who were questioned by the inquisitor Brother Ferrier and his associates, mostly between 1243 and 1245.²¹¹ Of these seventy, forty-six gave the names of only ten or fewer heretics; and within that group, thirty deponents named five or fewer. A few—perhaps ten of the deponents—knew larger numbers of *perfecti*, naming twenty or more of them. One deponent, Hélis de Mazerolles, listed the names of thirty-eight heretics.²¹² But she is the exception rather than the rule. The majority of deponents were in contact with only a few heretics, and their depositions usually centre around one or *two perfecti* with whom they most often dealt.²¹³ For most people, fairly narrow geographical limits may have also dictated the boundaries of their contact: one deponent mentions that he and four friends came “all the way” from the *castrum* of Niort to Montségur; this grand journey is in fact all of about twelve kilometers.²¹⁴ This is an important impression (although I must emphasize that it is only an impression) to retain, because it begs the question of *how perfecti* were viewed and how they functioned within the small social groups they inhabited.

It also begs the further question of the transmission of faith: how and why it was that people came to “believe” in Catharism, and what that “belief” might actually mean. In moving us away from the picture of a hierarchical sect set over a passive laity, we can also note the presence of interactions other than preaching: in particular, the various occasions when deponents talk of having heard “the words and admonitions” of the *perfecti*.²¹⁵ This may be “preaching,” but it operates in more intimate and contingent contexts, and it

falls more in line with another kind of interaction we find quite frequently: conversation. People talking, arguing, discussing matters of belief—conversations like that between Pierre Pictavin and Raymond de *Camis*—appear throughout the records. They occur most frequently in the later depositions, particularly in the 1270S and early fourteenth century, but then it is only later in the thirteenth century that the Inquisition itself comes to see “belief” as something to be placed under question. The conversations show an active and fluid engagement with belief, and the activities of belief. For example, in about 1301 the deponent Raymond Vayssière was asked by Bernard Arquier if he wanted to see the “good men Pierre and Guillaume Autier.” Raymond replied that “he feared that he had seen them too often,” to which Bernard responded “what a bad or weak heart you have!” Raymond gave in and visited the heretics.²¹⁶ Conversations such as these show “belief”—adherence to the Cathar faith—as a process of negotiation, tied up with other social pressures.²¹⁷

If we succumb to the inquisitorial pressure to see heresy and orthodoxy as a binary division, we may expect (as, perhaps, the inquisitors did) to find belief in the good men and belief in Cathar tenets of faith neatly tied up as one package. One can certainly find deponents reporting particular Cathar beliefs—in two gods, in the evil nature of corporeality, in the power of the *consolamentum*—but whether these were necessarily synonymous with belief “in” the good men is less clear. Where specific beliefs are attested, they tend to cohere around familiar objects and activities: for example, against the Eucharist, the familiar saying that even if Christ’s body was as big as a mountain (often specifying a *particular* mountain nearby), the priests would have eaten him up by now.²¹⁸ On one occasion, using another kind of familiar object, a deponent told his neighbors that if Christ was made from the kind of corn he kept in his storehouse, he had sufficient to make many more bodies for Christ.²¹⁹ With regards to the dualist nature of creation, various people said that the good God “made nothing that flowered or germinated and created nothing but spirits,” again picking an agrarian example.²²⁰ One deponent, Guillaume Orseti, was accused of having given this an even more particular gloss, that “God never made anything that flowered or germinated, nor made any of the terrestrial world [*visibilia*], but [they were made by] rotten earth and men digging and working the land.”²²¹ Beliefs that we might label as “Cathar,” leading from a particular dualist theology, were received, reproduced, and reinterpreted within the language and context of the everyday world.²²²

In any case, the sharp division between orthodox and heterodox belief and practice is also somewhat challenged by the records. There are a number of people who clearly had contact with more faiths than Catharism; in fact there may be many more than I can mention here, since theoretically everybody in Latin Christendom should have been attending confession at least once a year, and going regularly to mass. We know of a few occasions when people did

not fulfill these orthodox demands, because the records specifically note these transgressions; we do not know whether or not others in contact with Cathars were also fulfilling their orthodox religious duties.²²³ Some who were include: *the perfecta* Rixende Baussan (later burnt), who was reported to have heard mass regularly, and to have made offerings to the priest at the altar in the church of Sorèze; the deponent Arnaude de Cordes, who was planning to go away to the heretics (presumably in Lombardy), a fact she confided to her friend Alamande while the two were keeping vigil at the church of St. John of Maudanha, near Cordes, in thanks for Arnaude's recovery from an illness; and Guillaume Aribaud, who died without receiving the *consolamentum* because he had sent his wife and child to church to keep vigil there, and when the *perfecti* arrived he had lost the power of speech.²²⁴

We also find, in some number, people who had contact with, and adherence to, both the Cathars and the Waldensians. Sometimes this contact was for practical reasons: Stephanie Ricard, for example, was a "receiver" (*receptatrix*) of the *heretici*, but also consulted the Waldensians about her child's illness and sent them a salted fish.²²⁵ On other occasions the contact was primarily religious: Peirona, wife of Raymond Jean, received and listened to two Waldensians, and also attended the preaching of the *heretici* (Cathars) and sent them food.²²⁶ Sometimes we see someone moving from one allegiance to another, as in the case of P[ierre] R[aymond] Boca, who "in the beginning. . . believed the Waldensians were good men; the same thing he believed afterwards about the heretics."²²⁷ Most explicitly we have B[ernard] Remon who "went to the heretics, wanting to try out who were better, Waldensians or heretics."²²⁸ All of these examples, and others I have not recounted, are fairly early, drawn from the sentences of the inquisitor Pierre Seila, in a period when Waldensians were still widely active in Languedoc.²²⁹ One can also find occasional later examples: Guillaume Austatz the *bayle* of Ormolac, had contact with (though not necessarily belief in) the Cathars in the fourteenth century, and was also condemned for protesting against the burning of the Waldensian Raymond de Costa.²³⁰

In addition to these cross-sect adherents, there are also those who sought a different negotiation of belief, drawing a distinction between the heretic and the heresy. Guillaume Austatz questioned his mother about things *a. perfectas* had told her: "and you believed or believe [he said] that those things the said heretic said are true? and she replied that she neither believed nor disbelieved."²³¹ Arnaud de Ravat confessed that he believed the heretics to be good men and true, and friends of God, and to have a good faith, and that one could be saved through them, "and he heard heretics saying that there was no salvation except in the heretical faith, but the witness did not believe in that error."²³² Belief in the *perfecti* does not necessarily imply belief in all they say; particularly, perhaps, when they were laying claim to a unique position of mediation between God and the laity. Arnaud was not alone in drawing this distinction: Serena de Château-Verdun also believed the heretics

were good men, but did not believe in their errors; Arnaud Pons de Vernaux rejected those errors he heard against the Host and against marriage.²³³ Matfred de Poalhac, a knight, was actually a *perfectus* for four years, and heard a lot of heretical preaching “but did not believe it . . . he did not believe they were good men or had a good faith *or bad* . . . but he often adored them” [my emphasis].²³⁴ Can one dismiss Matfred as a liar or opportunist? Certainly he can be interpreted that way; but the words ascribed to him still speak of what should have been an impossibility: that one faith could be morally and truthfully “neutral,” not “a good faith, or bad.” What, then, is the nature of a “faith” that refuses the classic binary opposition?

Part of our confusion over the nature of belief stems from the multivalent ways the word can be used. One can have particular “beliefs,” such as that Christ’s body is not present in the Eucharist; and statements of these tenets may or may not indicate “belief” in them. One can believe that the *perfecti* are “good men and have a good faith” and can lead one’s soul to salvation. One can also believe “in” the good men, where this may indicate something more like respect than faith. The nature of “belief” is unclear to us, in what it specifies, what it implies, and how one is to identify it.

But our confusion also comes from the inquisitorial schema that demands, records, and evaluates these statements. Deponents are frequently asked how long they had belief in the heretics, and the replies are instructive: Fabrisa Vital believed in the heretics “from a year before the last grape-picking until the day of her citation, because all of the aforesaid things [i.e. contact with heretics] took place from that time.” Bernard Benedict said that “he remained in love and belief in the heretics for thirty years or more, but he relinquished it in the preceding year, namely in that week in which he began to confess.” Pierre de Laurac confessed that he believed in the heretics from when he first saw them preaching, “until the time of his confession to brother Pons de Poget.” Bona de Puy admitted that she believed the heretics were true men and friends of God from when “she first heard their words and admonitions, until the time when she was captured for heresy.” Guillaume Fabre had faith in the heretics “from when he first had discretion of good and bad, and totally left their faith when he made confession.”²³⁵ And so on.

These statements, it seems to me, present a confusion between what the deponents say and what the inquisitors hear. The various matters touched on in this chapter suggest that we are not simply rediscovering here what other writers have already noted (that people picked and chose between different faiths),²³⁶ but that the deponents understood their relationship to “belief” in a different way from that of inquisitors (and, perhaps, historians). The inquisitors solicit and record what are supposed to be bald statements of religious adherence, the admission that the confessant had walked in darkness. But given all we have seen above, one wonders whether the deponents were replying in more fluid terms about allegiance, interest, “respect,” and “love.” To say that one quits belief upon capture may no doubt in part be to please the

inquisitor; but to formulate this statement points to rather practical basis of “belief.” If the inquisitors have thrown the heretics from the land and made them “foreign,” perhaps one cannot “believe” in them because their absence largely precludes performing those actions—giving them food, listening to them, leading them around—that make up “belief”? Might, in fact, these actions not so much “indicate” belief as *constitute* it? Furthermore, could it not be the case that it was only when an inquisitor imposed the harsh and dividing question of belief that one was confronted for the first time with the hard binary of faith, the demand to place oneself, categorize oneself, on one “side” or the other?

At the beginning of this chapter I noted that deponents use the language of friendship to talk about *perfecti*. This kind of link between belief and communal bonds is also expressed between “believers”: for example, Raymond Textor told the deponent Raymond Hugo that a certain Hugo was a man “in whom a man could have faith [*in quo se podia hom fizar*], that is to say, a friend and believer of the heretics.”²³⁷ The sudden irruption of the vernacular within the inquisitorial Latin might indicate that this phrase was a popular saying. Having “faith” in Hugo is intrinsically linked with his belief in the Cathars; the bonds of community and belief are intertwined. Lacking faith could disrupt the community: Isarn Bonhomme was admonished by his aunt-in-law to respect (*diligere*) the heretics, and told that “because he did not respect the good men, namely the heretics, many knights and others hated the witness.”²³⁸ The different belief systems available in Languedoc—Catholic, Cathar, Waldensian, Jewish—might not always have been so radically separated as their theologies and polemics suggest. At different points one might have to choose between them or one might be able to synthesize from among them. The process of inquisition effectively shut down this fluidity.

When a deponent called Bernard Barra had been cited by the Inquisition, Guillaume Pictavin said to him (again using the vernacular), “Good man, you have God; do not do evil to your neighbors” (*Pros hom, vos avotz dias; no fassatz mal a vostres besins*).²³⁹ The “God” mentioned in this case was the good God of the Cathars. The examples I have given above might suggest that in a different situation, it could have been another deity. But whichever god one had, one also had one’s neighbors. The social context does not simply inculcate belief, nor do social actions indicate belief “elsewhere”: belief, actions, and community rely upon one another for their reciprocally productive performance.

Sex, Lies, and Telling Stories

A Critical and Effective History

Introduction

And so, at last, we return to the words exchanged between Pyrenean villagers and the man who would become pope. Jacques Fournier was born around 1278. He received his mastership of arts at Paris 1313–14, became bishop of Pamiers in 1317, and in 1334 went on to become Pope Benedict XII.¹ The register of his inquisition between 1318 and 1325 in the Ariège is both similar to, and different from, the records from the Doat collection.² It is similar in that the method of prompting confession still relies upon set questions, still has reference to the *topoi* of heretics as learned directors of the *illitterati*, heresy as akin to disease and similar rhetorical tropes, and still forms part of the textual mechanisms for demanding that a confessing-subject recognize him- or herself as a transgressor, and be categorized accordingly. It is different in that it includes far more detail than any previous record, not only on heresy and heretical beliefs, but also “extraneous” detail such as social practices, social beliefs, moments of direct speech, and the reporting of emotions. These elements are, of course, what made the register so attractive to Le Roy Ladurie. I have already discussed the theoretical and methodological problems of his use of this source; one should also note here that the register is so rich that *Montaillou* has only covered a portion of what is available.³ This richness has often been ascribed to the personal character of Jacques Fournier: that he was exceptionally “curious,” or was impelled by a “mad, inquisitorial zeal.”⁴ One can in fact compare Fournier’s records with those of his predecessor, Geoffroy d’Ablis, which in some cases contain earlier depositions from the same deponents. Broadly speaking, one finds the same pattern of greater detail and far longer depositions than those of the previous century; but one must also note that the Fournier register does have greater depth of detail, of local “color” and interest. A degree of personal influence (which should also be extended to the scribes who recorded each case, and those who produced the extant redactions) might therefore be admitted. However, the register also contains depositions given before a different, Aragonese inquisitor; and although these depositions perhaps make the presence of inquisitorial

questions more prominent than in Fournier's interrogations, they similarly contain the depth of detail that has otherwise been taken as a mark of Fournier's personal inquisitiveness.⁵ It seems more helpful, therefore, to treat these records as part of a wider discourse, rather than simply the products of one individual bishop's curiosity.

As we will see, many of the people present in the Fournier register were quite clearly "hereticated" by the inquisitorial process: they were no longer simply being questioned about the activity and words of Cathar *perfecti*, or their own close contact with the Cathars, but were being asked to confess about themselves, their speech, their actions, their personal histories. This does not imply that some of their beliefs were not "heretical," or that there were no "real" heretics left; it simply points out that "heresy" in the early fourteenth century encompassed a far wider range of actions, thoughts, and intentions, and hailed as interiorized confessing-subjects a much wider range of people than had been the case during the most part of the previous century. To put it bluntly, many of these people would have held no interest for the Inquisition a century earlier. I am not arguing that the Inquisition "made up" these heretics or transgressors, if by "made up" one implies an opposition between empirical truth and falsity; but I am arguing that they were "made up" in the sense that as a new site for inquisitorial policing, and as bearers of new transgressive identities, they were an additional element in the wider discourse on heresy.

The Catharism of the early fourteenth century in Languedoc was small-scale, and almost a family business. There were fourteen *perfecti* in the Sabarthès at this time, led by the notary of Ax, Pierre Autier, who had journeyed to Lombardy to meet the *boni homines* and receive the *consolamentum*.⁶ However, the people I have chosen to study in detail here had little or no direct involvement with Catharism. Béatrice de Lagleize, of the six, probably provides the greatest detail about Cathar beliefs, as they were reported to her, but she never actually met a *perfectus* or attended any formal Cathar ritual. Instead, these people have their own oppositional, and to some degree individual, interest for the historian: Arnaud de Savinhan presents a few individual beliefs, and steadfastly refuses to keep "the truth" in any one, stable position; Jean Rocas held extremely interesting beliefs that he had come to by himself, and refused to relinquish under inquisitorial pressure; Jean Joufre found an intriguing way of obeying the injunction "to speak" but avoiding the command "to confess"; Raymond de Laburat invoked the rhetorical codes of social order and obligation, and presented his own view of how religion should be practiced; Béatrice de Lagleize confessed what she knew of Catharism, but more interestingly what she knew of sex and of Béatrice; and Arnaud de Verniolles defended his own sexual appetites as best he could. These are all individuals, but they are also individuals operating, and confessing, within various discourses.

My concern in the analysis of each deposition is to examine some of these

discourses, to reveal the rhetorical or narrative devices to which each deponent had recourse. I read their particular negotiations as “tactics” in the face of the inquisitorial process; “tactics” being the term that the theorist Michel de Certeau uses to describe ways of operating within and against discourse from a subaltern position, while being unable to extricate oneself completely from the web of power and language.⁷ I also suggest that, for the first four deponents, there is a certain similarity in tactics, or rather in the mode with which their tactics are deployed. With some hesitation—for as the following overview will show, this is a perilous area—I would like to suggest that this similarity has its roots in orality or, perhaps we might say, “the vernacular.” Notions of orality and literacy in medieval studies have largely grounded themselves on the work of Jack Goody and Walter Ong.⁸ However, recent anthropological work has criticized the oral/literate division drawn by Goody and Ong as being empirically dubious, analytically sterile, and ideologically suspect. Landeg White and Leroy Vail have drawn attention to the deficiencies and prejudices of the idea of an absolute divide between orality and literacy, and have suggested that practically every kind of rhetorical device, tropological move and linguistic strategy can be found in both the oral and the written “text.”⁹ More recently, medievalist approaches to this question have stressed the interpenetration of literacy and orality;¹⁰ but even this notion of oral/literate miscegenation can be used as a basis for separating out once more the two elements. Thus Suzanne Fleischmann is able to write, “It is now commonly accepted that the European Middle Ages were ‘oral’ in so far as writing was dictated and reading was carried out *viva voce*,” going on to look for “oral residue” in the written text that can be identified by its “incoherence.”¹¹

Two works in particular have led me to a slightly different approach to the question. Isabel Hofmeyr’s wonderful book *We Spend Our Years as a Tale That Is Told* analyzes how in nineteenth-century southern Africa orality could provide a number of tactics and maneuvers to oppose the written, formulaic discourse of the white ruling class.¹² Following her lead, I have tried to draw out the tactics of the deponents that oppose (consciously or implicitly) the textual, inquisitorial discourse that had hailed them. Jesse Gellrich’s article “Orality, Literacy, and Crisis” has complemented my understanding of Hofmeyr: Gellrich has argued against the view that “we may penetrate the textuality of the medieval reception of orality and proceed back to an unmediated apprehension of its ‘pristine’ state.”¹³ Instead, he analyzes the medieval unease over the authority of writing, and the desire for an oral, authoritative “presence” in the text. My analysis retains Gellrich’s notion of struggle but perhaps reverses the terms: I am concerned to show that what is at stake in the depositions is the assertion of a textual, literate authority on the part of the inquisitor, as a dominant mode of discourse that must meet and defeat the vernacular practices of the *illitterati*.¹⁴ The reason that these depositions in particular were conducted, recorded, and thus survive for us, is

that they allow the representation of the struggle between the oral and literate, or between the vernacular authority of the *illitterati* and the Latinate, textual authority of the *illitterati*. Both literacy and orality, within the registers, are not so much a priori states as subjectivities that can be cited and re-cited within different contexts.¹⁵ To try to avoid some of the assumptions about what might constitute “orality,” I have chosen to name the subaltern discourse shared by the deponents as “vernacular,” since the most apparent marking of that discourse in the inquisitorial text is the irruption of vernacular speech within the Latin narrative. These elements of Occitan are not the emergence of a “true” voice, but still the representation of the idea of difference. However, as I show below, this does not deny the possibility of agency. As Hofmeyr puts it, “these case studies have sought to show that there are no automatic consequences that follow from the introduction of literacy. . . . At the same time, however, I have attempted to argue that at some levels, *the idea* of orality and that of literacy operated in opposition to one another” (her emphasis).¹⁶ Gingerly, and with humility, I attempt to step into her shoes.

Tactics of Opposition: The Liar and the Fool

Arnaud de Savinhan, the Liar

My use of the epithet “liar” is ironic: although Arnaud de Savinhan of Tarascon¹⁷ certainly told many untruths in the course of his depositions, the evidence surrounding him makes the attempt to separate “lie” from “truth” seem an ingenuous pursuit. Arnaud’s confession calls into question the whole relationship between speech and belief. Arnaud was denounced by three of his neighbors—Bernard Cordier of Pamiers, Pierre de Mayshelac of Tarascon and Jean Yfort of Tarascon—for saying what they believed were heretical words. His three accusers appeared before Fournier in 1320, on 20 and 22 April. They alleged that a year or so previously the four of them had held a conversation at the head of the bridge to Tarascon: Bernard Cordier had just come from Pamiers and was asked for any news. He had told the group that there was a letter from the Knights Hospitaller in the Holy Land, stating that in this year (1318–19) two cities built on sand would fall into ruin, and that the Antichrist was born, and great wars would begin in the world.¹⁸ Arnaud de Savinhan, a stonemason about forty-five years old, allegedly said that he did not believe in this apocalypticism, that “the world had never begun and would never finish, but always is and will be, and while we live and die, it always was and will be, and there is no other world but the present one.”¹⁹ On 9 May, Arnaud was cited for questioning, and denied this belief; but deposed that what he had actually said, jokingly (*trufando*) whilst working one time, was “In all the time there is and all the time there will be, a man will lie with another’s woman” (*Tos-temps es e tostemps sira, qu’home ab autru moilher jaira*).²⁰ He also deposed that the world would return to nothing after the Last

Judgment, including the bodies of men, and that only the human spirits would remain, either with God or with the devil; as Jean Duvernoy notes, Arnaud appears to have been under the impression that this was an orthodox belief.²¹ On 11 May he revoked this belief, but the inquisitor Fournier felt that “he had not fully confessed his errors” and gave him a space of three weeks to mull over his confession. On 25 July Arnaud admitted that the reported scene at the bridge outside Tarascon was true, and that he had said that the world was without beginning or end, but when asked whether when he said this he believed it, replied that he did not believe but had said it out of “his foolishness and silliness” (*stulticia et fatuitas*),²² He went on to confess that he believed that God made the world from nothing, and that it would return to nothing after judgment, and that there was no other world after this world. Since this too was a heresy (and once again one suspects that Arnaud was surprised to discover this) he was summoned once more on 5 September, only this time he refused to answer any questions and was consequently arrested as *vehementer suspectus de heresi* and placed in the *castrum* of Allemans. On 25 October, Arnaud was led from his prison and “spontaneously and freely” confessed that he had believed for thirty years of his adult life that the world had always existed, was not made by God or any other, “but that it had always existed through itself”;²³ but that God had made Adam, and that from Adam sprang the other generations of men. He stopped in these beliefs last May (May being when he was first questioned) and now believed in the orthodoxy, which he was made to enunciate under questioning.²⁴

Arnaud then abjured, and was sentenced and reconciled. However, two years later, on 25 November 1322, more witnesses appear in the record against Arnaud. This time he was accused of failing to wear the crosses to which he had been sentenced “either in the road or in church, or elsewhere,” and although he attended mass he had failed to go up to the priest after the Epistle to receive the discipline designated for the *crucesignati*.²⁵ Arnaud was also accused of saying that he should not have been punished, and that he had lost all his goods for no reason. On the last day of November, Arnaud was cited, and tried to explain in various ways his system for wearing or not wearing the crosses: that he wore them on his surcoat when in Pamiers, but when going to Tarascon rolled up its pleats so that the crosses were concealed; and that he then put them onto a mantle, which he wore inside-out unless in Pamiers or the manse of St. Antonin. He and the other prisoners had said to each other that they had been given a “bad” sentence, and were being harshly punished for simply saying words: none of them had seen or spoken with heretics. Arnaud had only deposed that he had believed the original words he had said (on the eternity of creation) because he had been thus advised by Pierre de Gaillac, but in fact had never believed these things. The question of belief having been raised anew, the original heretical “articles” were once again read to him in the vernacular; and Arnaud said that he *did* believe them! Why did he lie about Pierre de Gaillac? He had not lied—Pierre

had indeed advised him to say he had believed these errors (and then renounce them), but he had felt that this had been bad advice. Now he felt that if the Inquisition saw what a good man (*bonus homo*) he was, they would surely return his goods to him. And once again he abjured. And once again, on the 12 May 1323, Arnaud was cited for failing to wear the crosses. This time he offered a brief explanation of when he did and did not wear them (on festive days they are on, when he's working they are off) and gave evidence against three other people who similarly failed to wear the crosses. Finally, after this last rebellion and defeat, Arnaud was given the very harsh punishment of strict imprisonment (in irons, fed on bread and water). In 1329, surprisingly still alive, he was released once again to wear the crosses.²⁶

There are many interesting aspects to Arnaud's case: the fact that he was accused by his neighbors; the small vignette of conversations among the prisoners of the Inquisition; and the various beliefs he deposed. From these possibilities, I want to bring out two main areas of analysis, both of which are strongly connected to the divisions of literacy and illiteracy: firstly, the various positions and contexts Arnaud draws upon in an attempt to explain, excuse, or mitigate the beliefs ascribed to him; secondly, the tensions present in the deposition over the performance of belief. I am not particularly interested in codifying and identifying the "sources" of Arnaud's statements of belief, except insofar as the "sources" presented in the record tell us something about the negotiations of subjectivity and transgression in the deposition. Nor am I going to read the records in order to produce a "final" decoding of their complications, in an abortive attempt to say what Arnaud "really" believed.²⁷ Arnaud's beliefs interest me here not so much in their content but primarily in how they are deployed, negotiated, and contextualized within language, social practice, and competing notions of the confessing-subject.

Arnaud first excuses his statements on the eternal nature of the world through a variety of recourses to his position as a subject within the vernacular and the communal, which he presents as being comprehensible (if not completely legitimate) alternatives to the more inquisitorial discourse on heresy. When denying having said that the world was without end, he proffers instead the folk proverb *Tos-temps es e*, suggesting first of all that what might be said and understood in one context—"when working" he says specifically—might be misinterpreted by the formal, inquisitorial process.²⁸ Later on in his confessions, he proffers the same rhyme as a reason for having believed that the world was eternal, accompanied by the gloss that "he had heard from many men in the Sabarthès (whose names, as he said, he had forgotten but . . . will tell the inquisitor when he remembers) . . . that the world had always been and would always be." He explains how he "fell into these heresies" because of lack of instruction: "as he said, although he went to mass he did not however listen to the sermons," because he was preoccupied with his craft as a stonemason and wished to leave as quickly as possible.²⁹ Arnaud is allowed

to present himself here as a typical *illitteratus*, one of the flock and sorely ignorant; a *topos* of the layperson in the presence of heresy more usually found in twelfth-century works on the threat of heresy. Similarly, he explains his pronouncement of the words at the bridge to Tarascon (words, he said at this point in the text, he did not believe) as being on account of his “foolishness” and “stupidity.” In these moments he is one of those St. Bernard came to Languedoc to save some 170 years before.³⁰ Arnaud also presents his disobedience over the wearing of the crosses in a social manner: his little system of reversing the mantle depended upon where he was (whether in the town of Pamiers or not, which was, perhaps, the suitable place for public display under the authority of the Church) and what he was doing (crosses on for feastdays, crosses off for working).³¹ Two different worlds are presented here, in classic conflict: the ordered, disciplined world of the Church, and the contingent, cyclical world of the lay worker.³²

But Arnaud does not only use this stock of symbols and *topoi* to present himself in an intelligible and potentially mitigating way; in fact, he also has recourse to quite a different kind of context, which presents him as a far more literate and autonomous subject than the *illitteratus*. He offers three further explanations for why he said (and, at certain points of his confession, believed) that the bodies did not survive after Judgment, and his other heresies. Each time, Arnaud was responding to the inquisitorial question of who taught him his heresies (indicative in itself of not only the residual inquisitorial belief that heresy was an organised plot, but also that the layperson absorbed rather than fomented heresy): “Asked who taught him the aforesaid things, he replied that he taught himself letters, namely the seven psalms, a little of the Psalter, the fifteen signs of Judgment, the Credo, the Paternoster, the Ave Maria, and from these he believed that all bodies returned to nothing after judgment, and, as he said, he had no other teacher [*doctor*]”; “Asked who taught him the aforesaid things [principally that God had made the world from nothing] he said, Master Arnaud Tolus, who held school in Tarascon”; “Asked if he ever had an instructor to teach him that he should believe the aforesaid heretical articles . . . he replied that [he did] not, but that he devised them by his very own self, [while] thinking about the world, and about the things he saw in the world, from which he did not reckon [*perpendere*] that God had made it or that it began or would end, and from this, as he said, he fell into the said heresies, because he did not have any man to instruct him differently. . .,”³³ Here Arnaud is certainly not presented as a *litteratus*, but neither does he conform to the *topos* of the ignorant *illitteratus*. He has some learning, and receives some instruction (even if it is erroneous) from a *magister*; and although he falls into errors through lack of a proper instructor, he does not at this point believe through “foolishness” but rather from what he presents as empirical rationality. Arnaud in effect tries on both hats of subjectivity available to him through the Inquisition’s discourse: he attempts to be the ignorant, passive (and therefore nonthreatening) peasant;

and he also tries to be the interior, reflective, cognitive confessing-subject. Neither position gets him very far.

Arnaud's disobedience evidently shows that he considered that his own system of behavior was quite valid in opposition to the Inquisition's procedure. It equally shows that he was not rejecting the structure of the Church: he still went to mass (although he omitted to go up for punishment); although he did not wear the crosses as the Inquisition wanted, he still wore them after his own fashion. Arnaud's willfulness also plays out some of the tensions present throughout the discourse of Inquisition in both the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries over the relationship of actions, words, and belief. The possibility of separating "speech" from "belief" is posited by the Inquisition's questions: when Arnaud was first questioned (after his neighbors had presented their vignette) he deposed that God had made the world, and that the world would end. The Inquisition asked then if he had always believed this; he said he had. And had he ever said otherwise? At which point Arnaud submits the vernacular rhyme *Tos-temps es e*, mentioned above.

The belief-implications of speech are strongly contested throughout these depositions. To the neighbors who first gave evidence, Arnaud's words (on the eternity of the world) primarily indicated that he had "a bad faith" or "the faith of a dog"; but also led them to muse on the fact that he came from "heretical kin" (*genus hereticalis*).³⁴ For them, Arnaud's speech indicates not so much an interiorized belief as a social grouping and way of talking. As I have said, the Inquisition allows for a possible divide between speech and belief, a divide which Arnaud seeks to exploit. However, in submitting his vernacular words (*Tos-temps es e . . .*) and manner of speech (*trufando*), Arnaud also colludes in his own interpellation as a subject within the discourse of Inquisition. A speech act that is proffered as an innocent and explanatory example, and once again as a sign of social grouping (that this proverb is often said by the men of the Sabarthès), can be interpreted by the Inquisition as the individual utterance of a single subject, as something to be policed.

Elsewhere, the Inquisition tries to bind speech and belief more firmly together. The reports of Arnaud's first words on the nature of creation suggest to the inquisitor that his initial confession was not entirely truthful, and led to the demand that he confess "fully."³⁵ But as the deposition continues, and Arnaud's statements and retractions and restatements become more contradictory, this belief in the simple connection between speech, truth, and belief collapses. The inquisitors try to get Arnaud to "do" orthodox belief by making a detailed statement and promise for the future in orthodox language: "He used to believe . . . [his various errors on creation] . . . but now, as he says, instructed by the said Lord Bishop, he believes and will believe in the future, with God's help, that God created from nothing the world, that is the sky and the land, the bodies and all created spirits." Arnaud was performing the language of the Inquisition for them; looking at the Latin, one finds that

whereas most of the preceding statements have roughly followed the vernacular word order, here a more classical structure and extended subclause is used.³⁶ Getting Arnaud to pronounce the words of orthodoxy would hopefully make him orthodox, “with God’s help.” This connection of speech and internalized belief does not really work for Arnaud; he seems to see speech as a particular and contingent act—that if he can just say “the right thing” for the inquisitors, he will escape punishment. Hence the various different positions, statements, and retractions Arnaud makes, often in bewilderingly quick succession. While trying out the various positions on whether he said the heretical words but did not believe them (or said them and did believe them, or said he believed them because he had been told to say that, or had been told to say that, and in fact did believe them anyway) Arnaud says that “it was Pierre de Gaillac who lost him,” because Pierre had counseled confessing to belief in his words in order to get a lighter sentence. When the light sentence had failed to transpire, Arnaud felt aggrieved at Pierre, and understandably tried out the opposite position (that he hadn’t believed in the words) to see what would happen.³⁷

Arnaud—and the other prisoners he mentions—also posits the idea that physical actions should take priority over spoken words. Raymond Vayssi re had said to Arnaud, whilst both were in prison, “you others, you are imprisoned only because of the words you have said!” and that he had never heard of the inquisitor of Carcassonne (in contrast to Fournier) condemning people for the words they had said if they hadn’t seen heretics. Arnaud himself apparently told people that he should not have lost his goods, despite anything he might have said, “because he had not been a heretic nor had seen heretics.”³⁸

Arnaud was not “lost” by his friend’s bad advice, nor exactly by the comparative harshness of different inquisitors. He was lost by an historical change in the practice of inquisition: one hundred years before, or possibly even only fifty years before, Arnaud’s words would not have been submitted to the Inquisition for policing, and his lack of contact with or actions in support of Cathar heretics would indeed have left him untouched. But in the early fourteenth century words and individuals had become the site of transgression; and by recording and repeating back the words confessed, Arnaud’s tactic of trying out different acts of speech was doomed to failure, since the past statements could not be erased or reinscribed. That said, Arnaud’s defeat also demonstrated the deep unease and uncertainty that the discourse of inquisition still had over the connections between speech, action, and belief.

Jean Rocas de la Salvetat, the Fool

I name the deponent thus, not with derision, but to suggest a certain ironic subject position. Duvernoy does describe Jean Rocas as a “fool” and a

“madman.”³⁹ However, if his “foolishness” is taken to be marked in the text by elements of contradiction, lacunae, or admissions of the limits of thought, it can also be read as a tactic in the presence of the Inquisition; and thus presents a comparison with the case of Arnaud de Savinhan.

Jean Rocas de la Salvetat⁴⁰ appears first in the inquisitorial record on 25 July 1321. He had already been arrested and was brought from prison, though the reasons for his being *suspectus* are not revealed. Apparently under a minimum of questioning, Jean confessed to various beliefs: that “the Lord of Heaven and Earth” was the only divine person, thus excluding the Son and the Holy Spirit; that this Lord, whom he called the Father (because he made all creation, but not because he had a son, since Jean did not believe that he had a son), had always been a man, real in flesh and blood, and would always exist because he was invulnerable. On 28 July Jean continued, explaining that “this person” came to the Blessed Mary, but did not receive humanity from her since he was a perfect man beforehand; that “this person” did an injustice to Joseph by taking Mary from him, so that afterwards “Joseph could not have her”; and that he took Mary because she was young and beautiful. Jean thought it was likely “that this person entered the womb of the blessed Mary, because the priests said this,” although he was not certain what he did there. He would however have shrunk when he entered Mary’s womb, because otherwise he could not have left her womb “without a total cleaving of the body of the Blessed Mary.” Afterwards, “little by little, like other men, he arrived at the bodily height which he had had before.” “This person” was not crucified (although the priests say that he was) but only appeared to be crucified, so that those who did the deed believed that they had executed him; consequently, there was no resurrection, only a reappearance of the person. He believed that “Our Lord” (*Nostre senher*, which is what Jean names Christ) descended to Hell—in both body and soul, since the soul cannot do anything without the body—but he did not stay there for long! The divine person will judge all men, but he will not descend to do it; since he can do it perfectly well from heaven, why would he bother to come down here? Demons are in fact bad men and women—murderers—and the only “hell” that exists is this visible land where bad men live. Baptism is good, although it loses its power if the one baptized commits murder; in any case children are saved whether baptized or not (unless they are Saracen or Jewish children), as are those who do good works. The value of baptism is not to God, but in the “great friendship it contracts between men.”

On 29 July Jean went on: baptism does not give remission of sins; Saracens are good, if they believe in salvation through God, but no Jews can be saved; the body of Christ is not present in the Host, but the grace of God is; anyone (even a Jew or a pagan) can perform the sacrament as long as they are good, but a bad priest cannot accomplish it. On 12 March 1322, some eight months later, Brother Gaillard de Pomiès, a Dominican assistant to Fournier, visited Jean in his prison at the *castrum* of Allemans, to ask him if he wished to

abjure. He found that Jean was *infirmus*, and perplexed about the need to abjure: “when asked if what he had confessed . . . was the truth, he replied that he did not know what he had confessed, but if it was bad, he Jean did not know what he had said.” Questioned on the articles of faith, he replied “that he did not know.” Gaillard therefore told him that this is what the Church teaches. Jean replied that if the Church believed it, then he believed it. Gaillard then asked him if extramarital sex was a mortal sin. Jean thought so, unless it was with a prostitute: “and when brother Gaillard said to the said Jean that this was a mortal sin and a heresy to believe the aforesaid, the said Jean was silent.”⁴¹

And so it went on, through two more interrogations by Gaillard on 27 and 28 March. Gaillard explained again and again to Jean that there were many errors in his confessions. Jean seemed mystified, but would not abjure, and said that “he could not do otherwise.” When the notary read out to Jean his confession, Jean prevented him from finishing; on various orthodox articles Jean stated that he did not know what he believed, “but said that in all and through all he wished to stay in the confession he had made before the Lord Bishop.”⁴² The question of the morality of sex with a prostitute returned again (possibly because the inquisitor was trying to make sense of Jean’s beliefs by relating them to Catharism as a “coherent” system)⁴³ and Jean still clung to what he had always done and known.⁴⁴ “And then the said brother Gaillard questioned the said Jean and warned him once, twice, and three times that he should renounce all the errors he had confessed, or else he would be condemned and punished as an obstinate heretic, assigning him a term of three days in which to renounce his errors.”⁴⁵

On 6 September a letter from Fournier to the official of Cahors revealed that Jean had never recanted his errors and had died in their prison before he could be sentenced.⁴⁶ Jean’s heirs or relatives or creditors were called upon to defend him publicly (in order that they might recover goods that would otherwise be confiscated by the Inquisition), but none appeared although two separate dates were set. In the absence of a defense, Fournier “publicized” Jean’s confession and errors. Finally, on 18 June 1323 a definitive sentence was given against Jean.⁴⁷

Jean’s depositions interest me not only because of the various errors he professed. Although I will interpret these beliefs to some extent, I am more interested in two other things. One is the degree of textual effort the Inquisition expended on behalf of this “madman,” even after his death: five more letters, copied and recopied for the record, discussing his posthumous defense, searching for those who might defend him, and ultimately publicizing his idiosyncratic beliefs. Whatever degree of “bureaucratic red tape” one might wish to read into the inquisitorial process, the question of “textual effort” still remains; as Fournier himself puts it at one point, “wishing to proceed further in this matter and to its conclusion,” before writing yet another letter (which is, in turn, copied into the inquisitorial record).⁴⁸ The

second area is the manner in which Jean “sets about” believing, and thus arrives at the partial, patchy, and somewhat confused conclusions I have recorded above. I think that we can also see, as with the case of Arnaud de Savinhan, a clear example of the textual practices of inquisition meeting a more fluid and “vernacular” mode of discourse. However, as I shall argue below, in Jean’s case the latter arguably comes off better than in the last case discussed.

Duvernoy sees Cathar influence on some of Jean’s beliefs; or, to be more exact, he notes firstly that a certain belief (on baptism) was common among Cathar *croyants*, and then later comments that another belief (on the Host) “est là encore un argument cathare commun.”⁴⁹ One can certainly link some of what Jean says to a long, heterodox tradition: most particularly (and an example Duvernoy chooses not to cite), the Docetic nature ascribed to Christ, which appears from very early on in Christianity.⁵⁰ But this mode of analysis, which treats any particular expression of belief only as part of an exterior body of opinion, mirrors inquisitorial discourse, and tends to lead to a reductive foreclosure of discussion: Jean is “explained” by cross-referencing parts of what he says to the “canon” of Cathar beliefs and discarding the remainder as “incoherent.” Now, the beliefs expressed in this deposition are certainly confusing, and possibly even confused; but it is possible to pick out certain themes which support Jean’s words, and to trace the “logic” that leads him into certain areas.

First of all, much of what Jean confesses is an attempt to construct a narrative that will incorporate the supernatural elements of the Passion: Jean exemplifies one who receives cultural stories and attempts to make his own sense of them. “Our Lord” or “Our Father” is divine, and yet a man, therefore he must be invulnerable; “nothing can harm him or help him.” He was born of Mary, but both remained inviolate by the birthing process: therefore he must have shrunk. He is invulnerable, and so cannot have died on the Cross; rather, he must have only appeared to, leading people to assume he had been resurrected when they saw him afterwards. Why would he bother to descend to Earth to judge men when he could do it just as well from heaven? Demons are obviously the worst kind of people—murderers—and hence hell is down here on Earth.⁵¹ The Host cannot be the body of Christ because, firstly, “the sacrament of the altar is celebrated at once and the same time in diverse places and, as it seemed to him, he did not believe that the one body of God could be in diverse places at the same time.” Even if the true body of God was in the Host “he would not eat it, because . . . it would be as great a sin if he ate the body of the Lord and if he ate the flesh of his father [Father?]. If the body was there, God would not let it be touched by many priests who live bad and incontinent lives.”⁵² There may be a Cathar influence on the pool of stories available to Jean (arguments against the nature of the Host being common), but one can see that he constructed his own path through the difficulties of the Passion narrative.

Jean also illustrates the possibility of “citing” spiritual practices in his own manner.⁵³ Questioned on what he said when making the sign of the cross, he replied that he does not sign the cross, but if he had to he would say “God aid me, you who have made Heaven and Earth,” putting his hand on his forehead when saying “me,” on his shoulder when saying “you who have made Heaven,” and on the other shoulder when saying “and Earth.”⁵⁴ Although this is not a re-citing of orthodox religious performance that Jean actually *does* he is nonetheless able to imagine such a performance; to imagine “doing” a communal religious act differently. Similarly, he explained that he did not believe that the body of the Lord was present in the Host, but rather the grace of God: “and as he said, he did not bend his knees before the elevation of the body of the Lord because he believed the body of the Lord was there, but because he believed the grace of God was there.”⁵⁵ This time Jean spoke of a practice he had actually performed, and again sets out a way in which it might be “recited” with a different meaning.

One can also see that one principle that aided Jean was a sense of the interconnections between religion and community. Having identified “bad men and bad women” as “demons” he states that they are “murderers, and no others.” This is perhaps then glossed by his later remark that baptism becomes invalid when someone does bad deeds, “if for example he committed homicide through rancor or cupidity or other unjust cause, or was a brigand of the road, or a thief, or false witness.”⁵⁶ These are all crimes against the social fabric; one might recall that Jean believed that these bad men would be “reduced to nothing” after judgment and would not be placed in “hell” (remembering that for Jean, hell was here on Earth) because “His *domus* should not be embarrassed [*impedire*] by any bad thing.” The murderer, the brigand, the thief, the false witness—they all despoil the *domus*. In contrast, Jean praises baptism because in it “man contracts greater friendship with men.”⁵⁷ *Amicitia* is, once again, intimately connected with religion.⁵⁸ Jean’s belief in the redemptive power of good works, regardless of baptism, also fits this connection between the social and the spiritual. One might link Jean’s views on sex with social harmony as well: he believed that fornication was a mortal sin but that with a prostitute it was not. Because this was a point the inquisitor concentrated upon (possibly because it presented less worrying images than some of Jean’s other beliefs), Jean later said that “he did not know what to believe on this; but, as he said, he had often confessed to the sin of the flesh because he believed it to be a sin.”⁵⁹

“He did not know what to believe on this.” Jean admits to doubt, or indecision, or simply lacunae in his beliefs several times: “the Son and the Holy Spirit are not God, nor does he know if they are anything or not; and if they are something, he does not know what they are”; “Asked if he believed that this person entered the womb of the Blessed Mary, he replied that he did not know if he entered or not”; “nor moreover does he know what to believe on this”; “Asked about the article of faith . . . he replied that he did not

know.”⁶⁰ One could take these doubts to diagnose an infirm mind, but one might also read them, firstly, as moments of discursive tension, as the points at which Jean’s system of interpretation can no longer support and sustain its synthesis of orthodox and heterodox narratives and personal reworking. Secondly, it is significant that (as in the case of Arnaud de Savinhan) Jean’s narratives of spirituality and creation are “vernacular” in character. Jean was telling, and retelling, stories which sought to make sense of the various stories he had heard. His explanations of the Virgin Birth, the Harrowing of Hell, and the Resurrection obviously indicate that he had been exposed to orthodox narratives; the Docetic elements of his theology possibly indicate that Cathar narratives had also reached him. But Jean (in opposition to the stereotype of the *credens*) did not choose one “official” version over another; instead he synthesizes the two, using the resources available to him. He agrees with certain orthodox tenets on the authority of the priests; on other points he demurs. On the question of whether Christ entered Mary’s womb, for example, he expresses his uncertainty but then says, “But he believed that it was more likely that he entered her than not, because the priests say this, and he had heard this from them, and believed they spoke the truth in this.” Although in some senses accepting clerical authority, Jean makes it plain that he had assessed (rather than simply received) the priests’ words; and he goes on to set out his doubts: “He did not know, however, what he did in the womb of the Blessed Mary, nor if he received [*accipere*] anything from her or not, nor moreover does he know to believe on this.”⁶¹ Elsewhere he explicitly rejects clerical authority on theological truth: outlining his theory on how Christ only appeared to be crucified and killed, he says “and although the priests say that he was crucified . . . he did not believe the priests in this, although . . . it would have seemed to those who crucified him that they were crucifying and killing him.”⁶² The latter phrase seeks to exculpate the priests from their mistake; Jean was not particularly anticlerical (he does mention “priests who live bad or incontinent lives,” but does not apply this to all of the clergy), and tries to explain how it is that the priests might unwittingly have arrived at this false conclusion.

Jean’s crime is of course to assume that what he thought on these matters might be validly argued against the authority of Church officials. This was not, in fact, particularly unusual: there are many instances reported in the records of laity arguing theological points with each other and with priests. What shapes Jean’s case is not simply a conflict of authority, but a conflict between the vernacular and the textual. Jean’s propositions work themselves out during his questioning, and he appears to feel that anything he had said should be part of this dialectical process: “he replied that he did not believe that he had confessed any errors in the said confession, but if anything there was bad, he wished it to be removed.” As with Arnaud de Savinhan, this more fluid discourse is pulled into the textual narrative of inquisition, which records everything said expressly for the purpose of fixing it in position for later

comparison. This element seemed to alarm Jean: when the scribe read his confession back to him (to show him that he had confessed many errors) Jean stopped him before the end of the deposition “and did not permit it to be read to him any more.”⁶³

Jean could not recognize that what he had said were “errors,” not because he was “mad” or particularly obstinate, but because “errors” of the kind that interested the inquisitors were dependent on an evaluation of a fixed text that was quite alien to Jean’s discourse. Unlike Arnaud de Savinhan, Jean did not present conflicting depictions of “the truth”; his faith is presented as internalized, a way of processing the issues. His reply to the beseechings of the inquisitor to renounce what he had said is very telling: he did not respond aggressively, or assert one truth over another, or deny and cavil, but simply said that “he could not do otherwise” and begged that they deal quickly with him.⁶⁴ His death prevented the possibility of closing the record in the recognized fashion, with either an abjuration or a satisfactory condemnation. Instead, the ghost of his strange thoughts lingered on, to be broadcast by the Inquisition themselves in the final sentence. The Inquisition was sure of its authority and of its textually based path to truth, yet it is only through the recording of Jean’s words that his beliefs survived as anything other than passing moments of vernacular practice. There is, perhaps, the trace of a kind of agency present here, that even in death presents to others (those attending the “publication” of his confession, and those of us now reading the inquisitorial text) the possibility of “performing” belief differently, of citing orthodox (religious) practice for one’s own ends.

Demotic Visions of Belief: The Free Man and the Story Teller

Raymond de Laburat of Quié, the Free Man

On 25 January 1321, Pierre Peyre of Quié gave evidence to the Inquisition alleging that Raymond de Laburat of Quié,⁶⁵ a farmer and neighbor, had seen and received some Cathar heretics. Pierre’s brother Raymond had, on the same day, given evidence against others from the town. On 31 January Jacques Tartier of Quié alleged that Raymond had also given the heretics Jacques and Pierre Autier some bread and wine. Apparently nothing was done about these allegations at the time, but on 25 November 1322 Raymond Peyre returned before Bishop Fournier, this time cited, and gave further evidence. He and Raymond de Laburat and several other men had been talking, in the square at Quié, about the fact that some people of the Sabarthès had been excommunicated for failing to pay tithes to the Church. Raymond de Laburat (so Raymond Peyre alleged) had said “We made the churches for the chaplains and the doors of the churches, and now the same priests close the doors of the churches against our eyes! . . . I wish we had a box in some furrow [*? versana*] or field and that mass could be celebrated on the said box,

and if this were done, the priests could not close the doors against us but rather we could see and hear the mass!" Furthermore, Raymond said that "God never ordained [*mandere*] excommunication with his mouth, but however the priests excommunicate us quickly and easily!" On following days, other witnesses were cited, and similarly gave evidence of Raymond de Laburat's apparent flouting of the authority of the Church, including that he had suggested that Bishop Fournier could not order the people of Quié to make an Easter candle of any particular weight, that he wished there were no clergy in the Sabarthès, save one to celebrate Mass in the fields, that he wished all the churches were destroyed, and that he wished all the clergy were made to work in the fields or were sent to fight the Saracens in Outremer.⁶⁶ On 7 February 1323, Raymond de Laburat was cited and gave his confession.

Raymond's defense was threefold: firstly he tried to recontextualize his words, suggesting that they had been given a different import by his accusers; secondly he excused himself for saying some things in a fit of temper; thirdly, toward the end of his interrogations, he alleged that Pierre Peyre, Raymond Peyre, and Jacques Tartier had a grudge against him connected to a legal case that his son, Pierre de Laburat, a priest, was pursuing against Pierre Peyre, and that he had been warned that they were plotting to give evidence against him.⁶⁷ These defences in themselves are suggestive, but my main concern with Raymond's case is the tactic he pursued in the arguments he had with the Church over the limits and basis of its power, and the particular demotic vision he had of religion. Since Raymond's fate was to be condemned to strict imprisonment (in chains, fed on bread and water),⁶⁸ his strategies cannot be termed "successful" without a measure of bitter irony. Nevertheless, Raymond's rhetorical moves and ideas illuminated certain tensions between lay and inquisitorial conceptions of belief, and eventually had the unusual effect of pressing Bishop Fournier into some kind of dialogue on his views. In exploring these elements, I will show that Raymond was able to appropriate the entrenched narratives of tripartite social structure for his own purposes.

The primary tension between Raymond and his interrogators could be described as a contest between the local and the universal. By this I mean that Raymond's defense and statements presume that the site of his own discourse is geographically local and subjectively personal; and that this mode of speech and understanding finds itself in contest with the epistemological and sociological grand structures assumed by the Inquisition. In Raymond's counteraccusation against the witnesses who first got him into trouble (Pierre and Raymond Peyre, Jacques Tartier), he displays optimism that whatever kind of legal mechanism the Inquisition is, it can be started (and therefore stopped) by local disputes. He deposed that Pierre Geraud and Pierre den Hugol warned him at different times that because he had not brought to a halt (*pacificare*) the *causa* with Pierre Peyre and Raymond Peyre, the brothers "would greatly menace him."⁶⁹ Similarly, Pierre Clergue, the priest of Montaillou,⁷⁰ warned him

that the aforesaid Jacques Tartier de Quié had gone to Master Jacques de Poloniac, keeper of Carcassonne prison, and had said to him that he wished to say something on the crime of heresy against the witness; and Master Jacques said to him that if what he wished to say against the witness was not true, he should not say anything, nor accuse anyone of so great a crime unless he knew them to be guilty. And to this, the said priest [Clergue] said to the witness that if he had committed anything in heresy, he should go to the Lord Inquisitor of Carcassonne to confess it; to which the witness replied that he did not think himself guilty of heresy.⁷¹

In this passage, Raymond de Laburat sets up the possibility that Jacques Tartier was lying, but more importantly, suggests that the whole matter is personal and not for the attention of the Inquisition: as he tells Clergue, “he did not think himself guilty of heresy,” and therefore there was no case to answer. The witnesses against him are presented as seeking to pursue their vendetta through the inquisitorial courts; and Raymond attempts to show that the matter is therefore, at heart, limited to that local, personal arena. In accusing his accusers, one can see a model of legal process based on the older mechanism of *accusatio*; unfortunately for Raymond, this was not, of course, how *inquisitio* operated, and much of the direction of the narrative of the case comes from the conflict between Raymond’s assumptions about what he is dealing with, and the abstract and structured approach of the inquisitorial process.

This last point is particularly evident in the passage where Raymond attempts to show that he intended no criticism of Bishop Fournier, but of one of his colleagues. Raymond confessed as follows:

the witness said to the aforesaid men, “We made the churches and we buy all that is necessary for the churches, and the churches are ours, and now we are expelled from church. Reviled are those who prevent any Christian from hearing mass!”—intending, as he said, to revile [*maledicere*] Lord Pierre du Verdier, archdeacon of Majorque, who gave the sentence of excommunication against us [sic].

A later passage makes clear that what had led Raymond into revolt was the fact that whereas the excommunicated in the Sabarthès used to be allowed to go to mass, Bishop Fournier had changed the rules.⁷² Therefore Raymond’s glossing of his “intentions” in the quoted section illustrates a mistaken belief that he is dealing with a person (Fournier or Pierre du Verdier) rather than a system (*inquisitio*).

The Inquisition, of its very nature, did not read Raymond de Laburat’s actions within the context of a local dispute, but tried to contextualize him within the grand narratives of heresy. He was described as “vomiting forth” his errors, a formulaic piece of rhetoric with a long history in the discourse on heresy, as I have pointed out earlier.⁷³ He was questioned about subscribing to particular errors which did not actually appear in the accusers’ evidence against him: “Asked if he said or believed that prelates and priests could not absolve the sins of anyone who confessed to them their sins, he replied no.” This would have placed Raymond within a Cathar framework, and contextualized his particular brand of anticlericalism within the greater threat of heresy. Eventually Raymond was made to confess what he knew about Catharism, which was not much: he had never heard the Autiers preaching, and the only thing he had heard was that a couple of people had received the

consolamentum on their deathbeds. Above all, he was asked who had taught him his beliefs, the inquisitors expecting perhaps to discover a learned and dangerous heresiarch (perhaps Cathar, perhaps not) behind the peasant puppet. Raymond replied that on the question of the Church's power to excommunicate, he had been told by a certain presbyter called Lord John that God had never ordained excommunication, nor had He excommunicated anyone, but that the clergy had invented it so that they could have power over the people.⁷⁴ However, Raymond did not simply parrot this error; he explored it with (and used it as a way of taunting or teasing) his parish priest, Raymond Frézat:

Remembering these words. . . he asked the said priest, "Can you say to me that one can find in any part of the Scripture that God excommunicated anyone with his mouth or ordered excommunication?" and the said priest, as he said, was silent. . . . He said moreover that . . . another time he and the said priest went by themselves from the church of Sabarthès towards the head of the bridge of Tarascon, and when they were between the bridge of Sabarthès and the mill of Quié, the witness again asked the said priest if one could find it written that God, with his mouth, had excommunicated anyone or ordered that any man excommunicate anyone, and the said priest did not reply. . . . He said moreover that after this, in the month of August the witness again asked the said priest if one could find in any Scripture that God had excommunicated anyone or ordered any man to excommunicate anyone; and then the said priest replied to him that one found it written that the Hebrews had once made a great disturbance in the church when God preached, and God had ordered that they be expelled from the church so that they could not disturb the sermon, and because of this, as he said, excommunication was invented. And then the witness asked him if the Hebrews were men, and the said priest replied to him that they were.⁷⁵

Even accepting the authority of a text, Raymond had to check that what it said actually applied to the here and now by asking whether or not the Hebrews were men. This confirmed, he claimed to have abandoned his earlier belief.

The most important "local" aspect of the case was the reason why Raymond de Laburat had been excommunicated, and thus excluded from church, in the first place: the struggle between some of the men of the Sabarthès and Bishop Fournier over the question of tithes. The nonpayment of tithes appears frequently in the register, although Raymond's deposition gives the fullest details.⁷⁶ The excommunication for nonpayment of a large group of men was what sparked Raymond's speeches about access to church; and it also resulted in Raymond's opposition to another form of tithe, the making of an Easter candle, also ordered by Fournier. Raymond's opinions on these matters lead on to the second point of contest in the depositions: the contest between "custom" and "right."

Raymond questioned the power of the clergy, and of the bishop in particular, in several ways, according to the evidence against him and his own confession. Raymond Frézat, the priest, deposed that Raymond de Laburat railed against the exclusion of the excommunicated men from church, and that he said to them, "What power has the bishop, that he expels us or bars us from the church that is ours, because we built it and keep it built, and we do all that is necessary for the said church? Because of this, when the church is thus ours because of the aforesaid, the bishop does not have the power to expel us."⁷⁷ Raymond also suggested (claimed the witness Jean Montanié) that the bishop could not order them as he wished over the making of the Easter candle (the

other major bone of contention): “And what power does your bishop have to command us?” Raymond asked the priest who had come to tell the villagers they were supposed to produce the candle; “We will make a candle if we wish!”⁷⁸ Elsewhere, in both the evidence against him and his own deposition, Raymond makes clear that this rebellion is based firstly on the notion of “custom.” Bernard Faure deposed, on the same exchange between Raymond Frézat and Raymond de Laburat, that the latter had appealed to custom to explain why the villagers should not comply. The priest confirms this and elaborates that Raymond said he did not feel they should have to make the Easter candle “when it is not the custom to make it.” The priest demurred that they did have to comply and that Raymond should consider the bishop “as if he were your lord [*dominus*].” Raymond himself admitted saying that he had questioned the weight of wax they were supposedly asked for, and had said “it seems to me that we are not bound to make a candle of a certain quantity, but only that we should make one in the best manner that we can,” although he denied overtly questioning the power of the bishop. The inquisitors were keen to assert the principles which Raymond’s notion of “custom” opposed: one question began, “Asked if he ever said or believed that the Church couldn’t excommunicate anyone . . . who had refused to pay tithes, imposed *by divine and canonical right*” (my emphasis).⁷⁹

However, the tension between custom and right was not so easily defused. Frézat, again, deposed that Raymond had said that no man could excommunicate another, and had added, “and if I pay the tenths for *carnalage* [a tax on sheep], as my father paid them, and as is customary, I do not believe that any man in the world can excommunicate me!” Raymond considered that the implications of excommunication were also to be negotiated through custom. Bishop Fournier asked him

if he believed it was better that the excommunicated, against the prohibition of the Church, heard [the mass] than if they abstained, [to which] he replied that because in the Sabarthès the excommunicated were not prohibited from entering the churches to see the Body of Christ until the said Lord Bishop [i.e., Fournier himself] prohibited it, he therefore believed, and believed at the moment when he said the aforesaid words, that it was better that the excommunicated went to see the body of Christ against the prohibition of the church than if they did not see the body of Christ.⁸⁰

Raymond continually opposed local custom and practice to the external structures presented by the priest and most particularly by the inquisitor Bishop Fournier. He suggested that Fournier had sinned, though not beyond the possibility of redemption, in asking the men of the Sabarthès to pay tithes that were not customary. It is through this divide that one must read Raymond’s assertion that the churches “belonged” to the people; this was not a general statement about possessing the fruits of production, but an assertion particular to one locality. Being told that the church belonged to the bishop “and the people of the Church,” Raymond allegedly declared that he wished all the churches were destroyed.⁸¹ In his own deposition however he made it clear that he had intended to speak only of his parish church and no other, and furthermore had said he wished the church was “*enderocada* (that is, ruined or

destroyed),” his usage of a localized vernacular word indicating a passive process of decay rather than an active razing to the ground.⁸² Similarly, Bernard Faure deposed that he heard Raymond say that he wished there were no clergy “in these parts or country” (*in partibus istis vel in patria ista*).⁸³ Raymond would have been extremely unusual if he had spoken of “country” meaning “France” or even “Languedoc”; if Faure accurately related his words, I think *patria* here was synonymous with “land” (*terra*), used elsewhere in the records to indicate the Sabarthès region.⁸⁴

The localized and custom-based appeal Raymond made extended to a contest over social space and visibility. Various people deposed that he had said he wished that mass was celebrated in the fields, so that all who wished could see the Host.⁸⁵ Raymond himself supplied more details:

at the feast of Annunciation two years ago, when excommunicated for failing to pay tithes . . . [he and others were shut out of church]; and then he asked either Brune de Monteils, or Marie (nuns of that church), why the doors of the church were held closed when they were celebrating mass, to which the woman replied that the priest of the said church had ordered her to keep the said door closed while mass was celebrated so that no excommunicate could enter church. And then both the witness and the aforesaid others left the said doorway and stood next to the cemetery around a certain stone which was customarily used for blessing branches on Palm Sunday, and the witness said to the aforesaid men, “We made the churches [and so on].”

The inquisitor, interpreting the statements through his own structure, asked Raymond if he believed that it would be better to have no material church, but to use the fields; that is, he abstracted a general (heretical) proposition from Raymond’s speech. Raymond, again, denied this.⁸⁶ His concerns were locally based, drawn from the local experience of excommunication over the nonpayment of tithes and the changes in procedure introduced by Bishop Fournier. His response to exclusion from church was to reappropriate a public site of religious importance (the stone used for blessing branches) and to reimagine the central, spiritual act of faith in a public and open setting: on a rock, in a field, “where all who wanted to could see the Body of Christ.”

This is one thing that makes Raymond’s case so interesting and so revealing of the manner in which the Inquisition produced transgression: Raymond’s beliefs, although partly anticlerical, at heart held to the strongest of orthodox propositions. His confession presents both disobedience (in questioning the power of the bishop and of the clergy to excommunicate) but also obedience (in accepting the story of the Hebrews’ ejection from church). He explained his belief that the excommunicated should be able to enter church as initially due to ignorance of the changes instituted by Fournier, and submitted that once a certain Dominican had set him straight on the matter, he believed in an orthodox manner. Even when wishing the clergy were dead and gone, all witnesses agreed (as he deposed) that he said “one, sole priest” should be kept in order to consecrate the Host; so his anticlericalism stretched within certain bounds and no further.⁸⁷ In explaining why he imagined a mass conducted in the fields, and considered Fournier to have sinned in preventing the excommunicated from seeing the Host, he delivered an

apparently impromptu speech of great orthodox commitment:

Item, he said then that the best thing in the world, as he believed, was the sacrifice of God, “and now we others are prohibited from seeing God’s sacrifice, and I believe that whoever prevents us from seeing the said sacrifice sins and does not do well.”⁸⁸

In many ways, then, Raymond was deeply orthodox and also presented himself as someone willing to be corrected about his beliefs. He was, however, condemned to strict imprisonment. Why so harsh a punishment?

There are, I think, two reasons why Raymond (as with the other cases dealt with in this chapter) received the penultimate penalty the Inquisition could apply. One reason is drawn from the analysis I have conducted above, which identifies Raymond’s struggles as not simply a conflict based in anticlericalism, but rooted in a deeper struggle between a spirituality and morality based on the idea of locality, and one based on abstractions, principles, and structures. The second reason is connected to the first: Raymond’s narratives employ (and are invited to employ) a particularly interesting recourse to the concept of the tripartite society, and the social mechanism we (anachronistically) label “feudalism.” I say “invited” because it is the priest who instructs Raymond (and the other men of Quié) to regard Bishop Fournier “as if he was your lord,” and thus sites the struggle between “custom” and “right” discussed above.⁸⁹ “Invited” also tries to indicate that what I am going to say is not simply a matter of one individual being clever in his utterances (although that is part of it), but must be read firstly by remembering that the text which represents those utterances was created precisely to contain and control them; and that the reason the utterances were “successful” (as I am going to term them), and therefore needed policing, was that they re-cited elements from very broad—and hence potentially authoritative—social discourses.

Raymond invokes the tripartite structure of society, and the feudal obligations that underpinned it, as part of two different tactics. One, particularly invited by the demand to recognize Fournier “as if he was your lord,” was to stress the reciprocal nature of feudal demands: that whatever seigneurial rights existed, they had to operate within certain boundaries.⁹⁰ This lies behind Raymond’s arguments over the weight (though not the principle) of the Easter candle, and perhaps also behind the suggestion that Fournier could not prevent the excommunicated attending mass, because this would be an “abuse” of (quasi-seigneurial) power. When Raymond confesses on the matter, he deploys the same point, though more subtly than those who accused him:

Asked [whether he said that they did not have to make the Easter candle, or not make it of any particular weight] . . . he replied that. . . when he and Pierre Guiraud, Arnaud Gossiaud (consuls of Quié), and Pierre den Hugol, Vital Gossiaud, and others . . . were at the gate called Villeneuve of Quié, the consuls said to the witness and aforesaid others that the rector of the church of Quié had ordered them on the part of the said Lord Bishop to make an Easter candle of fifteen or twenty pounds of wax, to which the witness responded that the town of Quié had many expenses, and he did not believe that the said Lord Bishop would order that there should be in the said church a candle of a specific weight, but that the said parishoners should make the candle as best they could, of maybe four or five pounds, “and it seems to

me that we are not bound to make a candle of a certain quantity but only that we should make one in the best manner that we can.”⁹¹

Apart from the recourse to a notion of “custom,” we can also note a rhetorical move to suggest that demands for a candle of such “excessive” weight must be the result of a misunderstanding; and therefore that such an unreasonable demand would be an abuse of the bishop’s power.⁹² In this formulation, then, Raymond does not challenge the notion of there being a quasi-feudal relationship between the clergy and the laity, but cites it in a manner which stresses the mutual responsibilities of such a relationship.

The second tactic is far more radical: to revolve and realign the elements of the tripartite model of society. Raymond presents three different images of how to be rid of the clergy (save the one, sole priest necessary to consecrate the Host). Firstly, according to the testimony of Jean Montanié, Raymond suggested that after the churches were destroyed and mass celebrated in the fields, “all the bishops, abbots, priests, *religiosi*, and clerics were across the sea in Jerusalem, and this he would ordain and do if he were pope, because the clergy do nothing but bad for us.” Raymond himself elaborated, removing the suggestion that he had dreamed of becoming pontiff:

he said . . . that he wished that by order of the pope all the clergy were sent overseas or to Granada and avenge there the death of Christ . . . and that the bishop of Pamiers could go there with ten armed knights, and the abbot of Foix with five, and also the parish priests of Quié and Foix, and that he wished they were as keen to fight the Saracens and to gain their land and to avenge the death of Christ as they were keen or determined to claim the tenths and firsts of *carnalage*, because if the clerics went out there, they would leave us in peace, and not demand from us what they demand.⁹³

As Duvernoy points out, some of the clergy did in reality keep armed retinues, and were known to go on crusade;⁹⁴ however, the inclusion of “the parish priests” indicates that Raymond’s rhetoric is essentially ironic. If the clergy were actually to move into the place of the *bellatores*, the *laboratores* would be freed from their demands.

The second image Raymond presents twists the picture round another third: according to the priest Frézat, Raymond declared that he wished “all other men were in Paradise, and further that the chaplains and clerics tilled and dug the land.”⁹⁵ If the *oratores* were to take the place of the *laboratores*, the latter could relax from their allotted task and enjoy some peace in Paradise. Presumably this image resonated with the resentment of priests who did no “real” work, and certainly harks back to Raymond’s assertion that since the villagers “made” the churches, the churches were theirs.

One can obviously read these two inversions in the tradition of “the world turned upside down.” Analysis of this kind of “carnavalesque” trope has often tended to see it as trapped into performing symbolic transgressions that ultimately only serve to reassert existing hierarchies and norms.⁹⁶ However, in this particular instance, Raymond’s rotating of the social order allows him to imagine a more radical departure: first, the possibility that all the clergy (including his own son) were dead, or simply “gone.” This was attested by various witnesses; Raymond himself admitted it, but said he had not meant

the words when he said them, but had spoken out of wrath.⁹⁷ This is certainly not a reaffirmation of hierarchy, but the move from a tripartite to a bipartite society—and a bipartite society that does not actually mention the *bellatores*. Even more radical in its way was the second image Raymond called up (according to Frézat):

he added that he wished that he was with the bishop [Fournier] in a certain mountain gully which he named, and there “we would both fight out between me and him the matter of the *carnalages*, because I would see what the said bishop had in his belly!”⁹⁸

By rotating the social order, or rather by relocating the scene of conflict from the town to the mountain, Raymond was able to depict a scene where the social hierarchy is challenged. Two kinds of masculinity are imagined in conflict: Fournier’s bookish, patrician, town-based identity, and Raymond’s rural, unlettered physicality. Fournier’s authority comes from literacy and the hegemonic control of language; Raymond’s authority is drawn from personal physical might, and the implicit support of the community. And Raymond had no doubt about who would win. This was not simply “the world turned upside down,” but a whole new world.

What were the effects of these tactics? One can hardly term them “successful” since Raymond was punished, imprisoned, and effectively silenced. However, I think one can draw several inferences from my reading of this case. We can note that Raymond achieves the unusual position of engaging Fournier in some kind of dialogue: after Raymond had suggested that the clergy be sent on crusade, the inquisitor asked the witness “why he said this, when if [it were done] the Church would be destitute of people to defend its rights and to reprimand wrongdoers and infidels?” Raymond refused to respond; but he had provoked the inquisitor into the unprecedented position of debating a lay proposition.⁹⁹ We can also read the harshness of Raymond’s sentence back into the discursive struggle conducted within the case, and conclude that in reimagining the social structure, more remained at stake than historians might normally credit. Finally, we should note that Raymond’s re-citing of the social order was rhetorically extremely successful; I say this not so much from my own assessment of the quality of the language, but from noting that Raymond’s (alleged) words stayed with several witnesses—and therefore obviously struck them with some resonant force, if also with horror and revulsion. To re-cite the social order in such a way that one could imagine dismantling it is surely a success of a kind.¹⁰⁰

*Jean Joufre of Tignac, the Story Teller*¹⁰¹

1322, 6th February, Jean Joufre of Tignac of the parish of Unac, having been cited on the crime of heresy this year¹⁰² 18 August by . . . Lord Jacques, by grace of God bishop of Pamiers, and having appeared before him judically at the priory of Unac, having refused to say the truth after his oath, and was therefore adjourned to the morrow of the feast of St. Michael in September, on which day he did not trouble himself to appear, nor afterward troubled himself to appear, was cited by the said Lord Bishop to appear on the present day before him in the chambers of the see of the bishop of Pamiers, and placed in judgment, swore on the four Evangelists of God that he would say the simple and full truth on the said

I begin this section with a lengthy quotation of the familiar inquisitorial formula both to recall once again the framework which prompted and framed the words that followed; and to introduce, by way of Jean Joufre's contumacy, the theme of rebellion. However, the rebellion that interests me most is not Jean's initial failure to appear before the inquisitor, but a rebellion sited in narrative, in silence, and in the form of language pressed into use by the demands of confession. The rebellion eventually failed: the course of Jean's deposition charts the move from an initial tactic of resistance to an eventual capitulation to speak as the confessing subject. Once again, I am concerned not with celebrating a "heroic" stand against "the Inquisition," but with finding a productive way of reading the deposition.

Jean's deposition was delivered in three parts. He appeared first on 6 February 1322, and presented the inquisitor with two stories and one proverb, and thereafter refused to say anything: "After which the said Jean, although frequently requested, refused to confess the full truth on what he had committed in the crime of heresy," and was imprisoned until 12 April.¹⁰⁴ On his release, he told more stories, including one which described his own close brush with Cathars, and provided several other items which touched on heresy. He appeared for a final time on 4 May, and confessed several instances of his own, personal belief, dealing with the nature of animals, the salvation of infants, and the conduct of sex.¹⁰⁵ On 5 July 1322 he was condemned to strict imprisonment, and his eventual fate is unknown.¹⁰⁶ Jean's depositions show a path of resistance, slowly weakening, against the demand to speak as one "confessing"; he narrates tales, irritates the inquisitors, uses the structure of recounting events to enunciate insults against Fournier, but finally finds himself speaking about what he himself believed.

The stories from Jean's first interrogation are worth recounting in detail, simply to illustrate how the tone differs from the normal pattern of confession. The first is a kind of vernacular *exemplum*, illustrating the guile of a Cathar. Jean introduces it as being told to him by Arnaud Laufre de Tignac, though Arnaud's presence operates more as an authoritative figure of oral transmission than as an accusation against the man. Jean said that he could not remember "the year or the day or the place" that he heard it from Arnaud; and the story itself is similarly set adrift in time. Arnaud told him of a certain heretic who carried a sword. Jean asked him why the heretic did this, since he could not defend himself with it, or kill any animal: "Arnaud replied that if anyone threatened the heretic, the said heretic would draw the sword and say 'If you approach me, you will die!' the said heretic meaning not that he would kill with the sword the one who wanted to attack him, but that the attacker would die one day." Duvernoy footnotes this tale with references to the heretical practice of the "pious fraud," which was allegedly condoned by both Cathars and Waldensians in order to escape inquisitorial questions.¹⁰⁷ This may be a useful context in which to view the story, although the mendacity of

heretics is a difficult area to approach empirically, since Bernard Gui made such a feature of it in his *Practica*. It is possible that in beginning his deposition with such a story, Jean was setting out to undermine the possibility that he would confess “the full and plain truth.” It also uses the image of the heretic in a much simpler tradition of cunning and wordplay, a tradition exemplified by the tales of Renart the Fox, which originated in France but were popular throughout Europe. The story of how Renart, trapped in a well, tricked the wolf Sigrim into taking his place by pretending that he was a ghost and enjoying paradise, might be read as turning “pious fraud” into “fraudulent piety.”¹⁰⁸ Similarly, Jean’s story depends upon irony and implied reversal.

The second story operates similarly, and again is attributed to Arnaud Laufre, though this time the heretic is named as Guillaume Autier, fixing the tale in a contemporary setting. Arnaud told him that Guillaume and some companions once went to the banks of the Ariège; Guillaume carried a stone and a piece of fish. The heretic wagered the fish to one of his companions, betting that the companion could not throw the stone into the water. The bet accepted, Guillaume quickly threw the stone into the river himself, “and thus the wager was won by the said heretic, because the said companion [could not] have the stone, because the stone had been thrown into the water.”¹⁰⁹ If the “wit” falls a little flat, I wonder if one might ascribe that to intention, rather than medieval humor: that Jean was deliberately talking nonsense at this point.¹¹⁰ Jean’s first interview ends with a brief homily, told to him by the late Alazaïs Guillaumar of Tignac, who had heard it herself from the heretics she received in her *domus*— “you should not grow grass in another’s field, and if moreover you grow grass in your own field, you should not throw it into the field of another” (*non faceret erbam in alienis campis, et si etiam fecisset in proprio campo quod illam erbam non prohiceret in campum alterius*).¹¹¹ Although this advice might be taken in several different ways, one possibility must certainly be to warn people against concerning themselves in other’s affairs, for at that point Jean lapsed into stubborn silence. All three items indicate above all else the possibility of contextualizing and hence “understanding” Cathars in idioms foreign to the Inquisition. As the increasing number of denunciations and suspicions represented in the later records of inquisition undoubtedly show, the inquisitorial framework for interpreting heresy and Catharism had permeated the discourses of the laity. Jean’s tales oppose the inquisitorial framework with narratives that contextualize the Cathars within the tradition of cunning and jokes.

Jean’s second interview indicates how this refusal to fit into the inquisitorial narrative framework was difficult to sustain under their questioning. His stories acquire more specific introductions to time and place: “He said that, as he saw it, two years ago, but otherwise he does not remember the time, the witness was at Ax with Arnaud Laufre of Tignac, and it seemed to him that they were in the tavern of Bernard Pellicier of Ax”; “Item, he said

that twenty years ago or more, he and Arnaud Laufre went from Tignac to Tarascon to buy grain”; “Item he said that three years ago next Lent, the Lord Bishop of Pamiers [i.e., Fournier] came to reconcile the church of Ax which had been polluted by blood.”¹¹² Although a certain vernacular idiom is preserved, information was supplied that the inquisitors could fit into their systems of categorization: Jean tells a rambling story of buying grain with Arnaud Laufre from a woman in the square at Tarascon. She gave Arnaud an extra measure, which Jean questioned. The woman replied “ ‘*Dicitur: a totas gens fay be, for maiorment en aqueli de la fe*’ (that is, do good to all men, but most to those who are of the faith).”¹¹³ Arnaud revealed to Jean that the woman had been imprisoned with Arnaud’s father at Carcassonne. Although Jean presented a vernacular element in this tale, and expressed a social understanding of the implications of (Cathar) faith and allegiance, he was now also supplying information that confirmed heretical contact on the part of others.

However, despite his readiness to fill in more details, some of the items he presented in this second interview still looked very much like jocular *exempla*, and can be read in some instances as further, vernacular interpretations of Catharism, and even at points as mocking criticism of Fournier, legitimated by the very context of confession. Another tale Arnaud told him concerned two Cathars who freed a squirrel from a snare; the heretics then took care to leave money to the value of the squirrel in the snare, knowing that the man who set it depended upon it for his livelihood: “This told, the said Arnaud said to the witness, ‘You would not have been in a hurry to do that yourself,’ and he replied that he would greatly miss his money if he had put it in the snare.”¹¹⁴ Again, Jean’s tale (or Arnaud’s tale, if one prefers) places the Cathars and their beliefs within a vernacular, social framework. They are exemplars of good social behavior, understood to be better than that expected of the laity; and most interestingly, their beliefs are negotiated in a way that does not interfere harmfully with the exigencies of everyday life. This effort to ensure that morality did not harm economic survival was in stark contrast with the demands of the orthodox Church for tithes, a significant matter to those who had been excommunicated by Fournier for failing to pay the tithe on sheep.¹¹⁵

Jean also presented four items that mocked or opposed the behavior of the clergy, and Fournier in particular. In each case he was careful to ascribe the statements to Arnaud. Firstly he deposed that Arnaud had spoken about how Bishop Fournier had reconsecrated the church at Ax, reporting that the bishop had placed a fistful of salt in a wine barrel that was half full of water, and had then sprinkled the water on the church with a stick;

and he [Arnaud] said this derisively, as it seemed to the witness. And when the witness said to him that it was indeed right that the lord bishop had said the good words in the said church, the said Arnaud replied “Oh yes, for his payment the lord bishop wants twenty pounds Tournois, and those from Ax would willingly give him fifteen!”¹¹⁶

The themes of money and mockery reappear in the next items. Arnaud, Jean, Bernard Lorca of Foix, and a cleric called Guillaume had been talking of the dispute Fournier had with the laity over the tenths and firsts. Bernard Lorca was the “procurator” for the laity, and Arnaud admonished him,

“Lord Bernard, see that you do not fish from two banks,” (meaning that he should not take a fee from both the clerics and from us), “and take good cause . . . that the clerics have nothing from us that they ask. I wish that all the clerics in the world were hung by the throat, because they do nothing to us except bad, and always seek our badness, and this will not be held back from saying,” as he said, “because of the presence of Guillaume.”

In more mocking terms, Arnaud spoke in the square at Tignac about the late Raymond Donat, priest of the church of Vaychis, saying that “when he sprinkles holy water he says ‘*mehe mehe*’ and thereby he spoke just as a sheep when it bleats.” Finally, Arnaud also derided the clergy generally when they sung the mass, saying that “the clerics said ‘Ho ho ho’ and cried when they could, and added that he did not know what the point was of the said song of the clerics and priests.” In the last two cases, the learned language of the Church is placed in deliberate contrast to the lay vernacular; Latin is compared to the speech of animals, or incoherent sounds, to invert the usual hierarchy of Latin/Occitan.¹¹⁷

Superficially, all four items were accusations against Arnaud; however, they also afforded the opportunity to express such ribaldry to the very face of the bishop who had irritated the laity of the Sabarthès. And this was a point not missed by the inquisitor, who took the fairly unusual step of questioning Jean closely on what he had thought himself of these statements (a line of confession the stories had perhaps been designed to avoid):

Asked if when he heard Arnaud Laufre say these errors he reprimanded him, he said no, but that he and the others laughed a lot. Asked if it pleased him when he heard the aforesaid heretical words from Arnaud, he replied that it did not please him, although he had laughed at it. Asked if he had revealed any of the aforesaid to a bishop, inquisitor, or priest, he replied that he had not.¹¹⁸

Several interesting points come out of this interrogation. One, though perhaps a product of wishful thinking on my part, is that Jean’s tales seemed to have annoyed the inquisitor. More importantly, we can see a contest between the context and reception of Arnaud’s words—the square, laughter, and a communal expression of anticlericalism—as against the inquisitor’s identification of the words as “heretical” (which, strictly speaking, was not really true), in need of reprimand, and as something which should be *confessed*. In Arnaud’s discourse, the meaning of the words was negotiable, playful, multiform; in the Inquisition’s discourse, their meaning had to be determined, categorized, and fixed.

Jean’s final attempt to enunciate a vernacular understanding of Catharism concerned his own closest contact with, but eventual rejection of, the heretics. He introduced the item with an affirmation of the joys and benefits of baptism and having godchildren, thus establishing what he hoped were his own orthodox credentials:

Twenty years ago . . . the witness came to Ax, and to a certain *domus* which now belongs to Lord

Raymond Macoul, priest of Unac, in which *domus* the witness kept corn, which was sometimes sold for him by Raymond Vaissière of Ax, and found there the said Raymond, and among other things . . . the witness said that it was a great reward [*merces*] to him who made godchildren and made infants [into] Christians, because, as he said, when they were baptized they had more beautiful flesh and better faces than they had had before baptism, and moreover that if they died before baptism he believed them lost, whereas if they died after baptism they went straight to the Lord.¹¹⁹

Duvernoy glosses Jean's introduction to his tale as a belief in the "magical efficacy" of baptism, and cross-references the beliefs of Jean Rocas on this sacrament, presumably only because Rocas is another "odd" thinker.¹²⁰ One can find perfectly orthodox references in medieval culture to the miraculous impact of baptism, and therefore the desire to identify the two Jeans as part of a subculture of unorthodox belief says more about Duvernoy's ideas on the communication of faith than it does about modes of medieval belief.¹²¹ In fact, I think that one should probably read Jean's statement as figurative, but essentially as an assertion of orthodoxy in contrast to the various stories the Cathar Autiers told against baptism (for example, that the cold water could kill infants).¹²² The orthodox assertion was needed to distance Jean from what Raymond said next: that baptism was useless, and that God loved unbaptized children just as much as baptized ones; and indeed that God loved Saracens and Jews just as Christians. In fact, said Raymond, from one hundred men not one is saved except through the faith of the heretics; indeed, men could not otherwise be saved. Jean—not unreasonably, he suggests—desired to see the heretics; Raymond agreed to show them to him,

and immediately that these words were said, the witness remembered, as he said, certain words that he had heard from his father, who had said to him that there was no sickness [*infirmity*] as bad as the fact of heresy, even the illness of leprosy, because once heresy was in the *domus* it was difficult to expel it even after four generations, and maybe never. And from this he left Raymond.¹²³

He then told his cousin Raymond Sabatier what had been said; Sabatier reprimanded him, and told him to quickly go and confess. This Jean did, "to a certain *religiosus* in the church of Unac, who imposed a penance on him for the aforesaid, that he should fast on bread and water for one year on all Sundays, and on the four vigils of the Blessed Mary, and that he should say the Paternoster three times each day; which penance the witness, as he said, had completed."¹²⁴ If he had completed the penance (and the inquisitor was perhaps suspicious, hence the last "as he said") he could not legally be punished for what he had heard. What is more interesting about this last item is that Jean cites an orthodox image about heresy (that it is like disease, and particularly like leprosy) but in a way that effaces the authority of the Church in prohibiting contact with Cathars, and replaces it with vernacular, familial wisdom. If this is the closest Jean had yet come to "a confession"—in that the tale actually involved himself and his own judgments—it attempts to remain a remarkably hermetic confession, with the meaning, identity, and outcome all predetermined by the narrative: Jean is orthodox, heresy is met and rejected, penance is completed.

However, the drive towards inquisitorial confession was not to be completely escaped. At the end of that second interview, the inquisitors then

extrapolated every error from the stories, and read them back to Jean. He was then questioned if he ever believed any of the “articles” (as the various propositions had now become); he replied that he had not. The inquisitor pressed further:

Asked, if he never believed the errors, why he concealed them until now and refused to confess until he had been imprisoned for a long time, and concealed them against his oath, he said that he did not remember. Asked if he did not believe the errors why, after he had heard them, he had said, “From all of this, I wish to see the heretics!” he replied that he did not know why he said these words. Asked if he was pleased by the said blasphemy against the clerics and the song of the Church, *he replied that he did not know how to respond.* [my emphasis]¹²⁵

It is clear that the inquisitor, like myself, regarded Jean’s testimony as rebellious and as failing to conform to the correct pattern of a “confession.” After this performance Jean’s resources ran out; on his third and last appearance he confessed to his own beliefs, namely that it was a sin to kill animals without reason, that unbaptized children who died were nonetheless saved, that God loved (*diligere*) Jews and Saracens just as Christians,¹²⁶ that the heretics could save men, that God did not make wolves, snakes, “or other venomous creatures,” and that it was no sin to have sex with a woman, as long as you were not related and it pleased her; indeed, that if a woman wanted to have sex, even if she was married, it was a sin *not* to have sex with her, as long as her husband remained ignorant.¹²⁷ Although these beliefs were unusual enough to be interesting in themselves, the Inquisition was now able to contextualize them within its familiar framework of heresy: he was asked who “taught” (*docere*) him beliefs,¹²⁸ who else had repeated these errors, and if he had instructed anyone else on them, and particularly who taught him that God did not make venomous animals because they were bad and God would not make bad things.¹²⁹ On this last point one can see the inquisitors attempting to read a Cathar agenda behind Jean’s beliefs;¹³⁰ Jean insisted that no one taught him this, “but he came to it himself.” Eventually he abjured his beliefs, and on 2 July 1322 confirmed the accuracy of his depositions. Three days later he was in chains, eating bread and water.

Jean’s punishment was unusually harsh for someone who had never actually met a Cathar, had never taught anyone to believe in his errors, and who spent most of his time reporting the sayings of others rather than himself. Undoubtedly part of what condemned him was his original contumacy and refusal to speak. However, I think one can also diagnose a degree of concern on the part of the Inquisition over the tactic Jean semi-successfully employed to avoid fitting into their discourse. Jean’s tactic, though gradually weakened over his three interviews, was to try to find a way to fulfill the command to “speak,” and yet avoid the command to “confess.” By “confess,” I do not simply mean that he tried to elide any material that incriminated himself; in fact, his reporting of Arnaud’s stories did incriminate him, as the inquisitor’s questions on his reactions to them illustrate. What Jean was eluding was the demand to speak not “about oneself” but “of oneself”; instead he presented narratives that told of heretics, but which contextualized them in ways foreign

to inquisition, that denied any responsibility on the part of the teller for the tale, and that even insulted or poked fun at the interrogator himself. Finally Jean was interpellated as a “confessing subject,” but his tactic of resistance was successful enough to ensure that the machinery of inquisition silenced him in a very thorough manner, if not indeed forever.

Critical and Effective Histories

*Béatrice de Lagleize and the Possibility of (Auto)biography*¹³¹

On 19 June 1320, Guillaume Roussel of Dalou gave evidence to the Inquisition that he had heard Béatrice, widow of Othon de Lagleize of Dalou, say that “if God is in the sacrament of the altar, how is it that he allows himself to be eaten by priests?” On the same day, Guillaume de Montaut, parish priest of Dalou, deposed that Béatrice never went to church, and that he had heard her say, “You believe that that which the priests hold in the sacrament of the altar is the body of the Lord? Certainly, if it was the body of the Lord, and it was as big as that mountain (indicating the mountain called Margail) all the priests would have eaten it by now!”¹³² These accusations were enough to have Béatrice called before Bishop Fournier as strongly suspect of heresy. Initially she said little, and Fournier assigned another day for her to appear; however, Béatrice took fright and ran, but was quickly captured along with her lover, a priest called Barthélemy Amilhac. Over the course of eight interrogations (and a further three from Barthélemy), Béatrice confessed what she knew of heresy, which was not all that much. What she also confessed (and Barthélemy complemented) were elements of her life, and in particular her love life. Below I will analyze elements of her deposition in detail, but it would seem helpful to begin by briefly repeating the essence of what she said. In fact, I have a great desire to relate the narrative of her life, as far as we know it. Reflecting on this wish for the (auto)biographical Beatrice—the problematic desire to reclaim a subaltern subject from the silence of death—is at the heart of what I have to say.¹³³

Béatrice was born into the lower nobility around 1266, daughter of the knight Philippe de Planissoles.¹³⁴ She lived as a young girl in Sellis, where she heard a certain man called Oudin say that “if the Host was as big as *le Pech de Boulque*” it would have already been eaten by now. Six years later she was in Montaillou, where she married her first husband Bérenger de Roquefort, chat-elain of the village. In Montaillou she was wooed unsuccessfully by Raymond Roussel of Prades, her husband’s steward, who tried to persuade her to run away with him to the Cathars in Lombardy, but fell out of her favor when he entered her bed uninvited. Around 1298 she was raped by Raymond Clergue, also known as Pathau, in the *castrum* of Montaillou, and when her husband died later that year Pathau “held her publicly” as his mistress.¹³⁵ Not long after however, she was seduced by the

parish priest (and Pathau's cousin) Pierre Clergue. He made advances to her when she came to confess during Lent, and continued to petition her over Easter. Initially she held back, telling him that she would rather sleep with four men than a priest, because she "had heard it said that no woman who was known carnally by a priest could see the Face of God," but Pierre told her that it was as much a sin to sleep with one man as another (a belief he ascribed to the Cathars, along with various other tenets which he told her) and eventually, on the octave of the feast of St. Peter and St. Paul, Béatrice went to bed with him.¹³⁶

The affair lasted for about two years, until in 1301 she left the mountains and went to Crampagna in the lowlands to marry her second husband Othon de Lagleize, although she and Pierre managed one adulterous tryst, in the cellar of her *domus*, with her maid keeping watch. In 1308 Béatrice was living in Varilhes and was gravely ill. Pierre Clergue visited her as an old friend, but also to extol the benefits of the Cathar *consolamentum*. However, she recovered and outlived her second husband. In 1316 she began an affair with the younger priest Barthélemy Amilhac, who ran a class which her daughters attended. She returned with Barthélemy to his home town of Lladros, in Catalonia, where it was accepted that priests could keep concubines as if they were wives; indeed, Béatrice and Barthélemy had a notary draw up a contract that married them in all but name.¹³⁷ And there they lived for a year, although they argued about her past contact with heresy. Then Béatrice heard from the notary of Varilhes that Bishop Fournier had cited her for questioning. Barthélemy told her that she had to go and so she did. Having run from the Inquisition after the first interview, they met up again in secret. Béatrice told her lover that Fournier "had received her gravely .. and said to her that she was accused of heresy before him," and that when she had denied this, the bishop had told her that her father had been a great heretic, and that "bad trees bear bad fruit."¹³⁸ Others had advised her to flee the country, but Barthélemy argued against it. She wanted to run to Limoux with him, but he forbade it. That night they slept together again; in the morning he told her that he would go with her, "but this he did not promise from his heart but only from a desire to evade [*subterfugere*], because when they were in the middle of the road and he wished to leave her, she, weeping, asked him to go with her all the way to Mas-Saintes-Puelles; and from pity for her, as he said, he went with her as far as the said place . . . and when he was there, left her and returned to Mézerville." She was, however, quickly captured. On 8 March 1321 both Béatrice and Barthélemy were sentenced to prison. On 4 July 1322, she was released to wear the crosses; Barthélemy had his sentence commuted to simple penance.¹³⁹

A quick glance at my endnote references will show that Béatrice's story is told jointly by Béatrice and Barthélemy, and that there is a great deal of other material in Béatrice's deposition that I have not yet mentioned. Much of that material relates to things she was told about the Cathars by Raymond Roussel

and Pierre Clergue, although some of the other detail concerns more personal areas such as contraception, sexual conduct, and love magic. Indeed, there is such a wealth of interesting material for the historian that it is tempting to elide the process by which it arrived in the record, and to forget in particular that although other depositions in the Fournier register provide personal material, none exceeds the detail of Béatrice's confession, and most do not come close. In this case I do not argue that the Inquisition alone frames and dictates most of what is written; I would rather explore the possibility that Béatrice (and Barthélemy) took the injunction "to confess" to apply not simply to contact with heresy, but to be a demand or invitation to talk about Béatrice as a discrete subject. In this section, therefore, I am going to largely ignore what Béatrice had to say about Cathar beliefs, and instead try to contextualize what she confessed on the topics of sexuality and spirituality.¹⁴⁰ Béatrice's deposition, I will suggest, does not reflect a self prior to the text, but is better understood as a textual performance of subjectivity within various sexual and spiritual discourses. Her deposition can in fact be read as a narrative that seeks to ease the tensions between sexuality and spirituality.

We will therefore examine the possibility that Béatrice (and Barthélemy) confessed on the subject of "Béatrice," and try to unpick what the implications might be of that (auto) biographical move. The point of this approach is not to try to argue that Béatrice's deposition *is* autobiographical. My reasons for invoking the trope of autobiography are that our immediate reaction to Béatrice's story is much like our immediate reaction to life-writing: here is a self producing a text about a self. My aim is to explore the politics and ethics of that reaction. I wish to show why Béatrice's deposition cannot be counted as strictly autobiographical: as we will see, there is no narrating "I" or self exterior to the text that is stabilized by the autobiographical narrative. However, the force of this analysis is not to undermine the authority of Béatrice's narrative-of-the-self in contrast to a supposed stability of a "properly" autobiographical self, since various critiques of autobiography (invoked below) have similarly shown that autobiographical stability to be another fiction. At the final turn, my conjunction of Béatrice and autobiography aims to provoke reflection upon our *own* investment in the figure of the self exterior to the text. It is this investment (which is not "wrong" or "right," but perhaps a site of danger to be negotiated) that lies at the heart of the ethical question of our treatment of the evidence.

What Béatrice had to say about her sexual practices and life was extremely detailed. It should not, however, be read solely as a medieval version of the Hite Report, since it is in the proper sense a "confession": that is, Béatrice's account of her sexuality is informed by an interior sense of morality. The question of morality could appear in different ways: at times, her sexual contact is the context within which she heard heretical words and opinions

from her lover Pierre Clergue and her suitor Raymond Roussel. At other points there is a concern over the moral economy of sin, as for example when Pierre Clergue first wooed Béatrice although she had slept with his cousin Pathau, which meant that they would therefore be technically committing incest. Lastly, there is a level at which Béatrice's concern over sexual morality is intimately connected to her views on spirituality. The latter two directions of moral concern are enunciated within wider social and discursive contexts. In sketching out some of these contexts, we can thus analyze how Béatrice's depositions negotiate them.

Sexual acts are described in the Latin of the depositions as male action and female reception. The most common term is "to know carnally": *dictus sacerdos eam cognosceret carnaliter*.¹⁴¹ On the surface this follows the expected pattern of male dominance, and male control of the sexual act is reinforced by two further items: Pathau's rape of Béatrice, where he is said to have "overwhelmed her by force . . . and knew her carnally";¹⁴² and Pierre Clergue's control of the contraceptive device he and Béatrice used. Béatrice had expressed concern to Clergue about the scandal which would occur if she became pregnant; the priest told her not to worry, because he had a certain herb which, if used, meant that "the man could not generate nor the woman conceive." Béatrice explained to the inquisitor that

from then, when he wished to know the witness carnally, he carried a certain thing wrapped and bound in flaxen cloth, the width and length of an ounce, or the first phalange of the little finger of the witness, and he had a certain long thread which he placed around her neck when he mingled [*commiscere*] with her, and the said thing that he said was a herb, hanging on the thread, descended between her breasts and stayed in the orifice of the stomach of the witness, and he always placed the said thing thus when he wished to know her carnally, which stayed around the neck of the witness until the said priest wished to arise, and when he wished to arise the said priest took the said thing from her neck. . . . And, as she said, she asked the said priest that he give her the said herb, to which he replied that he would not do this because, as he said, she could unite with another man, and not be impregnated by him, if she carried the said herb, and because of this . . . he refused to give her the said herb, as she said. And, as she said, the said priest did this primarily because of Raymond Clergue, also called Pathau, who first held her before the said priest . . . had had her, because the aforesaid pair were jealous of her.¹⁴³

Pierre Clergue was the dominant actor in these sexual situations.¹⁴⁴ However, Béatrice is not presented as wholly passive: she is the one who prompts the use of a contraceptive, and she questions Clergue closely on its workings;¹⁴⁵ the verbs "to mingle" and "to unite with" (*commiscere*, *coniungere*) are used, and do not place man as the subject and woman as the object; and her rape by Pathau might be placed against her spirited ejection of Raymond Roussel from her bed, whom she calls *rusticus*, and says that if she were not worried about her husband's reaction she would have him thrown immediately into the *oubliette*.¹⁴⁶

In addition to this medieval construction of the sexual act as male activity and female passivity, there was also, of course, wider discussion about the morality of sexual liaison outside marriage, and in particular the woman's role in this. Le Roy Ladurie draws explicit comparison between Béatrice's adultery and the discourse of courtly love: "Béatrice belonged in the direct

line of the boldest lady-loves in Languedoc literature and Languedoc life.”¹⁴⁷ One might read this cultural context into Béatrice’s actions; one could also juxtapose the trope of the randy cleric found in various medieval fabliaux.¹⁴⁸ What is undoubtedly present in the depositions is the concept of sexual shame and honor: Béatrice tells Clergue that if he impregnates her, she would be “confused and lost.”¹⁴⁹ When Raymond Roussel tries to tempt her into going with him to Lombardy, she says that they would have to have two or three “good women” accompany them so that people would not think they had left the land because of the excess of their lust.¹⁵⁰ Pierre Clergue admits that he would not wish to impregnate her while her father was alive, since he would be much ashamed of her (although Pierre was keen to have a child with her, he said, once her father had died). Most explicitly, from the deposition of Barthélemy Amilhac, we learn that the priest of Dalou had called her a whore and someone who would not refuse anyone who wanted to have her.¹⁵¹

Béatrice herself is more precise in defining the circumstances in which she describes her fornication as a “sin.”¹⁵² She does not describe it thus when she first sleeps with Pierre Clergue, although she does specify that they were enthusiastic lovers: “he went to her three or four times a week, and lay with her at night in a certain *domus* which he had next to the *castrum* of Montaillou.” She does however describe their “commingling” as a “sin” in specific contexts: when it was adulterous; when Clergue slept with her and then celebrated the mass without first confessing his sin, and similarly when they slept together on Christmas Day; and when Clergue made up a bed for them both in the parish church, which she questioned, and called “a great sin,” but eventually agreed to use.¹⁵³ It would seem that for Béatrice sex occupied a difficult relationship to the spiritual. She castigated Raymond Roussel when he entered her bed: “Now I well see that your words which pretended we should go to the Good Christians were not said by you for this, but only to have me and know me carnally.” When Clergue wished to sleep with her on Christmas Day, she said to him, “And how, on this sacred night, can you wish to do such a great sin?” These concerns are expressed most resonantly in the objection she first offered to Clergue: that she would rather sleep with four other men than him, because she had heard it said that a woman who slept with a priest could never see the Face of God.¹⁵⁴ And yet she did sleep with him, and later slept with Barthélemy, another priest.

The phrase “to see the Face of God” perhaps alludes to the theological discussion of how the saints will apprehend God after death.¹⁵⁵ St. Augustine discusses the exegesis of the relevant passages in his *City of God*, explaining that “the face” of God is not to be taken as naming a corporeal part of the Deity, but as representing the revelation of his love; and that although we shall certainly be in our resurrected bodies when we behold him, we will actually be “seeing” him spiritually and not with our senses.¹⁵⁶ It is unlikely that Béatrice had come across this reference directly, since there is no evidence that she was literate (although her daughters were being taught to

read by Barthélemy); and she specifies that “she had heard it said” rather than that she had read it. Augustine is not the source of her concerns, but Augustine’s exegesis underlines the elements at stake: the separation of body and spirit, and the spiritual problematization of the corporeal. There was a great deal of medieval discussion over the relationship between the corporeal and the spiritual; between sexuality and spirituality, particularly women’s sexuality and spirituality. Women were often presented as sexual lures who sought to prevent men attaining their spiritual goals: for example, Jacobus de Voragine includes two stories in *The Golden Legend* that demonstrate Bernard of Clairvaux’s holiness when assailed by lustful women.¹⁵⁷ Barthélemy Amilhac presents Béatrice’s advances in just such a light, emphasizing that “the first time was instigated by her” (and continuing, in the same item, to recount that Guillaume Montaut had declared her a whore). Béatrice is also located within a misogynist discourse of sin and danger at the end of her confession, when the inquisitors questioned her closely on certain objects found upon her when captured, which they believed to be designed for magic (*maleficium*). Among them was a cloth stained with blood. Béatrice explained that a certain woman, a Christian convert from Judaism, had told her that she could make a love potion from the first menstrual flow of her daughter Philippa, which could be used to secure a husband for the daughter. In fact, Béatrice explained, although Philippa had found a man she wished to marry, Béatrice was not going to administer the potion yet, “because she knew that this would be better done once the husband of the said Philippa knew her carnally.” Both the inquisitorial questions and, in a more subtle fashion, Béatrice’s explanation, relate to the female powers of sexual entrapment.¹⁵⁸

Stephen Nichols has analyzed in detail the medieval relationship between reason and bodily sensation (including sexual sensation). He suggests that women in particular attempted to emphasize interconnections between sensuality and spirituality, and to argue that the sensual element was essential for a full spiritual life. In the letters of Heloise, in the *lais* of Marie de France, and in the letters of the nun Constance at Le Ronceray to a monk called Baudri of Bourgueil, Nichols argues that one can find a specifically feminine rhetoric that attempts to assert the necessity of the conjoining of the bodily and the spiritual.¹⁵⁹ However, the three examples Nichols chooses all practice what he calls “an oxymoronic chaste sexuality.” This is not the case with Béatrice, as she explains in some detail. But Béatrice might also be placed in this context of attempting to legitimate sexual and spiritual activity. Her two lovers and one suitor were all men in a particular, privileged spiritual position: Raymond Roussel was planning (so he said) to become a Cathar *perfectus*; Pierre Clergue and Barthélemy Amilhac were both parish priests. In the narrative of the depositions, each man is associated with a kind of utopian vision that allowed sexual congress free from orthodox moral constraints, and yet preserved a spiritual element. Raymond Roussel, in trying to tempt Béatrice to the Cathars in Lombardy, emphasizes the abandonment of

family and family demands,

saying to her that God said that man [sic] should leave father, mother, wife, husband, sons, and daughters and follow him, and he would give them the kingdom of Heaven; and since the present life is brief, and the kingdom of Heaven eternal, it is better that a man should not trouble himself with the present life when he could have the kingdom of Heaven. And when the witness asked him “How can I leave my husband and children?” the said Raymond replied that the Lord had ordained this, as is said above, and moreover because it is better that a woman leave a husband and children whose eyes will rot, than if she leave He who lives for eternity and can give the kingdom of Heaven.¹⁶⁰

He goes on to tell Béatrice that the child she was carrying would be an angel if born among the Cathars.¹⁶¹ In this case, of course, Béatrice rejected Raymond’s sexual advances and, as I have mentioned above, was concerned that if she did go with him, people would assume that they were doing it from lust. But the utopia of Lombardy and Catharism did have some appeal, as she confessed to Barthélemy Amilhac some years later that had she stayed in the Sabarthès for another year, she would surely have gone to the Cathars.¹⁶²

Pierre Clergue expounded a different kind of utopia, or utopian way of life, that was supposedly based upon Cathar doctrine, and was basically a case of “do what thou wilt.” He persuaded Béatrice into bed, telling her that sex was no more sinful with one person than with another, that even incest could be justified on the ground of preserving the integrity of the *domus*, and that marriage meant nothing. Béatrice specifically states that it was “because of these words and many others” that she went to bed with the priest. However, she also indicates that she argued some points with him, one of which is extremely revealing: she asked how he, a priest, could deny the sacrament of marriage when it was the Church that said that “marriage was instituted by God, and that the first ordination was marriage, that ordination that was instituted by God between Adam and Eve, so that it was not a sin when they knew each other conjugally.”¹⁶³

It was the purifying aspect of marriage—or, perhaps, legitimate conjugality—that Béatrice sought in the third utopia, the one that she briefly brought into existence with Barthélemy in his home town of Lladros. In having a notary draw up a quasi-nuptial contract between them, which guaranteed the inheritance of both their heirs, Béatrice was perhaps attempting to make their illicit liaison not only permanent but socially acceptable. Barthélemy had explained to her that in Lladros, the clergy held concubines or mistresses “openly and publicly just as the laity did their wives.”¹⁶⁴ According to canon law they were practically married—except, of course, for the fact that Barthélemy was a member of the clergy. As James Brundage makes clear there was a strong distinction drawn between a prostitute, who fornicated without distinction like a dog, and a concubine, who was “united with a man in conjugal affection, but without legal formalities.”¹⁶⁵ The peculiarly liberal customs in Lladros permitted Béatrice to elude the label of “whore.” Given the possibility, noted by Dyan Elliott in a not dissimilar context, of the communal gaze becoming associated with the divine gaze, it perhaps also therefore allowed Béatrice to remain within the sight of God.¹⁶⁶

Having outlined some of the social discourses within which Béatrice's confession might be located, we can return to the suggestion that one might read her deposition not simply as a confession to the crime of heresy (though it certainly is that) but also as a confession on the subject of Béatrice. In placing this suggestion center stage, I would like to explore how the text that is authorized by a confessing subject named Béatrice *might* be read as an autobiography. Within the range of modern theoretical writing on the subject of autobiography, I want to explore two specific areas: the relationship between confession and autobiography; and the nature of the "self" constructed by life-writing.¹⁶⁷

Various writers have located confession at the heart of autobiography, and Augustine's *Confessions* as the notional "first" example of the genre.¹⁶⁸ Both the assertion of the centrality of confession and the (deconstructive) analysis of the *Confessions* are seen to have implications for the nature of the subject in autobiographical writing. Leigh Gilmore suggests that "identity emerges not as a thing in itself patiently awaiting the moment of revelation, but as the space from which confession issues." Following Foucault, she is keen to stress the productive effects of confessional discourse, where confessor and confessant are "enjoined in a mutually productive performance of truth-telling"; but also argues that the prime "truth-effect" of confession is the production of a stable, gendered identity.¹⁶⁹ This book has similarly seized upon Foucault's emphasis on the "productive" elements of power, and the (inquisitorial) confession as a site for the production of identity; and a written confession might therefore be described as a textual performance of identity. However, as both John Freccero and Robert Smith have pointed out, the act of confessing, or rather the *written* confession, must also produce a divided self. In his article on Augustine, Freccero shows how the *Confessions*, in narrating the progress from sinner to saved, constitutes a duality of Augustines: there is the character who sins, who is within the text (and, as Freccero points out, also within temporality); and the author who is saved, who is "outside" the text (and concomitantly outside temporality, since this beatific state will never change). Freccero extends the point: "The representation of the self in confessional literature involves a reduplication of the self, a separation between the self that was, and the self that is, who narrates the story."¹⁷⁰ In relation to inquisitorial confession, this calls up once more the question of the author: who is producing the text? If, as I have argued, one cannot unproblematically posit the deponent as "author," with all that that cultural sign entails, does this negate the possibility of reading the deposition as autobiography? Or does Freccero's deconstruction of Augustine free us to place the self within the text of the *Confessions* on a par with the self within the depositional text?

How might we assess Béatrice's suitability for inclusion within the autobiographical canon? Philip Barker, in his Foucauldian analysis of medieval life-writing, proffers a "check-list" of attributes that allow him to

recognize in Abelard's writing "a conception of the subject (*subject*) and interiority so far not usually found in contemporary documents of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries."¹⁷¹ These elements are as follows: a reflection on the meaning of events, rather than simply recounting them as a chronicle; a subject who is not mediated through God (as Augustine is) but through its own self-reflection; inclusion of only those events participated in by the subject; the avoidance of anagogical reference that would turn the life into an *exemplum*; a framework of ethics that poses the question, how did I become the subject I am?¹⁷² In Béatrice's case, as we will see, one might well claim that she qualifies in all categories. However, this does not so much imply that Béatrice is therefore an autobiographer, indeed the first female autobiographer to write in the vernacular French, as that one needs to question further the nature of the subject implied by autobiography.

Natalie Zemon Davis has shown that explorations of the self in the early modern period were dependent upon consciously establishing relations with other social groups or discourses: "Virtually all the occasions for talking or writing about the self involved a relationship: with God or God and one's confessor . . . or with one's family and lineage."¹⁷³ Within the field of autobiography Mary G. Mason has similarly suggested that, for women in particular, the autobiographical self is inscribed through relationships and that relationships permit the possibility of female life-writing: "the disclosure of female self is linked to the identification of some 'other' . . . this grounding of relation to the chosen other seems . . . to enable women to write openly about themselves."¹⁷⁴ In Mason's thesis the fragmentation and problematization of the self is recuperated as a space in which women could find a voice. The notion of finding a voice can perhaps return us to the matter in hand. Marginal female voices have often presented historians with the greatest methodological demands and frustrations.¹⁷⁵ Jo Ann McNamara, in her reading of "hostile sources," describes women's voices as "broken images" that only reach us through male-dominated sources, but which can nevertheless allow one to imagine the "whole and complex" subject behind them. This celebration of possibility recalls Mason (and Gilmore's assertion of the opportunity presented by confession), but ignores the danger of the historian thus colonizing the fragmented subject and reconstituting it to her own needs.¹⁷⁶ More cautiously, Peter Dronke notes that one cannot ever suggest that the historical subjects "speak for themselves, as if there were some attainable ideal of clinical neutrality." Nevertheless, Dronke, in his use of the female deponents from the Fournier register, does suggest that the records allow us to hear what these women thought, by looking "through" the "awkward Latin" to discover an individual "way of looking at things." Dronke also locates the deponents (though Béatrice is not among their number) in an autobiographical and aestheticized moment: "The thirteenth-century women speak in their own name . . . the beauty of their writing is bound up with their vulnerability."¹⁷⁷

What is it then about Béatrice's deposition that makes me want to invoke the mode of autobiography? And what are the questions that such an analytical move should provoke? The desire is perhaps engendered by the same quality that has prompted others to treat her deposition as an intimate and enticing entrance into her "life," from René Nelli to Le Roy Ladurie. Hers is one of the most interesting and tempting depositions, an account that seems to spring free of its setting. There is a danger in being seduced by the voice that we choose to perceive, and therefore perhaps being blinded to the circumstances that produced Béatrice's deposition; nevertheless, I think that one can analyze in greater detail why this deposition presents at least the specter of autobiography. The questions that are foremost in my mind during this analysis are: What kind of subject is Béatrice? From what position or volition does the text issue? And what does Béatrice's case tell us about our investment in the very concept of autobiography, in its promise of recoverable historical subjects? We can separate our analysis into four areas of materials supplied by the text: the personal details it provides; the manner in which moral and spiritual questions are contained within the narrative; the elements of what might be termed "thick description"; and Barthélemy's perception of Béatrice.

There are a variety of personal details that "flesh out" Béatrice's social and cultural position. She frequently makes reference to her marriages as a means of dating items: for example, that it was "twenty-one years ago or thereabouts, after her aforesaid husband had been dead for one year," that she went to the church of Montailhou wishing to confess her sins, and Pierre Clergue kissed her.¹⁷⁸ We also learn in passing that Béatrice was pregnant, that her daughter Philippa was looking for a husband, that she had acquitted herself of her dowry obligations after the death of her first husband, and that she made a candle called a *reteinte* to go in the church of St.-Marie-de-Carnesses, which both Duvernoy and Boyle point out was probably for purification after giving birth.¹⁷⁹ Béatrice also says of both her husbands that they were likely to be violently jealous if they suspected her of wrongdoing; and she notes that Pierre Clergue was a jealous lover.¹⁸⁰ Béatrice tells us of what might be three of the most significant events in her life: her rape by Pathau, her near fatal illness, and her love for Barthélemy Amilhac, which, despite the fact that she was past the menopause, was so strong that she believed he had cast a spell on her.¹⁸¹ Now, none of these personal details appears "innocently" in the record: the candle is used to introduce Pierre Clergue to the narrative, who went on to tell her many heresies; her pregnancy introduces a particular passage on Cathar belief ascribed to Raymond Roussel; and her illness is framed by the continuing pressure Clergue put her under to receive the good men. However, there is certainly much greater detail here than in any record from the preceding century; and there is also an element of Béatrice conducting her own defense through detail, a defense not against charges of heresy so much as against attacks on her honor. It mattered that her husband

Béranger was dead when Clergue first kissed her, because it mattered whether or not she was committing adultery or just fornication. It mattered too that she was deeply in love with Barthélemy, because this explained much of their actions together and her flight from the Inquisition.

This leads me to the second autobiographical strand: the relating of spiritual matters to the personal. As I have outlined above, Raymond Roussel's arguments for why Béatrice should accompany him to Lombardy centered on the familial and the personal. Béatrice's questions to him, which are presented as first-person direct speech, also relate to the familial—"Why should I leave my husband and children?"—but also to abstract questions: "Why is it that God made all men and women if many of them are not saved?"¹⁸² However, this theological point had its own personal implications for Béatrice, if we recall her other words on belief, and particularly her view that a woman who had slept with a priest could never see the Face of God. The narrative of Béatrice's life makes it clear that she is a sinner in her sexual conduct and reflections upon this possibility are presented in the text, albeit more often implicitly than explicitly. As well as her question to Roussel, we also find her asking Pierre Clergue how he could defame marriage, when God had first instituted it between Adam and Eve so that their sexual coupling was not sinful. Again, the theological had very personal implications when Béatrice was about to be engaged in sexual coupling herself, without the protection of matrimony. One might even tie into this elements of the narrative not directly presented as Béatrice's words: for example, the story Raymond Roussel told her of the two women, Alestra and Serena, who had painted themselves in cosmetics in order to go unrecognized, but were nonetheless captured and tried as heretics and condemned to the flames. Before being burnt they requested water to wash their faces, "saying that they would not go painted before God."¹⁸³ The recurrence of the theme of female sensuality and the prospect of God suggests that Béatrice recounted the tale to the inquisitors (a tale which contained no information on living heretics or heretical beliefs) because of its personal resonance and import; as with Natalie Zemon Davis' pardon seekers, Béatrice was using a story to help express something about her own position.¹⁸⁴ And in fact she also provided her own gloss on the story: she told Raymond Roussel that she thought it would have been better if they had relinquished heresy and avoided the fire.¹⁸⁵

The third autobiographical element is what might be termed "thick description" or "verisimilitude" in the text: the detailed descriptions of circumstance, the recording of minute observations, and the passages of direct speech that make Béatrice's deposition (along with other contemporary depositions) so attractive to historians and thus liable to be read as transparent texts. The depositions record, for example, Béatrice's reaction to Pierre Clergue's first, unsolicited kiss: she was stunned (*stupefacta*); how often they had sex; their contraceptive precautions; and the mechanics of the love potion made for her daughter.¹⁸⁶ To emphasize the historical change revealed by the

amount of detail recorded in the inquisitorial text, one can note the reply to the inquisitor's question as to why Béatrice had fled from them. In the thirteenth-century material, the answer would have been "from fear" or something similarly concise.¹⁸⁷ Béatrice in fact responded thus: "She replied that she had fled from fear which she had of the said Lord Bishop because of what she had committed in the said crime of heresy, and most of all because the same bishop, when she first appeared before him, denounced to her Philippe her father, who had been accused of the said crime." And she does not finish there, with this particular and personal gloss on the reasons for her fear: she continues for another six hundred words or so, detailing how she had fled to Barthélemy Amilhac, the conversations that had passed between them, and how she had promised her daughter Condors that she would return, and kissed her on her cheeks.¹⁸⁸ She further recounts all that she had been accused of, her subsequent argument with Barthélemy, and how she had eventually ended up at Mas-Sainte-Puelles, where the bishop's men had captured her.¹⁸⁹ These details are all, in their way, important to the confessional situation; but they are all only made comprehensible and necessary through the locus of Béatrice as an individual subject, as the point through which these narratives intersect, in a manner quite unknown to the previous century.

Similarly, the most passing items on heresy are reported from Béatrice's viewpoint. She spends (or is given) a large amount of space relating how she witnessed a slightly coded conversation between Adelaïde Maury and Gauzia Clergue. Rather than briefly explaining what was said, and what she understood by it (or answering the inquisitor's question "and what did the witness understand by it?"), the text expounds upon the conversation, Béatrice's initial incomprehension, her questioning of Adelaïde, Adelaïde's initial refusal to explain, and the eventual gloss—that a woman known to them had received the *consolamentum* on her deathbed and had gone into the *endura* for fifteen days.¹⁹⁰ The text does not simply record "what happened" in an abstract sense: it relates Béatrice's perceptions of what happened.

This intertwining of inquisition, personal history, and interiorized perception, all gathered together into the locus named "Béatrice," is perhaps best illustrated by the following vignette:

Item, she said that twelve years ago, when she the witness was gravely ill at Varilhes in the *domus* of Othon her aforesaid late husband, a certain day the said priest [Clergue] came to a synod at Pamiers and entered her *domus* to visit her, and when he was with her, he sat on the frame of the bed in which she lay and asked her how she was, stroking her hand and her arm; to which she replied that she indeed was gravely ill. And then he said to Béatrice, the late daughter of the witness, who was present, that she should leave the room, because he wished to speak secretly with the witness. And when the said Béatrice [the daughter] had left the room, the said priest asked her the state of her heart [*cuiusmodi cor habebat*], to which she replied that it was very feeble, and that she feared greatly the words which had been between him and her, meaning to speak of the aforesaid heretical words that the said priest had said to her; and, as she said, she was so afraid of the aforesaid words that she had not dared to confess these sins to other priests, fearing they would hold her faith suspect; to which the priest replied that she should not fear this, because God, who knew her sin, and who alone could absolve her sins, would release her from the said sin; and that it was not proper that she should confess the said sin to another

priest. And he said to her moreover that she should be well soon, and that when he went down to Pamiers he would see her and they would talk together of the aforesaid words. And this said he left her, and afterwards she did not see him, although the said priest sent her an engraved phial and some sugar.¹⁹¹

The item is prompted and recorded because of Béatrice's illness and Pierre Clergue's presence, which implied the possibility of her agreeing to receive the *consolamentum* (though not, of course, from Clergue himself). It also supplies details rendered through Béatrice's perceptions—Clergue sitting specifically on the frame of the bed, his hand on her arm—and reports the state of Béatrice's "interior": "gravely ill," "very feeble," and afraid. Although the import of her conversation with Clergue is heresy, its narrative rendering is implicitly personal, connected with their own, sexual history. There is no explicit commentary on the meaning of this, but one cannot escape reading the suggestive resonance of the last line: "he left her, and afterwards she did not see him, although the said priest sent her an engraved phial and some sugar." This is personal, in its reflection on past and future lives. However, the account of this subjectivity is not given by a narrating subject: even the reflection on her interior state, her fears about the heretical words, are presented as something she *said* to Clergue. Béatrice is never "exterior" to the narrative, except insofar as our investment in the idea of Béatrice places her beyond these written confines.

Barthélemy's deposition continues the presentation of Béatrice as a unitary subject with an interior. He does not simply report what she did or said in connection with heresy, but describes her reactions, her opinions and emotions. She tells him that she felt she would have joined the heretics if she had stayed in the Sabarthès. He reports her opinion that the clergy are now oath-breakers (*peiores*) because although God had ordained that they should not sin the sin of the flesh, "they greatly sin the said sin, and greatly want women just as other men." He tells of her flight from the Inquisition, not simply in terms of her actions, but also of her fear and her reaction to Fournier's questions. And he reports her tears at his betrayal of her trust and destruction of the utopia of living with him as his wife.¹⁹² So in a way the records conspire with our desire to read Béatrice as autobiographer, since her contemporaries also reacted to her life; but her "life" is split over two separate depositions, is prompted by an inquisitorial injunction to confess, and is full of lacunae. How, then, can I play with the idea of calling her an autobiographer?

Robert Smith notes that autobiography seeks, in the confessing of a sinful life, to establish a stable identity that lies "beyond" the closure of the text. However, "in making of that sin a story or history or narrative a boundary is set as to how completely it may be negated, for it remains re-tellable and reappropriable."¹⁹³ Béatrice undoubtedly makes a narrative of that sin; but the re-appropriability of that narrative is inscribed in its very structure, in the obvious context of controlled confession, and does not need a deconstructive critic to bring it to the fore. It is a narrative without closure, without the

“rounding off” of identity, since there is no meditation on attained salvation, just an implicit return to the desire for it. There is no narrating “I” in the deposition, no authorial voice framing or commenting on the events and emotions. Under these terms, Béatrice cannot be named as an autobiographer, in so far as “self-writing” assumes a subject exterior to the text.

But there is subject present in the deposition, an “I” who speaks: there is the “I” that declares to Raymond Roussel, “Now I well see that your words . . . were not said for this, but to have me and to know me carnally”; that dismisses Bernard Belot by saying, “Do not come here, because if you frequent my *domus*, immediately my husband will suspect some ill or dishonesty or other badness on my part!”; and that tells Pierre Clergue, “And what shall I do if I am impregnated by you? I shall be confused and lost!”¹⁹⁴ These moments of direct speech issue from a subject, but a subject clearly implicated in the social codes of feminine sexuality and spirituality outlined at the beginning of this section. It is this nexus of social discourses that grounds and narrates the story of Alesta and Serena, the story of the woman who could not leave her child, the concern for public honor and fear of her husband’s wrath, the sexual encounters in church and on Christmas Day, and the belief that a woman who sleeps with a priest will never see the Face of God.

Like Augustine, Béatrice produced a narrative of sexuality and salvation.¹⁹⁵ But unlike Augustine, there is no self-as-author “outside” the text, no split between an authorial self and a narrative self: Béatrice’s self only exists within the narrative, within sin and within history. Perhaps, therefore, Augustine’s “coherent” authorial position could be opposed to Béatrice’s fractured one, as a classic example of the unitary male voice contrasted to the splintered female voice. But Augustine’s “coherence” is a fiction, or rather a “truth claim” as Leigh Gilmore puts it, which can therefore be contested, as Smith and Freccero have done. Gilmore argues that an analysis of gender in relation to autobiography should be wary of reasserting the classic binary of male coherence and female incoherence.¹⁹⁶ So I would prefer to refuse the notion that Béatrice presents the familiar case of the “fractured” female voice. She is clearly a discontinuous subject, in the Foucauldian sense, constructed through discourses of femininity, sexuality, and spirituality; but the reasons for her discontinuity are primarily situated within the ideological terrain of literacy and orality, rather than a male-female binary opposition of authority.

Perhaps, therefore, one might read the very discontinuities of Beatrice’s “self” as a kind of assertion of agency. Gilmore concludes her study of autobiography by noting that “women find in confessional discourse a subject position that grants them the authority from which to make truth claims.” This subject position is not “free” but nonetheless has agency in that it allows the enunciation of “truth claims.”¹⁹⁷ Beatrice was brought to confession and interpellated as a confessing-subject. As Althusser describes interpellation, the crucial moment is not the “hailing” into discourse, but the raising of the hand that indicates acknowledgment on the part of the subject.¹⁹⁸ Béatrice

figuratively raises her hand in acknowledgment—in that she confesses—but uses her *own* gesture. She is interpellated primarily as a confessing-subject within the discourses of heresy and literacy; but she also speaks as one within the discourses of sexuality, spirituality, and self-determination. Clearly, she is also “interpellated” by these other discourses, in that what she says within them is not unfettered; but she uses the opportunity of inquisition to “confess” within multiple discourses. She does not refuse her position as a gendered, confessing-subject, but her speech, through its excessive detail and insistent interrogation of the ideological web that surrounds her, does elude a final closure of identity.

I fear that the inquisitorial project of categorization, the patriarchal affirmation of the “author-outside-the-text,” the historian’s pursuit of the “whole and complex subject,” and my own “desire” to retell Béatrice’s life are, if not synonymous, then at least coterminous. So what is the ethical response to Béatrice’s narrative? There is a danger of sliding into one of two undesirable positions: that Béatrice, in her discontinuous confession, represents the earliest example of *écriture féminine* (undesirable since it ignores Gilmore’s warning against the binary categorization of gendered writing); or that Béatrice is to be celebrated for her “unknowable mystique” (which would probably indicate more about my problematic investment in the allure of Béatrice than provide an analysis of the deponent). But maybe one can invoke the trope of “unknowability” without being reactionary: Béatrice shows us that the “whole and complex subject,” or the “real” historical actor, or the “voice” that speaks to us from the past, are, above all else, products of *our* desires. Let her therefore act as our own inquisitor, asking us why we *want* to discover or recover the autobiographical subject. This is not to say that we must deny ourselves the pleasure of speaking with the past (and I have just invoked Béatrice-the-inquisitor as a critical challenge to my own practices). But surely we must also allow each “voice” to have its reticence? The silences of the past might then act as a prompt and challenge to our negotiation of the relationship between self and other, and perhaps to the stability we effortlessly claim for our own selves and histories.

Arnaud de Verniolles and the Economies of Sodomy

It is tempting to conclude this book with the analysis of Béatrice’s deposition, so rich is her narrative. However, I have decided against this for two reasons. The first is that I did not want to finish with what might be misconstrued as a new “discovery of the individual,” as if the preceding analysis of subjectivity in the inquisitorial records were no more than a progression culminating in that modernist identity. It has been my intention to show the historical and discursive forces at work throughout the procedures of the Inquisition and the texts that they produced; and the progression of this book has not been to affirm the production of the modern subject, but to investigate the possibilities

of an ethical and critical position from which the historian can analyze that constructed subjectivity and voice. Consequently, my second reason is to pursue a different kind of critical reading. This last case study is not concerned with the possibilities of “autobiography,” but with a deconstruction of gender and sexuality.

The concept of gender that I address here is the by now familiar assertion that gender is not a natural or inescapable condition, but a construction of language and social practice—that is, a construction of discourse. But to say that gender is a discursive construction begs other questions: In whose service is it constructed? Is it constructed so firmly that it might as well be inescapably real? Is there any position of agency within discourse that can allow us to direct our negotiations of gender? And most importantly, can gender be disrupted, deconstructed, or otherwise opposed? One theorist who believes that gender not only can be disrupted, but indeed invites disruption, is Judith Buder. In her books *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies That Matter*, Buder argues that gender, sex, and sexuality take on the appearance of stability through constant and contingent reiteration; that they are not simply cultural constructions, but repeated citations of discontinuous moments of construction. In other words, Buder suggests, we are always “doing” gender over and over again in an attempt to make it the permanent and stable reality it always claims to be.¹⁹⁹ This analysis positively invites us to read these discontinuous moments back into gender, and thus to explode it as a hegemonic concept.

The man at the center of this section is one Arnaud de Verniolles, a thirty-two-year-old subdeacon of Pamiers, who is known to us through the inquisition depositions of witnesses against him, and his own confession, on crimes of heresy and sodomy.²⁰⁰ On 9 June 1323, Jean Ferrié, a student in liberal arts at Pamiers, came before the inquisitor Fournier, and alleged that Arnaud de Verniolles had offered to hear his confession, although Arnaud, as a lowly subdeacon, was not qualified for that task. On 13 June, three more witnesses were summoned—Guillaume Roux, Guillaume Bernard and Guillaume Boyer, all three between sixteen and eighteen years of age, all three also students at Pamiers. None of the three had been mentioned in the first deposition; therefore we must be aware that elements of the investigation were going on “outside the text,” as it were. The three confirmed the earlier allegation of heresy, and two of them—Guillaume Roux and Guillaume Bernard—further alleged that Arnaud had committed the crime of sodomy with them. At some point during the day Arnaud was taken into custody; on 23 June 1323 he made his own confession to the inquisitor. He admitted impersonating a priest and hearing confessions unlawfully, although he denied a charge that he had attempted to celebrate a mass. He also admitted the crime of sodomy, and offered various explanations and understandings of the sexual contact between the students and himself. Fournier felt that Arnaud was not telling the whole truth, and had him imprisoned for a year. On 2 June 1324, a

Friar Pierre Recort, who had shared Arnaud's cell for a space of time, gave evidence on what Arnaud had said to him about sodomy, sin, and confession.²⁰¹ Arnaud himself made a final confession on 1 August 1324, setting out again his beliefs and actions. He was found guilty of heresy, degraded from his ecclesiastical office, and sentenced to harsh imprisonment for the rest of his life.

These are the bare bones of the evidence. Arnaud's case is mentioned in several works on gay history in the Middle Ages: Jeffrey Richards briefly refers to him, noting that he was hypocritically condemned for heresy rather than sodomy and that he forms part of the medieval *topos* where same-sex activity was seen as taking place when there was an absence of women (i.e., among students and clerics) rather than as a natural inclination; John Boswell mentions him briefly as an example of how repression had grown stronger in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; and Michael Goodich translates his deposition into modern English, but offers little commentary.²⁰² Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie also discusses Arnaud at some length, noting again that the inquisitor had condemned him for heresy rather than sodomy, and otherwise makes remarks about Arnaud's sexuality that are at best naive and at worst offensive.²⁰³ It is perfectly possible to use Arnaud's case in the service of reclaiming a gay history of the Middle Ages, although that is not my purpose here. I am interested drawing out the different contexts and continuities within which "sodomy" is positioned by the competing discourses of inquisitor and deponent, to see what then happens to that medieval concept. We can find illumination by looking closely at what Arnaud, and the witnesses against him, said in detail; and by examining the different discourses that went into producing the inquisitorial text, and that allowed Arnaud to enter into the historical record.

As we have seen, inquisition was a mechanism for producing confessional narratives that could be interpreted to distribute subjects within a range of transgressive identities; at the same time, the closure of identity was held in abeyance by the heteroglossic nature of the record. In Arnaud's case, the question of identity is even more complicated, because the narrative deals with sodomy, "that utterly confused category" as Foucault called it.²⁰⁴ With *fautores*, *crecientes*, and *heretici* we have seen how contemporary texts were directed toward constituting these terms as stable identities. Sodomy is not the main subject of inquisitorial handbooks, and in fact there has been much modern, academic argument over whether or not "the sodomite" or some other notion of homosexual identity even existed in the medieval period. *Sodomitia*, it has been shown, could cover a variety of activities, from bestiality to same-sex contact between either men or women, or even heterosexual contact that used "unnatural"—but not necessarily anal—positions.²⁰⁵ John Boswell has argued that there was a "gay" subculture in the earlier middle ages with its own argot, and that the term "Ganymede" labeled a stable, homosexual identity. However, this was not a term

appropriated by “official” culture; and the subculture, Boswell argues, had been repressed by the fourteenth century.²⁰⁶ Others, following Foucault, have pointed out that “homosexual” is a term invented in the late nineteenth century, and argue that it should not be applied ahistorically, since it implies a particular kind of psychologized or pathologized basis for sexual identity.²⁰⁷

What we can note at this point is that there was a discourse that surrounded same-sex contact in the Middle Ages, even if only as part of a larger group under the sign *sodomitia*, and that by the fourteenth century this discourse condemned the activity most strongly as an offence “against nature”; although, as Vern Bullough points out, “nature” was a trope for ordering rhetoric, rather than an expression of empirical reality.²⁰⁸ Alain de Lille, for example, had defined *sodomitia* in the thirteenth century as “expending seed outside of its proper vessel,” and hence so against nature that “not even beasts did it.”²⁰⁹ The Inquisition primarily inquired into actions performed, and since its principal enemy was heresy rather than sexual transgression, had not developed its own nomenclature for this area of sin; therefore we do not find the noun *sodomita* in Arnaud’s deposition or in the sentence against him. However, one must be aware that other cultural discourses were possibly struggling towards this kind of identification: Albertus Magnus, for example, reputedly saw sodomy as comparable to a disease, and suggested a cure for it, which involved rubbing a compound (made from the fur of an Arabian animal called an *alzabo*, burned with pitch and then powdered) onto the anus of a *sodomita*.²¹⁰ Here we have a noun of identity, and a suggestion of anal sex as the basis for that identity. My concern here is not to argue whether or not Arnaud really was “a homosexual,” or whether he was viewed as such; in following Foucault, I am suggesting that categorized sexuality is not an a priori element of human identity, but one element that specific discourses can claim as the foundation of subjectivity.²¹¹ In the inquisitorial record, it is the interrogation of Arnaud’s sexual activities and their penitential meanings that interpellate him as a confessing subject. Following Butler, I suggest that Arnaud’s confession on his sexuality is framed within normative codes that are necessary to “make sense of” what he says; as I argue below, it is precisely the demand to obey these codes that makes Arnaud’s confession a transgression against the stability of “gender” and “sexual identity.”²¹²

So, with these framing elements in mind, let us turn to the texts, and see what they can tell us about gender, sexuality, and transgression. The evidence on sodomy comes from four different people: from the youths, Guillaume Roux and Guillaume Bernard, from the friar who shared Arnaud’s prison cell, and from Arnaud himself. Unsurprisingly there are contradictions between these accounts; mainly, as we shall see, they are contradictions between the youths and Arnaud over the question of consent. However, there are further contradictions, or tensions, both between and within the various accounts; and these tensions are largely left unresolved by the inquisitorial process. We might say, therefore, that there are competing conceptions of sodomy in the

records.

It is Arnaud who is the central sexual actor in these accounts. We are told of his sexual contact with Guillaume Roux, Guillaume Bernard, and with another unnamed youth; of sexual contact between Arnaud and one Arnaud Auriol, which happened when the former was ten or twelve years old; and of past heterosexual contact. The two Guilllaumes both present Arnaud as the dominant actor in their accounts. Guillaume Roux alleges that on two occasions Arnaud violently forced himself upon the boy; he also states that Arnaud was the instigator.²¹³ Guillaume Roux deposed that the sexual acts between himself and Arnaud had been mutual—that Arnaud had first sodomized him, and then he had sodomized Arnaud—but again stresses that this was at Arnaud’s request and instigation.²¹⁴ Arnaud himself claimed that this mutual activity had also been the case between himself and Guillaume Bernard; however, Bernard deposed that although Arnaud had wanted mutual intercourse, he Guillaume Bernard had refused.²¹⁵ Arnaud also confessed to one liaison with an unnamed youth, whom he sodomized; this time the act was not reciprocated, but Arnaud stresses that it was consensual, as he does for all of the sexual liaisons reported in his confession.²¹⁶

Both Guillaume Roux and Guillaume Bernard, then, deny any active role on their own parts. Guillaume Bernard denied ever taking the physically active role; Guillaume Roux admitted this, but presents it in a passive sense, as something Arnaud made him do. Arnaud, on the other hand, tries to erase questions of active and passive behavior in his contact with the youths. According to him, the sex they had was always mutual (or he had wanted it to be mutual), both in terms of physical actions and in terms of consent. In contrast, when describing his adolescent sexual contact with Arnaud Auriol, an older youth “who had already shaved his beard,” he makes it plain that he was the unwilling, passive victim. At the time that it happened, he was about ten or twelve years old, staying with other students at a school for grammar run by one Master Pons de Massabrac. Arnaud Auriol was one of the other lodgers, and shared a bed with Arnaud de Verniolles (a frequent and nonsexual practice at the time). The older boy waited until he thought Arnaud was asleep before using him sexually.²¹⁷

Possibly in parallel with these competing questions of activity and passivity, there is also a mapping of gender on to physical actions. The active male partner is described as “moving himself as if he had a thing with a woman,”²¹⁸ a phrase found in other depositions from Languedoc, describing male-female sexual contact.²¹⁹ Both Guillaume Roux and Guillaume Bernard describe Arnaud’s actions in this way (again, they seem to see their passivity as a protection rather than something shameful) and the phrase does not directly feminize their own position, but rather genders the active sexual act. Arnaud himself also describes the actions of Arnaud Auriol toward himself in this way; again the gendering is directed toward the act rather than the actor. Does it also invoke—in order to condemn—a notion of the “natural”

heterosexual act? That is, does describing the actions of one committing sodomy as “moving himself as if with a woman” emphasize the unnatural turn of his actions, where male-male sexual contact is an inversion of the “natural” order?

Friar Recort, Arnaud’s cellmate, tells of Arnaud’s vision of sexual morality. Arnaud, he said, thought that sodomy was a mortal sin, equal to simple fornication or fornication with prostitutes. However, Arnaud also thought that it would be a much greater sin “if a man lay on top of another man as if he was a woman, or the said sin was committed through the rear.”²²⁰ The latter statement can confirm for us that the kind of sex Arnaud practised was intercrural (that is, moving the penis between the legs of the partner) rather than anal.²²¹ The first part, however, poses interesting tensions: is the gendering of partners simply a question of position, so that two men lying side by side are not feminized, whereas one beneath another would be womanly, and therefore more sinful? Or is it a question of passivity: that for only one man to be used sexually, as women are used sexually, would be wrong—indeed, as wrong as if he was penetrated (as women are penetrated)? Arnaud seemed keen on the idea of mutual consent and activity, as I have mentioned above. He also took a position “on top” of his partners, however, which would mark the act as a worse sin following this concept. Behind these questions of gender, there is a further instability of course: how is it that a man could “mistake”—even through sinful choice—another man for a woman, and thus use him sexually in this way? How can male identity be so easily effaced, if sexual actions go into making up that identity?²²²

In fact, Arnaud invokes several different concepts of what is “natural” when explaining his actions. Guillaume Roux deposed that Arnaud showed him a book written in Latin—which Guillaume did not understand—and said that it contained decretals which said that “it was written that if a man plays with another man, and from the warmth of their bodies semen flows, it is not as grave a sin as if a man carnally knows a woman; because, so Arnaud said, nature demands this and a man is healthier as a result. And, as he said, he himself could not stay with either a man or a woman without semen flowing.”²²³ Desire here is a natural product of bodily warmth, regardless of the gender of that body; and the fulfilment of desire, regardless of its object, is natural too since it leaves the body healthier. But although natural, it is still sinful; but although sinful, not as grave a sin as fornication.

Similarly Arnaud himself deposed that he had told Guillaume Roux that “in some men nature demands that they perform that act [i.e., sodomy] or know women carnally; and, he said, that he very much felt in himself that his body would suffer if he should abstain for more than eight or fifteen days if he did not have sex with a woman or commit that crime with a man. Nor, he said, did he believe that he committed a greater sin by committing sodomy than by knowing a woman carnally.”²²⁴ Here, as above, sodomy is simply one outlet for natural lust; in this formulation the negotiation of the sexual act practically

avoids gender, although, of course, the sexual body in need of relief is by default male. But the combination of bodies does not gender them; the action is practically identical here if the recipient body is male or female. Sexual identity is based upon a level of desire—which in Arnaud was strong—rather than an object of desire.

Arnaud also deposes that when Arnaud Auriol slept with him, he himself did not enjoy the act because he was too young to feel *any* desire: “and, as he said, at that time he did not have the will or desire to commit that sin, for, as he said, he did not yet have such desires.”²²⁵ The “as he said” is an inquisitorial interjection, and usually indicates suspicion or disbelief about a witness’s statement. Possibly therefore the Inquisition believed that Arnaud had always been prone to this particular crime, and thus rejected Arnaud’s theory of polymorphous desire in favor of something like a stable “homosexual” identity. If they were suspicious of Arnaud’s suggestion of a period of life free from lust, the inquisitors were in opposition to contemporary medical opinion; but of course medical and religious discourses on sexuality could differ markedly.²²⁶ In fact, elsewhere Arnaud rejects his own argument about undifferentiated lust, in two different ways. The first is when Friar Recort deposed that Arnaud had explained to him why he only slept with men: it was, Arnaud said, because he had once caught some kind of disease from a prostitute, which had made his face swell up and made him fear that he had caught leprosy. As a result he had sworn only to use men as the objects of his desires, since they were safer.²²⁷ Gender therefore reappears in the economy of desire, this time predicated on notions of disease, infection, and danger, all traditionally, misogynistically female. The second rejection is when Arnaud was asked by the inquisitor “if he told anyone or believed that because his nature required him to satisfy his lust either with a man or a woman, it is not sinful to have relations with men or with women.” This question, in all probability, was designed to see if Arnaud believed in the tenet, frequently if probably erroneously ascribed to Cathar heretics, that since all sex is sinful, you might as well sleep with whomsoever you desire. We can see quite clearly here the Inquisition’s attempt to place Arnaud’s sodomy in a clear continuum with heresy. Arnaud in fact replied thus:

although he believed that his nature inclined him to the said sin of sodomy, however he always believed that sodomy was a mortal sin; thus however [he held] that sodomy was equal to the simple sin of fornication; and that the illicit deflowering of a virgin, adultery, and incest are greater sins, and in any case, [they are greater] than the sin of sodomy, [that is, of] men knowing carnally other men.²²⁸

Nature, in this instance, legitimates a particular kind of sexual act: although the progression of sins which Arnaud sets out establishes that sodomy is still in a kind of continuum with other lusts, Arnaud here indicates that his particular sin is sodomy. Does this example suggest a more firmly anchored “homosexual” identity? Possibly so, though one must return to the problems outlined above over the medieval multiplicities of sodomitical identities. Joan Cadden outlines the theories on this matter of Peter of Albano, one of the

writers we know to have dealt with anal sex in any detail.²²⁹ He described a group of men who took pleasure from anal penetration, explaining this on anatomical grounds: that their pores or channels that usually carried semen (and hence sexual pleasure) to the penis had become blocked or misdirected, making them more effeminate. Although Peter distinguished their sexual couplings from “natural” (heterosexual) intercourse, “he considered it natural *for these individuals*, in the sense that the disposition of their pores and vessels is innate” (Cadden’s emphasis). This could be taken to constitute a “natural” sexual identity; however, Peter goes on to distinguish a second group of men who *choose* to practice anal intercourse, and who are not born this way. They come to it “on account of depraved and filthy habit—such are sodomites.”²³⁰

One begins to appreciate what might be at stake for Arnaud in his attempt to “naturalize” his sexual predilections. We should also recognize that medieval notions of sexual behavior could take the context of other areas of morality rather than of sexual identities as such: there was, for example, the confused argument that linked sodomy to heresy, either as a practice noted among heretics, or more precisely as a heresy in and of itself.²³¹ This argument, in fact, continues within the sources: Arnaud explained to the inquisitors that the reason he had spoken to his lovers of confession and penance, and of the place of sodomy within morality, was because they had asked him if what they had done was a heresy. Arnaud had told them that it was not. According to Guillaume Roux, Arnaud had called him a “heretic” when he had seen him in town after their first sexual congress. Presumably Arnaud was teasing the boy, although Guillaume did not seem much amused and complained that Arnaud had failed to take him to the Franciscan he had told him of, who was supposed to absolve Guillaume of his sin.²³²

This question of confession and absolution in fact plays a larger part in the records than previous commentators have allowed. It is not the case that Arnaud was sentenced simply for the heresy of impersonating a priest: as his sentence of degradation from ecclesiastical office makes clear, he was being punished for sodomy too, and his defense of sodomy possibly constituted a heresy in itself. More importantly though, we can read two deep-seated links in the depositions between sodomy and the availability of confession and absolution. As I have just mentioned, both Guillaume Roux and Guillaume Bernard were concerned about the morality of their actions, and Arnaud appeased them by telling them that he could take them to a certain Franciscan who would absolve their sins and give them a light penance. It is unclear from the records if this Franciscan actually existed, or was Arnaud’s invention. Nevertheless, we can see the attempt to place sodomy into a *manageable* economy of sin, and not necessarily in a hypocritical way, but one that balanced the notions of “natural needs” against the law of the Church. It is possible that one motive for Arnaud’s impersonation of a priest was therefore the desire to wield the power of absolution which would make his own sexual

practices, if not legitimate—for he never denied that sodomy was a sin—at least negotiable.

The records also show us, however, what might be described as a “homoerotics” of confession. In several places the *intimacy* of confession is attested. Jean Ferrié cited the precept that one should confess all one’s sins to only one priest; Arnaud overcomes his objection by telling him that confession to one man is as good as another, and by taking him back to Jean’s home where Jean confessed to Arnaud in private, which was not yet the norm in this period.²³³ Arnaud similarly tried to get Guillaume Pech to confess to him, and told him that it was better to confess to “your confidant” (*secretarius*) than to a stranger (*extraneus*);²³⁴ by “your confidant” Guillaume understood him to mean Arnaud himself, but he refused the offer. These speak, perhaps, of the intimacy and closeness of confession; much more graphic and direct are the descriptions Arnaud provides of the mutual seductions between himself and both Guillaume Roux and Guillaume Bernard. Arnaud deposes that Guillaume Roux came to him asking for advice on finding a master; Arnaud told him of the canon (of whom he spoke to each of his lovers) who was looking for a cleric such as Guillaume to carry his books for him to and from school. Arnaud then swore Guillaume to secrecy, and told him that the canon sometimes kissed and embraced youths, and sometimes put his penis between their thighs—and, said Arnaud, if you lodge with him, you will have to allow him to do this. Guillaume answered that he was willing. Arnaud then asked him if he had already committed this crime with someone else; Guillaume replied that he had, with a certain squire, and that he knew well how to commit that crime. Arnaud then asked him, “shall I demonstrate the act to you? and will you show me how the squire acted with you?”—and so they progressed to intercourse. Similarly, with Guillaume Bernard, Arnaud began by telling him about the canon—who was again presented as a prospective employer for the younger cleric—and the canon’s private habits. Arnaud then asked Guillaume Bernard “have you ever done this?” (i.e., have you ever had intercrural sex?); “Guillaume Bernard replied embarrassedly that he did not know, and then said, ‘do you want me to show you?’ Arnaud replied that he would . . .” and so on.²³⁵ There are several interesting elements to the seductions: one is the way in which the story of the canon is used to prefigure the following events, in some ways legitimating the sexual activity, but also placing it consciously within the realm of the transgressive, as Arnaud makes his young partners swear an oath of secrecy before he tells them the details. But the seductions also follow a classic pattern of the question-and-answer structure proper to confession. Compare them to these extracts from the *Liber poenitentialis* of Robert of Flamborough, written about a century earlier:

Priest: Have you sinned with a man?

Penitent: With many.

Priest: Have you initiated any innocent persons into this sin?

Penitent: Yes, three students and a subdeacon.

Priest: Tell me about every person you abused, how long you did so, what your status and theirs was, whether clerics, and if laymen whether they were married.

Penitent: I had sex while I was a subdeacon for half a year with three subdeacons. . . . One of them was married. . . . At the time he and I polluted each other in turns.²³⁶

And, in another section:

Afterward the penitent may be asked if he had sinned against nature at any other time and if he had sex with anyone in a particular way. If he should ask what is meant by a particular way I would not answer him, for he would know. I never make mention of anything that might become an occasion for sinning, but rather speak of generalities that everyone knows are sins. I craftily draw the penitent out about masturbation and relations with women.²³⁷

Now, there are obvious differences: most importantly, Arnaud is very keen to talk about the “particular ways” that one might have sex, and then to put theory into practice. But both confession and seduction depend upon a careful negotiation of sharing knowledge; and Robert of Flamborough’s example is perfectly aware of the dangers of saying too specifically what might become an incitement to further sin. Arnaud would also seem to use a method of “craftily drawing out” the other speaker; although for a rather different purpose.

It may seem that what we have drawn out of the records is somewhat disparate and contradictory: in fact these contradictions and tensions are at the heart of what I want to say in conclusion. Let me summarize the constructions and contextualizations of sodomy performed in the records: sodomy is constructed as a male body acting upon a passive body, which is described as analogous to heterosexuality, the man “moving as if with a woman”; sodomy is constructed as male desire acting on an undifferentiated and therefore ungendered receptacle; sodomy is the mutual sexual contact between two equal and desiring men; sodomy is the sexual contact performed by an active sinner on an unwilling and disempowered victim; sodomy is one outlet for the natural sexual desire of a man, in a continuum with other heterosexual outlets; sodomy is an innate desire for sex with another man; sodomy is a logical response to the dangers of heterosexual disease; sodomy is natural and yet sinful; sinful and yet within an economy of sins, and can therefore be managed, controlled and negotiated; sodomy is a form of intimacy, that I have rather mischievously suggested is akin to formal confession.²³⁸

The process of inquisition—from interrogation to deposition to sentencing to final penance—was concerned with the production of stable transgressive identities. In the case of Arnaud, to call the identity thus produced “homosexual” would be, if we follow Foucault’s analysis of sexuality, an anachronism. But “identity” is not necessarily predicated on the use of a noun to label the subject; as Butler has said in a slightly different context, we should be wary of the “seductions of grammar” in our understanding of language and power.²³⁹ Arnaud de Verniolles was sentenced and punished for his crimes of heresy and sodomy, and although it would be incorrect to label him either “heretic” or “sodomite,” he nevertheless remained “one who

had committed sodomy and heresy” until the end of his days. He was interpellated as a subject into the inquisitorial discourse of transgression; and his interpellation into those continuities of transgression is indelibly recorded by the texts produced by the Inquisition, texts that constituted their contemporary body of knowledge, and texts that now allow us to construct our own historical knowledge. Indeed, it is perhaps in our own backward glances to the fourteenth century that Arnaud is most firmly identified, labeled and constituted as “a homosexual” or “a gay man” or simply “a sexual subject.” Whatever “agency” Arnaud might have had it did not save him from his prison cell, nor does it completely deny us these kinds of historical interpretations.

But, as Butler has said, these identities depend upon claims to continuity and stability that can be shown to be illusory. And the fascinating thing about the trial of Arnaud de Verniolles is that it performs just such an unmasking: for although the whole process of confession is concerned with producing an identity, nonetheless the position of the confessing-subject that legitimates the deposition once again supplies the record with an *excess* of information and continuities. Inquisition confessions are a kind of narrative, and like most narratives they are concerned with producing “closure.” But narrative, by the very process of leading us from its beginning to its close, *displays* to us heterogeneous moments. Sexuality and gender are indeed “performed,” but the performance also displays for us their discontinuities. In the deposition of Arnaud de Verniolles, gender and sexual identity ultimately implode under the vast cultural weights they attempt to sustain; the confessing-subject is allowed to have its say, and what it says fractures and dislocates the very stability of its own subjectivity. Ultimately, Arnaud was a convicted sinner; or, as we may use him in our histories, a homosexual, a sodomite, a gay man, a victim. But ultimately too Arnaud refuses every identity laid out for him—not because the records do not give us enough detail, or are sometimes contradictory—but because they supply too many conflicting details, because Arnaud’s actions are contextualized in too many ways, because they lay claim to too many continuities. Is this “agency”? Of a kind; it is still limited by the demands of the discursive web, and Arnaud was still imprisoned. But in fact I think it would be more appropriate and effective to argue that Arnaud does not consciously subvert gender in his trial; but rather that gender is subverted because of the very demands it makes upon Arnaud to justify and make intelligible his actions within “naturalizing” continuities; and that it is the *excess* of coherence, and the *narration* of the inquisitorial search for Truth that displays the very discontinuities and ruptures gender sets out to hide. When gender tells us about itself, it does indeed invite its own destruction; but we have to find critical and effective ways of reading it. And this point can be expanded to cover the entirety of this book: when power displays itself, it invites its own destruction; but we have to find critical and effective ways of writing our histories.

Conclusion

We are a little in love with the dead, I think. They appear to be at once so biddable and yet so mysterious. As Jacques Rancière has recently noted, it is the silences of the past that provide both the possibility and the impossibility of history: without the gaps and elisions of our sources, which so frustrate us and leave our knowledge incomplete, we historians would have no job to perform.¹ It may be that in recalling the subaltern voices of the past for the inspection of posterity, the historian finds him or herself in a heroic position, defending those otherwise lost by the famous condescension of posterity. To adopt this position as hero usually involves filling the elisions of the past by projecting subjects “beyond” the textual traces of our documents, trying to give life once again to those now lost by reconstructing them as “rounded characters.” But to play the role of this champion of the dead has its dangers: not only of constructing historical subjects who are chiefly the phantasms of our own time, resummoned to speak in the service of our own discourses, but also the snare of eliding the operations of power that first brought those voices into texts, and thus reiterating the original process of subjection. In negotiating these dangers, as I have suggested, we are confronted by a problem that is not simply historiographical, but political and ethical.

In the late nineteenth century, Henry Charles Lea concluded his discussion of the Inquisition by noting, with passion and fury, that its legacy stretched far beyond the Middle Ages; from his humanist perspective, in fact, it seemed to extend into the dying days of the eighteenth century. For Lea, the crime of inquisition was not simply the violence it enacted on medieval people, but the template of authority, truth, and power it provided for later European jurisprudence.² He may have been right; and, in fact, correct beyond his own hopeful time. We still today, for example, have a tendency to desire exteriors that mark the “truth” of an interior state: in 1986, the right-wing American journalist William F. Buckley suggested that “everyone detected with AIDS should be tattooed in the upper forearm, to protect common needle users, and on the buttocks to protect victimisation of other homosexuals.”³ The demands and dangers of confession are also still present, as Michel Foucault spent his last years warning us. So it may be, as Lea felt, that to write about the distant past has some point and utility for present discourses.

In a different light, Kathleen Biddick has also pointed to another legacy: she suggests that we might see the Inquisition as “an important institutional moment and process in the formation of European ethnographic disciplines.”⁴

There may be something in her suggestion: inquisitorial discourse, and the mechanisms that it developed to construct a knowledge about faith, do suggest a process that marks an essential shift in the eye of power. Within the realm of religion, inquisition was certainly part of a new way of looking at lay people, where the Church began to regard the subaltern masses as individuals, with interiors, with agency and autonomy. Having looked, the Church began to worry; and through worrying, examined the subaltern further, via various discursive techniques. Inquisition was certainly not the only process in this change, but it may well be that it formed an essential intersection between other discourses, of religious confession and secular justice. And although after its early years inquisition only directly affected a relatively small number of people, its resonances stretched much more widely, because the concerns it grappled with over the status of lay speech, action and belief permeated other discourses within and beyond the high Middle Ages.

If one is right in seeing something new appearing here in the thirteenth century, we might suppose that we not only have to render bitter thanks to the Inquisition for making visible the particular subaltern subjects dealt with in this book; but also for making possible (through its development of mechanisms of textual subjection) a large proportion of social history. For is it not the case that much of the development of social history has depended upon the possibilities for resummoning the voices of the dead provided by legal records? The variety of kinds of legal process, and the documents they produced, have of course their own historical, juridical, and regional variations; indeed, this book has kept to a fairly tight geographical focus in an effort to preserve what is local and particular to the discourse analyzed. I hesitate therefore to suggest that the reading strategies forged here can simply be applied to other juridical archives; I would rather, drawing from this work, proffer a few questions that may have some utility to those working on other places and periods.

The first of these is to consider whether all discourses are the same. In trying to track the formation of the particular discourse of inquisition—a discourse that has a strong sense of itself as a bounded area of language, practice, and knowledge—I have also touched upon other discursive fields. Some of these, I would suggest, precede but also infect inquisition: the polemical language against heresy, depicting it as disease, madness, poison; the cultural investment in the idea of literacy, and all that it entails, and so on. Other discourses may be contemporaneous, such as the wider realm of confessional discourse developed (with regard to the laity) in the thirteenth century. Whilst these discourses interweave, and at times support one another, might it also be the case (as I have tried to suggest with regards to literacy) that they can also produce tensions between themselves? And, perhaps, that it is these tensions that provide our best hope for reading beyond the particular “reality” mapped by languages of power?

Secondly, we might also consider and investigate how discourses *change*

over time. That they do seems inescapably obvious. Inquisition in the mid-thirteenth century was not the same as inquisition in the early fourteenth century. Neither were identical to the Spanish Inquisition of later times. To investigate these changes may be the particular role that the historian can bring to the wider discussion of theories of power, language, and culture. While historians are often lambasted (and occasionally lambast themselves) for failing to engage with the conceptual arena of argument favored by the rest of the humanities and social sciences, they can point with some justifiable pride to their sensitivity to historical specificity and diachronic change. That I know myself, despite what I have sometimes been told along the way, still to be an *historian* is due to the fact that whatever else it has offered, this book has analyzed change over time: how inquisition, and inquisitorial subjects, altered between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This, I would like to think, need not signal a “retreat” into historiography; but rather an assertion that history still has an essential role to play in wider theoretical and political discussion.

Which leads me to my third point: having noted change over time, one must account for it. Here, I suspect, is the essential basis for ascribing agency to the subjects of the past. If things change, it is because of human historical interaction. Discourses construct and position us as subjects; but they also allow (or, as I have argued, demand) an *excess* of speech and action. In confronting that excess, change occurs. And where there is change, there is hope. We are not, as some have suggested, merely prisoners of discourse: we are also its—and our—guardians and servants. But if we have agency, there may be other roles we can choose.

To return to Biddick’s association of inquisition with ethnography: the force of her comparison is, of course, to point once again to the dangers of writing about the Other. We may fall into the trap of colonizing subaltern subjects, appropriating their voices for our own glory without paying sufficient heed to the contexts of power and struggle their words inhabited. The heroic role of championing the dead is therefore a problematic one, and a position I must regretfully decline. But what role, then, should one adopt? Biddick herself suggests, and performs, a “counterethnography” that (with regard to the fifteenth-century inquisition manual the *Malleus maleficarum*) seeks to show how inquisitors construct a phantasmic “truth” that constitutes themselves as knowing subjects and the witches they persecuted as abject and silenced. I have, I think, performed a similar operation for the earlier inquisitors studied here; but I would suggest that this cannot be an end in itself. Although one cannot recapture the “true” voices of the past, to leave the possibilities of speech in silence seems to me a recapitulation of failure and defeat in the face of power. In feeding off these texts of power, as the historian can only do, there is an ethical demand to return a space for resistance, to forge thus a critical and effective history, even if the recipient of that gift is only a projected fantasy of the historical subject. However, in

emphasizing a “space” and “resistance”—in emphasizing, perhaps, a number of reading *strategies* rather than claiming an epistemology—we may save ourselves from colonizing the subaltern subjects of the past. There are, I suspect, a variety of condescensions of posterity: one is that we can resummon and understand past individuals, because we are on “their” side.

What I most truly know about Béatrice de Lagleize, Jean Rocas, and the others is that, since they have been dead for a very long time, they remain ultimately mysterious and mostly silent. But the silences that punctuate their voices are not, it seems to me, simply historical silences. They are more obvious to us because the distance of time has rendered those elisions fixed and unalterable. But silences—gaps in what is said, and hence understood—are present to us in the here and now, between (and perhaps within) ourselves; they provoke a question of whether we can achieve any “true” or complete knowledge. Instead of filling those historical gaps with our own busy concerns, might we not let those medieval silences infect our present discourse? Might we, in fact, invite the dead to interrogate *us*? In so doing, we might challenge our assumptions about self and other, our understanding of ourselves as “subjects”; and perhaps thus begin the search for new grounds of commonality and new voices for our own time.

Abbreviations

~~AE~~ *Es*: *Economie, Société, Civilisations*

~~AH~~ *R*: *African Historical Review*

~~Ca~~ *Li*: *Chiers de Fanjeaux*

~~A. A.~~ *Al*: *Alles-Gobilliard, ed., L'Inquisiteur Geoffroy d'Ablis et les cathares du Comté de Foix (1308–1309)* (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984)

~~Do~~ *Bi*: *Bibliothèque Nationale, fonds Doat mss. 21–16*

~~Do~~ *Do*: *Doat, Les Crises de l'inquisition toulousaine au XIIIe siècle* (Bordeaux: Imprimerie Bière, 1959)

~~Du~~ *De*: *Deveroy, Histoire des cathares* (Toulouse: Privat, 1979)

~~Du~~ *De*: *Deveroy, Religion des cathares* (Toulouse: Privat, 1976)

~~Fu~~ *Fu*: *Faulstich, The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London: Routledge, 1989)

~~Fu~~ *Fu*: *Faulstich, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. A. Sheridan (London: Peregrine, 1979)

~~Fu~~ *Fu*: *Faulstich, The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, *The Will to Knowledge*, trans. R. Hurley (London: Penguin, 1990)

~~Fo~~ *Do*: *Doat, 3ed., Le Registre d'inquisition de Jacques Fournier, évêque de Pamiers (1318–1325)*, 3 vols. (Toulouse: Privat, 1965)

~~JE~~ *H*: *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*

~~JE~~ *H*: *Journal of Medieval History*

~~Ea~~ *Li*: *Li, Raymond, Montautou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village 1294–1324*, trans. B. Bray (London: Penguin, 1980)

~~He~~ *Ch*: *Chesly, A History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages* (1888. Reprint, New York: S.A. Russell, 1955), 3 vols

~~in~~ *in*: *Limborch, ed., Historia Inquisitionis, cui subjungitur liber sententiarum inquisitionis Tholosane ab anno Christi 1307 ad annum 1323* (Amsterdam, 1692)

~~Ma~~ *Ma*: *Maisonneuve, Etudes sur les origines de l'inquisition* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1960)

~~Mo~~ *Mo*: *Moreau, Formation of a Persecuting Society; Power and Deviance in Western Europe 950–1250* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)

~~Pl~~ *Pl*: *Patrologia Latina*

~~P&P~~ *P*: *P&P & Present*

~~Pr~~ *Pr*: *Pradon, ed., Bernardus Guidonis Practica inquisitionis heretice pravitatis* (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1886)

- Dracopis**, *processus Narbonensis*, in K.-V. Selge, ed., *Texte zur Inquisition* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1967), 70–76
- Reynolds**, ed. and trans., *Le Registre d'inquisition de Jacques Fournier (évêque de Pamiers) 1318–1325* (Paris: Mouton, 1978), 3 vols. (French translation of *Fournier* 1–3)
- SCH**ies in Church History
- THS**actions of the Royal Historical Society
- W&E** Wakefield and A. P. Evans, eds., *Heresies of the High Middle Ages* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992)
- Wakefield**, *Heresy, Crusade and Inquisition in Southern France 1100–1250* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974)

Notes

Introduction

1. Doat 25 fols. 11r–14V. The case is discussed briefly in A. Murray, *Suicide in the Middle Ages*, vol. 1, *The Violent Against Themselves* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 187–88. There is nothing in the record to support Murray's description of Bernard as a "suspected Cathar Perfect."

2. E. Muir and G. Ruggerio, "The Crime of History," in *History from Crime*, ed. E. Muir and G. Ruggerio, trans. C. B. Curry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), vii.

3. For such a revision, see M. Benad, *Domus und Religion in Montailou: Katholische Kirche und Katharismus im Überlebenskampf der Familie des Pfarreres Petrus Clerici am Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1990).

4. For an overview of Catharism, see M. Lambert, *The Cathars* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) and M. Barber, *The Cathars: Dualist Heretics in Languedoc in the High Middle Ages* (Harlow: Longman, 2000); on Languedoc, L. Paterson, *The World of the Troubadours: Medieval Occitan Society, c. 1100–c. 1300* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), and J. H. Mundy, *Society and Government at Toulouse in the Age of the Cathars* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1997).

5. C. Ginzburg, "The Inquisitor as Anthropologist," in *Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method*, trans. J. and A. Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 157.

6. There have been a variety of excellent historiographical overviews of Catharism in recent years, among which see A. Borst, *Les Cathares*, trans. Ch. Roy (Paris: Payot, 1984), 9–53; P. Martel, "Les Cathares et leurs historiens" in *Les Cathares en Occitanie*, ed. R. Lafont (Paris: Fayard, 1982), 409–83; and the essays in *Historiographie du catharisme*, CdF 14 (1979).

7. For a relatively recent Catholic apologist account see M. Bévenot, "The Inquisition and Its Antecedents," *Heythrop Journal* 7, 3 (1966): 257–68; no. 4 (1966): 381–93; 8, 1 (1966): 52–69; no. 2 (1966): 152–68.

8. See R. Manselli, "Les Approches matérialistes de l'histoire du catharisme," CdF 14 (1979): 229–48; J.-L. Biget, "Mythographie du catharisme (1870–1960)" CdF 14 (1979): 271–342; A. Vauchez, "Les Recherches françaises sur les hérésies médiévales au cours des trente dernières années (1962–1992)" in *Eretici ed eresie medievali: Nella storiografia contemporanea*, ed. G. G. Merlo (Torre Pellice: Bolletino della Società di Studi Valdesi 174, 1994), 94–108.

9. For example: Lea, *History*; J. Guiraud, *Histoire de l'inquisition au moyen âge*, 2 vols (Paris: August Picard, 1935–38); Borst, *Les Cathares*; R. Abels and E. Harrison, "The Participation of Women in Languedocian Catharism" *Mediaeval Studies* 41 (1979): 215–51.

10. Montailou; P. Dronke, *Women Writers of the Middle Ages: A Critical Study of Texts from Perpetua (203) to Marguerite Porete (1310)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 203–14; M. Rubin, *Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 343–45.

11. For example, J. Bossy, "The Mass as a Social Institution 1200–1700," *P & P* 100 (1983): 36. On Montailou's success, see P. Carrard, *Poetics of the New History: French Historical Discourse from Braudel to Chartier* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 136.

12. A. Brenon, *Les Femmes cathares* (Paris: Perrin, 1992); G. Lerner, *Why History Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 18–32; B. Stock, "History, Literature and Medieval Textuality," in *Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).

13. See Ch.-O. Carbonell, "Vulgarisation et recuperation: Le catharisme à travers les mass-media," CdF 14 (1979): 361–80; A. Roach, "Occitania Past and Present: Southern Consciousness in Medieval and Modern French Politics," *History Workshop Journal* 43 (1997): 1–22. For two popular fictions, see Michael Baldwin, *The Rape of Oc* (London: Little, Brown, 1993), and, more interestingly, Louis de Bernières, *The Troublesome Offspring of Cardinal Guzman* (London: Minerva, 1993).

14. See account in M. Bourin and J. Tricard, "Villeroque: mise en scène d'un procès cathare," *Histoire* 156 (1992): 69–71.
15. A. Murray, "Time and Money," in *The Work of Jacques Le Goff and the Challenges of Medieval History*, ed. M. Rubin (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1997), 7; E. Griffie, *Le Languedoc Cathare de 1190 à 1210* (Paris: Letouzey and Ané, 1971), 15.
16. This pattern is found elsewhere: see for example A. Cazenave, "Les Ordres mendiants dans l'Aude et l'Ariège," Cdf 8 (1973): 143–76, and M. Pegg, *The Corruption of Angels: the Great Inquisition of 1244–1246* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). Whether one should see the practice of changing the records to first-person as a "problem" is debatable, but note that at least one commentator has been fooled into believing that this is how the sources themselves are constituted: Carrard, *Poetics*, 128–29.
17. H. Grundmann, "Ketzerverhöre des Spätmittelalters als quellenkritisches Problem," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 21 (1965): 519–75.
18. Lea, *History*, 1: 450; see A. Friedlander, *The Hammer of the Inquisitors: Brother Bernard Déléicieux and the Struggle Against the Inquisition in Fourteenth-Century France* (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Y. Dossat, "Les Origines de la querelle entre Prêcheurs et Mineurs provençaux: Bernard Déléicieux," Cdf 10 (1975): 315–54.
19. C. Schmidt, *Histoire et doctrine des cathares* (1848; reprint, Bayonne: Jean Curutchet, 1983) 1: iv; 2: 4.
20. Guiraud, *Histoire*, 1: xxix–xxx.
21. Borst, *Les Cathares*, 24.
22. G. G. Merlo, *Eretici e inquisitori nella società piemontese del Trecento* (Turin: Claudiana, 1977), 11–15.
23. R. E. Lerner, *The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1972), 4–5.
24. For a slightly different viewpoint, to which I am nonetheless indebted, see P. P. A. Biller, "Les Vaudois dans les territoires de langue Allemande vers la fin du XIV^e siècle: Le regard d'un inquisiteur," *Heresis* 13–14 (1990): 199–234.
25. For example, Wakefield, *Heresy*, 242–43; J.-L. Biget, "L'Extinction du catharisme urbain: Les points chaudes de la répression" Cdf 20 (1985): 305–40; P. P. A. Biller, "The Common Woman in the Western Church in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries," *SCH* 27 (1990), 138.
26. J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 101–40.
27. Ginzburg, "Inquisitor as Anthropologist," 159, 160.
28. C. Ginzburg, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*, trans. J. and A. Tedeschi (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).
29. D. LaCapra, "The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Twentieth-Century Historian," in *History and Criticism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985), 45–69.
30. The straightforward question of "power" and inquisition (that inquisitors have power over others, in that they can make them do things they do not wish to do) has of course been addressed since Bernard Déléicieux's time. For an incisive study, see J. B. Given, "The Inquisitors of Languedoc and the Medieval Technology of Power," *AHR* 94 (1989): 336–59. The vicissitudes of political power and inquisition has also been studied; see for example R. E. Lerner, "The Uses of Heterodoxy: The French Monarchy and Unbelief in the Thirteenth Century," *French Historical Studies* 4 (1965): 189–202; J. B. Given, "Social Stress, Social Strain and the Inquisitors of Languedoc," in *Christendom and Its Discontents: Exclusion, Persecution, and Rebellion, 1000–1500*, ed. S. L. Waugh and P. D. Diehl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 67–85. However, as I argue below, one is dealing here with a different conception of "power."
31. LaCapra, "The Cheese and the Worms," 62–63.
32. R. Rosaldo, "From the Door of His Tent: The Fieldworker and the Inquisitor," in *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, ed. J. Clifford and G. E. Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 80; Ginzburg similarly stresses the inquisitors' "will to truth" — see "Inquisitor as Anthropologist," 158.
33. For a similar critique, see K. Biddick, "The Devil's Anal Eye: Inquisitorial Optics and Ethnographic Authority," in *The Shock of Medievalism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), 105–34; also J. H. Arnold, "The Historian as Inquisitor: The Ethics of Interrogating Subaltern Voices," *Rethinking History* 2, 3 (1998): 379–86, which develops a slightly more extended historiographical critique along the lines presented here.
34. Lerner, *Free Spirit*, 101, 118, 129.

35. *Ibid.*, 91, 138.
36. For a provocative study of the interrelations between inquisition and psychiatry, see T. Szasz, *The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971).
37. Lerner, *Free Spirit*, 136. A similar pattern is found in Gustav Henningsen's fascinating study of Basque witchcraft. In attempting to explain the apparent compliance of witnesses with the structures of repression, Henningsen similarly finds himself playing psychiatrist and diagnosing "sexual neurosis" and the use of psychedelic drugs; see G. Henningsen, *The Witches' Advocate: Basque Witchcraft and the Spanish Inquisition (1609–1614)* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1980), 156, 164 and *passim*.
38. See M. Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress" and "Politics and Ethics: An Interview," in *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*, ed. P. Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1984), 340–72, 373–80.
39. L. E. Boyle, "Montaillou Revisited: Mentalité and Methodology," in *Pathways to Medieval Peasants*, ed. J. A. Raftis (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1981), 127.
40. Ethical concern is also strongly evoked in Lyndal Roper's work on early-modern witchcraft, *Oedipus and the Devil: Witchcraft, Sexuality, and Religion in Early Modern Europe* (London: Routledge, 1994). While finding her imaginative engagement with these sources inspiring, I do not share Roper's enthusiasm for using psychoanalysis as a way of recovering past "individuality," not least because — as I note below — there may be a dangerous similarity between the categorizing nature of inquisitorial discourse and the diagnostic discourse of psychoanalysis. Nor am I persuaded by her rejection of the possibilities of relating subjectivities to cultural languages and contexts. Roper characterizes the latter approach as the "mere recapitulation of cultural stereotypes" (2), which seems to me to imply a reductive reading of poststructuralist theories of language, power, and subjectivity. For further commentary, see my "Historian as Inquisitor."
41. See particularly G. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988), 271–313.
42. For an interesting commentary, see K. Lochrie, "Desiring Foucault," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 27, 1 (1997): 3–16. On Foucault and historians — though none medieval — see the articles in J. Goldstein, ed., *Foucault and the Writing of History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
43. M. Foucault, "Truth and Power," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, trans. and ed. C. Gordon et al. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980), 119.
44. For an overview and critique see D. Macdonell, *Theories of Discourse: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
45. On "interpellation," see L. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an investigation)," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. B. Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), 163: "interpellation . . . can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!' . . . The hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he [sic] becomes a *subject*. Why? Because he has recognised that the hail was 'really' addressed to him, and that 'it was *really* him who was hailed' (and not someone else)."
46. M. Bakhtin, "The Discourse of the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination*, ed. and trans. M. Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 326.
47. M. Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. and trans. D. F. Bouchard (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 139–64.
48. S. Justice, "Inquisition, Speech, and Writing: A Case from Late-Medieval Norwich," *Representations* 48 (1994): 1, 25–26.
49. It is tempting to identify with one particular inquisitor: a fourteenth-century Dominican called John Arnoldi was threatened by the Waldensians he was supposed to be prosecuting, and resigned his commission. See R. Kieckhefer, *The Repression of Heresy in Medieval Germany* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1979), 59–60.

Chapter 1. The Lump and the Leaven

1. W&E, 89–93.
2. Pierre Maury's deposition appears in *Fournier*, 3: 119–252. The section dealt with here is on pp. 229–31. Maury is discussed in detail in Ladurie, *Montaillou*, particularly pp. 69–88.
3. W&E, 669–70, n. 2.
4. N. Cohn, *Europe's Inner Demons: An Enquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-Hunt* (London:

5. For a survey of medieval heresies, see M. Lambert, *Medieval Heresy: Popular Movements from the Gregorian Reform to the Reformation*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

6. J. B. Russell, “Interpretations on the Origins of Medieval Heresy,” *Mediaeval Studies* 25 (1963): 26–53; Stock, *Implications*, 92–101. On problems presented by the sources, see R. Morghen, “Problèmes sur l’origine de l’hérésie au moyen âge,” in *Hérésies et sociétés dans l’Europepre-industrielle, 11e–18e siècles*, ed. J. Le Goff (Paris: Mouton, 1968), 122.

7. R. I. Moore, *The Origins of European Dissent* (London: Allen Lane, 1977), 4 5, 83, and passim; C. Thouzelier “Tradition et résurgence dans l’hérésie médiévale,” in *Hérésies et société*, ed. Le Goff, 108. For a provocative view, that seeks to link various heresies together, see J.-P. Poly and E. Bournazel, *The Feudal Transformation: 900–1200*, trans. C. Higgitt (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991), 272–308; for a rebuttal, see R. I. Moore, “Heresy, Repression, and Social Change in the Age of Gregorian Reform,” in *Christendom and Its Discontents: Exclusion, Persecution, and Rebellion, 1000–1500*, ed. S. L. Waugh and P. D. Diehl (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19–46.

8. H. Grundmann, *Religious Movements in the Middle Ages*, trans. S. Rowan (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Moore, *Origins*, 46–136; Thouzelier, “Tradition et résurgence,” 109.

9. Stock, *Implications*, 92–151; R. I. Moore, “New Sects and Secret Meetings: Association and Authority in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,” *SCH* 23 (1986): 57.

10. Moore, *Origins*, 168–240; B. Hamilton, “The Cathar Council of St Félix Reconsidered,” in *Monastic Reform, Catharism and the Crusades (900–1300)* (London: Variorum, 1979), 23–53. Mark Pegg has recently presented strenuous arguments against this institutional picture of Catharism (and indeed, against using the name “Catharism”) in M. Pegg, *The Corruption of Angels: The Great Inquisition of 1245–1246* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). As Chapter 4 will show, I have some sympathy with this position, although I would not extend the argument as far, or in quite the same way.

11. See G. Audisio, *The Waldensian Dissent: Persecution and Survival, c. 1170–C. 1570*, trans. C. Davison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

12. Moore, *Formation*, 9–10, 131 and passim; B. Bolton, “Tradition and Temerity: Papal Attitudes to Deviants, 1159–1216,” *SCH* 9 (1972): 79 (similarly, see G. Leff, “Heresy and the Decline of the Medieval Church,” *P&P* 20 [1981]: 46; R. Manselli, “De la ‘persuasio’ à la ‘coercitio,’” *CdF* 6 [1971]: 175–97); B. Hamilton, *The Medieval Inquisition* (London: Historical Association Pamphlets, 1981), 33 (similarly, see A. P. Evans, “Hunting Subversion in the Middle Ages,” *Speculum* 33 [1958]: 2; R. W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* [London: Penguin, 1970], 1719); R. I. Moore, “Popular Violence and Popular Heresy in Western Europe, c. 1000–1179,” *SCH* 21 (1984): 43–50.

13. Moore, *Origins*, 280.

14. For example Lea, *History*, 1: iii; Hamilton, *Medieval Inquisition*, 19–20; Leff, “Heresy and the Decline,” 40; B. Bolton, “*Paupertas Christi*: Old Wealth and new Poverty in the Twelfth Century,” *SCH* 14 (1977): 102–3. Against these views, see Moore, *Formation*, 2–5, 67.

15. Moore, *Origins*, 83 and passim.

16. Moore, *Formation*, passim.

17. On these tropes see R. I. Moore, “Heresy as Disease,” in *The Concept of Heresy in the Middle Ages*, ed. W. Lourdaux and D. Verhelst (Louvain: University Press The Hague, 1976), 1–11; Cohn, *Europe’s Inner Demons*, 16–59; Lerner, *Free Spirit*, 20–34. For an account of how the tropes moved from disease-images to animal-images, see L. Bosworth, “The Perception of the Origins and Causes of Heresy in Medieval Heresiology” (Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 1995).

18. See P. P. A. Biller, “Heresy and Literacy: Earlier History of the Theme,” in *Heresy and Literacy, 1000–1530*, ed. P. P. A. Biller and A. Hudson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4; P.-P.-A. Biller, “The *Topos* and Reality of the Heretic as *Illiteratus* “in *Medieval Waldensians* (Woodbridge: Variorum, 2000), 169–90.

19. Ralph Glaber, *Historiarum libri quinque*, ed. and trans. J. France, N. Bulst, and P. Reynolds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 88–91; W&E, 72.

20. See W&E, 76–81, 86–89, 95–101, 107–26.

21. PL, 182: 434; W&E, 123.

22. W&E, 132–138. See also B. M. Kienzle, “Tending the Lord’s Vineyard: Cistercians, Rhetoric, and Heresy, 1143–1229,” *Heresis* 25 (1995): 29–61.

23. This analysis is per force brief, and has not dealt with occasional instances — such as Orléans in 1022—where a small, heretical group was found that seems to have been both discrete and discreet; nor

have I dwelt upon the few accounts of reactions which attacked not only the “heresiarch” but also his followers, such as the heresy of Vilgard, reported by Ralph Glaber. However, it still holds true that in these accounts the charismatic center—whether a named individual or a small group—is also the narrative centre of the account. See W&E, 75–81.

24. W&E, 85.

25. H. Grundmann, “*Litteratus-illitteratus*: Der Wandel einer Bildungsnorm vom Altertum zum Mittelalter,” *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 40 (1958): 1–65.

26. M. Irvine, *The Making of Textual Culture: “Grammatica” and Literary Theory, 350–1100* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 5462.

27. Moore, *Formation*, 128 n. 8, and 138–39; M. T. Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066–1307*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 226–30 and passim; Stock, *Implications*, 12–86 and passim; A. Murray, *Reason and Society in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 237–300 and passim; Chenu, *Man, Nature, and Society*, 252–55; M. Richter, “A Socio-Linguistic Approach to the Latin Middle Ages,” *SCH* 11 (1975): 69–82; S. Justice, *Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 142–43 and passim; S. Menache, *The Vox Dei: Communication in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3 and passim.

28. Quoted in Menache, *Vox Dei*, 3

29. Quoted in A. Cazenave, “Langage catholique et discours cathare: Les écoles du Montpelier,” in *I’art des confins: Melanges offerts a Maurice de Gandillac*, ed. A. Cazenave and J.-F. Lyotard (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985), 140.

30. Quoted in A. Murray, “Religion Amongst the Poor in Thirteenth Century France: The Testimony of Humbert de Romans,” *Traditio* 30 (1974): 298, 301.

31. *Summa theologiae*, 1a2ae, Q.10, article 7.

32. D. L. d’Avray, *The Preaching of the Friars: Sermons diffused from Paris Before 1300* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 231–33; L. Scanlon, *Narrative, Authority and Power: The Medieval Exemplum and the Chaucerian Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 66 and passim.

33. Biller, “*Topos and Reality*”; Grundmann, *Religious Movements*, 14.

34. W&E, 90.

35. J. Avril, “Eglise, paroisse, encadrement diocésain aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles d’après les conciles et statuts synodaux,” *CdF* 25 (1990): 29.

36. R. N. Swanson, *Religion and Devotion in Europe, c.1215–c.1515* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9–41.

37. A. Murray, “Counselling in Medieval Confession,” in *Handling Sin: Confession in the Middle Ages*, ed. P. P. A. Biller and A. J. Minnis (York: York Medieval Press, 1998), 63–77.

38. On the development of regular and individual confession both before and after 1215, and its use against heresy, see J. Avril, “Remarques sur un aspect de la vie religieuse paroissiale: La pratique de la confession et de la communion du Xe au XIVe siècle,” *Actes du 109e congrès national des sociétés savantes, Dijon 1984* (Paris: CTHS, 1985), I: 345–63.

39. A. Esmein, *A History of Continental Criminal Procedure*, trans. J. Simpson (London: John Murray, 1914), 1–10, 78. See also J. B. Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society: Power, Discipline and Resistance in Languedoc* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 21–22.

40. Esmein, *History*, 40, 78–84.

41. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 250–66. On apparently the first use of *inquisitio* against heresy, see J. M. M. H. Thijssen, “Master Amalric and the Amalricians: Inquisitorial Procedure and the Suppression of Heresy at the University of Paris,” *Speculum* 71 (1996): 43–65. It must be noted however that this case proceeds not ex officio but from the older concept of *infamia*, and therefore differs from inquisition after 1230.

42. Esmein, *History*, 93.

43. See Lea, *History*, vol. 1; Guiraud, *Histoire*, vol. 1; Maisonneuve, *Etudes*; Dossat, *Crises*; Hamilton, *Medieval Inquisition*.

44. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 65, 79.

45. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 151–56; R. Helmholz, *The Spirit of Classical Canon Law* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), 360–65.

46. Moore, *Formation*, 25, referring to PL, 182: 434–36; W&E, 122–24.

47. Moore, *Formation*, 26, referring to PL 204: col. 237.

48. See P. Belperron, *La Croisade contre les albigeois et l’union du Languedoc à la France* (Paris: Plon, 1942); B. Hamilton, *The Albigensian Crusade* (London: Historical Association Pamphlet, 1974); J. Strayer, *The Albigensian Crusades* (New York: Dial Press, 1971); J. Sumption, *The Albigensian*

Crusade (London: Faber and Faber, 1978); M. Costen, *The Cathars and the Albigensian Crusade* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

49. Mundy, *Society and Government*, 233–49.

50. Strayer, *Albigensian Crusade*, 139.

51. A. P. Evans, “The Albigensian Crusade,” in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K. M. Setton (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 2: 293, 309.

52. Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 14.

53. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 243–86; Dossat, *Crises*, 105–52. Maisonneuve points out that whilst the inquisitors behaved aggressively, the canonists stressed the greater equity of the Roman Law behind the inquisitorial process, and the rigor and fairness of the Church.

54. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 293, 299.

55. Legislation comprising the following councils and bulls: council of Narbonne, 1227 (Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum*, vol. 23, cols. 20–26); council of Toulouse, 1229 (ibid., cols. 191–204); Louis IX’s statute *Cupientes* of 1229 (ibid., cols. 185–86); council of Albi, 1230 (O. Pontal, ed., *Les Statuts synodaux Français du XIII^e siècle* [Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1983], 2: 9–33); constitution of Gregory IX, *Excommunicamus*, 1231 (Mansi, vol. 23, cols. 73–74); council of Beziers, 1232 (ibid., cols. 269–78); statutes of Raymond VII, 1233 (ibid., cols. 265–68); council of Tarragona 1233/4 (ibid., cols. 329–32); and council of Arles, 1234 (ibid., cols. 335–42).

56. Legislation comprising: letter of Gregory IX, 1238 (Mansi, vol. 23, cols. 7475); council of Tarragona, 1242 (ibid., cols. 553–58); council of Narbonne, 1243 (ibid., cols. 355–66); council of Beziers, 1246 (ibid., cols. 689–702); Directory of Beziers, 1246 (ibid., cols. 715–24); council of Valence, 1248 (ibid., cols. 769–78); and council of Albi, 1254 (ibid., cols. 829–53).

57. For example, sixty-six canons from the council of Albi, 1230, are concerned with the reforms of the Fourth Lateran Council; and the council of Beziers, 1232, which has similar interests, also links the control of heresy with pastoral care by urging the parish priest to keep track of those suspected of heresy “as if preserving the pupil of the eye” (c. 5).

58. Guillaume Pelhisson, *Chronique*, ed. and trans. J. Duvernoy (Paris: CNRS, 1994), 36–38. English translation in Wakefield, *Heresy*, 207–36; see 209.

59. *Chronique*, 48; Wakefield, *Heresy*, 212. On the concentration on the nobility, see also p. 64, where Peytavi Boursier, a *nuntius hereticorum*, was captured and then “courageously denounced many important people.”

60. Mundy reads this in a positivistic sense: that the nobility formed the main group of adherents. See J. H. Mundy, *The Repression of Catharism at Toulouse: The Royal Diploma of 1279* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1985), 50ff.

61. Narbonne 1227 c.15; *Cupientes* 1229 c.14; Toulouse 1229 c. 3; Raymond VII 1233 col. 265; Arles 1234 c. 3.

62. Narbonne 1227 c. 16; Toulouse 1229 c. 17; Gregory IX *Excommunicamus* 1231; Beziers 1232 c. 3; Tarragona 1233 c. 3.

63. Narbonne 1227 canons 17, 15.

64. *Cupientes* 1229 c. 4.

65. Toulouse 1229 c. 4.

66. See discussion above; and Moore, *Origins*, 215–17; Lambert, *Medieval Heresy*, 55–57.

67. T. N. Bisson, “The Organised Peace in Southern France and Catalonia, c. 1140–123 3,” in *Medieval France and Her Pyrenean Neighbours* (London: Hambledon Press, 1989), 236.

68. Peace and heresy were also linked before the Crusade; see Griffe, *Le Languedoc cathare de 1190 a 1210*, 274.

69. Bisson, “Organised Peace,” 229; see Mansi, vol. 22, cols. 947–48 canons 32–42; Toulouse 1229 canons 28–31.

70. The statutes begin “In nomine sanctae et individuae Trinitatis. Ad exaltationem fidei Christianae, et ad extirpandam haereticam pravitatem, et ad conservationem pacis, et ad bonum statum totius terrae conservandum, et in melius reformandum,” and continue to link the “Catholic faith” with “peace” throughout. Also punished are “receivers” (*receptatores*) of the *ruptarii* and *fayditi*; one is reminded that the later records often speak of *receptatores hereticorum*.

71. For example Toulouse 1229 c. 12; Albi 1230 c. 14; Gregory IX, *Excommunicamus*, 1231 col. 74; Béziers 1232 c. 2. On the twelfth-century peace oaths, see Bisson, “Organised Peace,” 221–22.

72. Narbonne 1227 c. 14; Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 238–39; Toulouse 1229 c. 1; Raymond VII, 1233 col. 265; Tarragona 1234 c. 8 (similarly Arles 1234 c. 5).

73. For example, a Toulousan citizen called Jean Textor was prosecuted; there were witnesses who spoke against him, but also some who spoke in his favor; see similarly the prosecution of Arnaud Sans

(Wakefield, *Heresy*, 213–14, 215).

74. *Chronique*, 62–64.

75. Tarragona 1234 c. 9.

76. Toulouse 1229 c. 1.

77. Toulouse 1229 canons 12, 13.

78. Albi 1230 canons 40, 46; Béziers 1230 c. 5 (Mansi, vol. 23, col. 271); Béziers 1246 c. 31; Albi 1254 canons 11, 12.

79. I am indebted here for inspiration to the overview presented in Moore, *Formation*, particularly pp. 66–99.

80. Raymond VII 1229 col. 263.

81. Narbonne 1227 canons 15, 16, 17.

82. Raymond VII 1229 cols. 263–65.

83. Toulouse 1229 c. 1.

84. Béziers 1232, Tarragona 1233, Arles 1234, *passim*.

85. Toulouse 1229 canons 10, 11; there is a slight confusion over whether the statutes are also distinguishing between *heretici* and *heretici vestiti*.

86. Toulouse 1229 canons 4, 1. On the changing meanings of *animadversio debita*, see Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 245–48.

87. Arles 1234 canons 6, 11.

88. Names for heretics are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

89. L. Clédat, ed., *Le Nouveau Testament traduit au XIII^e siècle en langue Provençale, suivi d'un rituel cathare* (1887; reprint Geneva: Slatkine, 1968), ix–xxvi, 470–82 (Roman numeral pages contain a transcription of the Ritual, Arabic numeral pages a lithographic reproduction of the manuscript). For an English translation, see W&E, 483–94.

90. Guillaume de Tudela, *La Chanson de la croisade albigeoise*, ed. and trans. E. Martin-Chabot (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1960), 1: 112–13. My thanks to Nicole Schulman for discussion on the meaning of this passage.

91. Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, *Histoire albigeoise*, ed. and trans. P. Guébin and H. Maisonneuve (Paris: Librairie Philosophie J. Vrin, 1951), 7; W&E, 239.

92. For example, letter of Gregory IX, *Contra Patarenos*, Mansi, vol. 23, col. 73: “*credentes* of their errors we judge similarly to *heretici*.” *Receptatores, defensores* and *fautores* are also mentioned as being excommunicate, but are not defined other than by the nouns used.

93. Toulouse 1229 canons 11, 12.

94. Esmein, *History*, 79.

95. Toulouse 1229 canons 15, 17.

96. A. Patschovsky and K.-V. Selge, eds., *Quellen zur Geschichte der Waldenser*, Texte zur Kirchen- und Theologiegeschichte 18 (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1973), 51.

97. *Ibid.*, 53.

98. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 287, 293. Similarly Dossat, *Crises*, 158–68.

99. G. Gonnet and A. Molnar, *Les Vaudois au moyen âge* (Turin: Claudiana, 1974), 189–90. My thanks to Peter Biller on this topic.

100. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 283ff.

101. These beliefs are specific to Waldensians; the important thing to note is that beliefs are included as well as disobedience.

102. Tarragona 1242 cols. 554–55. I have slightly condensed and paraphrased the text for clarity.

103. Tarragona 1242 col. 555.

104. Tarragona 1242 col. 555.

105. H. C. Lea felt that the “invention” of the category of “suspect” was one of the Inquisition’s worst crimes; in fact, the logic behind it probably comes from canonical proceedings on the basis of *infamia*, although it changes the understanding of it from public opinion to inquisitorial assessment; Lea, *History*, 1: 454–56. For further evidence that *suspectus* was a named category, see *Practica*, 108, 110–11, 186.

106. Narbonne 1243 canons 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9–16.

107. Narbonne 1243 canons 20, 22, 24.

108. Narbonne 1243 canons 4, 8, 15.

109. Narbonne 1243 canons 14, 23, 26.

110. Narbonne 1243 c. 29.

111. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 294. For his discussion of these councils, see 293–307, and Dossat, *Crises*, 158–68.

112. More will be said on “interiority” in Chapter 3. However, it is worth noting here an example of what Alexander Murray has described as the moment when the act of confession *becomes* penitence; see A. Murray, “Confession Before 1215,” *TRHS* 6th ser. 3 (1993): 62.

113. The council and directory primarily address episcopal inquisition, rather than papal inquisition; however, a strong degree of cross-referencing and “interpollination” are obvious. See Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 293.

114. Beziers 1246 canons 1–9.

115. Beziers 1246 canons 10–12, 17–28.

116. Beziers 1246 c. 29.

117. The difference between acts and identities is discussed in Foucault, *Sexuality*, 43

118. For example, Béziers 1246 c. 36. This also indicates a particular theory of heretical “contamination” of course.

119. Albi 1254 canons 1–13, 15.

120. Albi 1254 c. 18.

Chapter 2. To Correct the Guilty Life

1. These were the ages of “discretion” within law. Nearly 6000 of the depositions taken between 1245 and 1246 are recorded in MS 609 of the Bibliothèque Municipale of Toulouse, which is apparently only a record of two out of an original ten books compiled by the inquisitors. On the inquisitors’ activities, and this manuscript, see Pegg, *Corruption of Angels*, particularly chap. 4.

2. K.-V. Selge, ed., *Texte zur Inquisition* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1967), 70–76; translated in Wakefield, *Heresy*, 250–58. Working from the internal evidence of the document, Antoine Dondaine ascribed the *Processus* to Guillaume Raymond and Pierre Durant, who wrote it between 20 November 1244 and the end of the pontificate of Innocent IV in 1254; however, Yves Dossat argues (and I concur) that authorship belongs to Bernard de Caux and Jean de St. Pierre, writing in 1248 or 1249. See Dossat, *Crises*, 167.

3. Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 44. See also A. Casenave, “Aveu et contrition: manuels de confesseurs et interrogatoires d’inquisition en Languedoc et en Catalogne (XIIIe–XIVe siècles),” in *Actes du 99e congrès national des sociétés savantes* (1977), 1: 333–52.

4. Robert of Flamborough, *Liber poenitentialis*, ed. J. J. F. Firth (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1971).

5. Plura quidem et alia facimus in processu et aliis, que scripto facile non pos-sent comprehendere, per omnia juris tenentes ordinem aut sedis ordinationem apostolice specialem. *Processus*, 75–76 (Wakefield, *Heresy*, 257).

6. For a description of all the inquisition manuals, see A. Dondaine, “Le Manuel de Pinquisiteur (1230–1330),” in *Les Hérésies et l’inquisition, XIIe–XIIIe siècles*, ed. Y. Dossat (Aldershot: Variorum, 1990), 85–194.

7. *Doctrina de modo procedendi contra hereticos* is edited in E. Martène and U. Durand, eds., *Thesaurus novus anecdotum* (Paris: Lutetian, 1717), 5: cols. 1795–1814. On Gui’s career and intellectual background see B. Guenée, *Between Church and State: The Lives of Four French Prelates in the Late Middle Ages*, trans. A. Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 37–70; J. Paul, “Le Mentalité de l’inquisiteur chez Bernard Gui,” *CdF* 16 (1981): 279–316. For a history and description of the manuscript of the *Practica*, see A. Pales-Gobilliard, “Bernard Gui inquisiteur et auteur de la *Practica*,” *CdF* 16 (1981): 253–64. The pseudo-David d’Augsbourg is of unknown date and uncertain provenance, and has a more complicated genealogy of edited editions; for a full account see Dondaine, “Manuel,” 104–5, 180–83. A long redaction is edited in W. Preger, ed., *Der Tractat des David von Augsburg* (Munich: Straub, 1878), 204–35, a shorter redaction in Martène and Durand, *Thesaurus*, 5: cols. 1777–94. It is to the latter which I mainly refer, as it can most confidently be located in southern France.

8. *Processus*, 71, 73.

9. *Processus*, 71–72.

10. *Processus*, 70–71.

11. *Processus*, 70, 76 (Wakefield, *Heresy*, 251, 257). The latter are the last words of the manual.

12. *Doctrina*, cols. 1796–97; see Dondaine, “Manuel,” 108–11.

13. *Doctrina*, col. 1805.

14. *Doctrina*, col. 1795.

15. Cant. 2:15. On the use of this trope in the twelfth century, see B. M. Kienzle, “Defending the Lord’s Vineyard: Hildegard of Bingen’s Preaching Against the Cathars,” in *Medieval Monastic*

Preaching, ed. C. Muessig (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 163–81.

16. Preger, *Der Tractat*, 219–20; this passage is missing from the version in Martène and Durand.

17. Martène and Durand, *Thesaurus*, 5: cols. 1786, 1785, 1786–87. A passage in the longer redaction also suggests that the inquisitor should not publicize the names of heretics and their errors, so that anyone confessing must make a full and complete account of their errors and associates (Preger, *Der Tractat*, 220–21).

18. On my concept of “strategic paranoia,” see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 97–98.

19. Wakefield, *Heresy*, 68–70, suggests between a thousand and fifteen hundred *perfecti*. Vicaire and Duvernoy arrive at higher figures, though any attempt is obviously prone to error.

20. See Barber, *The Cathars*, 181.

21. *Practica*, books 1–3.

22. *Practica*, 218–20.

23. *Practica*, 227–30.

24. *Practica*, 49, 68, 69.

25. For further thoughts on the gaps between the labels used by inquisitors, historians, and deponents see [Chapter 4](#).

26. See Bosworth, “Perception of the Origins and Causes of Heresy,” *passim*.

27. For example, the interrogation, and subsequent conversion, of heretics by Bishop Gerard of Arras-Cambrai, in 1025, discussed in [Chapter 1](#) (W&E, 82–85).

28. My analysis is informed by Michel Foucault’s work on “power/knowledge” and the “will to knowledge” or the “will to truth.” These concerns permeate all his work, but see particularly Foucault, *Archaeology*, 178–95; Foucault, *Discipline*, 104–31.

29. *Doctrina*, cols. 1808, 1813; *De inquisitione*, col. 1794; *Practica*, 35, 39, 46, 49, 67, 69, 70, 71, 170, 145, 154, 288, 292, 298, and *passim*.

30. Prov. 26:11. See, for example, Bernard of Clairvaux’s letter to the count of Toulouse, W&E, 124

31. *Practica*, 35, 71, and *passim*. On the linking together of different, perceived threats, see Moore, *Formation*, particularly pp. 66–99. On the worsening position of the Jews in Languedoc during the thirteenth century (including a massacre at Toulouse in 1320), see Paterson, *World of the Troubadours*, 175–82; Mundy, *Society and Government*, 277–84; and the essays in *Juifs et Judaïsme de Languedoc*, CdF 12 (1977). See also M. Kriegel, “La Juridiction inquisitoriale sur les Juifs à l’époque de Philippe le Hardi et Philippe le Bel,” in *Les Juifs dans l’histoire de France*, ed. M. Yardeni (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 70–77.

32. Note that the most famous passage in Gui, describing the “hidden meanings” behind Waldensians’ seemingly innocent answers (*Practica*, 255) and used fictionally by Umberto Eco (*The Name of the Rose*, trans. W. Weaver [London: Secker and Warburg, 1983], 370–73) is in fact largely copied by Gui from *De inquisitione hereticorum* (Martène and Durand, *Thesaurus*, 5: cols. 1789–90) — and therefore, the “knowledge” I am describing here is not limited to the *Practica*. For discussion of this passage, see [Chapter 3](#), p. 97.

33. *Practica*, 237–43; W&E, 379–86.

34. *Practica*, 226, quoting from the consultations of Gui Foulques.

35. Narbonne 1243 c. 5; repeated word for word in Directory of Beziers 1246, c. 29; *Practica*, 175.

36. On this duality, see A. Roach, “Penance and the Making of the Inquisition in Languedoc,” *JEH* (2001). For another, inspiring discussion of the penances, see Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 66–90. H. C. Lea saw this tension as a “fiction,” believing that the inquisitors were essentially there to punish, not to convert (*History*, 1: 459); others have swung the other way, or seen greater nuances (for example Hamilton, *Medieval Inquisition*, 49).

37. G. G. Merlo, “Coercition et orthodoxie: modalités de communication et d’imposition d’un message religieux hégémonique,” in *Faire croire: Modalités de la diffusion et de la réception des messages religieux du XII^e au XV^e siècle*, ed. A. Vauchez (Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1981), 101.

38. Toulouse 1229 canons 10, 11; Gregory IX *Excommunicamus* 1231 col. 73; Beziers 1232 c. 4; Raymond VII 1233 col. 266. The council of Arles in 1234 sentenced spontaneous converts to prison and impenitents to death (Arles 1234 c. 6).

39. Toulouse 1229 c. 6; Raymond VII 1233 col. 266; Tarragona 1233 c. 4.

40. Arles 1234 c. 11.

41. *Cupientes* 1229 c. 3; Toulouse 1229 c. 4; Gregory IX *Excommunicamus* 1231 col. 73; Raymond VII 1233 col. 266.

42. Beziers 1232 c. 1; Arles 1234 c. 4.

43. *Chronique*, 58. Pelhissou recounts many burnings and exhumations: *Chronique*, 42, 46, 56, 58,

44. *Chronique*, 96. The passage appears in Occitan in the original.
45. For a similar analysis of the violence of later medieval secular punishment, see M. B. Merback, *The Thief, the Cross, and the Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment in Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 20 and passim.
46. For a description of later penances, see Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 301–6; Lea, *History*, 1: 459ff.
47. Tarragona 1242 col. 556; Directory of Béziers 1246 c. 17. Canonists justified burning as the specific mode of execution through reference to John 15:6: “If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned.” See Helmholz, *Spirit of Classical Canon Law*, 362.
48. Tarragona 1242 col. 556; Narbonne 1243 canons 9, 12.
49. Albi 1254 c. 25.
50. Béziers 1246 c. 35; Albi 1254 c. 6.
51. Narbonne 1243 c. 1. More than one parish church is sometimes specified, indicating that the penitent was being made public to quite a wide geographical area: see, for example, the sentence given by the inquisitors Ferrier and Pierre Durand in 1244, edited in Patschovsky and Selge, *Quellen zur Geschichte*, 63–65.
52. Béziers 1246 c. 26. The crosses predate inquisition: St. Dominic imposed crosses on a penitent *perfectus* in 1208 (Dossat, *Crises*, 111).
53. There is debate over the distinction between St. Eulalie of Barcelona (12 February) and St. Eulalie of Mérida (11 December). 12 February fits chronologically into the list of days given in the penance. Most commentators now suggest that they were one and the same, and that the historical authenticity of the latter is more strongly attested. Both saints figure strongly as martyrs in Christian repression. See R. Aubert and E. Van Canwenbergh, eds., *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1912-), vol. 15.
54. Tarragona 1242 cols. 556–57.
55. For a detailed account of penance, see M. Mansfield, *The Humiliation of Sinners: Public Penance in Thirteenth-Century France* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).
56. M. de Jong, “Power and Humility in Carolingian Society: The Public Penance of Louis the Pious,” *Early Medieval Europe* 1 (1992): 29–52, 44; T. N. Tentler, *Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 3–5.
57. *Paenitentiale remense* (c. a.d. 800) quoted in Jong, “Power and Humility,” 35.
58. Jong, “Power and Humility,” 36–49. See also R. Folz, “La Pénitence publique au IX^e siècle d’après les canons de l’évêque Isaac de Langres” in *Actes du 109^e congrès national des sociétés savantes, Dijon 1984* (Paris: CTHS, 1985), 1: 331–43.
59. Jong, “Power and Humility,” 33. See also M. de Jong, “What Was Public About Public Penance? *Paenitentia publica* in the Carolingian World,” in *La giustizia neWalto medioevo (secoli IX–XI)*, Settimane di Studio 44 (Spoleto: Presso la Sede del Centro, 1997), 2: 863–902.
60. Flamborough, *Liber poenitentialis*, 205; Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 125–79; H. C. Lea, *A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences in the Latin Church* (1896; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 2: 77–86. Mansfield sees this tripartite division as something of a “fiction,” but nevertheless a useful one; see Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 56 and passim.
61. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 156–57.
62. Raymond de Peñafort defended arbitrary penance, but argued that capital sins (adultery, perjury, fornication, homicide) should receive seven years penance, although this was still a “norm” and not an absolute. See Tentler, *Sin and Confession*, 18.
63. Béziers 1246 c. 33. See descriptions in Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 125–46.
64. L. L. Otis, *Prostitution in Medieval Society: The History of an Urban Institution in Languedoc* (London: Chicago University Press, 1985), 21.
65. There had been differences between penances for heretics and orthodox sinners since at least the seventh century; see T. Charles-Edwards, “The Penitential of Theodore and the *Iudicia Theodori*,” in *Archbishop Theodore: Commemorative Studies on His Life and Influence*, ed. M. Lapidge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 164–66.
66. Lea, *Auricular Confession*, 2: 84.
67. Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 161.
68. Flamborough, *Liber poenitentialis*, 208; R. Hill, “Public Penance: Some Problems of a Thirteenth Century Bishop,” *History* n.s. 36 (1951): 216. Mansfield suggests that keeping any sin or penance “secret” was fairly unworkable, and that “public” and “secret” should be related to the specific, legal concept of *infamia* (Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 78–89, 118). Nevertheless, it is clear that whereas the

theologians suggest preserving secrecy in one form of penance, they explicitly request publicity in relation to heresy.

69. Béziers 1246 c. 26.

70. Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 127–31, 179–208.

71. Béziers 1246 c. 6. Valence 1248 c.13 orders that those who put down the crosses are to be compelled to resume them, and if they refuse, to be treated as *heretici*.

72. See [Chapter 5](#), pp. 169–73.

73. Adémar de Chabannes, *Chronique*, ed. J. Chavanon (Paris: Alphonse Picard et fils, 1897), 185 (III.lix); W&E, 74, 75.

74. W&E, 108, 109. See similarly St. Bernard's description of Henry, W&E, 122.

75. For example, Odo of Cluny's well-known misogynist remarks: "The beauty of the body resides wholly in the skin. In truth, if men could see what is beneath the skin, the very sight of women would be nauseating to them. Consider what is hidden in the nostrils, the throat, the belly: filth throughout. And we, who loath to touch vomit or manure even with a fingertip, how could we desire to clasp a very sack of excrement in our arms?" PL 133, col. 556; quoted in M.-C. Pouchelle, *The Body and Surgery in the Middle Ages*, trans. R. Morris (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 232, n. 57.

76. W&E, 132–38.

77. W&E, 129.

78. Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogue on Miracles*, trans. H. von E. Scott and C. C. Swinton Bland (London: Routledge, 1929), 1: 338–41.

79. W&E, 93. See [Chapter 1](#), pp. 19–21.

80. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum*, vol. 22, col. 165; W&E, 192.

81. Jordan of Saxony, *On the Beginnings of the Order of Preachers*, ed. and trans. S. Tugwell (Chicago: Parable, 1982), 6.

82. G. Klaniczay, *The Uses of Supernatural Power: The Transformation of Popular Religion in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, trans. S. Singerman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 52.

83. *Practica*, 129 and *passim*.

84. *Practica*, 129, 131.

85. R. Jütte, "Stigma-Symbole: Kleidung als identitätsstiftendes Merkmal bei spätmittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Randgruppen (Juden, Dirnen, Aussatziige, Bettler)," *Saeculum* 44 (1993): 65–89.

86. Lateran IV c. 68; Arles 1234 c. 16; Béziers 1246 canons 37–43; Valence 1248 c. 5; Albi 1254 canons 63–70.

87. Jütte, "Stigma-Symbole," 68–79.

88. *Practica*, 105.

89. *Practica*, 158–59.

90. Though the more punitive aspects of the procedure might override this element: in 1245, one Faure Raseire told inquisitors that when he had been condemned earlier at Toulouse "his crosses had been marked on his brow with a branding iron." This was one way of dealing with the uneasiness over the mutability of exterior signs. Quoted in J. H. Mundy, *Men and Women at Toulouse in the Age of the Cathars* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990), 124.

91. *Practica*, 60, 100.

92. Béziers 1246 canons 38–41. In practice, signs could of course have other interpretations, and act as advertisements for beggars or prostitutes. See Jütte, "StigmaSymbole," 86–89.

93. Béziers 1246 c. 6.

94. For an opposing view, see Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 66, 90.

95. *Doctrina*, col. 1796.

96. *Practica*, 84. *Doctrina*, col. 1796 also presents hierarchical sentencing, and the sentences of Bernard Gui recorded in Limborch are also grouped into contexts of guilt.

97. *Practica*, 91.

98. Tarragona 1242 cols. 555–56; *Doctrina*, col. 1803. For discussion, see Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 288–90.

99. Klaniczay, *Supernatural Power*, 69–78.

100. Grundmann, *Religious Movements*, 11 and *passim*; A. Brenon, *Le Vrai visage ducatharisme* (Portet-sur-Garonne: Loubatières, 1989), 23 and *passim*.

101. For general background, see Chenu, *Nature, Man, and Society*, 99–145.

102. For example, D. Elliott, "Dress as Mediator Between Inner and Outer Self: The Pious Matron of the High and Later Middle Ages," *Medieval Studies* 53 (1991): 279–308.

103. Klaniczay, *Supernatural Power*, 52.

104. Jütte, "Stigma-Symbole," 87–88; D. O. Hughes, "Distinguishing Signs: Earrings, Jews and Franciscan Rhetoric in the Italian Renaissance City," *P&P* 112 (1986): 3–59. On signs "slipping," see also S. Lipton, "Jews, Heretics and the Sign of the Cat in the *Bible Moralisee*," *Word and Image* 8 (1992): 362–77.
105. For a statistical analysis of penances in the earlier half of the thirteenth century, see Dossat, *Crises*, 247–68; and for Gui's penances, see Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 67–71.
106. On an early, northern French hagiographical poem on St. Eulalie of Barcelona, see F. J. Barnett, "Some Notes to the Sequence of St. Eulalia," in *Studies in Medieval French Presented to Alfred Ewert*, ed. E. A. Francis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 1–25.
107. See above, p. 66. This mimetic system is perhaps closer to secular public punishments, which frequently sought to mirror the crime in the punishment. See R. van Dülmen, *Theatre of Horror: Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Germany*, trans. E. Neu (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 43–57.
108. Lea, *History*, 1: 468.
109. V. Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1969), 95–113 —though Lea obviously predates this kind of analysis.
110. Jutte, "Stigma-Symbole," 81; R. Mellinkoff, *Outcasts: Signs of Otherness in Northern European Art of the Late Middle Ages* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1: 36, 45–46.
111. For example, Doat 25 fols. 31V, 4or, 138r; for orthodox contexts, see M. Markowski, "Crucesignatus: Its Origins and Early Usage," *JMH* 10 (1984): 157–65.
112. E. O. Blake, "The Formation of the 'Crusade Idea,'" *JEH* 21 (1970): 11–31.
113. Moore, *Formation*, 26, quoting PL 204: cols. 236–37.
114. Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 72–73, 90.
115. M.-H. Vicaire, "La Predication nouvelle des prêcheurs méridionaux auXIIIe siècle," *CdF* 6 (1971), 38–41.
116. Toulouse 1229 c. 12; *Processus*, 74 (Wakefield, *Heresy*, 256).
117. *Practica*, 44–45; see also 38, 84 (quoted above), and *passim*.
118. Mansfield argues that public penitents, particularly in their Palm Sunday processions, similarly used the image of Christ "in imitative atonement" for their sins; see Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 146–47.
119. See for example their prominence among the Flagellants: G. Dickson, "The Flagellants of 1260 and the Crusades," *JMH* 15 (1989): 229–33.
120. See S. Lerer, "'Representyd now in yower syght': The Culture of Spectatorship in Late-Fifteenth-Century England," in *Bodies and Disciplines: Intersections of Literature and History in Fifteenth-Century England*, ed. B. Hanawalt and D. Wallace (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 29–62.
121. A. Vauchez, *The Laity in the Middle Ages: Religious Beliefs and Devotional Practices*, trans. M. J. Schneider (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 99.
122. R. Rusconi, "De la Predication à la confession: Transmission et contrôle des modèles de comportement au XIIIe siècle," in *Faire croire*, 83.

Chapter 3. The Construction of the Confessing Subject

1. Doat 26 fols. 117V–118V.
2. Doat 26 fols. 115V–132V.
3. For discussion of these rituals, see [Chapter 4](#).
4. R. Kieckhefer, "The Office of Inquisition and Medieval Heresy: The transition from Personal to Institutional Jurisdiction," *JEH* 46 (1995): 36–61. See also Kieckhefer, *Repression of Heresy*, 3–5; H. A. Kelly, "Inquisition and the Prosecution of Heresy: Misconceptions and Abuses," *Church History* 58 (1989): 439–51. For a wider analysis of the (mistaken) cultural image of the Inquisition, see E. Peters, *Inquisition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). This image still persists: see the risible M. Baignent and R. Leigh, *The Inquisition* (London: Viking, 1999).
5. Friedlander, *Hammer of the Inquisitors*, 270–72.
6. *Practica*, 160.
7. *Summae Theologiae* 1a2ae, Q. 183, articles 1 and 3 (Blackfriars ed., 47: 6–13).
8. On the production of truth within inquisition, see Esmein, *History*, 10; T. Asad, "Notes on Body Pain and Truth in Medieval Christian Ritual," *Economy and Society* 12 (1983): 287–327; and discussion below.
9. *De inquisitione hereticorum* in Preger, *Der Tractat*, 219. For commentary on this aspect of the manual, see Dondaine, "Manuel," 104–5.
10. *Practica*, 239. The passage notes the duplicity of Cathars under questioning, which can deceive

simplices et etiam magni litterati inexpertii; successful inquisitors are therefore, by implication, “expert.”

11. *Practica*, 233.

12. *Practica*, 175.

13. Given, “Inquisitors of Languedoc,” 347.

14. Dossat, *Crises*, 33.

15. Lea, *History*, 1: 379; Borst, *Les Cathares*, 24; Dossat, *Crises*, 32. See similarly comments in Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 34–35.

16. Although all “hostile” accounts in varying degrees, the narratives of Moore, Lambert, and Hamilton all support this move toward rationality. See also comments in Introduction and Chapter 1.

17. For example, Lambert, *Medieval Heresy*, 177; Hamilton, *Inquisition*, 73–76.

18. Given, “Inquisitors of Languedoc,” 347.

19. *Ibid.*, 350. Given goes on to note that what they discovered was not necessarily “the truth,” but he locates such distortions not in the texts, but in the procedures for interrogation; that is, he preserves the idea that consulting texts was logical, rational, and therefore *natural*, even if the information they contained was not.

20. See, for example, Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*.

21. Asad, “Body Pain,” 291.

22. For example, *Ad extirpanda*, 1252, specifies that four copies of the records of heretics declared *infama* are to be kept, and the names are to be publicized three times per year. See Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 310.

23. *Processus*, 72 (Wakefield, *Heresy*, 253).

24. *Practica*, 138ff, 193, 202.

25. *Practica*, 203, 66, 63.

26. *Processus*, 74 (Wakefield, *Heresy*, 255); *Doctrina*, cols. 1808–9, 1810; *Practica*, 38 — a separate letter is needed for each place of pilgrimage assigned from the twenty-five possible choices.

27. *Practica*, 38.

28. *Doctrina*, col. 1796.

29. Lea, *History*, 1: 380–81. On the plot at Carcassonne, see Friedlander, *Hammer of the Inquisitors*, 16–17; depositions in Doat 26 fols. 215v–216r, 261V–264r, 266r–267r.

30. Doat 24 fols. 67r–68r.

31. Doat 24 fol. 166v.

32. Guiraud, *Histoire*, 2: 121.

33. I am influenced here by Steven Justice’s arguments about the English rebels of 1381 (in *Writing and Rebellion*). He has a stronger case; I am merely posting this suggestion now for the context of later argument about cultural notions of literacy in Chapter 5.

34. Another possible example of people recognizing power in texts is given by the odd case of a clerk apparently forging wills which detailed contact between certain deceased persons and a heretic called “brother Isarn,” which he then used to blackmail their descendants (who stood to lose their property if heretical ancestors were established). See Doat 26 fols. 142v–147r; Friedlander, *Hammer of the Inquisitors*, 9–11.

35. Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record*, 145.

36. Doat 26 fol. 292r. For some other examples, see Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 39–42.

37. Lea, *History*, 1: 379, referring to Limborch, 198–99.

38. Dossat, *Crises*, 32, where a few similar examples can be found.

39. Toulouse MS 609, *passim*. Since the Doat manuscripts are later copies, they provide no firm evidence, but in fact they do tend to work similarly by area. Gui’s sentences also use geographical divisions, arranged alphabetically; see Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 35–38.

40. Given, *Inquisition and Medieval Society*, 35.

41. For example, the deposition of Guillaume Orseti; he is asked questions about a specific heretic, and other particular matters (Doat 25 fol. 178V).

42. Some of the interrogations are undated. The case appears in Doat 25: witnesses against Fabrisa, fols. 38V–43V; her testimony, fols. 43v–52r; Philippa, fols. 52V–53 V.

43. Limborch, 3–4.

44. Dossat, *Crises*, 243, quoting Toulouse MS 609, fol. 192r.

45. W. L. Wakefield, “Friar Ferrier, Inquisition at Caunes, and Escapes from Prison at Carcassonne,” *Catholic Historical Review* 58 (1972): 236. On the events at Avignonet, see Y. Dossat, “Le Massacre d’Avignonet,” *CdF* 6 (1971): 343–59 and comments above.

46. Wakefield, “Friar Ferrier,” 236, n. 89.

47. Doat 23 fols. 105V, 114V, 115r; Doat 24 fol. 13V. Similar examples from Toulouse MS 609 in Dossat, *Crises*, 240.

48. Doat 25 fols. 157V, 172r, 298r.

49. Doat 25 fols. 86v, 114r, 127V, 139V, 157V, 172r, 184r, 184V, 193V, 208r, 218r, 220V, 251V, 272r, 275r, 282V, 298r.

50. For example, Ranulphe de Plassac questioned Barthélemy Jordan on prior contact with inquisitors, and the deponent said that he had been before Ferrier; asked if he had been given penance, he said not (Doat 25 fol. 36r). This possibly indicates that Ranulphe did not have a record of Barthélemy's penance, and was asking for information; or else he was trying to catch the deponent in perjury and possible relapsation, as discussed below.

51. *Practica*, 243–44; W&E, 386.

52. For example, Doat 23 fols. 86v–87r, 154r–57r.

53. For example, three depositions given in Doat 26 fols. 7r–v. See also Dossat, *Crises*, 240.

54. For example, the deponent Pierre Pictavin “admitted that he had done ill because he had confessed none of these things [recorded in his deposition] to the most recently mentioned inquisitor” (in this case, Pons de Parnac) (Doat 25 fol. 25iv).

55. Doat 26 fol. 7r. This is followed by an identical deposition given by Guilabert de Foissac, knight of Puylaurens. The “etc.” is common (although not necessarily medieval) and indicates the familiar formula “to tell the truth on himself and others, living and dead, on the crime of heresy and Waldensianism”

56. That is, presumably, that he is not a squire.

57. Doat 26 fol. 63r–v.

58. There is another example of a group of deponents attempting to derail the production of inquisition documents: a group of men who gave false names to inquisitors. As Dossat remarks, we unfortunately do not know how or why this ruse failed. See Dossat, *Crises*, 243, referring to Toulouse MS 609 fol. 237V.

59. On a similar “crisis” in written authority, see J. M. Gellrich, “Orality, Literacy, and Crisis in the Later Middle Ages,” *Philological Quarterly* 67 (1988): 461–73.

60. One suspects that Guiraud was probably telling the truth, since the inquisitors Guillaume Arnaud and Pierre Seila had been active forty to forty-five years earlier.

61. Doat 25 fol. 208r–v.

62. Doat 23 fol. 273r–v. Presumably the fragment is not a survivor from the Avignon registers, but part of the letter of reconciliation given to him by the inquisitor.

63. Doat 25 fol. 133r–v. On the use of inquisitorial spies, see A. Cazenave, “L’Entraide cathare et la chasse à l’hérétique en Languedoc au XIII^e siècle,” in *Actes du 100^e congrès nationale des sociétés savantes* (1971)52: 108–9.

64. Doat 25 fol. 135V.

65. Doat 25 fols. 83r–89v.

66. Possibly Raymond du Falga; see Dossat, *Crises*, 182–85.

67. *Practica*, 192, 212.

68. *Practica*, 201, 199, 131–33.

69. *Practica*, 43.

70. Foucault’s work on subjectivity inform my thoughts here; see particularly “The Subject and Power,” in H. L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, eds., *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Brighton, Eng.: Harvester Press, 1986), 208–26.

71. Narbonne 1243 c. 23; *Processus*, 75.

72. Directory of Beziers 1246 c. 11 — that no one is to be condemned without confession, or clear and frank proof.

73. Murray, “Religion amongst the Poor,” 287.

74. Lea, *Auricular Confession*, 1: 227–50; Tentler, *Sin and Confession*; J. Bossy, “The Social History of Confession in the Age of the Reformation,” *TRHS* 5th ser. 25 (1975): 21–38; Murray, “Confession Before 1215”; Mansfield, *Humiliation*; and the various articles in Biller and Minnis, eds., *Handling Sin*.

75. Nîmes/Arles/Béziers 1252 c. 26 (Pontal, *Statuts synodaux*). See also Albi 1254 c. 29.

76. Murray, “Counselling in Medieval Confession,” 63–77.

77. Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 73.

78. For example, Robert of Flamborough notes that most penitents will need to be interrogated diligently and discreetly by the priest to confess sins other than avarice and lust, unless the penitent is *discretus et litemus*; Flamborough, *Liber poenitentialis*, 296.

79. Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 59.
80. M. F. Branswell, *The Medieval Sinner: Characterization and Confession in the Literature of the English Middle Ages* (London: Associated University Presses, 1983), 50.
81. Flamborough, *Liber poenitentialis*, 179.
82. Quoted in R. Kieckhefer, *Unquiet Souls: Fourteenth Century Saints and their Religious Milieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 126.
83. Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogue on Miracles*, 1: 184–85; quoted in Mansfield, *Humiliation*, 67.
84. T. N. Tentler, “The *Summa* for Confessors as an Instrument of Social Control,” in *The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion*, ed. C. Trinkaus and H. A. Oberman (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 113, 122–23. See also the objections raised in L. E. Boyle, “The *Summa* for Confessors as a Genre and Its Religious Intent” and Tentler’s reply, *ibid*.
85. Boyle, “Religious Intent,” 127.
86. Tentler, “Social Control,” 123.
87. Foucault, *Sexuality*, 61–62. See also M. Hepworth and B. S. Turner, *Confession: Studies in Deviance and Religion* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982) particularly chap. 4; J. Tambling, *Confession: Sexuality, Sin, the Subject* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); T. Asad, “On Ritual and Discipline in Medieval Christian Monasticism,” *Economy & Society* 16 (1987), particularly 186–93, which outlines the theoretical critique of Tentler very clearly. For a recent medieval engagement with Foucault on confession, see K. Lochrie, *Covert Operations: The Medieval Uses of Secrecy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 12–42. Lochrie rightly points out that Foucault homogenizes “the medieval”; however, her own insightful analysis is slightly weakened by also grouping together commentators from Robert of Flamborough to Jean Gerson, thus missing what was *changing* in the nature of lay confession over time.
88. Tarragona 1242 cols. 555–56.
89. Maisonneuve, *Etudes*, 289–90. The witness was required to clear him or herself of *infamia* by the use of two witnesses or compurgators, a practice closer to the system of *accusatio* than *inquisitio*. For a couple of depositions that provide exactly the problem of prior confession, see above pp. 88–89. The *Doctrina* specifically orders priests to inquire about heresy in confession, and to write down the names of any found suspect to be passed on to the bishop or other authorities (col. 1802). On the relationship between parochial confession and inquisition, see P.-M. Gy, “Le Précepte de la confession annuelle (Latran IV c. 21) et la detection des hérétiques,” *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 58 (1974): 444–50; Cazenave, “Aveu et contrition.”
90. For example, the *Processus* implicitly differentiates between those who come during the Period of Grace and those who are cited (although the line between them is not clearly defined); whereas the *Doctrina* begins with an assumption of citing people and then notes that some might have to be imprisoned before they will talk.
91. For example, Limborch, 2, 4.
92. Limborch, 3–4. See also pp. 10–11 and *passim*.
93. Limborch, 5.
94. *Practica*, 219.
95. *Practica*, 40 and *passim*.
96. Similarly on annual confession, see Lochrie, *Covert Operations*, 29–38.
97. Asad, “Body Pain,” 296.
98. The phrase *ut dixit* (as in, “the witness, as he says, did so-and-so”) appears frequently in depositions and usually does indicate an area of doubt or uncertainty. Throughout the *Practica*, formulae for sentences make reference to the records of the witness’s crimes, against which his or her penitential behavior can be checked. See for example the sentence for imprisoning a Jew who led Jewish converts to Christianity to “relapse” into Judaism: his sentence is imposed for what he committed against the faith, “just as plainly contained in his confession, written in our books” (*Practica*, 35).
99. Limborch, 4.
100. *Doctrina*, col. 1795.
101. *De inquisitione hereticorum*, cols. 1787–88 — “Timor enim mortis et spes vite emolliunt cor quod vix aliter possunt emollire.” A possible source for the phrase is Augustine’s writings against the Manichaeans: “Reply to Faustus the Manichaean,” book 18 (*The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo*, vol. 5, *Writings in Connection with the Manichaean Heresy*, trans. R. Stothert [Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1872], 323–24), quoting Ezek. 11:19. Later inquisitors seem to have adopted even more severe tactics; see the discussion of Nicholas Aymeric in Cazenave, “Aveu et contrition,” 337.
102. For more on coercive tactics, see Given, “Inquisitors and Power,” 343–47.

103. Asad remarks (though still concentrating on torture), “confession made in the torture-chamber could not in itself serve as the basis for conviction. It had to be repeated willingly in court. . . . Hence the doctrine that truth cannot be the product of violence — that it must be the spontaneous confession of a conscious and sincere *subject*” (“Body Pain,” 297). Even without the direct threat of torture, this still holds true for the cases I describe above. On “spontaneity” and the importance of confession to inquisition, see also H. H. Cohn, “Tortures and Confessions: Historical Sidelights on the Psychology of Law,” *Scripta hierosolymitana* 21 (1969): 6–11.

104. Cazenave, “Aveu et contrition,” 333.

105. Doat 26 fols. 291r–92v.

106. For example, Doat 26 fols. 102V, 112–13r, 131V; Doat 25 fol. 32or.

107. On secular support, see Dossat, *Crises*, 173–88; C. Delpoux, “Alphonse de Poitiers et l’inquisition,” *Cahiers d’études cathares* 27–28 (1976): 27–44, 47–55; Friedlander, *Hammer of the Inquisitors*.

108. *Practica*, 254; W&E, 400; *De inquisitione* cols. 1789–90.

109. For example, Doat 23 fols. 114v–15r, 236V.

110. For example, Doat 25 fol. 23 ir.

111. Those abjuring heresy “recoil from their errors and recognize the true faith of the Holy Roman Church, *believe it in their heart and confess it with their mouth and serve it*” (my emphasis) (*Practica*, 131 and *passim*).

112. See Lea, *History*, 1: 432.

113. For example, Duvernoy suggests that this “laconic” approach arose from the large number of people dealt with, and therefore the limited time each could be given (Duvernoy, *Registre de Bernard de Caux*, 8). However, this simply pushes the questions to one remove: Why were they interviewing large numbers of people? And why was “belief” the area they let by? See also W. L. Wakefield, “Heretics and Inquisitors: The case of Auriac and Cambiac,” *JMH* 12 (1986): 225: “The intent was to obtain evidence of guilty acts, not to discover the nature of the heresies, about which the inquisitors no doubt felt themselves fully informed.” If the latter were so, why would Gui, some years later, bother to include a large section in the *Practica* that informed his brethren even further?

114. Although a few of these contain the evidence of more than one deponent and there is a missing volume to that register. Nonetheless, the broad point remains true. For a similar description of the changes in evidence, although with a different explanation, see Given, “Inquisitors and Power,” 340.

115. *Doctrina*, col. 1795.

116. *Processus*, 72 (Wakefield, *Heresy*, 253).

117. *Practica*, 14 and *passim*.

118. *Processus*, 73 (Wakefield, *Heresy*, 254–55).

119. *Doctrina*, cols. 1796, 1808; *Processus*, 74 (Wakefield, *Heresy*, 255).

120. *Practica*, 235–36. Mollat glosses this passage, “C’est-à-dire sans l’emploi de la torture” (Bernard Gui, *Manuel de l’inquisiteur*, ed. and trans. M. Mollat [Paris: Société d’Edition Les Belles Lettres, 1964], 1: 5, n. 2). This is partly accurate, though the rest of the passage indicates that Gui also considers encouraging spontaneity by giving the deponent some time to think. In any case, see discussion above on spontaneity and coercion.

121. For example, Doat 25 fols. 11v, 17r; Doat 26 fols. 152r, 191r–v.

122. Doat 26 fols. 215V–16V. See also fols. 220v–21r for a different witness, using similar language.

123. For example, Doat 24 fols. 42r, 180r–v.

124. Doat 23 fol. 205r, and again fol. 206V. On this rite, see Borst, *Les Cathares*, 170–71.

125. For example, Doat 26 fols. 115r–131V. See further discussion in Chapter 4.

126. A. Murray, “Medieval Doubt,” paper presented at Religion and Society, sixty-fifth Anglo-American Conference of Historians, Institute of Historical Research, London, 4 July 1998. Murray went on to argue that “mice” usually appear because of other, nontheological disputes, such as political and financial quarrels. This can be shown in some, but by no means all, cases. See also A. Murray, “The Epicureans,” in *Intellectuals and Writers in Fourteenth Century Europe*, ed. P. Boitani and A. Torti (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1986), 147.

127. See examples in Chapter 5.

128. See A. Brenon, *Les Femmes cathares* (Paris: Perrin, 1992), 246.

129. This was about a month before the fall of Montségur but well after the siege had begun; see Duvernoy, *Histoire*, 286–95.

130. Doat 22 fols. 243v–47r.

131. Doat 22 fols. 243V–44r.

132. Doat 22 fols. 244r, 246V.

133. Doat 22 fol. 244r.

134. Doat 22 fol. 244r-v.

135. Doat 22 fol. 247r. Most depositions specify whether or not the deponents were at the same table as the heretics, and whether or not they ate blessed bread. There might have been various reasons why people did not eat at the same table: one man, for example, specifies that he was eating meat (and blessed bread) next to the heretics at a different table (Doat 24 fol. 7iv). This might have been in deference to the Cathars' abhorrence of meat, but was nonetheless in response to an inquisitor's question. Although it is not explicitly stated anywhere, I have the impression that inquisitors had an interest in physical proximity to heretics, and along with their notion of the heretical rite of blessing bread that they saw as mimicking the sacrament of the Host; on this latter point see Duvernoy, *Religion*, 212–16. At certain points in the record, the “table” is almost certainly metaphorical: Pierre Daide, for example, mentions eating with heretics “at the same table” but was in the mountains at the time (Doat 23 fol. 132V; it is just possible that a village, “Les Montagnes,” is implied, but there is no mention of a *domus*, which is very unusual); another deponent similarly eats “at the same table” in the middle of the woods (Doat 23 fol. 59V). This might be early evidence of portable garden furniture, but a metaphorical interpretation seems more likely.

136. Doat 25 fol. 114V.

137. Doat 22 fol. 247r.

138. *Fournier*, 3: 89–98 [*Registre*, 3: 1101–9]. The dates within the text begin in 1324, and then refer simply to “the same year”; however, the much later date of Guillemette's imprisonment (see below) might imply that there was in fact a longer gap between interviews.

139. *Fournier*, 3: 89, 90. The minor points were two conversations she had held with Raymonde Maury, wife of Guillaume Maury, whilst they had gone for water together; they had talked about the inquisitor of Carcassonne, and generally about the Cathars (*Fournier*, 3: 91).

140. *Fournier*, 3: 91–92.

141. *Fournier*, 3: 92–93.

142. *Fournier*, 3: 93–96.

143. *Registre*, 3: 1107, n. 8, referring to Doat 27 fol. 148V; this date seems rather delayed, but I have no access to the original manuscript at this time. She was almost certainly punished with prison because of her initial disobedience.

144. In depositions from the 1240s, imprisonment as a means of coercing confession also occurs, but the deponent is simply noted as “*detentus*.” See for example the second interview of Raymond de Miraval in 1244 (Doat 23 fol. 237V).

145. *Fournier*, 3: 98.

146. *Fournier*, 3: 97–98.

147. *Fournier*, 3: 96.

148. *Fournier*, 3: 95.

149. *Fournier*, 3: 95–96. On Cathar attitudes toward women, see P. P. A. Biller, “Cathars and Material Women,” in *Medieval Theology and the Natural Body*, ed. P. P. A. Biller and A. J. Minnis (York: York Medieval Press, 1997), 61–107.

150. Doat 22 fols. 89r–106r, translated in part in Wakefield, *Heresy*, 243–47. See discussion in Pegg, *Corruption of Angels*, chap. 8.

151. *D'Ablis*, 368–93. See similarly the deposition of Pierre de Gaillac of Tarascon (*D'Ablis*, 332–61).

152. The scribe does not comment on the language of the original document, but during the course of his confession Pierre mentions hearing Cathars reading scripture in the vernacular, and mentions that he prefers it in Latin (*D'Ablis*, 380).

153. Doat 23 fols. 2V–49V. See also deposition of Pierre Fogasset de Caraman, fols. 312V–43V, about forty-five hundred words long. For a short, fourteenth-century deposition, see that of Pierre Fournier of Surla (*Fournier*, 3: 438–39).

154. J. Burckhardt, *The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860; reprint, London: Phaidon Press, 1940), 81.

155. C. H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (1927; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955); R. W. Southern, *The Making of the Middle Ages* (London: Hutchinson, 1953), 219–57; C. Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual, 1050–1200* (London: S.P.C.K., 1972). For other overviews, see R. D. Logan, “A Conception of the Self in the Later Middle Ages,” *JMH* 12 (1986): 253–59, and J. F. Benton, “Individualism and Conformity in Medieval Western Europe,” in *Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam*, ed. A. Banani and S. Vryonis, Jr. (Wiesbaden: Otto

Harrasowitz, 1977), 145–58.

156. D. Aers, “A Whisper in the Ear of the Early Modernists; or, Reflections on Literary Critics Writing the ‘History of the Subject,’” in *Culture and History 1350–1600: Essays on English Communities, Identities, and Writing*, ed. D. Aers (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 177–202.

157. W. Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1967), 6; R. W. Hanning, *The Individual in Twelfth Century Romance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 18; P. Braunstein, “Towards Intimacy: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” in *A History of Private Life*, vol. 2, *Revelations of the Medieval World*, ed. G. Duby, trans. A. Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 535.

158. Logan, “Conception of Self,” 259. Although Logan partly writes to insist on the historical specificity of that “self,” and is informed by elements of the theoretical critique I turn to below, this sense of teleology underlies his discussions.

159. Morris, *Individual*, 7–8.

160. G. Duby, “Solitude: Eleventh to Thirteenth Century,” in *History of Private Life*, 2: 529–30. See similarly Southern, *Making of the Middle Ages*, 241, 250.

161. Braunstein, “Towards Intimacy,” 541–42; A. Gurevitch, “L’Individuauté au Moyen Age: Le cas d’Opicinus de Canistris,” *AESC* 48 (1993): 1264.

162. For example, C. W. Bynum, “Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?” in *Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages* (London: University of California Press, 1982), 82–109. See also Morris’s reply to her critique in C. Morris, “Individualism in Twelfth-Century Religion: Some Further Reflections,” *JEH* 31 (1980): 195–206. The critique of “selfhood” as also being constituted through the group rather than the individual has also been projected “forward” into the early modern period; see N. Z. Davis, “Boundaries of the Self in Sixteenth Century France,” in *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*, ed. T. C. Heller, M. Sosna and D. E. Wellbery (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1986), 53–63.

163. Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 208.

164. See for example L. Patterson, *Chaucer and the Subject of History* (London: Routledge, 1991); Barker, *Michel Foucault*; S. Kay, *Subjectivity in Troubadour Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); J. Martin, “Inventing Sincerity, Refashioning Prudence: The Discovery of the Individual in Renaissance Europe,” *AHR* 102, 5 (1997): 1309–42; and the other works mentioned below.

165. Asad, “Ritual and Discipline,” 159.

166. M. J. Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 182.

167. On the medieval equation of textuality and subjectivity, see E. Jager, “The Book of the Heart: Reading and Writing the Medieval Subject,” *Speculum* 71 (1996): 1–26.

168. See for example T. Asad, “Medieval Heresy: An Anthropological View,” *Social History* 11 (1986): 395: “As the Church becomes more centralised and more actively concerned with empowering Truth, so its institutional practices become more elaborate, its rules and regulations more differentiated, and its doctrinal discourses more refined and methodical. Together with these differentiating processes goes the proliferation of authorized Christian selves: monastic discipline is no longer the only locus for perfecting the Christian self, for learning to avoid danger.”

169. For example, Morris, *Individual*, 70–73.

170. L. Gilmore, “Policing the Truth: Confession, Gender, and Autobiographical Authority,” in *Autobiography and Postmodernism*, ed. K. Ashley, L. Gilmore, and G. Peters (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), 54. See also L. Gilmore, *Autobiographies: A Feminist Theory of Women’s Self-Representation* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994). On medieval confession and subjectivity, see also J. F. Benton, “Consciousness of Self and Perceptions of Individuality,” in *Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century*, ed. R. L. Benson and G. Constable (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 273.

171. C. H. Haskins, “Robert le Bougre and the Beginnings of the Inquisition in Northern France,” in *Studies in Medieval Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), 225.

172. Doat 25 fol. 296v; see Biller, “Heresy and Literacy,” 9 and n. 27; and a more extended discussion in J. H. Arnold, “‘A man takes an ox by the horn and a peasant by the tongue’: Literacy, Orality and Inquisition in Medieval Languedoc” in *Learning and Literacy in the Middle Ages*, ed. M. C. Cross, S. Rees-Jones, and F. Riddy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001).

Part II. Introduction

1. See, for example, L. Patterson, “Historical Criticism and the Claims of Humanism,” in

Negotiating the Past: The Historical Understanding of Medieval Literature (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 41–74. I am not convinced, however, that Foucault’s view of power is the trap thus envisaged: particularly in his later writings, he seems clearly to hold out the possibility of resistance within the field of power, while refusing to present that resistance as stable or transcendent, nor as exterior to the domain of relationships constituted by power. See, for example, Foucault, *Sexuality*, 95–96.

2. I am influenced, in these thoughts, by M. de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. S. F. Rendall (London: University of California Press, 1984); P. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and J. Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex* (London: Routledge, 1993).

Chapter 4. Questions of Belief

1. Doat 25 fol. 267r/v. Pictavin recounts a number of statements similar to Raymond’s, bemoaning the fact that the *perfecti* did not dare to stay in “the land”: see Doat 25 fols. 266v, 267r, 267v, 268r.

2. Pierre states that he had “belief in the good men” for about twenty years, up until the massacre of the inquisitors at Avignonet (Doat 25 fol. 265r), which occurred in 1242. One *might* assume that Pierre’s belief therefore “began” at the age of discretion—fourteen—which would place his birth around 1208.

3. Pierre was present at the deathbeds of his uncle, two brothers-in-law, a fellow apprentice, and the father of his future wife (the latter two I am counting as part of his *familia*). He also *heard* about certain other deathbed heretications, where no social or familial contact is attested.

4. Doat 25 fol. 255r. Father and son share the same name.

5. Doat 25 fol. 256r/v.

6. See similarly, for example, Mundy’s description of a deponent who received both the *consolamentum* and the Host on her deathbed as wishing to “cover all bets”: *Men and Women*, 70.

7. Dossat, "Cathares," 89.
8. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 167.
9. See L. Bosworth, "The Two-Churches Typology in Medieval Heresiology," *Heresis* 24 (1995): 9–20. I am aware that these terms are sometimes used to differentiate belief-structures, following the seminal work of E. Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, trans. O. Wyon (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), particularly 1: 331–69. However, in this context, it is the *delimited* nature that both "church" and "sect" share that interests me. For an interesting discussion in a different context, see M. Aston, "Were the Lollards a Sect?" in *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life. Essays in Honour of Gordon Leff*, SCH, subsidia 11, ed. P. P. A. Biller and B. Dobson (Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1999), 163–91.
10. See for example, amongst others, the deposition of Arnaud de Savinhan discussed in Chapter 5.
11. For example, Dossat suggests that "le croyant était essentiellement passif" ("Cathares," 100).
12. For example, M. D. Lambert, "The Motives of the Cathars: Some Reflections," SCH 15 (1978): 49–59.
13. See similarly the criticism of "intellectualist bias" in Pegg, *Corruption of Angels*, chap. 3.
14. Duvernoy, *Régistre de Bernard de Caux*, 7.
15. N. Z. Davis, "Some Tasks and Themes in the Study of Popular Religion," in *The Pursuit of Holiness*, ed. Trinkaus and Oberman, 309. For other inspiring thoughts, see S. Reynolds, "Social Mentalities and the Case of Medieval Scepticism," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 6th ser. 1 (1991): 21–41.
16. On the complexities of the term "belief," see R. Needham, *Belief, Language, and Experience* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972).
17. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), 13.
18. See, for example, J. W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1991): 773–97; G. Stedman-Jones, "Anglo-Marxism, Neo-Marxism and the Discursive Approach to History," in *Was Bleibt von Marxistischen Perspektiven in der Geschichtsforschung?*, ed. A. Lüdtke (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 1997), 151–209. Commenting on the project of the Annales school, see H. Martin, *Mentalités médiévales XIe-XVe siècles* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996).
19. J. Rancière, *The Names of History*, trans. H. Melehy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 73.
20. *Processus*, 71–72.
21. Commenting on Victor Turner and Clifford Geertz's conceptions of ritual, see T. Asad, "Ritual and Discipline."
22. B. Hamilton, "The Cathars and Christian Perfection" in *The Medieval Church*, ed. Biller and Dobson, 16. In fact, one might also note that part of the confusion may arise from the inquisitors' investment in the idea of a ritual blessing of bread (which looked, to them, suspiciously like a perversion of the Eucharist); and, additionally, that the laity could have other relationships to the ritual, such as those occasions when they kept and stored the blessed bread, perhaps as a "stand in" or talisman for the absent *perfecti*.
23. Similarly, on lay interpretation of orthodox ritual, see Rubin, *Corpus Christi*, 288–346.
24. See A. Brenon, "Les Fonctions sacramentelles du consolament," *Heresis* 20 (1993): 33–50.
25. Clédât, *Nouveau Testament*, ix–xxvi, 470–82; W&E, 483–94.
26. Clédât, *Nouveau Testament*, xx–xxi, 479; W&E, 490–91. The "Pardon" was a ritualized exchange asking for forgiveness of sin; the "Prayer" indicates the Lord's Prayer; the "Six" indicates six repetitions of that prayer, and the "Double" sixteen repetitions; the "Act of Peace" was a kiss of peace exchanged between adherents, although women were not allowed bodily contact with men, and therefore, as is indicated, kissed the Book instead.
27. Brenon, "Consolament," 41.
28. Stock, *Implications of Literacy*, 88–240.
29. Davis, *Inquisition at Albi*, 40.
30. Brenon, "Consolament," 49; see Gui's beliefs that the Cathars, "like monkeys," invent new rituals to replace the sacraments (W&E, 379).
31. See for example the short account given of her own *consolamentum* by Dyas de St. Germier, Doat fols. 57v–58r.
32. See for example Doat 26 fols. 104r, 107r/v, 109r, 115r, 116r.
33. Doat 26 fol. 155v.
34. Clédât, *Nouveau Testament*, xxvi, 482; W&E, 494.
35. Clédât, *Nouveau Testament*, xxii–xxvi, 480–482; W&E, 492–4.

36. Doat 23 fol. 152V.
37. Doat 23 fol. 179r.
38. Doat 25 fol. 323V; Doat 24 fol. 132r/v.
39. See for example Doat 24, fol. 185r, Doat 25 fols. 48r, 253v.
40. For example Adélaïde de Massabrac, with six other women, arranged during the siege of Montségur that if they were mortally wounded, Bertrand Marty, the Cathar bishop, would administer the *consolamentum* even if they could not speak (Doat 24 fol. 207r; see similarly the deposition of Philippa de Mirepoix, Doat 24 fol. 202r/v).
41. Doat 23 fol. 219r. There are other instances: see for example Doat 24 fol. 209V, Doat 25 fols. 194v/195r.
42. Doat 25 fol. 267V.
43. Doat 24 fol. 284r/v.
44. Doat 24 fol. 140v. The deponent, Bergère de Loubens, elsewhere admits to having contact with, and “doing good” to, the *perfecti*, which further complicates the matter.
45. Doat 23 fol. 299v.
46. Doat 23 fol. 234r/v.
47. Doat 25 fol. 253v. Hitting one’s cheeks was a stylized gesture of grief: see the depiction from a thirteenth-century Castilian sarcophagus in P. Binski, *Medieval Death: Ritual and Representation* (London: British Museum Press, 1996), 52.
48. On the theme of community, see Binski, *Medieval Death*, particularly pp. 29–30.
49. Doat 23 fol. 92r/v.
50. *D’Ablis*, 352.
51. See W. L. Wakefield, “Burial of Heretics in the Middle Ages,” *Heresis* 5 (1985): 29–32.
52. Doat 23 fols. 76v–77r; Doat 24 fol. 100v.
53. *DAblis*, 190.
54. See Binski, *Medieval Death*, 33–47.
55. Doat 25 fol. 253V.
56. Pales-Gobilliard makes this suggestion (*D’Ablis*, 66). The Provençal Ritual certainly indicates that the *melioramentum* must be performed before the *consolamentum* is administered (Clédar, *Nouveau Testament*, xv, 475; W&E, 488) but it is not clear if this actually changes the status of the lay adherent to *credens*.
57. On inquisitorial reinterpretation of the ritual, see also H. Steinschneider, “Le Melhorier du Rituel Occitan,” *Cahiers d’études cathare*, 2nd ser. 38 (1987): 31–37.
58. Doat 25 fol. 114v. Other examples are too numerous to list.
59. For example, Doat 23 fol. 96r; Doat 24 fol. 10r; Doat 25 fol. 11v.
60. Davis, *Inquisition at Albi*, 125.
61. *D’Ablis*, 65.
62. Doat 24 fol. 240v; Doat 24 fols. 2v–3r.
63. For example, Doat 23 fol. 222V.
64. Doat 25 fol. 19r/v. On the meaning and import of “supersubstantial bread,” see W&E, 469, n. 8.
65. For example, Doat 23 fol. 326v; Doat 24 fols. 28r, 111v, 113v.
66. Doat 24 fol. 136v.
67. Doat 23 fols. 82v, 83r.
68. Doat 23 fol. 80r. See similarly fol. 74r; Doat 24 fol. 127r/v.
69. Doat 24 fol. 109v.
70. Doat 24 fol. 4v; Doat 25 fols. 157v–58r.
71. On Arnaud’s beliefs, see Laduric, *Montaillou*, 345–51.
72. *Fournier*, 1: 130.
73. Another example is of course the “kiss of peace” that quite clearly exists outside the context of heresy. In fact what is often also taken to be a “Cathar” nuance to this ritual, the demand that women kiss not the male *perfectus* but his book, can also be found in other contexts: a Benedictine customary at Eynsham asks that women who come to ask for protection from the monastery kneel down with one hand “on the book” and kiss it, while men were allowed to kiss the monks directly. See L. Smith, “The Theology of the Bible,” in *The Early Medieval Bible*, ed. R. Gameson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 230.
74. *Processus*, 72.
75. J. Duvernoy, “Les Albigeois dans la vie sociale et économique de leur temps” *Annales de l’Institut d’Etudes Occitanes* (1962–63): 64–73.
76. Doat 23 fol. 71r.

77. Doat 22 fol. 246r.
78. Doat 24 fol. 190v; Doat 24 fol. 137r.
79. Doat 23 fol. 166v.
80. Doat 23 fol. 183v. On the question of heresy and usury, see A. Roach, "The Cathar Economy" *Reading Medieval Studies* 12 (1986): 51–71.
81. Doat 25 fol. 121v.
82. Lateran IV c. 22.
83. Toulouse 1229, c. 15. The council of Albi in 1254 repeated this legislation, adding that no *medici* were to practice in places suspected of heresy without the permission of the local bishop (c. 14).
84. W. L. Wakefield, "Heretics as Physicians in the Thirteenth Century" *Speculum* 57 (1982): 328–31.
85. Guiraud, *Histoire*, 1: 351–53.
86. Doat 24 fols. 103v, 4r.
87. Doat 25 fols. 249r–v.
88. The connection between spiritual and medical practice perhaps emphasizes again the continuity—in the laity's view—between heretical and orthodox priests; on the importance of spiritual healing to the medical process, see C. Rawcliffe, *Medicine and Society in Later Medieval England* (Stroud: Sutton, 1995), particularly pp. 58–59. My thanks to Carole Rawcliffe for suggestions on this point.
89. Doat 24 fol. 140v.
90. Duvernoy, *Religion*, 195.
91. See for example Doat 22 fols. 87r, 121r, 161v, 221r, 274r. Duvernoy also includes examples from Toulouse 609, though he omits the example discussed below from Doat 24.
92. See now, however, P. Biller, "Cathar Peace-Making," in *Christianity and Community in the West: Essays for John Bossy*, ed. S. Ditchfield (Aldershot, Eng.: Ashgate, 2001).
93. Doat 23 fol. 130v.
94. Doat 24 fol. 64v–65r.
95. For example, a witness notes that he had previously abjured "in the hands of the Brother Preachers" (Doat 23 fol. 115r). It has been suggested that in the twelfth century monks played a similar role in arbitration; see S.D. White, "Feuding and Peace-Making in the Touraine around the Year 1100," *Traditio* 42 (1986): 209.
96. Doat 23 fols. 106r–16v—the deponent Gaucelin de Miraval of Puylaurens says that he became a *perfectus* because of fear of capture because he had killed a man; what the heretics thought about this is not deposed (fol. 106v). Gaucelin left the sect after two years. In the register of Geoffroi d'Ablis another murder is committed to protect the secrecy of the *perfecti*—but it is not done with their knowledge or consent. See D'Ablis, 151–55, 277, 309; and a brief retelling in J. H. Arnold, *History: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1–14.
97. Doat 24 fols. 78r, 200r–v.
98. Doat 22 fol. 167r–v.
99. See also Biller's conclusions in "Cathar Peace-Making," and further discussion below.
100. Common inquisitorial question and response, within the registers, to the appearance of terms discussed below.
101. For a sharp warning about historians' use of names and labels, see Pegg, *Corruption of Angels*, chap. 3.
102. J. Duvernoy, "L'Acception: 'haereticus' (*iretge*) = 'parfait cathare' en Languedoc au XIII^e siècle," in *The Concept of Heresy*, ed. Lourdaux and Verhelst, 198–210.
103. That is, for example, those who had been excommunicated for more than one year without making amends; there are a surprising number of people labeled thus, particularly up to the 1250s.
104. See for example the deposition of Arnaude of Lamothe (Doat 23 fols. 2v–49v).
105. Doat 23 fols. 55v, 105r, 119r, 142v and passim. In contrast, when deponent failed to identify laypeople, the record usually glosses this lapse with *ut dixit* (indicating inquisitorial suspicion), unless the failure of memory or knowledge was explained, or followed a generous list of named people.
106. Doat 23 fols. 58v, 89v, 202r.
107. Doat 24 fols. 182v–93r.
108. For example, the converted *perfectus* Raymond Carabasse of Montolieu is recorded as deposing that several people came to see him, and that all of them "adored the said heretics, namely the witness and his companion" (Doat 24 fols. 211r–212r). This pattern is repeated in the depositions of other converted *perfecti*.
109. See [Chapter 3](#).
110. *Histoire albigeoise*, 7; W&E, 239.

111. Lélat, *Nouveau Testament*, xi, 473, and passim.
112. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum*, 22: col. 157; W&E, 190; see also p. 703, n. 6.
113. Doat 25 fol. 69r.
114. Doat 25 fol. 210r.
115. Narbonne 1243 c. 29.
116. Doat 25 fol. 258v.
117. Doat 25 fol. 157r-v; see similarly fols. 46r and 250r-v.
118. *D'Abliis*, 324.
119. See Duvernoy, *Religion*, 297–311; Borst, *Cathares*, 173, n. 3, 175, n. 3, 205, n. 4; Pegg, *Corruption of Angels*, chap. 13.
120. Doat 23 fol. 49v; Doat 26 fol. 141v. For other examples of similar names, see Doat 26 fols. 100v, 154r, 223r; Doat 25 fol. 2v.
121. Doat 26 fol. 40r.
122. Doat 26 fol. 106v.
123. *Chanson*, 1: 28, 182, 262; 2: 260; 3: 12.
124. Duvernoy, *Religion*, 298.
125. Doat 23 fol. 141 v; Doat 25 fol. 266v.
126. Duvernoy, *Religion*, 172 and n. 5.
127. Borst, *Cathares*, 205, n. 4, Pegg, *Corruption of Angels*, chap. 13.
128. R. H. Hilton, *English and French Towns in Feudal Society: A comparative study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 115.
129. Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, *Le Roman de la rose*, ed. F. Lecoy (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, 1960), line 8657 and passim; Paterson, *World of the Troubadours*, 164–65; A. de la Presle-Evesque “Une Famille d’Albi face à l’inquisition aux XIIIe-XIVe siècles,” *Actes du 115e congrès national des sociétés savantes, Avignon 1990* (1991): 141.
130. M. Bourin-Derruau, *Villages médiévaux en Bas-Languedoc: Genèse d’une sociabilité* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1987), 1: 315–24; 2: 177, 333–35.
131. For example, Guillaume Austatz, speaking of the Waldensian Raymond de Costa, said “he was a good man, and if his arguments had been received by the Lord Bishop of Pamiers, he would not have been burnt” (*Fournier*, 1: 198).
132. Paterson, *World of the Troubadours*, 323; Paterson suggests that the Cathars “took over” the name on their arrival; what I am suggesting is not quite as mechanistic as that, nor—as I discuss below—assumes quite such a black-and-white division of faith in Languedoc.
133. A. Pauphilet, ed., *La Queste del Saint Graal* (Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1923), 28, 83 and passim; 52 and passim.
134. *Graal*, 161–62.
135. See, similarly, conclusion to Biller, “Cathar Peace-Making.”
136. R. Mazelier, “Amici Dei,” *Cahiers d’études cathare* 2nd ser. 38 (1987): 5–18 makes a few helpful etymological remarks alongside less useful speculation. See also Duvernoy, *Religion*, 298–99.
137. Doat 25 fols. 51v, 77v, 245r, and passim.
138. Doat 25 fols. 159v, 46v.
139. P. Brown, “The Rise of the Friends of God,” in *The Making of Late Antiquity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1978), 56–80. See also Brown, “The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity” in *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity* (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 103–52 and “The Christian Holy Man in Late Antiquity” in *Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55–78.
140. Doat 25 fols. 122v–123v; Doat 26 fol. 25r.
141. A possible exception is the story of a woman called Anglesia who said that the *perfecti* had a book which they looked at when there were storms—though to what effect she did not say. See P. P. A. Biller, “Women and Texts in Languedocian Catharism” in *Women, the Book and the Godly: Selected Proceedings of the St Hilda’s conference, 1993*, ed. L. Smith and J. H. M. Taylor (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1995), 1: 180.
142. See Chapter 2, p. 65.
143. Humbert de Romans, “Treatise on the Formation of the Preachers,” in *Early Dominicans: Selected Writings*, ed. and trans. S. Tugwell (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 306.
144. For example Doat 22 fol. 20r.
145. Doat 24 fol. 44r.
146. *Fournier*, 3: 315; Doat 25 fol. 39v; *Fournier*, 3: 312; Davis, *Inquisition at Albi*, 216, 235, 245.
147. Doat 25 fol. 4v.

148. This view was put forward most strongly by J.-M. Vidal, "Doctrine et morale des dernier ministres albigeois," *Revue des questions historiques* 41–42 (1909): 357–409, 5–48, particularly at pp. 5–6. See similarly, though with different degrees of sympathy: Belperron, *Croisade*, 76; D. Radcliff-Umstead, "The Catharists and the Failure of Community," *Medievalia* 1 (1975): 63–87; Mundy, *Repression of Catharism*, 11.
149. M.-D. Chenu, "Orthodoxie et hérésie, le point de vue du théologien," in *Hérésies et sociétés*, ed. Le Goff, 9–14. See similarly B. Bolton, "*Paupertas Christi*: Old Wealth and New Poverty in the Twelfth Century," *SCH* 14 (1977): 103; Hamilton, *Medieval Inquisition*, 19–20. Against these views generally, see Moore, *Formation*, 1–5.
150. Doat 22 fol. 5r. See also fols. 28v, 73r; Doat 23 fol. 153r; Doat 24 fol. 231v and passim. The concept could also be attached to things connected with the *perfecti*—Guillaume Escot of Montolieu is reported as saying that "he loved more [*plus diligere*] those grapes which they [the *perfecti*] ate than those which remained in the vineyard" (Doat 24 fol. 223r).
151. Doat 24 fol. 109v–10r.
152. Doat 25 fols. 118v–19r. See also fols. 17v, 31r, 79v, 95v, 98v–99r, 103v, 106v, 112r, 160r, 164r, 188r, 247r–v; Doat 24 fol. 266v. Sometimes a qualitative note enters: *perfecti* told Bernard Ugo that Raymond Bordier was a "great friend [*magnus amicus*] of theirs" (Doat 25 fol. 74v).
153. For example, in the deposition of Pierre de Beauville, various people the deponent met while he was a fugitive are simply described as *amid et credentes hereticorum*, although no actual contact with Cathars is mentioned (Doat fol. 300v; see similarly fols. 13r, 109r, mv, 293r–v).
154. J. Haseldine, "Understanding the Language of *Amicitia*: The Friendship Circle of Peter of Celle (c.1115–1183)," *JMH* 20 (1994): 240, 259. See also J. Haseldine, "Friendship and Rivalry: The Role of *Amicitia* in Twelfth Century Monastic Relations," *JEH* 44 (1993): 390–414.
155. Doat 22 fol. 2v.
156. Doat 25 fol. 150r–v.
157. Davis, *Inquisition at Albi*, 157.
158. *Ibid.*, 190.
159. Standard inquisitorial question.
160. Guillaume de Puylaurens, *Chronique*, ed. and trans. J. Duvernoy (Paris: CNRS, 1976), 48–49.
161. Lambert, *Medieval Heresy*, 112; J. Duvernoy, "Pierre Autier" *CEC* 21 (1970): 14.
162. Doat 23 fols. 2v–49r. On Arnaude's life story, see Brenon, *Les Femmes cathares*, 13–57.
163. Duvernoy, "Pierre Autier," 9 and passim.
164. M. Roquebert, "Le Catharisme comme tradition dans la 'familia' languedo-cienne" *CdF* 20 (1985): 221–42.
165. Roquebert, "Le Catharisme" 229.
166. Doat 22 fol. 276v.
167. Doat 24 fol. 208v.
168. Doat 24 fol. 83v. See also Doat 23 fol. 159r–v; Doat 24 fol. 240 r–v.
169. Doat 24 fol. 240r–v. The Latin displays the formulaic language most clearly: "Dixit quod vidit apud Mirapicem Jordanam de Marlhac matrem ipsius testis et Flandinam de Marlhac aviam ipsius testis et socias [suas] hereticas stantes publice in domi-bus ipsarum hereticarum, et pluries ipse testis comedit, bibit et iacuit cum dictis hereticabus, et totiens quod non recordatur; sed non adoravit eas nec vidit adorari."
170. Doat 24 fol. 219r.
171. Doat 25 fols. 122r–v, 124r.
172. Doat 24 fols. 240r–244v.
173. Doat 23 fol. 209v. He states that this meeting took place twenty years ago, and later says that he believed in the heretics from eighteen years ago.
174. Doat 23 fols. 157v–61r.
175. Doat 23 fol. 109r. The phrase "nor bent his knees"—an action understood by the inquisitors to be an integral part of the rite of "adoration"—often appears when adoring heretics is denied, but never when it is affirmed, presumably because the inquisitors wished to make certain that the deponent did not have a different understanding of "adoration" from their own.
176. Doat 24 fols. 37v–38r.
177. Doat 24 fol. 208v.
178. Doat 24 fol. 83v.
179. Dossat, "Cathares" 89.
180. Duvernoy, *Histoire*, 257–58.
181. See for example Doat 24 fol. 111v: In 1229 the deponent Guillaume Matfred de Puylaurens, a

knight, was contracted by Guilabert de Castres, bishop of the heretics, to accompany a group of heretics.

182. For example, Doat 24 fol. 185r; Doat 25 fol. 40v; *D'Ablis*, 270.

183. Doat 21 fols. 196v, 303v, and *passim*.

184. Doat 21 fol. 189r-v.

185. Doat 21 fols. 196v-97r.

186. Doat 22 fol. 132v; Doat 23 fol. 292v. There are countless places called Villeneuve ("New Town") around Toulouse. For other examples of paid work, see Doat 22 fols. 268r-69r; Doat 23 fols. 212v; Doat 24 fols. 111v-12r.

187. Doat 24 fol. 22v.

188. Arnaud Roger admitted to belief in the heretics; Stephan Massa had frequent contact with the heretics, but usually denied adoring them, particularly at the period in which this example is drawn, and he is not asked (or it is not recorded) about belief; Pierre Comelhan had contact with the heretics before the Albigensian Crusade, but denied adoring and was never asked about belief.

189. Doat 25 fols. 155v-156r, 244v. On the migration to Lombardy, see Duvernoy, *Histoire*, 304-8.

190. Doat 23 fol. 218r-v; Doat 24 fols. 267r-v, 24r-v.

191. See Wakefield, *Heresy*.

192. A. Peal, "Olivier de Termes and the Occitan Nobility in the Thirteenth Century," *Reading Medieval Studies* 12 (1986): 109-29.

193. Doat 24 fols. 247v-48r. To be clear, he admitted in the first interview seeing heretics but denied adoring them, and presents a vignette where someone presses him to be a "friend" to the heretics but he refuses and leaves.

194. Doat 22 fols. 62r-64v.

195. Duvernoy, *Religion*, 178, gives references to twelfth-century examples of this curious tenet of faith. It remains controversial in its interpretation within the "morality" of Catharism. For later references, see Ladurie, *Montaillou*, chap. 8 and *passim*.

196. For example Veziada was at one time a *perfecta* but was converted to orthodoxy "and took a man"; Doat 23 fol. 124r. See also Doat 23 fols. 108v, 192v; Doat 24 fols. 205v, 126r, 136r; and Biller, "Cathars and Material Women," 50.

197. For example, Pierre de St. Michel was given a piece of bread (*panada*) by Raymond Matres, who told him that he should "value this as if it were blessed by St. Peter himself, because the good men ate from it and it survives them" (Doat 23 fol. 91r). For other preservation of bread, see Doat 25 fol. 229v; *Fournier*, 1: 204.

198. Doat 23 fol. 124v; Doat 24 fols. 235r, 236v; Doat 25 fols. 88v, 103r, 129v.

199. The inquisitors could specify on occasion: "Asked who carried victuals [to Montségur] namely grain and wine" (Doat 24 fol. 206v). Other foodstuffs certainly appear, but one or all of fish, bread, and wine appear in the following places: Doat 23 fols. 59r-v, 124v, 183r, 192r, 241v, 306r, 317v, 339r, 342r; Doat 24 fols. 66r, 140r, 161v, 172r, 199v, 201v, 224r, 233v, 235r; Doat 25 fols. 5r, 7v, 31v, 32r, 69r, 74v, 88v, 109r, 170v.

200. Doat 24 fols. 173v, 180r; Doat 25 fol. 88v and *passim*.

201. Doat 23 fol. 62r; Doat 24 fol. IV; Doat 25 fols. 102v-103r; Doat 23 fol. 249v.

202. Doat 22 fol. 197v.

203. Doat 22 fols. 177r, 178r, 181r, 187r-v, 188r, 188v, 189r, 196r-97r and for adoring in other circumstances, *passim*.

204. Doat 22 fols. 173v, 189v-194r, 182r, 183r, 185r, 184v, 182r-v.

205. Doat 22 fols. 173r, 176r, 181v, 183v, 186v.

206. Doat 22 fols. 186r, 189r, 197r, 173r.

207. See [Chapter 1](#), p. 43.

208. Standard inquisitorial question.

209. See J. H. Arnold, "The Preaching of the Cathars," in *Medieval Monastic Preaching*, ed. C. Muessig (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 183-205.

210. Arnold, "Preaching" 192-96.

211. Doat 23 and 24. I have excluded earlier evidence as details about particular *perfecti* are too rare to be of use.

212. Her deposition is in Doat 23 fols. 162r-80r.

213. This is very much the case with the later depositions in Doat 25 and 26, when we find for example a large amount of activity by just two *perfecti*, Guillaume Prunel and Bernard de Tilhol. In the depositions from the early fourteenth century, there were again, of course, only a few *perfecti* that deponents *could* know: the Autier family and the few others they converted.

214. Doat 24 fol. 80r. The kind of massive cross-referencing necessary to produce a truly accurate

picture of people and locales is beyond my present resources, and therefore my point here is only speculative; however, for more localized studies of Catharism, see for example M. Bécamel, "Le Catharisme dans le diocèse d'Albi," *CdF* 3 (1968): 237–52, and Griffe, *Le Languedoc cathare de 1190 à 1210*, 77–192.

215. For example, Doat 25 fols. 12r, 27v, 29v, 49 v, 50v, 73v, 142v.

216. *D'Ablis*, 206.

217. Although it is an area that I am aware of having neglected in this chapter, this sense of negotiation might be used to reexamine the question of female participation in and relation to Catharism. While it can be argued, as Peter Biller has recently shown, that Cathar theology was intrinsically misogynist, this does not exclude the possibility of "belief" for female adherents finding a basis more in activities and social relationships than in abstract theological principles. For various thoughts on the debate, see Biller, "Cathars and Material Women"; Abels and Harrison, "The Participation of Women"; and M. C. Barber, "Women and Catharism," *Reading Medieval Studies* 3 (1977): 45–62.

218. For example, Doat 25 fols. 231v, 235r, 236r, 237r. The saying appears frequently also in the Fournier registers.

219. Doat 25 fol. 237v.

220. *D'Ablis*, 190.

221. Doat 25 fol. 179r.

222. See, similarly, on the laity "remodeling" orthodox beliefs to their own needs: Vauchez, *Laity*, 265–66.

223. For a discussion of Cathar adherents also practising orthodox religion, see Roquebert, "Le Catharisme," 236ff.

224. Doat 26 fol. 4r; Doat 25 fol. 56r; Doat 25 fol. 40r/v.

225. Doat 21 fol. 198r; similarly on seeking medical advice from Waldensians, see 200v, 201v, 202r, and passim; and P. P. A. Biller, "*Curate infirmos*: the Medieval Waldensian Practice of Medicine," *SCH* 19 (1982): 55–77.

226. Doat 21 fol. 204r.

227. Doat 21 fol. 232r.

228. Doat 21 fol. 242v.

229. Other examples of joint Cathar and Waldensian contact from these sentences: Doat 21 fols. 197r-v, 188r, 189r, 196r, 196v-97r, 197r-v, 197r, 198r, 200v, 201r, 201v, 202r, 203r, 204r; 208r, 210v, 232r, 232v-33r, 233v, 235v, 236v, 242v, 243r, 243v-44r, 245r-v, 245v, 246v, 250r, 251v-52r, 253v, 256r, 258v, 262r, 269v, 271v, 278v, 280v.

230. For his deposition, see *Fournier*, 1: 200–213.

231. *Fournier*, 1: 204.

232. Doat 24 fol. 256r.

233. Doat 24 fol. 263r; Doat 24 fols. 280v-81r.

234. Doat 22 fols. 60v-61v.

235. Doat 25 fol. 51v; Doat 26 fol. 311v; Doat 26 fol. 72r; Doat 25 fols. 83v-84r; Doat 22 fol. 4r.

236. See, for example, Ladurie, *Montaillou*, 324, commenting on Pierre Maury and others.

237. Doat 25 fols. 98v-99r. My thanks to Peter Biller for suggesting this translation.

238. Doat 23 fol. 227v.

239. Doat 25 fol. 296r-v.

Chapter 5. Sex, Lies, and Telling Stories

1. *Registre*, 1: 1–4.

2. The Fournier register contains ninety-five depositions recorded between 1318 and 1325. The original manuscript is Vatican Latin 4030; I have relied upon Duvernoy's Latin text, and the corrections he later provided: J. Duvernoy, *Le Registre d'inquisition de Jacques Fournier évêque de Pamiers (1318–1325); Corrections* (Toulouse: Privat, 1972). For a detailed analysis of the technical aspects of the manuscript, see *Fournier*, 1: 7–17. For some discussion of the dates during which Fournier conducted his inquisition, see Ladurie, *Montaillou*, xiv.

3. For another study that uses the Fournier register see E. Griffe, *Le Languedoc cathare et l'inquisition, 1229–1329* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1980), 270–299.

4. *Registre*, 1: 4; Dronke, *Women Writers*, 203.

5. *Fournier*, 2: 441–468.

6. The clearest account of Pierre Autier's career is given in Duvernoy, "Pierre Autier." Le Roy

Ladurie's *Montaillou* of course provides a great number of disparate details about Cathar practices and beliefs in this place and period, although his analysis is perhaps slightly distorted by relying strongly on the reported testimony of the colorful and amoral *perfectus* Bélibaste. A more sober account is given by J. Duvernoy, "Le Catharisme en Languedoc au début du XIV^e siècle," *CdF* 20 (1985): 27–56.

7. De Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life*, 29–42. See also [Part II](#), above, and Scott, *Domination*, although I find myself less comfortable with the clear divide Scott draws between the "official record" and the "hidden transcript" of the subaltern. As I have argued throughout this book, I see languages of power and languages of resistance as intertwined and less easily separable.

8. J. Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); W. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (London: Methuen, 1982). For an overview of medievalists' approaches, see D. H. Green, "Orality and Reading: the State of Research in Medieval Studies," *Speculum* 65 (1990): 267–80.

9. L. Vail and L. White, *Power and the Praise Poem: Southern African Voices in History* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991), 17–33.

10. For example, *Stock, Implications*, 12–18.

11. S. Fleischmann, "Philology, Linguistics, and the Discourse of the Medieval Text," *Speculum* 65 (1990): 20.

12. I. Hofmeyr, "We Spend Our Years as a Tale That Is Told": *Oral Historical Narrative in a South African Chieftdom* (London: James Currey, 1994), particularly pp. 59–77.

13. Gellrich, "Orality, Literacy, and Crisis," 465.

14. In this notion of necessary and displayed struggle, I am also influenced by K. Biddick, "Genders, Bodies, Borders: Technologies of the Visible," *Speculum* 68 (1993): 389–418.

15. For further discussion, see Arnold, " 'A man takes an ox by the horn.' "

16. Hofmeyr, *We Spend Our Years*, 176

17. Tarascon is on the river Ariège in the Sabarthès. The witnesses against Arnaud appear in *Fournier*, 1: 160–62; his depositions are in *Fournier*, 1: 163–168 and *Fournier*, 2: 430–40, and all matters on his case are translated in *Registre*, 1: 199–218. He is mentioned very briefly in Ladurie, *Montaillou*, 144, 302, 319, 320. It should be noted that the references in the English edition suffer from typographical errors; and that Le Roy Ladurie not only alters the person and tense of what was said, but also conflates reported and direct speech.

18. *Fournier*, 1: 160. All three deponents present very similar stories, although interestingly the AntiChrist increases his power in each: Bernard Cordier says that he is "born," Pierre de Mayshelac that he is "abroad," and Jean Yfort that he is "reigning."

19. *Fournier*, 1: 160–61.

20. *Fournier*, 1: 163. It appears thus in Occitan in the register; I have followed Duvernoy's modern French translation.

21. *Fournier*, 1: 164, n. 72. Duvernoy also notes that this is "manifestly influenced" by Cathar beliefs on metempsychosis and the fate of the spirit after death; he may be right, but as we shall see, the question of what Arnaud actually believed (as opposed to said) is rather complicated—and to reduce this to the "parroting" of "Cathar" belief forecloses analysis.

22. *Fournier*, 1: 165.

23. *Fournier*, 1: 166—*sed quod semper fuisse per se*. The Cathar belief being questioned for here by the inquisitor is that the bad God made the world.

24. *Fournier*, 1: 167.

25. *Fournier*, 2: 430. On public penance and chastizement, see [Chapter 2](#).

26. *Fournier*, 2: 434, 435, 437, 338; *Registre*, 1: 218, n. 32.

27. Jean Duvernoy "excuses" Arnaud by deciding that his sayings are proverbial and not part of a coherent system: Duvernoy, "Le Catharisme en Languedoc au début du XIV^e siècle," 40. See also G. de Llobet, "Variété des croyances populaires au comté de Foix au début du XIV^e siècle d'après les enquêtes de Jacques Fournier" *CdF* 11 (1976): 112, 117.

28. *Fournier*, 1: 163, 167.

29. *Fournier*, 1: 167.

30. *Fournier*, 1: 165. St. Bernard for example, denouncing the heretic Henry of Lausanne, talks of the "silly and foolish people" of Languedoc (W&E, 122–26).

31. *Fournier*, 2: 433, 440.

32. A distinction perhaps first drawn by M. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. H. Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), and more empirically explored by J. Le Goff, *Time, Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages*, trans. A. Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and A. Gurevich, *Medieval Popular Culture: Problems of Belief and Perception*, trans. J. M. Bak

and P. A. Hollingsworth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

33. *Fournier*, 1: 164, 165, 167.

34. *Fournier*, 1: 160, 161.

35. *Fournier*, 1: 165.

36. *Fournier*, 1: 167. Compare Arnaud's heretical statement to the declaration of orthodox faith: "Credidit etiam quod sicut ex nichilo Deus fecerat mundum, ita etiam reduceret ipsum post iudicium in nichil, et hoc quoad corpora omnia, solis spiritibus remanentibus"; "credit et credet in futurum, Deo dante, quod Deus mundum, id est celum et terram, corpora omnia et spiritus omnes creatos fecerit ex nichilo."

37. *Fournier*, 2: 434, 436.

38. *Fournier*, 2: 434, 432.

39. *Registre*, 2: 666, n. 9.

40. Duvernoy identifies Salvétat-Belmontet, in the district of Monclar, Tarn-et-Garonne; like Arnaud de Savinhan, Jean Rocas was from the lowlands. His deposition appears in *Fournier*, 2: 241–54, translated in *Registre*, 2: 655–66. He is not mentioned by Le Roy Ladurie, or any other commentator I have found.

41. *Fournier*, 2: 241–47. More precise references will be given when using specific examples; otherwise I have followed closely the order and language in which Jean professed his beliefs.

42. *Fournier*, 2: 248, 247, 248.

43. That is, by relating his statements to the Cathar tenets expressed elsewhere on the indivisible nature of sexual sin, that could be reinterpreted by Pierre Clergue, amongst others, to justify any heterosexual liaison. See Ladurie, *Montaillou*, 179–91; and discussion of Beatrice de Lagleize below.

44. *Fournier*, 2: 247.

45. *Fournier*, 2: 248–49.

46. *Fournier*, 2: 249.

47. *Fournier*, 2: 254. We do not know exactly what that sentence was, although the record gives no reason to suppose that they did not proceed as they had promised and condemned him posthumously as an obstinate heretic.

48. *Fournier*, 2: 253.

49. *Registre*, 2: 666, n. 4 and n. 6.

50. See S. Runciman, *The Medieval Manichee* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), 50. On Docetic beliefs among the Bogomils, see M. Loos, *Dualist Heresy in the Middle Ages*, trans. I. Lewitová (Prague: Academia, 1974), 58; and among eleventh-century heresies, Lambert, *Medieval Heresy*, 8–32.

51. *Fournier*, 2: 242–44. One might also read this as a reinterpretation of the Cathar belief in the evil nature of corporeality—but must emphasize that this is an active reinterpretation, since Jean does not seem to reject corporeal existence. It should also be remembered that at various points in medieval thought, people had ascribed an earthly location to Purgatory, or its entrance: see J. Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, trans. A. Goldhammer (London: Scholar Press, 1984), 88–95, 196–208.

52. *Fournier*, 2: 245.

53. On the theoretical possibility of citing discursive norms for an alternative (subversive) agenda, see Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, particularly p. 15: "What would it mean to 'cite' the law to produce it differently, to 'cite' the law in order to reiterate and co-opt its power. . .?"

54. *Fournier*, 2: 241.

55. *Fournier*, 2: 246.

56. *Fournier*, 2: 244. One might read a Waldensian influence on his views against homicide, if also noting that again Jean *interprets*—his list of motives leaves open the possibility that one might kill for a "just cause." See P. P. A. Biller, "The Waldensian Abhorrence of Killing, Pre-c. 1400," *SCH* 20 (1983): 129–46.

57. *Fournier*, 2: 244, 245.

58. See discussion in [Chapter 4](#), pp. 147–49.

59. *Fournier*, 2: 248.

60. *Fournier*, 2: 241, 242, 246.

61. *Fournier*, 2: 242. That which would be "accepted" from Mary would be flesh; Jean is again inclining towards a Docetic notion of Christ. This is actually in some contrast with contemporary Cathar theology, which held that Christ did not receive flesh from Mary, but that Mary "foreshadowed" (*adumbrare*) his earthly body—see Pierre Clergue's reporting of Cathar belief in the deposition of Beatrice de Lagleize, *Fournier*, 1: 230.

62. *Fournier*, 2: 243.

63. *Fournier*, 2: 247.
64. *Fournier*, 2: 248.
65. Quié is about ten kilometers southwest of Foix. The witnesses against Raymond, and his own deposition appear in *Fournier*, 2: 305–29, and are translated into French in *Registre*, 2: 675–95. He is mentioned in Ladurie, *Montaillou*, 261–62, 274, 304.
66. *Fournier*, 2: 305, 308, 309, 310–16. The witnesses and dates were as follows: 26 November 1322, Bernard Faure of Quié, Arnaud Gousiaud of Quié, Jean Montanié de la Tête de Pont de Tarascon; 5 December 1322, Raymond Frézat, priest of Quié.
67. *Fournier*, 2: 326. Pierre Peyre, Raymond Peyre and Jacques Tartier were themselves subject to inquisition in 1324, having been overheard discussing the possibility of lying to Bishop Fournier. Pierre Peyre was condemned to prison; the fate of the other two is unknown. See *Fournier*, 3: 372–437, and *Registre*, 3: 1222, n. 21, p. 1228, n. 3, p. 1254, n. 17.
68. *Registre*, 2: 695, n. 33 (Limborch, 393). He was imprisoned on 19 June 1323; his eventual fate is unknown.
69. *Fournier*, 2: 326.
70. There is no deposition extant for Pierre Clergue, although as Leonard Boyle reminds us, this may be because it is contained in the missing registers rather than because he did not appear before the Inquisition (Boyle, “*Montaillou* revisited” 120). He certainly makes frequent appearances in records, and in particular in the deposition of Béatrice de Lagleize, discussed below. He is another primary character in Ladurie, *Montaillou*, in particular pp. 153–68.
71. *Fournier*, 2: 327.
72. *Fournier*, 2: 316, 320; see discussion below.
73. *Fournier*, 2: 316, 328. One finds, for example, the inquisitor Pons de Parnac writing to another Dominican about one Bernard de Souillac, describing the errors he “vomited” against the faith (Doat 25 fol. 231r).
74. *Fournier*, 2: 318, 325, 318.
75. *Fournier*, 2: 318–19.
76. For other references, see depositions of Guillaume Autast (*Fournier*, 1: 209), Raymond Delaire (*Fournier*, 2: 122), Jean Joufre (*Fournier*, 2: 109) and Arnaud de Savinhan (*Fournier*, 2: 434), among others. For a wider context see G. Constable, “Resistance to Tithes in the Middle Ages” *JEH* 13 (1962): 172–85.
77. *Fournier*, 2:313. “Because of the aforesaid” might be taken to illustrate the gulf between what is recorded in the records and the unrecoverable reality of what was said; although, of course, it is just possible that Raymond de Laburat used these words himself.
78. *Fournier*, 2: 312; my emphasis, for clarity.
79. *Fournier*, 2: 310, 314, 325, 317
80. *Fournier*, 2: 313, 320. If Raymond was correct in saying that Fournier was the first to prevent the excommunicated from attending mass, one gains an interesting glimpse of the contingency or tardiness of the implementation of statutory principles; to quote a local example, the synod of Albi had forbidden the presence of the excommunicated in 1230, c. 7 (Pontal, *Statuts synodaux*, 2: 9).
81. *Fournier*, 2: 322, 313.
82. *Fournier*, 2: 320. Frézat uses the words *destruere* (to pull down) and *diruere* (to pull asunder) (p. 313), whereas Raymond says “*enderocada* (that is, *corruere* [to fall into ruins] or *destruere*)”
83. *Fournier*, 2: 310.
84. For example, Beatrice de Lagleize (discussed below) told Raymond Roussel that they would be suspected of lust if they left the *terra* together. This situates the word within the local context of public opinion. *Fournier*, 1: 221.
85. See *Fournier*, 2: 310, 311, 313.
86. *Fournier*, 2: 316, 320.
87. *Fournier*, 2: 321, 310, 313.
88. *Fournier*, 2: 321. This is one of the only moments in all the inquisitorial texts where reported speech is presented as occurring at the time of the interrogation, rather than reported as a past event. What Raymond said in the interrogation was, in itself, an error; the next question leads him to modify his statement, to the effect that he *used to* believe that one who prevents anyone from seeing the Host sins mortally. The reporting of his contemporary speech allows the Inquisition to fix his beliefs to a timescale, which might or might not imply that he had “relapsed” or was being “obstinate.”
89. R. H. Hilton, “Feudalism or *Feodalité* and *Seigneurie* in France and England,” in *Class Conflict and the Crisis of Feudalism* (London: Hambledon Press, 1985), 154–65 suggests that in France the concept of *seigneurie* implied by this period a sense of sovereign power: “Counts, castellans and knights

were not merely landowners with tenants but sovereigns with subjects" (233). The implications of regarding Fournier as "lord" were therefore suggestive of an overwhelming power.

90. What I have to say here is concerned with the narrative appropriation of certain contemporary models of society, rather than with any "real" social structure that modern historians might wish to perceive. However, to locate what assumptions might be reasonable for contemporary attitudes to seigneurial rights and the divisions of society, one can turn to Hilton's brief but useful analysis of "feudalism" in France in his *English and French Towns*, particularly chapter 1. In contextualizing the clergy's evocation of the lord-serf relationship as a model for bishop-laity, one should also note the following passage: "It is a grave error to separate the church from feudalism. . . . [T]he hierarchy of the church, as well as its economic base, reflected that of the lay element in the feudal order" (p. 15).

91. *Fournier*, 2: 324–25.

92. For a different interpretation, see Ladurie, *Montaillou*, 274.

93. *Fournier*, 2: 311, 323.

94. *Registre*, 2: 695, n. 28 and n. 29.

95. *Fournier*, 2: 315.

96. See Bakhtin, *Rabelais and his World*, particularly chapter 1. Medievalists have tended to be particularly despondent about the possibility of the carnivalesque achieving anything other than a reassertion of the status quo—for example, M. Camille, *Image on the Edge: The Margins of Medieval Art* (London: Reaktion, 1992), particularly pp. 143–46, 154–60. See recently, however, C. Humphrey, *The Politics of Carnival: Performance and Social Change in Medieval England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).

97. *Fournier*, 2: 325. See also pp. 310, 313.

98. *Fournier*, 2: 315.

99. *Fournier*, 2: 324.

100. I am aware here of a certain sentimentality in my position; however, the opposite position of reading Raymond de Laburat as "confused" or simply "anticlerical" seems to me to be both unproductive and reactionary.

101. His deposition appears in *Fournier*, 2: 106–17, and is translated in *Registre*, 2: 610–19. Duvernoy identifies Tignac as a district of Ax.

102. That is, 1321; in my quotations I follow Duvernoy's modern translation of the years.

103. *Fournier*, 2: 106.

104. *Fournier*, 2: 107.

105. Evidence concerning Jean also appears in the witnesses against Raymond Delaire of Tignac, given by Guillaume de Corneillan of Lordat, Arnaud Laufre, and Raymond Vaissière (witnesses and confession *Fournier*, 2: 118–34); these were deposed on 23 January 1322 and 20 April 1322. However, Jean is mentioned only in passing, and the evidence given has little bearing on the analysis here.

106. *Registre*, 2: 619, n. 13.

107. *Fournier*, 2: 106 and n. 274.

108. P. Boitani, *English Medieval Narrative in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 30–31. On "false piety" see above [Chapter 2](#), pp. 63–65.

109. *Fournier*, 2: 106–7.

110. Natalie Zemon Davis shows how folk proverbs, in a later period, asserted a sense of community through exclusion by their very obtuseness: they emphasized that you had to be in the know to understand. N. Z. Davis, "Proverbial Wisdom and Popular Errors" in *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (London: Duckworth, 1975), 227–67.

111. *Fournier*, 2: 107. Duvernoy footnotes as a gloss an occasion when a heretic admonished Brune Porcel that it was a sin to accept anything from a stranger (*Fournier*, 1: 386); this is possibly helpful, although I think it would be wrong to conclude that the Cathars had the copyright on the principle of "keeping oneself to oneself"

112. *Fournier*, 2: 107, 108. The church had been thus polluted by the murder of Valentin Barra in the cemetery, according to the process against Jacqueline den Carot. See *Registre*, 2: 618, n. 4.

113. *Fournier*, 2: 108; note that the vernacular is glossed and translated (into Latin, of course) within the deposition itself.

114. *Fournier*, 2: 107. The story appears elsewhere in the records, as Le Roy Ladurie notes (*Montaillou*, 344): *Fournier*, 3: 306.

115. I am not suggesting that the Cathars were necessarily "really" less economically demanding than the clergy—they did of course make their own economic demands upon the community. What is discussed here are the competing *representations* of Catharism, inquisitorial and vernacular.

116. *Fournier*, 2: 108–9.

117. *Fournier*, 2: 109. On this theme, see also Arnold, “‘A Man Takes an Ox’.”
118. *Fournier*, 2: 109–10.
119. *Fournier*, 2: 110.
120. *Registre*, 2: 618, n. 6.
121. For example, one life of St. Katherine has the infant Christ refusing to look upon her face because “she is so foul” until she was baptized, whereupon “she [had] become a white dove instead of a black crow” (Walter Bower, *Scotichronicum*, ed. and trans. J. and W. MacQueen [Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987]). For a discussion of the same theme in visual culture, see M. Meiss, *Painting in Florence and Siena after the Black Death* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), 107. My thanks to Katherine Lewis for these references.
122. *D’Abilis*, 172; Arnaud Sicre also reports the belief that it must be bad since it makes the children cry (*Fournier*, 2: 52).
123. *Fournier*, 2: 110–11.
124. *Fournier*, 2: 111.
125. *Fournier*, 2: 111.
126. *Fournier*, 2:113. Raymond proved this to Jean by pointing out that God gave Jews and Saracens just as many riches as he gave to Christians, which perhaps outlines a kind of “feudal” relationship with the Deity.
127. *Fournier*, 2:112–15. For a similar viewpoint about the morality of sex, see the deposition of Grazida Lizier, *Fournier*, 1: 302–6.
128. *Fournier*, 2: 112; on the subject of not killing animals, or indeed men, he explains that he was told by Arnaud Laurens that it was a sin to kill animals, and the rest he deduced (*deducere*) for himself, “as he said, and had no instruction” The Inquisition was still searching for the hidden heresiarch, even when compelling confession on the most particular beliefs.
129. *Fournier*, 2: 113, 114.
130. A position also adopted by Le Roy Ladurie, who describes Jean as holding “to a certain muddled Cathar belief” that God did not make dangerous animals (*Montaillou*, 321).
131. Beatrice is also known as Beatrice de Planissoles, but she is named “de Lagleize” after her second husband, in the records.
132. *Fournier*, 1: 214–15. As Duvernoy points out (*ibid.*, n. 84), sayings like this were common in Languedoc. See also [Chapter 4](#), pp. 159–60.
133. Béatrice’s deposition appears in *Fournier*, 1: 216–50 (French translation in *Registre*, 1: 260–90) and Barthélemy’s deposition is in *Fournier*, 1: 251–62 (*Registre*, 1: 291–98). She also appears as a witness against Bernard Clergue when she was in prison (*Fournier*, 1: 290–92) as does Barthélemy (*Fournier*, 1: 278–79), and is briefly mentioned in the deposition of Adelaide Ademar (*Fournier*, 1: 308, 309, 312). She appears frequently in Ladurie, *Montaillou*, particularly pp. 159–68 and 172–74 (the treatment in the French version is even longer); however, it is essential to supplement Le Roy Ladurie’s account with the corrections made by Leonard Boyle in his “*Montaillou Revisited*” 121–29.
134. In labeling Béatrice as “subaltern” I am, to some degree, eliding her more privileged social position (although one should note that the lower nobility in Languedoc were perhaps less divided from the lower orders than other areas of Europe: see Mundy, *Society and Government*, 38–47). However, as I discuss below, I am primarily using the term to indicate people’s relationship towards discourse rather than capital or service: as a woman, Béatrice is still “subaltern” to hegemonic languages of gender and belief. See discussion below.
135. *Fournier*, 1: 218, 219–22, 238. It is impossible to reconstruct Béatrice’s psychological reaction to the rape, or explain exactly how or why she remained with Pathau afterward. It is possible that Béatrice was bound to Pathau, until Pierre Clergue’s appearance, by the social discourse that could see rape as a legal contract to marriage; see K. Gravdal, *Ravishing Maidens: Writing Rape in Medieval French Literature and Law* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991).
136. *Fournier*, 1: 224, 226.
137. *Fournier*, 1: 239, 234, 252, 253—note that from this point on, the information comes from Barthélemy’s evidence.
138. *Fournier*, 1: 256–57.
139. *Fournier*, 1: 258; *Registre*, 1: 290, n. 65, 298, n. 9; references to Limborch, 294.
140. Béatrice had minimal contact with Cathars—she had seen Pierre Autier when he was a notary, before he went to Lombardy (*Fournier*, 1: 217), she listened to what Raymond Roussel and Pierre Clergue told her of Cathar beliefs (219–21, 224–30), she sent some flour to the heretics via Alazaïs Maury (237), and she gave a little money to the heretics (308). She did admit to believing in their errors (but never in the error about the Host that she was supposed to have said) but abandoned these beliefs

when she left Pierre Clergue and traveled to the Lowlands. She also specifies that she never believed Raymond Roussel's words, except when Pierre Clergue later told her the same beliefs; which clearly indicates that it was the personal element that was important to belief—the speaker, not what was said. See *Fournier*, 1:232.

141. *Fournier*, 1: 226 and passim.

142. *Fournier*, 1: 238—*vi oppressit eam. . . et carnaliter cognovit eam*.

143. *Fournier*, 1: 244. On this example of contraception within a wider context, see P. P. A. Biller, "Birth-Control in the West in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries" *P&P* 94 (1982): 3–26.

144. Jacqueline Murray identifies the same pattern of male action and female passivity in the depiction of sex in medieval handbooks of penance: J. Murray, "Gendered Souls in Sexed Bodies: The Male Construction of Sexuality in some Medieval Confessors' Manuals," in *Handling Sin*, ed. Biller and Minnis, 79–93. This contrasts greatly, of course, with other (and competing) medieval discourses that present women as sexually voracious, or more physically active during sex. See J. W. Baldwin, *The Language of Sex: Five Voices from Northern France around 1200* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 194 and passim; J. M. Cadden, *Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages: Medicine, Science, and Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 169–227 and passim.

145. Specifically she asks him if it is like the stuff that herdsmen put in stored milk to stop it coagulating; Clergue said it was not, but was unable to expand very much: "he replied that she should not trouble herself to know what sort of herb it was, but, as he said, there was a certain herb which had the aforesaid virtue, which herb, he, as he said, had." Clergue was certainly blustering over its properties, and Béatrice was none the wiser; but this is not ignorant "superstition" (*contra* Llobet, "Variété des croyances populaires," 114).

146. *Fournier*, 1: 222.

147. Ladurie, *Montaillou*, 165. See also pp. 161, 163.

148. For example, "The Miller and the Two Clerics" and "The Priests Breeches" ed. and trans. R. Hellman and R. O'Gorman, in *Fabliaux: Ribald Tales from the Old French* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965). On the opposition between courtly love and fabliaux, and the trope of the lover as the young priest, see S. E. Berger, "Sex in the Literature of the Middle Ages: The Fabliaux," in *Sexual Practices and the Medieval Church*, ed. V. L. Bullough and J. A. Brundage (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1982), 163.

149. *Fournier*, 1: 244.

150. *Fournier*, 1: 221; Béatrice also links this projected social assumption to the youthfulness of herself and Raymond.

151. *Fournier*, 1: 244–45, 252. Guillaume de Montaut, priest of Dalou, was one of the first witnesses against Béatrice. His description of the prostitute as one freely available to all men follows patristic models; see J. A. Brundage, "Prostitution in Medieval Canon Law," in *Sexual Practices*, ed. Bullough and Brundage, 150.

152. In contrast, for her lover Barthélemy, at least in the presence of the inquisitors, sexual acts with Béatrice were always sinful. See *Fournier*, 1: 252 and passim.

153. *Fournier*, 1: 226, 239, 226, 243. On the transgression of having sex in church, see D. Elliott, *Fallen Bodies: Pollution, Sexuality, and Demonology in the Middle Ages* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 61–80.

154. *Fournier*, 1: 222, 226, 224.

155. "We now see a dim reflection in a mirror; but then we shall see face-to-face" (1 Cor. 13:9); "Take care not to despise any of these little ones; for I tell you that their angels in heaven always see the face of my Father" (Matt. 18:10).

156. Augustine, *City of God*, ed. and trans. D. Knowles (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), book 22, chap. 29 (pp. 1082, 1084–85).

157. Jacobus de Voragine, *The Golden Legend*, trans. W. G. Ryan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 2: 99. On discourses of medieval misogyny and religion, see R. Howard Bloch, *Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 65–91.

158. *Fournier*, 1: 252, 248. It is possible that Fournier accepted Béatrice's explanation at face value, agreeing in effect that there was a distinction between *maleficium* and this kind of magic, since she was not questioned further on the subject, and it is not mentioned in the surviving sentence that commuted her imprisonment to wearing the crosses (Limborch, 294–95). In a later period, such love potions formed the epitome of female malice, and attracted harsher penalties than any other kind of *maleficia*; see M. O'Neil, "Magic Healing, Love Magic, and the Inquisition in Late Sixteenth-Century Modena," in *Inquisition and Society in Early Modern Europe*, ed. S. Haliczer (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 98.

159. S. G. Nichols, "An Intellectual Anthropology of Marriage in the Middle Ages," in *The New Medievalism*, ed. M. S. Brownlee, K. Brownlee, and S. G. Nichols (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), particularly p. 89.

160. *Fournier*, 1: 219.

161. Other statements of Cathar belief would have argued the other way: there are examples of Cathars or their supporters describing a pregnant woman as having the devil in her belly. See Biller, "Cathars and Material Women."

162. *Fournier*, 1: 254.

163. *Fournier*, 1: 225, 224; Clergue replied that "if God had made Adam and Eve, why did he not stop them from sinning?" and went on to say that most things the Church claimed were not true.

164. *Fournier*, 1: 252.

165. J. A. Brundage, "Concubinage and Marriage in Medieval Canon Law," in *Sexual Practices*, ed. Bullough and Brundage, 118–28.

166. Elliott, *Fallen Bodies*, 79.

167. For an overview, see S. Smith, *A Poetics of Women's Autobiographies: Marginality and the Fictions of Self-Representation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).

168. Gilmore, "Policing the Truth," 59: "Autobiography is rooted in the confession." On Augustine's position as "origin" for Western autobiography, see for example C. D. Ferguson, "Autobiography as Therapy: Guibert de Nogent, Peter Abelard, and the Making of Medieval Autobiography," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 13 (1983): 187; M. M. McLaughlin, "Abelard as Autobiographer: The Motives and Meaning of His 'Story of Calamities,'" *Speculum* 42 (1967): 463, and B. Brodzki and C. Schenk, eds., *Life/Lines: Theorizing Women's Autobiography* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 1–5.

169. Gilmore, "Policing the Truth," 54, 59, 60.

170. J. Freccero, "Autobiography and Narrative," in *Reconstructing Individualism*, ed. Heller et al., 20.

171. Barker, *Michel Foucault*, 138. Barker writes "subject (*subject*)" to emphasize the Althusserian point that one is both subject *of* and subject *to* the constituting discourse.

172. *Ibid.*, 138–39.

173. Davis, "Boundaries of the Self," 53.

174. M. G. Mason, "The Other Voice: Autobiographies of Women Writers," in *Life/Lines*, ed. Brodzki and Schenk, 22. Her chosen examples are Margery Kempe, Julian of Norwich, Margaret Cavendish, and Anne Bradstreet, and they are placed in opposition to the "male" tradition of the unitary subject as exemplified by Augustine and Rousseau.

175. By characterizing Beatrice as "marginal," I mean to follow Natalie Zemon Davis's understanding of women, barring those at the very highest levels of society, as marginal, in the sense that their voices are rarely at the center of the cultural hegemonic discourse, and their written voice can never appear except under contested terms. Socially, Beatrice was not as "marginal" as most of the people dealt with in this book, since she belonged to the ranks of the lower nobility.

176. J. A. McNamara, "*De Quibusdam Mulieribus*: Reading Women's History from Hostile Sources," in *Medieval Women and the Sources of Medieval History*, ed. J. T. Rosenthal (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 251–52.

177. Dronke, *Women Writers*, ix, 203.

178. *Fournier*, 1: 223–24. See, similarly, pp. 219, 231, 232, 233, 234.

179. *Fournier*, 1: 219, 248, 233, 223. Boyle, "Montaillou Revisited," 124; *Registre*, 1: 287, n. 25.

180. *Fournier*, 1: 219, 234, 237.

181. *Fournier*, 1: 236, 234, 249. Since Beatrice had made her own love potion for her daughter, I do not think one necessarily has to read this as a metaphor.

182. *Fournier*, 1: 219.

183. *Fournier*, 1: 220–21. They were "tried" by being asked to kill a chicken, which they refused to do—Cathars believing it wrong to take animal life. See discussion above. Duvernoy has identified Serena in Doat 24 fol. 261r.

184. Davis, *Fiction in the Archives*, passim.

185. *Fournier*, 1: 221.

186. *Fournier*, 1: 224, 226, 244, 248.

187. For example, the deponent Aldric, who also fled after his first interview *protimorem Inquisitionem* (Doat 25 fol. 17v).

188. This vignette is interestingly prefigured by a story told to Béatrice by Raymond Roussel, of a woman who was supposed to leave the country and go to the Cathars, but was detained by concern for

her crying child. Roussel told her the story as an illustration of why she should leave her family immediately; Béatrice appears to have internalized it, to the degree that it structures this later element of her account, but also to have reinterpreted it in her own fashion (*Fournier*, 1: 221).

189. *Fournier*, 1: 246–47.

190. *Fournier*, 1: 234–35. Béatrice is similarly detailed on a conversation between herself and Adelaïde Ademar over what her son was doing (which was taking some food to the heretics), down to reporting that Adelaïde said she had “large eyebrows” and would not trust her. *Fournier*, 1: 237.

191. *Fournier*, 1: 234.

192. *Fournier*, 1: 254, 255, 256–57, 258.

193. R. Smith, *Derrida and Autobiography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 47.

194. *Fournier*, 1: 222, 234, 243–44.

195. On the centrality of sexuality to Augustine’s narrative, see Freccero, “Autobiography and Narrative,” 18.

196. Gilmore, *Autobiographies*, 11: “The male autobiographies that many feminist critics have claimed as models of unity and coherence, such as Augustine’s and Rousseau’s, evidence the discursive and ideological tensions of the models of personhood they invoke. My research has not borne out the claim that all men or all women do any one thing in autobiography all the time.”

197. Gilmore, *Autobiographies*, 225, 226.

198. Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” 163. For different analyzes of agency in relation to interpellation, see Gilmore, *Autobiographies*, 20; J. Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997), 106–31.

199. J. Buder, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge 1990) particularly the conclusion; and *Bodies That Matter*, particularly the introduction.

200. The witnesses against Arnaud and his deposition appear in *Fournier*, 3: 14–50; French translation in *Registre*, 3: 1039–68.

201. For Recort’s background, see *Fournier*, 3: 30, n. 418.

202. J. Richards, *Sex, Dissidence, and Damnation: Minority Groups in the Middle Ages* (London: Routledge, 1990), 138; J. Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1980), 285 (on pp. 401–2 Boswell translates a tiny fraction of Arnaud’s deposition; curiously, he picked a section that shows inquisitorial questions, rather than Arnaud’s beliefs); M. Goodich, *The Unmentionable Vice: Homosexuality in the Later Medieval Period* (New York: Dorset Press, 1979), 93–123. Arnaud is discussed briefly in M. Goodich, “Sexual Deviation as Heresy in the XII–XIVth Centuries,” in *Modemité et non-conformisme en France à travers les âges*, ed. M. Yardeni (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 21–22.

203. Ladurie, *Montaillou*, 144–49, 150: “A latent tendency was awakened, and Arnaud was doomed to become a homosexual”; “He belonged to one of those slightly superior groups from which homosexuals tended to come in those days.” The one example of Arnaud is used to illustrate an entire social pattern of behavior, although no other supporting evidence is offered.

204. Foucault, *Sexuality*, 101.

205. H. J. Kuster and R. J. Cormier, “Old Views and New Trends: Observations on the Problem of Homosexuality in the Middle Ages,” *Studi medievali* 25 (1984): 587–610. See also M. D. Jordan, *The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

206. Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance*, passim.

207. D. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek Love* (London: Routledge, 1990), particularly chaps. 1–3.

208. V. L. Bullough, “The Sin against Nature and Homosexuality” in *Sexual Practices*, ed. Bullough and Brundage, 57.

209. Quoted in Goodich, *Unmentionable Vice*, 34.

210. Boswell, *Christianity, Social Tolerance*, 316–17.

211. For a trenchant restatement of Foucault’s argument on the discursive construction of sexuality and sex, that argues against the dilution and appropriation of his ideas, see D. Halperin, “Historicizing the Subject of Desire: Sexual Preferences and Erotic Identities in the Pseudo-Lucianic *Erôtes*,” in *Foucault and the Writing of History*, ed. Goldstein, 19–34.

212. One can also take note of Ian Hacking’s useful point that “naming is only one element in the constitution of the subject.” I. Hacking, “Making-Up People,” in *Reconstructing Individualism*, ed. Heller et al., 226.

213. *Fournier*, 3: 18, 19, 20.

214. *Fournier*, 3: 18, 19, 21.

215. *Fournier*, 3: 44, 23, 24.
216. *Fournier*, 3: 39–40.
217. *Fournier*, 3: 39.
218. *Fournier*, 3: 18, 24, 39; “movens se ac si haberet rem cum muliere”; “faciens sic ac si haberet rem cum muliere”; “se movendo acsi haberet rem cum muliere.”
219. For example, the deposition of Beatrice de Lagleize, discussed above (*Fournier*, 1: 226).
220. *Fournier*, 3: 31; “nisi masculus se poneret super masculum acsi esset mulier, vel quod per partem posteriorem dictum peccatum comiteretur.”
221. On the practice and possible motives and meanings of intercrural sex, see K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (London: Duckworth, 1978).
222. In this sense, it seems to me that Arnaud’s deposition potentially upsets gender binaries even more radically than the case of John/Eleanor Rykener, the crossdressing London prostitute, analyzed in C. Dinshaw, *Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities Pre-and Postmodern* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), 100–42.
223. *Fournier*, 3: 17.
224. *Fournier*, 3: 43.
225. *Fournier*, 3: 39.
226. On medieval, medical notions of adolescent sexuality, see Cadden, *Meanings of Sex Difference*, 145–48. For some discussion on the differences and interrelations between ecclesiastical and medical discourses on sexuality and gender, particularly in relation to sodomy or homosexuality, see D. Jacquart and C. Thomasset, *Sexuality and Medicine in the Middle Ages*, trans. M. Adamson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 155–64.
227. *Fournier*, 3:31. On the rhetorical links between leprosy and prostitution, see Moore, *Formation*, 97–98. On the medical theory that linked leprosy with sexual activity, see S. R. Ell, “Blood and Sexuality in Medieval Leprosy,” *Janus* 71 (1984): 153–64. My thanks to Carole Rawcliffe for this reference.
228. *Fournier*, 3: 49; Goodich, *Unmentionable Vice*, 120. The translation is difficult, and Goodich and Duvernoy render it very differently: “licet crederet quod natura sua inclinaret eum ad dictum peccatum sodomie, tamen semper credidit quod esset peccatum mortale, sic tamen quod peccatum sodomie esset equale cum peccato fornicationis simplicis, et quod illicita defloratio virginum, adulterium, aut incestus, graviora peccata [essent], et quodlibet eorumdem, quam peccatum sodomie, carnaliter homines masculos cognoscendo.” Arranging a particular “kind” of *sodomitia* within a hierarchy of sins is frequently found in penitential and scholastic literature; for example Aquinas placed bestiality as the most serious sin, followed by same-sex contact (whether male or female), then intercourse in an “unnatural” position, and lastly masturbation. Earlier penitentials tended to rank bestiality lower; see Bullough, “Sin against Nature” 59–66.
229. On medieval commentators’ silence and evasions, see Jacquart and Thomasset, *Sexuality and Medicine*, 155–64.
230. Cadden, *Meanings of Sex Difference*, 214–16.
231. See V. L. Bullough, “Postscript: Heresy, Witchcraft, and Sexuality,” in *Sexual Practices*, ed. Bullough and Brundage, 207–8.
232. *Fournier*, 3: 18.
233. *Fournier*, 3: 14–15.
234. *Fournier*, 3: 29.
235. *Fournier*, 3: 44.
236. Flamborough, *Liber poenitentialis*, 298.
237. *Ibid.*, 196.
238. Karma Lochrie also finds a conjunction of seduction and confession, see Lochrie, *Covered Operations*, 42–45.
239. Butler, *Bodies That Matter*, 6–7.

Conclusion

1. Rancière, *The Names of History*, 61–75.
2. H. C. Lea, *The Inquisition of the Middle Ages: Its Organisation and Operation*, ed. W. Ullmann (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1963), 318.
3. W. F. Buckley, “Crucial Steps in Combating the AIDS Epidemic: Identify All the Carriers” *New York Times*, 18 March 1986, 27. My thanks to Peter Knight for this reference.
4. Biddick, “The Devil’s Anal Eye,” 106. An earlier version of this article, entitled “Becoming

Ethnographic: Reading Inquisitorial Authority in the *Hammer of Witches*” appeared in *Figures of Speech: The Body in Medieval Art, History and Literature*, ed. A. J. Frantzen and D. A. Robertson, special issue of *Essays in Medieval Studies*, Proceedings of the Illinois Medieval Association (1994), 2:21–37; and I am grateful to the author for providing me with access to this earlier version.

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Index

Note that medieval people are listed alphabetically via their first name (e.g., “Alain de Lille” rather than “Lille, Alain de”).

- Accusatio*, 30, 36, 182, 253 n. 89
Ad abolendam (1184), 31
Ad extirpanda (1252), 31
Adélaïde Ademar, 275 n. 133, 279 n. 190
Adélaïde de Massabrac, 260 n. 40
Adélaïde de Miraval, heretic, 151
Adélaïde Maury, 210
Adémar of Chabannes, 63
Aers, David, 107
Alain de Lille, 28, 216
Alazaïs Guillaumar of Tignac, 192
Albi, 37, 42, 47, 79, 83, 88
Albigensian Crusade, 3, 22, 24, 32–35, 37, 40, 42, 48, 52, 57, 59, 61, 70, 117, 139, 143, 146, 149, 152, 154, 155
Aldric Saix, 131
Althusser, Louis, 213, 236 n. 45
Alzeu de Massabrac, 149, 151
Antichrist, 168, 269 n. 18
Anticlericalism, 179, 183, 186, 194
Arnald Hugo of Vieilmorès, Cathar deacon, 119
Arnaud Aimery, legate, 32
Arnaud Daide, 136
Arnaud de Bretos, heretic, 139
Arnaud de Cordes, 160
Arnaud de Corneilhan, 86
Arnaud de Miglos, knight, 155
Arnaud de Ravat, 161
Arnaud de Savinhan of Tarascon, 165, 167–73, 174, 176, 178, 179
Arnaud de Verniolles, 166, 214–25
Arnaud Gélis, 133
Arnaud Gossiaud of Quié, 187
Arnaud Laufre of Tignac, 191–92, 194, 275 n. 128
Arnaud Orre, 136
Arnaud Pons de Vernaux, 161
Arnaud Sicre, 275 n. 122
Arnaud Tolus, *magister*, of Tarascon, 171
Arnaude de Lamothe, heretic, 107, 149
Asad, Talal, 80, 95, 109, 249 n. 8, 254 n. 103, 257–58 n. 168
Athon de Sainte-Victore, notary, 2
Athon du Château, 141
Augustine of Hippo, 20, 202–3, 205–6, 212, 254 n. 101
Austorga de Rosengua, 132, 156
Autobiography, 200, 205–13. *See also* [Individuality](#); [Subjectivity](#)
Avignonet, 82, 84, 259 n. 2
Avril, Jean, 29

Ax-les-Thermes, [165](#), [192](#), [193](#), [194](#)

Bakhtin, Mikhail, [8](#), [12](#), [236 n. 46](#), [270 n. 32](#)

Baptism, [24](#), [56](#), [125](#), [155](#), [174](#), [176](#), [177](#), [178](#), [194–95](#), [196](#), [274 n. 121](#)

Barker, Philip, [206](#)

Barthélemy Amilhac, [83](#), [197–200](#), [202–8](#), [210–11](#)

Barthélemy Jordan, [251 n. 50](#)

Béatrice de Lagleize (a.k.a. de Planissoles), [83](#), [165](#), [166](#), [197–214](#), [229](#), [273 n. 84](#), [275 n. 131](#)

Beguines, [55](#)

Belief, [21](#), [118](#), [120](#), [122](#), [132](#), [151–52](#), [157–63](#), [172–73](#), [178–79](#)

Bérenger de Lavelanet, [82](#), [102](#)

Bergère de Loubens, [131](#), [134](#), [260 n. 44](#)

Bernard Amati, notary, [126](#)

Bernard Arquier, [159](#)

Bernard Barra, no, [163](#)

Bernard Benedict of Villardonel, [83](#), [162](#)

Bernard Bonafos, heretic deacon, [153](#)

Bernard Cordier of Pamiers, [168](#)

Bernard Costa, heretic, [74](#)

Bernard Daide, [136](#)

Bernard de Caux, inquisitor, [48](#), [83](#), [85](#), [99](#), [243 n. 2](#)

Bernard de Montesquieu, [145](#)

Bernard de Puys, [145](#)

Bernard de Revel, [1–2](#), no, [233 n. 1](#)

Bernard de Tinhol, heretic, [267 n. 213](#)

Bernard Délicieux, OM, [5](#), [82](#)

Bernard Escoulan, [154](#)

Bernard Faure of Quié, [183](#), [185](#)

Bernard Faure of Toulouse, [134](#)

Bernard Furnier, [154](#)

Bernard Godalh, heretic, [89](#)

Bernard Gui, [50–57](#), [65](#), [67](#), [71](#), [78](#), [81](#), [84](#), [85](#), [86](#), [89](#), [95](#), [97](#), [99](#), [191](#), [245 n. 32](#), [248 n. 96](#), [255 n. 120](#).

See also *Practica inquisitionis heretice pravitatis*

Bernard Lorca of Foix, [193](#)

Bernard of Clairvaux, [24](#), [26](#), [31](#), [34](#), [64](#), [108](#), [170](#), [244 n. 30](#), [247 n. 74](#), [270 n. 30](#)

Bernard Oth, lord of Niort, [129](#), [149](#), [152](#)

Bernard Pages, heretic, [74](#)

Bernard Pellicier of Ax-les-Thermes, [192](#)

Bernard Rastel, heretic, [1](#)

Bernard Remon, [160](#)

Bernard Ugo, [265 n. 152](#)

Bernarde de Fonte, [140](#)

Bertrand Alamans, [1](#)

Bertrand Marty, Cathar bishop, [102](#), [136](#), [139](#), [142](#), [260 n. 40](#)

Biller, Peter, [235 n. 24](#), [267 n. 217](#)

Bisson, Thomas, [35](#)

Bolton, Brenda, [24](#)

Bon Mancip, inquisition scribe, [141](#)

Bona de Puy of Prades, [88](#), [89](#), [162](#)

Borst, Arno, [6](#), [79](#), [143](#), [155](#)

Boswell, John, [215](#), [216](#)

Bourin-Derruau, Monique, [143](#)

Boyle, Leonard, [10](#), [92](#), [208](#), [272 n. 70](#), [275 n. 133](#)

Braunstein, Philippe, [109](#)

Brown, Peter, [145](#), [146](#), [264 n. 139](#)

Brundage, James, [205](#)

Brune de Monteils, nun, [185](#)

Burckhardt, Jacob, [107](#)

Butler, Judith, [214](#), [217](#), [224](#), [271 n. 53](#)

Caesarius of Heisterbach, 64, 92
 Cahors, 175
 Carcassonne, 48, 74, 82, 100, 104, 173, 181, 182, 192
Carnalage. *See* *Tithes*
 Carruthers, Mary, 109
 Catharism, 3–4, 23–24, 117, 120, 124, 127, 129–30, 133–34, 144, 145–47, 165; cemeteries, 129; *consolamentum*, 20, 24, 36, 40, 65, 75, 89, 100, 116, 118, 119, 124–30, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138, 145, 146, 153, 157, 158, 159, 160, 165, 183, 198, 210, 211, 261 n. 56; *endura*, 89, 147, 210; family, 117–19, 149–51, 172, 204; food, 124, 127, 134, 155–56, 255 n. 135, 260 n. 22; involvement with other faiths, 119, 160–61, 268 n. 229; kiss of peace, 261 n. 73; laity leading heretics, 153–54; language of friendship, 147–49, 162–63, 178; *melioramentum*, 75, 124, 130–33, 261 n. 56; names for *perfecti*, 138–47; nonhieratic activities, 133–38; peace-making, 136–37; preaching, 116–17, 158–59; Provençal Ritual, 40, 124–26, 127, 128, 140. *See also* *Heresy*; individual heretics
 Cazenave, Annie, 96
 Certeau, Michel de, 166, 258 n. 2
 Châlons-sur-Marne, 19–21, 23, 25, 28
Chanson de la Croisade, 40, 142
 Chenu, Marie-Dominique, 147
 Clanchy, Michael, 83
 Compurgation, 36, 43, 67, 253 n. 89
 Condors de Lagleize, 210
 Confession (inquisitorial), 2, 12, 22, 29, 36, 51, 53, 65, 67, 76, 81, 84–89, 93–107, 110, 114, 121, 152, 196, 200. *See also* *Autobiography*; *Inquisition*; *Subjectivity*
 Confession (sacramental), 20, 29, 37, 50, 56, 60, 62, 70, 73, 90–93, 109–10, 135, 160, 195, 222–23, 239 n. 38, 253 n. 89; homoeroticism of, 222–23
 Conrad of Marburg, inquisitor, 80
 Contraception, 201
 Council of Albi (1230), 37, 272 n. 80
 Council of Albi (1254), 42, 47
 Council of Arles (1234), 39, 40, 41
 Council of Béziers (1232), 37, 39
 Council of Béziers (1246), 42, 45, 59, 62, 63, 90
 Council of Montpellier (1215), 35
 Council of Narbonne (1227), 34, 35, 39
 Council of Narbonne (1243), 42, 44, 45, 58, 90, 140
 Council of Tarragona (1233–34), 36, 39
 Council of Tarragona (1242), 42–44, 45, 52, 59, 67, 94, 120
 Council of Toulouse (1229), 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 51, 70, 135
 Council of Valence (1248), 42
 Cuella, 153
 Custom, 184–88. *See also* *Tithes*
 Davis, Natalie Zemon, 121, 206, 209, 274 n. 110
De inquisitione hereticorum, 49, 53
 Death, 128–30
 Diego of Osma, 65
 Discourse, 11–13, 50, 55–56, 78, 120–21, 181, 227–29; agency within, 10, 12, 99–102, 105–7, 113–14, 166–67, 180, 213, 224–25, 228; demanding excess of language, 13, 49, 114–15, 224–25, 228; hegemony, 8, 57, 70, 73, 93; interpellation into, 11–12, 21, 92, 165, 167, 197, 213, 224, 236 n. 45; power, 8–9, 11, 14, 23, 50, 54–56, 77–78, 81–93, 97–98, 101, 108–9, 110, 113–15, 205, 227, 235 n. 30, 258 n. 1. *See also* *Foucault, Michel*; *Heteroglossia*; *Subaltern*; *Subjectivity*
Doctrina de modo procendendi contra hereticos, 49, 52, 53, 56, 81, 96, 99
 Dominican order, 24, 33, 36, 65, 146
 Dossat, Yves, 33, 80, 84, 119, 120, 152, 243 n. 2
 Dronke, Peter, 207
 Duby, Georges, 108
 Duvernoy, Jean, 5, 121, 133, 136, 137, 138, 142, 143, 149, 168, 173, 176, 188, 191, 195, 208, 244 n. 19, 254 n. 113, 270 n. 21, 274 n. 111
 Dyas de Deime, 134, 156

Eberwin of Steinfeld, 64
 Elliott, Dyan, 205
 Esmein, Adhémar, 30
 Ethics, 2–3, 9–10, 14–15, 113–15, 120, 122–23, 213–14, 225, 226–29, 236 n. 40
 Etienne Donat, heretic, 88
 Eucharist, 66, 69, 91, 159, 161, 175, 176, 177, 185, 186, 188, 197, 198
 Eulalie of Barcelona, St., 59, 69, 246 n. 53
 Excommunication, 37, 39, 51, 57, 61, 180, 183–85. *See also* Inquisition, penances and punishments

 Fabrissa Vital, 83–84, 145, 147, 162
 Faure Paratori, 134
 Faure Raseire, 248 n. 90
 Ferrier, inquisitor, 85, 102, 156, 158, 251 n. 50
 Flandina de Marlac, of Mirepoix, 150
 Fleischmann, Suzanne, 166
 Foucault, Michel, 10, 11, 14, 93, 101, 109, 113, 205, 206, 212, 216, 217, 224, 227, 236 n. 42, 244 n. 28, 252 n. 70, 253 n. 87, 258 n. 1
 Foulques, bishop of Toulouse, 149
 Fourth Lateran Council (1215), 24, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 62, 66, 91, 135
 Freccero, John, 205, 206, 212
 Friedlander, Alan, 77

 Gaillard de Pomiès, OP, 175
 Gaillarde de Gaillac, lady, 129
 Gaucelin de Miraval, 151, 262 n. 96
 Gautier Archambaut, 153
 Gauzia Clergue, 210
 Gellrich, Jesse, 167
 Gender, 214, 218, 219, 223–25, 267 n. 217
 Geoffroi d'Ablis, inquisitor, 79, 83, 107, 164, 262 n. 96
 Gerard, bishop of Arras-Cambrai, 27
 Gilmore, Leigh, 110, 205, 207, 212, 213
 Ginzburg, Carlo, 1, 4, 8, 12, 233
 Given, James, 38, 48, 68, 70, 79, 80, 205, 245 n. 36, 250 n. 19
 Goodich, Michael, 215
 Goody, Jack, 166
 Gratian, 31
 Grazida Lizier, 275 n. 127
 Griffe, Elie, 5
 Grundmann, Herbert, 6, 27
 Guilabert de Castres, Cathar bishop, 266 n. 181
 Guilabert de Foissac, knight, 251 n. 55
 Guilabert de Roussillon, knight, 135
 Guillaume Faure of Puyhermer, 148
 Guillaume Aribaud, 160
 Guillaume Arnaud, inquisitor, 82, 85, 87
 Guillaume Austatz, of Ormolac, 161, 264 n. 131
 Guillaume Autier, of Ax-les-Thermes, heretic, 159, 191
 Guillaume Bernard, inquisitor, 85
 Guillaume Bernard d'Airoux, heretic, 135
 Guillaume Bernard of Pamiers, 215, 217, 218, 221, 222, 233
 Guillaume Boyer of Pamiers, 215
 Guillaume d'Albi, 147
 Guillaume d'Elves of Cordes, 151
 Guillaume de Astrava, 137
 Guillaume de Bouan, 137
 Guillaume de Montaut, priest of Dalou, 197, 203
 Guillaume de Montreuil, inquisitor, 88
 Guillaume de Saint Seine, inquisitor, 74

Guillaume Escot of Montolieu, 265 n. 150
 Guillaume Fabre, 162
 Guillaume Matfred of Puylaurens, 132, 148, 266 n. 181
 Guillaume Orseti, 251 n. 41
 Guillaume Pelhisson, OP, 34, 36, 58
 Guillaume Pictavin, 163
 Guillaume Prunel, heretic, 267 n. 213
 Guillaume Raymond Frances of Sorèze, 119
 Guillaume Roussel of Dalou, 197
 Guillaume Roux of Pamiers, 215, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222
 Guillelme den Marty, heretic, 134
 Guillemette Arzelier of Montailhou, 102–3
 Guirald Terrier of Sorèze, 118
 Guiraud Colom, knight, 127
 Guiraud de Aveyron, 87
 Guiraud, Jean, 6, 135
 Gurevitch, Aron, 109, 270 n. 32

 Hamilton, Bernard, 24, 124
 Haseldine, Julian, 148
 Haskins, Charles Homer, 107
 Heaven, 145, 174, 177, 204
 Hélis de Mazerolles, 134, 158
 Hell, 174, 178
 Henry de Marcy, papal legate, 31, 34, 37, 70
 Henry of Lausanne, heretic, 23, 26, 28, 31, 63
 Heresy: church's image of, 25–27, 38, 46, 50, 52, 63–65, 68, 139, 164, 195, 228; doceticism, 176–78, 271 n. 50; early development, 23–29; secular power's relation to, 19, 24, 31, 34, 39–40, 154–55. *See also* Baptism; Belief; Catharism; Eucharist
 Heteroglossia, 12–13, 114, 157, 216
 Hilton, Rodney, 143, 273 n. 89
 Hofmeyr, Isabel, 166–67
 Homosexuality. *See* Sodomy
 Humbert de Romans, 28, 146–47

 Individuality, 11–13, 22, 29, 31, 44, 46–47, 52, 56, 60, 62, 67, 70, 72, 76–77, 91, 92–93, 107–10, 214. *See also* Autobiography; Subjectivity
 Innocent III, 32, 61
 Inquisition: categories, 9, 37–47, 51–56, 119–20, 138, 152, 156, 157; death sentence, 31, 40, 58, 245 n. 47; depositions, 1–10, 19–22, 45, 75–76, 102–7, 116–17, 150, 164–65, 209–10; development, 22–23, 29–47, 66, 239 n. 41; imprisonment, 1–2, 21, 39, 57, 58, 67, 74, 88, 94, 95, 96, 100, 104–5, 168, 169, 174, 175, 181, 186, 190, 192, 196, 199, 215, 217, 245 n. 38, 253 n. 90, 256 n. 144; institutionalization, 50, 77–78, 90, 101; manuals, 45, 48–56; penances and punishments, 39–40, 44–45, 52, 54, 57–73, 76, 82, 86, 87, 100, 169–70, 248 n. 90, 248 n. 105; procedures, 30, 35–36, 44–45, 49, 51–53, 81–82, 89, 94–96, 102–3, 253 n. 89; questions, 5, 49, 75, 103, 123, 126, 130, 133, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 149, 155, 157, 162, 164, 182–83, 189, 196, 251 n. 41; records and registers, 48, 79–80, 81–90, 98–99, 164–65, 243 n. 1, 268 n. 2; textuality, 7–8, 74–76, 79–80, 85–90, 103–6. *See also* Confession (inquisitorial); Heresy, church's image of; individual inquisitors
 Irvine, Martin, 27
 Isarn Bonhomme, knight, 141, 163
 Isarn, lord of Laurac, 155

 Jackson-Lears, T. J., 1
 Jacobus de Voragine, 203
 Jacques Autier, of Ax-les-Thermes, heretic, 84, 180, 183, 195
 Jacques Fournier, bishop and inquisitor, 5, 9, 14, 19, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 107, 133, 142, 164–65, 168, 173, 175, 176, 180, 181–87, 189, 191, 192, 193, 197, 199, 207, 211, 215
 Jacques Poloniac, jailer at Carcassonne, 104, 181
 Jacques Tartier of Quié, 180, 181, 182
 Jean Blach, 156

Jean de St. Pierre, inquisitor, 48, 83, 99, 243 n. 2
 Jean Fabre, 131
 Jean Ferrié of Pamiers, 215, 222
 Jean Galand, inquisitor, 84
 Jean Gandil, *bayle*, 154
 Jean Joufre of Tignac, 166, 190–97
 Jean Montanié of Quié, 184, 188
 Jean Rocas de la Salvetat, 165, 173–80, 195, 229
 Jean Yfort of Tarascon, 168
 Jews, 54, 55, 58, 66, 68, 69, 163, 174, 175, 195, 196, 244 n. 31
 John Arnoldi, inquisitor, 237 n. 49
 Jordana de Marlhac, of Mirepoix, 150
 Justice, Steven, 14, 250 n. 33
 Jütte, Robert, 66

 Katherine of Alexandria, St., 274 n. 121
 Kieckhefer, Richard, 77, 90, 101
 Klaniczay, Gábor, 65, 68, 70
 Knights Hospitaller, 168

 LaCapra, Dominick, 8–9
 Ladurie, Emmanuel Le Roy, 3, 5, 9, 10, 123, 164, 201, 207, 215, 280 n. 203
 Lagrasse, 153
 Lambert, Malcolm, 149, 233
 Laroque d'Olmes, 153
 Lasbordes, 149, 152
 Laurac, 149, 152, 155, 162
 Lea, Henry Charles, 4, 69, 79, 226, 227
 Leprosy, 66, 68, 195, 220
 Lerner, Robert, 6, 7, 9
 Leutard, heretic, 25, 26
 Literacy, 8, 12, 23, 27–28, 29, 42, 44, 46, 49, 78, 81, 82, 85, 91, 98, 99, 106, 108, 110, 125, 164, 166–67, 170–71, 189, 194, 213, 228
 Lladros, Catalonia, 198, 204–5
 Lochrie, Karma, 253 n. 87, 258 n. 1,
 Logan, Robert, 108
 Lombarde de Lavelanet, 102–4, 105, 106
 Lombardy, 2, 81, 101, 117, 147, 153, 154, 160, 165, 198, 202, 204, 208
 Lordat, 154
 Louis VIII, king of France, 32
 Louis IX, king of France, 32, 34, 35

 Magic, 55, 61, 66, 71, 110, 203, 208, 277 n. 158
 Maisonneuve, Henri, 31, 33, 35, 42, 45, 94, 240 n. 53
 Manichaeans, 19, 20, 28, 55, 56, 63
 Mansfield, Mary, 61, 62, 72, 91, 247 n. 68
 Marriage, 19, 24, 29, 56, 147, 155, 161, 201, 204, 209,
 Mason, Mary G., 206–7
 Matfred de Poalhac, 161
 Mathilda de Montcabrier, heretic, 151
 McNamara, Jo Ann, 207
 Medicine, 41, 117, 134, 135–36, 262 n. 88
 Merlo, Grado, 6, 7, 57
 Montaillou, 19, 83, 102, 103, 104, 105, 123, 164, 181, 198, 202, 208, 233
 Montforte, 26, 55
 Montségur, 56, 82, 100, 101, 102, 136, 137, 139, 146, 149, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158
 Moore, Robert, 23, 24, 25, 241 n. 79
 Morris, Colin, 107–8
 Muir, Edward, 3, 233
 Murray, Alexander, 5, 7, 29, 90, 91, 101, 233 n. 1, 255 n. 126

Murray, Jacqueline, [276 n. 144](#)

Nairos, heretic, [74](#)

Narbonne, [34](#), [35](#), [39](#), [42](#), [44](#), [45](#), [58](#), [59](#), [82](#), [85](#), [90](#), [140](#)

Nelli, René, [207](#)

Nichols, Stephen, [203](#)

Niort, [129](#), [149](#), [152](#), [158](#)

Odo of Cluny, [247 n. 75](#)

Olivier de Termes, knight, [154](#)

Ong, Walter, [166](#)

Orality. *See* [Literacy](#)

Ordo Processus Narbonensis, [48](#), [49](#), [50–53](#), [57](#), [81](#), [99](#)

Orléans, [26](#), [63](#)

Orthodox piety, [29](#), [47](#), [53](#), [70](#), [71](#), [72](#), [73](#), [171](#), [178](#). *See also* [Baptism](#); [Confession \(sacramental\)](#); [Eucharist](#)

Pales-Gobilliard, Annette, [130](#), [261 n. 56](#)

Pamiers, [19](#), [103](#), [133](#), [164](#), [168](#), [169](#), [170](#), [190](#), [210–11](#), [215](#)

Peace, organized, [35](#), [38](#)

Peal, Ann, [154](#)

Pegg, Mark, [143](#), [234 n. 16](#), [237 n. 10](#), [259 n. 13](#), [263 n. 101](#)

Peirona Jean, [160](#)

Penance, [60–63](#). *See also* [Confession \(sacramental\)](#); [Inquisition](#), penances and punishments

Perjury, [54](#), [59](#), [61](#), [66](#), [67](#), [69](#), [177](#), [81](#), [89](#), [100](#)

Peter Abelard, [108](#), [109](#), [206](#)

Peter of Bruys, heretic, [23](#), [26](#)

Philippa de Lagleize, [203](#), [208](#)

Philippa de Mirepoix, [260 n. 40](#)

Philippa Vital, [83–86](#), [95–96](#)

Philippe de Larnat, [141](#)

Pierre Autier, of Ax-les-Thermes, heretic, [84](#), [149](#), [159](#), [165](#), [180](#), [183](#), [195](#)

Pierre Barta, heretic, [157](#)

Pierre Clergue of Montailou, [181–82](#), [198–203](#), [204](#), [208–12](#), [271 n. 43](#), [272 n. 70](#)

Pierre Daide, [136](#), [256 n. 135](#)

Pierre de Beauville, [127](#), [265 n. 153](#)

Pierre de Cabanial, [154](#)

Pierre de Cornelhan, [153](#)

Pierre de Flairan of Mirepoix, [156](#)

Pierre de la Caunes, [154](#)

Pierre de Laburat of Quié, priest, [181](#)

Pierre de Lace Oleiras, [153](#)

Pierre de Laurac, [162](#)

Pierre de Luzenac, [106](#)

Pierre de Maysheiac of Tarascon, [168](#)

Pierre de Mulcéon, [84](#)

Pierre de St. Michel, [129](#), [267 n. 197](#)

Pierre de Vaux-de-Cernay, [40](#), [140](#)

Pierre du Verdier, archdeacon of Majorque, [182](#)

Pierre Fogasset of Caraman, [256 n. 153](#)

Pierre Fournier of Surla, [256 n. 153](#)

Pierre Garsias of Toulouse, [106](#)

Pierre Geraud of Quié, [181](#)

Pierre Guillaume, [88](#)

Pierre Guillaume d'Arvigna, [150](#), [151](#)

Pierre Guiraud of Quié, [187](#)

Pierre Maury, [19–22](#)

Pierre Orre, [136](#)

Pierre Peyre of Quié, [180](#), [181](#)

Pierre Pictavin of Sorèze, [116–19](#), [159](#), [251 n. 54](#)

Pierre Pollan, heretic, [136](#)
 Pierre Raymond Boca, [160](#)
 Pierre Recort, friar, [215](#), [218](#), [220](#)
 Pierre Roger de Mirepoix, [82](#), [136](#), [137](#), [154](#), [155](#)
 Pierre Seila, inquisitor, [87](#), [153](#), [161](#)
 Pons Adhémar de Roudeille, [149](#)
 Pons Arnaud de Château-Verdun, [137](#)
 Pons de Parnac, inquisitor, [1](#), [83](#), [84](#), [85](#), [89](#), [272 n. 73](#)
 Pons Ramfred of Sorèze, [118](#)
Practica inquisitionis heretice pravitatis, [50](#), [53](#), [54](#), [56](#), [71](#), [77](#), [81](#), [89](#), [95](#), [97](#), [99](#), [100](#), [191](#). *See also*
 [Bernard Gui](#)
 Prostitution, [61](#), [66](#), [175](#), [178](#), [202](#), [205](#), [219](#), [220](#), [277 n. 151](#)
 Proverbs, [110](#), [168](#), [172](#), [190](#), [192](#), [193](#),
 Purgatory, [119](#), [271 n. 51](#)

Queste del Saint Graal, La, [144](#)
 Quié, [180](#), [183](#), [187](#), [188](#), [272 n. 65](#)

 Ralph Glaber, [25](#)
 Ramihdrus, heretic, [26](#)
 Rancière, Jacques, [122](#), [123](#), [226](#)
 Ranulphe de Plassac, inquisitor, [1](#), [83](#), [84](#), [85](#), [89](#), [251 n. 50](#)
 Rape, [71](#), [198](#), [200–201](#), [208](#), [275 n. 135](#)
 Raymond VII, count of Toulouse, [32](#), [34](#), [35](#), [38](#), [39](#), [56](#)
 Raymond Adémar, [128](#)
 Raymond Aiffre, [132](#)
 Raymond Bordier, [265 n. 152](#)
 Raymond Carabasse of Montolieu, heretic, [150](#), [263 n. 108](#)
 Raymond Clergue (a.k.a. Pathou) of Montaillou, [198](#), [200](#), [201](#), [208](#)
 Raymond David, heretic, [1](#)
 Raymond de Astanova, [133](#), [141](#)
 Raymond de Camis of Montxoy, [116](#), [118](#), [159](#)
 Raymond de Carlipac, [128](#), [135](#)
 Raymond de Costa, Waldensian, [161](#), [264 n. 131](#)
 Raymond de Cue, heretic, [102](#)
 Raymond de Laburat of Quié, [166](#), [180–90](#)
 Raymond de Mireval, [129](#)
 Raymond de Montcabrier, knight, [151](#)
 Raymond de Peñafort, [42](#), [44](#), [92](#)
 Raymond de Péreille, [136](#), [137](#)
 Raymond de St. Paul, [129](#)
 Raymond Donat, priest of Vaychis, [193](#)
 Raymond Frézat, priest of Quié, [183](#), [184](#), [188](#), [189](#)
 Raymond Garrigue of Puylaurens, [96](#)
 Raymond Hugo, [162](#)
 Raymond Imbert, heretic, [154](#)
 Raymond Isarn, [142](#)
 Raymond Jean of Abia, [88](#)
 Raymond Jordan, squire, [148](#)
 Raymond Matres, [267 n. 197](#)
 Raymond Maury of Montaillou, [104](#)
 Raymond Orre, [136](#)
 Raymond Peyre of Quié, [180](#), [181](#)
 Raymond Rociner of Sorèze, [141](#)
 Raymond Roussel of Prades, [198](#), [199](#), [200–204](#), [208](#), [209](#), [212](#)
 Raymond Sabatier, [195](#)
 Raymond Textor, [162](#)
 Raymond Trencavel, [32](#)
 Raymond Vayssière, [159](#), [173](#), [274 n. 105](#)

Reginald de Chartres, inquisitor, 85
 Renart the Fox, 191
 Richa Topina, 74, 79, 86
 Richards, Jeffrey, 215
 Ritual, 123–24, 154, 255 n. 135, 260 n. 22. *See also* Catharism, *consolamentum*, *melioramentum*
 Rivière-Cabaret, 74
 Rixende Baussan, heretic, 160
 Robert le Bougre, inquisitor, 80, 110
 Robert of Flamborough, 48, 91, 92, 223
Roman de la Rose, 143
 Roquebert, Michel, 149
 Roquefort, 153, 198
 Rubea Ceteratz, 134
 Ruggerio, Guido, 3, 233
 Rusconi, Roberto, 73

 Saissac, 142
 Saracens (Islam), 174, 181, 188, 195, 196
 Schmidt, Charles, 5
 Scott, James C., 269 n. 7
 Serena de Château-Verdun, 161
 Sexuality, 109, 175, 178, 196, 197–225. *See also* Sodomy
 Smith, Robert, 205, 211, 212
 Social order, 187–89, 273 n. 96
 Sodomy, 214–25
 Sorèze, 116–18, 141, 142, 160
 Southern, Richard, 107
Statutes of Raymond VII (1229), 35, 38–39
 Stephan de Gâtines, inquisitor, 85
 Stephan de Prades, 156
 Stephan Massa, 153
 Stephane de Proaude, 95
 Stephanie Ricard, 160
 Stock, Brian, 23, 125
 Subaltern, 4, 10, 113, 167, 227, 275 n. 134
 Subjectivity, 8, 12–13, 14, 22, 49, 51, 57, 62, 65, 71–73, 76–77, 92–93, 98–110, 114–15, 120, 170–71, 199–200, 210–14, 224–25, 226. *See also* Discourse; Individuality
 Suicide, 2. *See also* Catharism, *endura*

 Tanchelm, heretic, 26
 Tarascon, 167–71, 183, 192, 269 n. 17
 Tentler, Thomas, 92, 93
 Thomas Aquinas, 28, 77
 Thompson, Edward P., 122
 Tithes, 73, 180, 183, 184–85, 187, 188, 193
 Torture, 6, 31, 94, 100, 255 n. 120
 Toulouse, 1, 3, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 48, 51, 58, 70, 81, 83, 86, 88, 89, 106, 134, 135, 137, 149, 153, 233

 Ugo Amiel, inquisitor, 84, 148
 Unac, 190
 Usury, 55, 61, 71, 100, 134

 Vail, Leroy, 166
 Varilhes, 198, 199, 210
 Vauchez, André, 73
Vergentis in senium (1199), 31
 Vernacular. *See* Literacy
 Vigoroux de la Baconne, heretic, 151
 Villemur, 148

Wakefield, Walter, [135](#), [244](#) n. 19, [254](#) n. 113
Waldensians, [42](#), [54](#), [102](#), [153](#), [161](#), [163](#)
Wazo, bishop of Liège, [19](#), [24](#), [27](#), [28](#), [64](#)
White, Landeg, [166](#)

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